JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 22 SESS: 25 OUTPUT: Thu Jun 21 09:59:04 2007
/orchid2/orchid2/267/80215/slipops
Wilton sells the imported merchandise at issue (described in
greater detail below) as seasonal goods, and as goods associated with
certain special occasions. All of the merchandise is imported and sold
only in conjunction with holidays or other special occasions. Many of
1145, 1151 (7
th
Cir. 1989). Nor has the Government ‘‘produce[d] any evidence to specifically
cast doubt on [the affiant’s] credibility.’’ Id.; see generally Pl.’s Supp. Brief at 12–13.
At the eleventh hour (in the course of supplemental briefing), the parties have traded
barbs as to matters such as their respective evidentiary burdens and the effect of the pre-
sumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (2000) (presumption of correctness).
Wilton argues that ‘‘once the plaintiff has provided a prima facie case, the government has
an obligation to provide its own evidentiary support for its claims that plaintiff ’s merchan-
dise is not entitled to classification under Heading 9505.’’ See generally Pl.’s Supp. Brief at
9–12. Wilton emphasizes: ‘‘[The Government] has not provided any factual evidence that
the subject merchandise should not be classified under Heading 9505. It has simply criti-
cized every aspect of [Wilton’s] evidence and stated that whatever has been provided is not
enough.’’ See Pl.’s Supp. Reply Brief at 5–6.
The Government argues – for the first time in its Supplemental Brief – that it ‘‘is not
required to produce evidence,’’ because, it asserts, ‘‘Wilton has failed to meet its burden of
contradicting Customs’ presumptively correct factual finding that the imported articles are
not ‘festive articles.’ ’’ See Def.’s Supp. Brief at 15–16 (quoting Saab Cars USA, Inc. v.
United States, 434 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
In briefing these points, however, neither party has adequately addressed the interplay
of all relevant principles and doctrines. For example, the Government fails to acknowledge
that the parties are in agreement that no material facts are in dispute. See, e.g., Pl.’s Brief
at 13; Def.’s Brief at 2, 4, 6. And the statutory presumption of correctness attaches only to
Customs’ factual findings. Thus, where – as here – there are no disputes of material fact,
the presumption of correctness has no practical effect. See, e.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v.
United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803)); id.(citing Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505, 508 (Fed. Cir.
1995)) (‘‘[W]e conclude that although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate
classification decision, [plaintiff] properly interprets Goodman as standing for the proposi-
tion that, as a practical matter, the presumption carries no force as to questions of law.’’).
As Wilton emphasizes, the Government similarly fails to acknowledge that it has cross-
moved for summary judgment, and ignores the implications of that fact. See Pl.’s Supp. Re-
ply Brief at 6. It is one thing for a party to defeat a movant’s motion for summary judgment;
it is something else entirely to prevail as cross-movant.
Finally, Saab – on which the Government seeks to rely heavily – was not a classification
case, and is thus distinguishable from the case at bar. See Saab, 434 F.3d at 1368. In classi-
fication cases, the Court has an independent obligation under Jarvis Clark to ascertain the
proper classification of merchandise in dispute. See Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733
F.2d 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1984). And, as officers of the court, counsel have a duty to assist the
Court in that function. Even if Wilton had not made out a prima facie case for ‘‘festive ar-
ticles’’ classification of any of its merchandise, neither party has argued that the Court
would somehow be relieved of its Jarvis Clark obligation (and that the Government could
somehow, in essence, prevail on its cross-motion by default).
Fortunately, there is no need to definitively resolve such issues here. Notwithstanding
their posturing, the parties have steadfastly maintained throughout the course of litigation
– despite countless opportunities to indicate to the contrary (before, during, and after oral
argument) – that there are no disputes of material fact which would preclude summary
judgment in favor of either party. And, although the existing evidentiary record is thin on a
number of points, and does not afford the pristine basis for summary judgment that would
be optimal (and which a court is certainly entitled to expect), it is also abundantly clear that
a trial would serve no real purpose in this matter. See, e.g., Pl.’s Brief at 13 (stating that
‘‘[t]here is no genuine dispute of material fact’’); Def.’s Brief at 2 (noting that ‘‘[t]here is no
dispute between the parties regarding what the merchandise is or how it is actually used’’),
4 (‘‘Summary judgment is proper as there are no material facts in dispute.’’), 6 (‘‘Inasmuch
as the parties agree as to what the merchandise is and how it is used, this action is ripe for
summary judgment.’’).
78
CUSTOMS BULLETIN AND DECISIONS, VOL. 41, NO. 27, JUNE 27, 2007