Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
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CHAPTER 10
Rising Interests in the Persian Gulf
The 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo catapulted the Persian Gulf to the top of the U.S. national
security agenda. Major oil-producing Arab countries imposed the embargo to punish the United
States for supporting Israel during the October War. In Washington, U.S. officials were
concerned about the embargo’s short and long-term impact of oil shortages. “What we are
talking about,” Exxon board chairman John Kenneth “Ken” Jamieson warned Secretary
Kissinger, Deputy Defense Secretary Clements, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, on
October 26, 1973, “is the possible breakdown of the [U.S.] economy.” Clements, a former Texas
oil man, agreed: “This could be a true disaster.”
The embargo abruptly introduced much of the
American public to the growing U.S. dependency on Arab oil, as gas prices quadrupled, lines
stretched for blocks to fill fuel tanks, and the government implemented new rules about which
days of the week gas could be purchased. Over time, the embargo contributed to a period of
economic turmoil in the United States not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s,
including soaring inflation, rising unemployment, and a shrinking gross domestic product.
1
The oil embargo quickly affected the U.S. defense community. The Defense Department
depended on a reliable supply of Persian Gulf oil to fuel activities across the globe—and to
maintain U.S. military readiness at home. A DoD paper prepared for President Nixon’s Cabinet
Task Force on Oil Import Control in October 1969 called oil a “strategic material and one of the
few items that is absolutely essential and foremost in the minds of military commanders” and as
vital as weapons and ammunition. It assessed that approximately 65 percent of the petroleum
required for the war in Southeast Asia came from the Gulf region, with another 25 percent
coming from the Caribbean and other nearby sources, and 10 percent from the United States.
2
By
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October 1970 an NSC Review Group calculated that the Persian Gulf countries were supplying
89 percent of the oil used by U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific,
including Japan, also depended heavily on Gulf oil, which provided for 55 percent of Western
Europe’s needs and 90 percent of Japan’s. The DoD report prepared for the Review Group
summarized the implications for the United States in stark terms: “The very chance of success or
failure in any conflict hinges on oil.”
3
The U.S. approach to the Persian Gulf region changed during the Nixon-Ford era. The
British withdrawal from the area in the late 1960s opened the door to greater U.S. involvement.
At the beginning of the 1973 crisis, Secretary Schlesinger proposed seizing Gulf oil fields, an
indication of the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the U.S. military. Logistical and political
challenges rendered the concept impractical. Schlesinger nevertheless persuaded Congress to
enlarge the U.S. military presence in the region. Working from new military facilities on Diego
Garcia, U.S. power would be on display for Gulf oil-producing states, and for the Soviets, and
would enhance the U.S. ability to respond with force to future crises. As the Defense Department
expanded its military footprint, it also managed complex relationships with Saudi Arabia and
Iran, the Gulf area’s major U.S.-allied states. President Nixon’s so-called “twin pillars” policy,
relying on Saudi Arabia and Iran to advance U.S. security interests in the region, swung into high
gear after the oil crisis. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the DoD was a driving force in the
development of broad, tightly knit U.S.-Saudi security alliance. Yet when it came to Iran, the
Pentagon did not want the Shah to have unfettered access to all nonnuclear American arms and
technology—a position that put senior Defense leaders at odds with President Nixon and
Secretary Kissinger. The U.S. government’s handling of Iran—and other regional challenges
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during the Nixon-Ford years—shaped U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf during the
decades that followed.
4
View on the Eve of the Crisis
By the beginning of the second Nixon administration in January 1973, the United States had long
been accustomed to playing a limited, subordinate role in Persian Gulf security affairs. For
decades Washington had relied on London to safeguard common security interests there, as
Britain’s global empire included political protection agreements, military bases, and major
economic ties in the Gulf. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in January
1968 that his government would withdraw its military forces from east of the Suez Canal by
1971, Washington made a conscious decision to avoid assuming the former British
commitments. Neither the Lyndon B. Johnson administration nor the Nixon administration, in its
first term, wanted or intended to replace America’s close ally as the region’s superpower.
Two dynamics weighed in favor of continuity as President Nixon entered his second
term. Americans suffered war fatigue as U.S. military involvement in Vietnam ended. Neither
Congress nor the American public had any appetite for expanding military commitments to a
new region. Also, as the Soviet threat evolved, U.S. officials focused on NATO commitments in
Europe. Thus, it was not surprising when Nixon’s first defense secretary, Elliot Richardson, told
British Defense Secretary Lord Carrington in April 1973 that Washington considered it
important for London to maintain its influence in the Persian Gulf.
5
The Department of Defense
did not want to expand the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf.
Nonetheless, U.S. interests in Gulf oil resources and in checking Soviet influence in the
region required a policy response. Washington turned to its political allies, the Shah of Iran and
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to a lesser extent the al-Saud rulers of Saudi Arabia. During summer 1973, President Nixon
hosted the Shah for a lavish state dinner to strengthen bilateral relations. The president sought a
new equilibrium between wealthy American oil companies and the oil-producing states that had
granted them concessions.
6
These efforts paralleled moves the president had made on the
domestic front as U.S. vulnerability to oil shocks reached emergency proportions. In April he
had delivered a special message to Congress on U.S. energy policy, supporting the development
of domestic resources like nuclear energy, coal, oil, and natural gas, launching an energy
conservation program, and reorganizing the federal government to better address energy issues.
7
The previous month Nixon had directed an interagency study group, which included the DoD, to
assess the security implications of global energy supply and distribution. One prescient area to be
studied was how to mitigate the potential impact of reductions in foreign oil supplies, including a
decrease due to boycotts by producer nations. On the transmittal sheet attached to JCS Chairman
Admiral Moorer’s copy of the presidential directive, the military assistant to the defense
secretary, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy wrote, “Very important subject. All major future wars
will be fought over, for and about energy sources (primarily oil).” Moorer signaled this point’s
significance by placing a large checkmark next to this comment.
8
Before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (see chapter 8), the Defense Department and the U.S.
intelligence community believed Arab-Israeli tensions might have disturbing energy implications
for the United States. Defense maintained that oil could be used as a weapon by foreign
suppliers, including countries with which the United States had friendly relations. A decision by
a friendly country to deny the United States oil could be “just as final as the destruction of those
[oil] sources” by an enemy country, the department assessed. The “most severe test” of the DoD
petroleum procurement system to date had been the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the study observed. A
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1970 a national intelligence estimate (NIE) judged that the chance of an Arab oil embargo would
be high in any future Arab-Israeli conflict: “In the event of a resumption of Arab-Israeli
hostilities, some interruption of oil shipments seems almost certain.”
9
During spring and summer 1973 Saudi leaders, including King Faisal ibn Abdul al-Aziz
al-Saud and Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that Saudi
Arabia would restrict oil exports if progress were not made toward an Arab-Israeli political
settlement. In April, Schlesinger, then director of the CIA, told President Nixon, “The Saudis are
raising the prospect of a cutoff in oil supplies in an effort to induce the U.S. to push harder for a
peace settlement in the Middle East.” Schlesinger was quite aware of the Arab oil supply
problem by the time he informally assumed the role of defense secretary following Elliot
Richardson’s appointment to attorney general in May.
10
By June 1973 another NIE assessed that “the increasing importance of Gulf oil, coupled
with Arab frustration over the impasse with Israel, raises the specter of oil being used for
political purposes—something occasionally threatened but not attempted on a large scale
before.” The study continued, “A major intensification of the crisis in Arab-Israeli affairs” could
lead to a situation in which the Gulf states “would all feel compelled to take actions against the
U.S., which they regard as Tel Aviv’s principal ally.… It would not be as easy for the U.S. to
ride out this storm as it was in the past.”
11
In August the draft interagency study that President Nixon had ordered in March
provided little comfort. It projected an increasing U.S. dependence on imported oil, from nearly
one-third at the time to almost 60 percent by 1985. Moreover, the study foresaw there would be
significant increases in global demand for oil that could be met only by rapidly expanding
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Middle East production. It assessed that Saudi Arabia would hold the key to meeting world
production requirements through 1980.
12
When the study group convened several days later to discuss the next steps, there was
general agreement that the United Stated needed a “major national effort to expand domestic
supplies of energy” to reverse America’s increasing dependence on Gulf oil. Activities on the
domestic front, officials concluded, were utterly insufficient. In September, President Nixon sent
a special message to Congress on national legislative goals, including energy matters. Congress
must act on proposals to increasing domestic energy production, he warned, or prospects for the
future “could be very dangerous…We will be at the mercy of the producers of oil in the
Mideast.”
13
Thus, by early October, on the eve of the embargo, there were concerns at the highest
levels of government, including in the DoD, about America’s growing dependency on Gulf oil
and its vulnerability to foreign restrictions on oil supplies. Interagency assessments indicated that
fresh Arab-Israeli hostilities might trigger an oil crisis of some sort. Secretaries Schlesinger and
Kissinger even entertained contingency plans with the Shah for securing Gulf oil as required by
regional circumstances. Even so, the eruption of the Arab-Israeli war in October still caught
Washington by surprise, as did the far-reaching oil embargo that followed. The United States had
few military options in place to respond to the crisis.
14
Immediate Responses
Washington generally failed to predict war would break out between Israel and its Arab
neighbors during the fall of 1973. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
was a lone voice in warning that spring that there was a “better than even bet” of war between
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Egypt and Israel by autumn. In late September the NSA reported that a sudden intensification of
military signals indicated war could be imminent, but this warning was largely ignored by U.S.
officials. Egypt and Syria chose the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, which fell on October 6 that
calendar year, to conduct a surprise attack on Israel. The Department of Defense began airlifting
military supplies to Israel the following week.
15
Secretary Schlesinger and others in the administration understood that providing support
to Israel’s war effort would jeopardize the United States’ existing relationships with the Arab
states in the Gulf region. During discussions at the White House on October 9 about whether and
how to resupply Israel, Schlesinger acknowledged that “if we seem to turn around a battle that
the Arabs are winning, we are in trouble.”
16
The next day he told Kissinger on the telephone,
“We may be faced with the choice that lies cruelly between support of Israel [and the] loss of
Saudi Arabia.”
17
In his diary, Admiral Moorer recorded a somber prediction, “We are headed
downhill on a toboggan that will drive a permanent wedge between the United States and the oil-
exporting Arab states.”
18
Oil ministers in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
or OPEC, happened to be meeting in Kuwait just days after the first American CA-5 transport
plane arrived in Israel with U.S. supplies. On October 17, OPEC’s Arab members agreed to
reduce oil production by 5 percent each month. Some countries announced they would start
reducing production by 10 percent, and others, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and
Kuwait, announced a complete embargo on oil exports to the United States. Saudi Arabia
initially rejected the idea of a total embargo but changed course after President Nixon proposed a
$2.2 billion military aid package for Israel, a sum intended to match the Soviet Union’s massive
resupply effort for Egypt. On October 20 the Kingdom announced it was cutting off all oil
shipments to the United States. Other countries that had not yet instituted an embargo followed
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suit. Saudi Arabia soon extended the ban to include fuel deliveries to the U.S. military and
insisted that the major oil companies, such as Aramco and Exxon, cooperate or face
nationalization. Arab embargos also were imposed on the Netherlands, Portugal, and South
Africa for their own roles in providing direct or indirect support to Israel during the war.
19
Washington lacked military options to end the embargo. Importantly, the United States
had no combat-ready military forces in the area. The only permanent American military presence
was a naval task force established in 1948 that evolved into a command designated Middle East
Force (MEF) in 1949. Based on the small island state of Bahrain, it included one command ship
and two destroyers and was set up neither for combat nor requisite logistics support. In fact, the
MEF’s primary purpose was to help build and sustain diplomatic relations with regional states,
and to show U.S. interest in the region. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt later
referred to the force as “too small to give us any significant military capability.”
20
Moreover,
while the U.S. military services enjoyed close relationships with their Iranian and Saudi
counterparts, Washington did not have military assets positioned inside either country that it
could use to display U.S. power in relation to the embargo. American military resources in the
two large Gulf allies consisted mostly of advisers and trainers who supported local armed forces
and their use of American-made weaponry.
Absent local options, on October 28 Admiral Moorer ordered the aircraft carrier USS
Hancock to cruise from the Pacific toward the Arabian Sea. In congressional testimony he
described its mission there as providing a “visible demonstration of U.S. presence and
interest.”
21
Zumwalt had wished to keep the Hancock in the Pacific, and instead augment the
Middle East Force to respond to the new developments in the Gulf region. He understood that
sending aircraft carriers toward the Gulf “taxed our logistics support capabilities to the absolute
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limit requiring a significant reduction in our ability to support our forces in other key areas, such
as the Western Pacific.”
22
However, Secretary Schlesinger was intent on displaying more U.S.
power near the Arabian Peninsula’s vast oil resources. “Our problem is lack of respect for [the]
U.S.” in the region, the defense secretary told Chairman Moorer on October 26. “If we show
some force in this area, [we will] earn respect, [and if] the American public gets cold this winter,
[there will be] less sympathy for [the] little sheikhs.” Three weeks later the secretary affirmed
that “power will move to those who control [the] energy supply.”
23
In early December, Secretary Schlesinger announced that after the scheduled departure of
the Hancock, another task group from the Pacific Fleet, including the carrier USS Oriskany,
would take up position near the Gulf peninsula. Moreover, he proclaimed that in the future, the
Navy would establish a “pattern of regular visits into the Indian Ocean” and that “we expect that
our presence there will be more frequent…than in the past.”
24
Task groups led by the USS
Oriskany, USS Bainbridge, and USS Kitty Hawk remained in the Indian Ocean until April 1974.
An interagency study later would assess that, given these new naval deployments, “the Arab
states could not ignore the possibility that we might at some future time be driven to react with
force.”
25
As Schlesinger expanded the U.S. naval presence around the Gulf, he also considered a
more dramatic option to help guarantee reliable supplies of oil for the United States and its allies:
a U.S. military takeover of certain oil fields. The secretary had signaled his thinking more than a
month before the start of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Amid Saudi oil threats and Libya’s
nationalization of its oil industry he told Kissinger that should the need arise “The Iranians could
take Kuwait but not cross the Gulf.”
26
Only U.S. forces could do that. Days after the outbreak of
the October war, Schlesinger again aired with Kissinger the idea of a military takeover: “If
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interests in the Middle East are at risk,” the United States may be faced with a choice between
“occupation or watching them go down the drain.”
27
Although the secretary was a primary
proponent of developing such contingency plans, he did not view U.S. occupation as a likely
scenario. Schlesinger acknowledged on October 29, after the Arab-Israeli cease-fire had been
achieved, that the United States still had the “oil problem” in the Middle East: “Maybe [we
should develop a] contingency plan to occupy [the] crucial states…. [I’m] not saying [we] will
ever do this—but maybe 10% if diplomacy fails.”
28
Schlesinger was drawn to the idea of an amphibious assault on Abu Dhabi involving U.S.
Marines. At that time the newly formed, oil-rich UAE was “a collection of small, traditional
communities largely lacking central governmental institutions,” as described by a June 1973
NIE.
29
Admiral Moorer considered Abu Dhabi the “most feasible … rather the least unattractive”
option in the Persian Gulf.
30
“Abu Dhabi would give us what we want,” Schlesinger told
Kissinger.
31
“We have been talking about using the Marines,” he said.
32
Years later, Schlesinger
would recall in an interview that this was not only talk: “I was prepared to seize Abu Dhabi.
Something small. But nothing big. No, it wasn’t just bravado.”
33
For his part, Kissinger (dual-hatted since early September as national security adviser and
secretary of state) initially expressed disdain for the idea of using U.S. troops to secure Gulf oil
fields. When White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig told him during a telephone call on
October 27 that Schlesinger had mentioned “putting troops in crucial states to get oil,” Kissinger
replied: “He is insane…I do not think we can survive with these fellows in there at Defense—
they are crazy.”
34
However, Kissinger quickly warmed to the idea of military action as a viable
option for countering the embargo. For the secretary of state, it was the prospect of economic
“strangulation” of the industrialized world that would prompt U.S. military action.
35
“Let’s work
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out a plan for grabbing some Middle East oil if we want,” he suggested in early November.
36
Several weeks later Kissinger asked at a White House meeting, “Can’t we overthrow one of the
sheikhs just to show that we can do it?”
37
Kissinger also came to regard the threat of force as a
useful political tool. During a November 21 press conference, he subtly floated the idea of a
possible military response to the embargo: “If pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely,
then the United States will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take.” He
added: “We would do this with enormous reluctance, and we are still hopeful that matters will
not reach this point.”
38
In his memoirs, he recalled: “These were not empty threats.”
39
Secretary Schlesinger’s interest in military options against Gulf oil fields caused tension
with some of the United States’ European allies. In early November the secretary shared his
rationale with members of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. There, he communicated to
Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl, British Defense Minister Lord Peter Carrington, and
German Defense Minister Georg Leber that “the United States did not intend to be driven to the
wall in this situation.” He further told Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel that “we want it
clearly understood that while Washington was not advertising its position, “we will not tolerate
this kind of blackmail and it would be most helpful if our partners were not so willing to pay
it.”
40
British ambassador to the United States George Rowland Stanley Baring, Earl of Cromer,
met with Schlesinger in Washington on November 15 to express London’s concern and defend
its own regional policy. Afterward the ambassador reported that Schlesinger had said that British
and European “overt acquiescence in Arab bullying” was setting a dangerous precedent. “It was
no longer obvious to him,” Cromer recalled the defense secretary saying, “that the U.S. could not
use force. An interesting outcome of the Middle East crisis was that the notion of the
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industrialized nations being continuously submitted to whims of the underpopulated, under-
developed countries, particularly of the Middle East, might well change public perceptions about
the use of the power that was available to the U.S. and the Alliance.”
41
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other uniformed officers were concerned
about the consequences of military action on the Arabian Peninsula. There was not sufficient
logistical support available to U.S. forces to hold territory and extract oil over time. Furthermore,
it would take time to move forces into position for such a campaign. “I am working up options,”
Admiral Moorer told Secretary Kissinger in late October.
42
However, even by January 1974,
when Kissinger asked Schlesinger if he had “a contingency plan for the Middle East,” the
defense secretary replied “a piss-poor one.” Moorer added that the JCS did not yet have firm
plans.
43
DoD was waiting for London to agree to more comprehensive use of the British Indian
Ocean island of Diego Garcia as a logistical base for any extensive U.S. operation on the Arabian
Peninsula.
The October 1973 war concluded 20 days after it had begun. However, the Arab embargo
endured for five months, finally ending after Kissinger negotiated an Israeli-Egyptian
disengagement agreement, and when an Israeli-Syrian arrangement was on the horizon. The
United States did not employ military force to seize oil fields, but the crisis confirmed the
importance of military force to the protection of U.S. energy interests in the region. With the
immediate crisis behind it, the U.S. government and DoD leadership turned attention to building
a new security relationship with a key actor of the embargo—Saudi Arabia—so that another oil
crisis could be averted.
Deepening Ties with Saudi Arabia
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The 1973 embargo brought the new political clout of young oil-producing nations in the Gulf
region into sharp relief, and demonstrated their growing power vis-à-vis militarily strong oil-
consuming nations. If Washington were to secure reliable access to the Gulf peninsula’s massive
oil resources, it would need a new approach to these countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which
according to a 1973 NIE study would be the single most important supplier for the United States
and its allies at least through 1980.
44
President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal and Prince Fahd
worked together to bring the oil embargo to an end in March 1974. From DoD’s perspective, it
was important during negotiations that U.S. diplomats not give concessions to Riyadh for lifting
the embargo. However, during the weeks immediately prior to an agreement, Kissinger sought to
promote a new expanded bilateral relationship with the Saudis, particularly in security and
economic affairs. He viewed closer bilateral relations first and foremost as giving Washington
greater influence over the price of Saudi oil.
45
Despite the possible appearance of U.S.
concessions, the DoD also supported a tighter security relationship with the Kingdom. In
February 1974, one month before the embargo ended, Admiral Moorer had laid out an argument
for closer bilateral ties in a memorandum to Secretary Schlesinger regarding new basing and
facility requirements in the region. The Chairman argued that maintaining access to vital oil
resources in the Gulf would hinge upon the United States displaying an unmistakable resolve to
oppose threats to regional stability and develop “relationships of mutual respect” with the Arab
oil countries.
46
He believed “Arab nations should be provided an alternate to the presence and
assistance of the USSR.” The United States could achieve this goal by ensuring access to high-
quality, professional U.S. military assistance via advisory groups, defense attachés, engineers,
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trainers, and technical teams. The JCS chairman also recommended expanded exchange
programs and orientation tours. These program, Moorer urged, should receive high priority.
47
From Schlesinger’s perspective, developing closer strategic ties with the Kingdom would
help thwart Soviet influence in the Gulf and maintain stability and access to oil on the Arabian
Peninsula. For their part, the Saudis shared the U.S. view of the Soviet Union as the principal
menace to the peninsula’s stability and security, and they welcomed additional assistance in
hindering Soviet influence with socialist leaders in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY) and with the Baathist government of neighboring Iraq.
48
Strongly supporting State
Department and DoD interests, Secretary of the Treasury William Simon saw deeper relations
with Riyadh as being economically advantageous to the United States. The quadrupling of oil
prices since the embargo meant Saudi Arabia possessed substantial new wealth. From 1973 to
1974 the Kingdom had seen its oil earnings jump from $8.5 billion to $35 billion. Saudi
purchases of American weaponry, along with commercial and public-sector investment in the
United States, could aid the faltering U.S. economy. Saudi military purchases and financial
investments would help “recoup” U.S. dollars lost to higher oil prices in the post-embargo era.
Moreover, tying Riyadh’s economic future to that of Washington would contribute to preventing
another Saudi oil embargo: under the new circumstances, if the U.S. economy were to slump due
to an oil embargo, Saudi Arabia’s economic interests would suffer as well.
49
King Faisal was highly enthusiastic about the planned upgrade in bilateral defense
relations. With a modern military and security apparatus, he believed, the Kingdom would be
better positioned to achieve its rightful role as leader of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Upon
Riyadh’s request, DoD began preparing for an extensive survey of Saudi defense needs in April
1974—almost immediately after the embargo ended. Completed in September, the survey
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proposed major increases in the amount of military equipment and technical assistance provided
to Saudi armed forces.
50
Secretary Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary Clements, Admiral Moorer,
and other Defense officials met with Prince Fahd during his June 1974 visit to Washington to
discuss security cooperation. Schlesinger explained two aspects of future cooperation on military
matters: one concerned the broader strategic situation in the Middle East (i.e., deterring Soviet
aggression and maintaining stability) and the other having to do with the forces, doctrine,
training, and hardware needed to strengthen Saudi armed forces. Schlesinger noted that DoD was
prepared to train large numbers of Saudi personnel in the United States and Saudi Arabia, as
Riyadh wished.
51
For his part, Prince Fahd emphasized that the Kingdom sought to strengthen its
forces only for defensive purposes, and would not be seeking to do so had the Soviet Union not
“tak[en] advantage of certain ‘open doors and windows’” and started “showering arms upon the
PDRY and Iraq.” The meeting signaled that Schlesinger and Prince Fahd were on the same page
about countering the Soviet threat to stability in the Gulf.
52
Although both countries were eager to expand military cooperation, they faced several
challenges from the outset. The Saudis thought Washington moved far too slowly to meet their
defense needs. During his Washington visit, Prince Fahd had asked the United States to expedite
40 foreign military sale (FMS) cases. Five months later, In November, Saudi adviser Prince
Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud delivered a message from King Faisal to Secretary
Schlesinger: “Please emphasize to our friends in the United States, our urgent need for them to
meet our military requests which we regard as important.”
53
In part, the U.S.-Saudi disconnect
was over the time it took to consider, approve, and deliver defense items given the bureaucratic
differences between the two countries. On the U.S. side, Saudi requests were filtered through
multiple agencies in the large federal bureaucracy, a process quite different from the more
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16
immediate decision-making characteristic of the Saudi system. Nevertheless, DoD tried to
address Saudi concerns as the security relationship developed. In response to Riyadh’s
grievances, Schlesinger requested a status report on outstanding FMS cases and brought Brig.
Gen. John G. Hill Jr., chief of the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, to Washington
in early October to discuss how best to implement the DoD surveys. The Specialist Team itself
would go to Saudi Arabia in late October to address the status of outstanding FMS cases,
problems in ongoing programs, and plans for implementing the recommendations in the DoD
survey. In mid-November Assistant Secretary (ISA) Robert Ellsworth traveled to Saudi Arabia
for meetings of the new U.S.-Saudi bilateral security commission.
54
Throughout, Defense
officials worked to ensure the Saudis could readily absorb U.S. assistance. Too much aid too
quickly, they believed, would create problems for Saudi forces. While reaffirming the U.S.
commitment to strengthening the Saudi military, Schlesinger and Clements raised these concerns
Prince Turki in November 1974. Although Turki accepted the explanation, the pace of deliveries
remained problematic for both sides.
55
Cultural difference likewise created challenges for U.S. and Saudi security forces. In
February 1975, for example, the DoD subcontracted a $77 million program to Vinnell
Corporation to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). In DIA’s judgment, the guard
was “almost totally lacking in military managerial capabilities … organizationally primitive, and
… plagued by the almost total illiteracy rate of the Bedouins in the Guard.”
56
The Vinnell
contract was the first of its kind awarded to a private American company. To perform the work,
Vinnell sought to recruit former U.S. Special Forces soldiers and other war veterans for a 1,000-
person mission to send to Saudi Arabia. However, the original contract prohibited Vinnell from
employing women and individuals from countries (such as Israel) not recognized by Riyadh, as
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
17
well as individuals with personal contacts or interests in countries not recognized by Saudi
Arabia—a category that included Jewish Americans. The exclusionary clauses caused an uproar
when they became public, especially in Congress. The Pentagon informed Vinnell that the
contract was illegal in its original form, and had the offending clauses struck from the document.
President Ford himself ordered additional measures to counter discriminatory practices, requiring
federal agencies to inform State of any visa rejections linked to the exclusionary policies of a
host nation regarding race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or age. Ford’s initiative, however,
upset Riyadh, which threatened to turn to other weapon suppliers.
57
Other tensions permeated the bilateral relationship, as well. In the wake of the embargo,
Secretaries Schlesinger and Kissinger privately continued to consider military action against oil-
rich Gulf states as a viable option if another energy crisis occurred. In August 1974, five months
after the embargo had been lifted, Schlesinger suggested that “we might have to seize Abu
Dhabi” in a future crisis and said he “may put some Marines in the Indian Ocean” at Diego
Garcia for this purpose. Kissinger responded that seizing Abu Dhabi should be planned for, and
wondered if the U.S. military had contingency plans for both Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.
58
When hints of what the United States was considering were aired publicly, they caused great
offense to the Saudis and to the smaller Gulf states. Schlesinger made a series of public remarks
along these lines during the spring of 1975. On May 18, during the ABC television program
Issues and Answers, the secretary said the United States would use “political, economic and even
military means” to avoid another oil boycott. Days later, when asked by a U.S. News and World
Report interviewer what being “less tolerant” of a renewed oil embargo might mean, the
secretary responded he would not “indicate any prospective reaction other than to point out there
are economic, political, or conceivably military measures in response.”
59
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
18
Immediately following these remarks, Prince Fahd turned down an invitation to visit
President Ford in Washington on July 10, 1975, and asked that the trip be postponed indefinitely.
Deputy National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, noted in a May 21 telegram to Kissinger that
the Prince’s delay of his visit “may have been linked” to the defense secretary’s comments in the
press.
60
After several exchanges with the U.S. embassy in Riyadh about how to handle the
situation, Kissinger asked the U.S. ambassador there to convey the following message in person
to King Khalid and Prince Fahd: “It is not our policy to threaten our Arab friends…. Our policy
is to work cooperatively to strengthen our bilateral relations and to resolve in that spirit any
differences between us.”
61
Schlesinger’s successor as defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, refrained from
public discussion of U.S. contingency plans in the Persian Gulf and generally took a more
dispassionate view of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. When asked during his November 1975
confirmation hearing about major arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Rumsfeld coolly remarked on the
long history of U.S. security ties with both Riyadh and Tehran and the overall strategy of
encouraging regional states “to take the lead in assuring the security of the area.”
62
Even 10
months later, when Assistant Defense Secretary (ISA) Eugene McAuliffe told Rumsfeld that
that sending Deputy Secretary Clements as his representative to a Saudi military ceremony
might give Riyadh some much needed assurances about the steadfastness of U.S. support,
the secretary responded “Gene, you decide and handle it.”
63
However, like Schlesinger,
Rumsfeld viewed U.S.-Saudi security ties primarily through the prism of the Cold War and
recognized the importance of securing vital oil supplies for the United States and its closest
allies. But the arms sales central to the bilateral relationship ran into opposition in congress.
During a July 1976 visit to Washington, Second Deputy Prime Minister and SANG
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
19
Commander Prince Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud remarked to Secretary Rumsfeld that
while the Saudis realized the United States was firmly anticommunist, they “would very
much like to see some tangible evidence of [U.S.] intentions” in the form of greater military
assistance to anticommunist governments like Saudi Arabia. Abdullah thought “the
American Congress is to blame” for the lack of forward movement on arms purchases.
Rumsfeld responded that President Ford was committed to countering the Soviet threat in
the Gulf region and noted that the mood of congress was improving.
64
An ISA brief prepared for Secretary Rumsfeld in advance of Minister of Foreign
Affairs Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud’s U.S. visit that September echoed
Saudi frustrations. Despite the DoD’s view of the Saudi requests as “justified and
reasonable,” the State Department and White House reduced the quantities of munitions
approved, following consultations with congressional leaders.
65
The American public also
was skeptical about major arms sales to the Gulf. Rumsfeld explained to President Elect
Jimmy Carter in January 1977 that the process for assessing Saudi (and Iranian) weapon
requests “currently in effect, was not bad, but did not seem to make much sense to the
American people.”
66
Toward the end of the Ford administration, officials sorted out many of the initial
challenges in the U.S.-Saudi defense relationship. In March 1976, Acting Assistant Secretary
Amos Jordan visited Saudi Arabia and reported finding an atmosphere “more harmonious and
less abrasive than has been the case for several years.” The assistance programs had greatly
improved from both countries’ perspectives. Jordan saw good results from the F–5E program,
training exercises by combined forces, and work by the U.S. Army Transportation Corps to
improve conditions at Saudi seaports on the Red Sea (Jidda) and the Persian Gulf (Damman).
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
20
Two months later Washington and Riyadh concluded a $1.4 billion deal to equip two Saudi
mechanized brigades with M60 tanks, M113 armored personnel carriers, and the TOW antitank
missile system.
67
A paper prepared for President-elect Jimmy Carter’s transition team in early 1977
described the defense relationship as having entered “the take-off stage.”
68
By that time
Washington had committed to overseeing the development of an effective jet interceptor (F–5)
force capable of defending the Kingdom against attack; managing a 10-year program in which
Saudi Arabia would acquire an 18-ship navy, two naval bases, and trained personnel;
mechanizing two out of four Saudi army brigades; training the Saudi Arabian National Guard;
and managing a multibillion dollar military construction program.
69
As for private contracting
work, the Saudis had contracted directly with U.S. firms for an air defense missile system
(Raytheon Company), an air defense radar network (Lockheed Corporation), and a fleet of C-130
military transport aircraft (Lockheed Corporation). These acquisition requests were in many
cases based on recommendations made in the 1974 DoD survey of the Saudi armed forces.
70
In
these and other ways, the U.S.-Saudi defense relationship had changed significantly since the
early 1970s.
Concerns about Supplying Iran
While DoD played a major role in building closer relations with Saudi Arabia after the October
war, when it came to the other member of Nixon’s “twin pillars”—Iran—the Pentagon was a
voice of caution. At the time, the U.S.-Iran relationship was built on personal ties between
President Nixon and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who first became acquainted in 1953 when
Nixon was vice president. In May 1972, President Nixon and the Shah struck a grand bargain in
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
21
Tehran that ultimately served as the foundation for U.S.-Iran defense ties throughout the
remaining Nixon and Ford years. The gentlemen’s agreement the two leaders reached during
meetings that spring granted the Shah access to all nonnuclear American arms and technology as
well as U.S. military advisers and technicians. Kissinger articulated the president’s overarching
view of the arrangement two months later when he said “in general, decisions on the acquisition
of military equipment should be left to the government of Iran.” In turn, the Shah accepted a
principal role protecting U.S. interests in the region—a role the Iranian leader himself had long
sought. The deal was widely perceived as an American “blank check” for Iran, while Iran
became known as the “policeman” of the Gulf.
71
Elliot Richardson did not engage in U.S.-Iran affairs during his short tenure as defense
secretary, but his successor, Schlesinger, met with the Shah twice during his first month in office
(July 1973). Before these meetings, Assistant Defense Secretary (ISA) Robert Hill reminded the
Schlesinger of the Shah’s belief that he had received “a major understanding” from President
Nixon in May 1972 “to the effect that Iran could get all available sophisticated weapons short of
atomic bombs.”
72
During the congenial meetings in Washington, the Shah made major requests
for U.S. air and naval equipment as expected. For his part, Schlesinger sought to impress upon
the Shah that superior arms did not necessarily achieve a country’s objective, because much
depended on the Iranian military’s ability to employ the weaponry effectively.
73
As with Saudi
Arabia, Schlesinger believed that strong U.S. relations with Iran served as an important check on
Soviet influence in the Gulf—and protected U.S. access to Iranian oil. But U.S. weapons
transfers to Iran should occur at a measured pace to ensure Iranian troops were properly trained
to use and maintain U.S. defense items.
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
22
Meanwhile, the Shah sought to deepen security cooperation with the United States. To
build on their discussions, Schlesinger sent retired Army Col. Richard R. Hallock, a colleague
from his RAND days, to Iran as his unofficial representative. At the time, Hallock was a private
consultant under contract to DoD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). In Iran he was
to provide the Shah and his arms purchasing officer, General Hassan Toufanian, with
professional assessments about weapons purchases while keeping the secretary informed of the
Shah’s views and any problems that might occur.
74
Hallock quickly ingratiated himself with the
Iranian leadership and had an office right next to General Toufanian. However, in July 1974,
while the colonel was still employed by the Pentagon, Hallock’s own California-based consultant
firm signed a multimillion-dollar contract with Tehran. NSC staffer Gary Sick later wrote that
the overlapping arrangements opened Hallock up to questions about whose interests he was
serving in Tehran—America’s, Iran’s, or his own. The Pentagon terminated Hallock’s
employment in January 1976.
75
Wider regional tensions had also shaped the U.S.-Iran relationship by late 1973. On the
one hand, Iran had not joined the Arab oil embargo, and had agreed to provide support to the
USS Hancock while the carrier was stationed in the Arabian Sea. In November the Shah granted
Washington permission to stage long-range surveillance (P-3), logistics (C-141/C-130), and
COD (carrier onboard delivery) flights out of the coastal city of Bandar Abbas, Iran.
76
However,
the Shah’s leading role in raising the price of oil in December to help fund his military purchases
bred deep resentment in the Pentagon. After the Shah requested U.S. government—rather than
foreign buyer—prices for his purchases, Admiral Moorer remarked, “Two can play this. Maybe
we should raise the price of our stuff to the Shah.” Schlesinger replied, “We are. I am thinking of
charging him 1.9 [million] for the F-15 R&D.”
77
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
23
In 1974 Secretary Schlesinger assigned senior ISA analyst Glenn E. Blitgen the task of
assessing DoD’s military supply relationship with Iran. The resulting study recommended a
policy review, the establishment of “more refined guidelines than what the Shah wants, the Shah
gets,” and a “more cautious and guarded” U.S. relationship with the Iranian monarch. It also
proposed a risk assessment of “over-identification with the Shah” and “over-extension of
the DoD relationship.” The ISA study asked when the United States would “cash our check of
accumulated leverage,” or if military sales to Iran were sufficient justification for the current
state of the relationship. Clements, the former oil man, took a more charitable view of the Shah
that was out of step with ISA and with the secretary of defense, noting in response to Blitgen’s
recommendations that Iran “did not join oil embargo … [and] did supply Israel.” While his
deputy secretary was sanguine about the U.S.-Iran relationship, Schlesinger grew more and more
concerned about Iran’s ability to absorb and maintain U.S. weapons in its vast and growing
inventory. In discussing Iranian weapons requests at an October 1974 meeting with Kissinger
and Scowcroft, the defense secretary concluded ominously, “If you want a country in a mess in
3-4 years, Iran will be it.”
78
The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) echoed ISA’s and the
secretary’s shared concerns about the direction of U.S.-Iran military ties. In January 1975,
Assistant Defense Secretary (PA&E) Leonard Sullivan worried about the growing size of the
U.S. presence in Iran (approximately 17,000 Americans then resided in Iran—about four times
the size in 1970) and about the scale of U.S. transfers of sophisticated military equipment (nearly
$6 billion worth of FMS expenditures in FY 1973 and FY 1974). Sullivan identified three
potential risks in these developments: the United States could become enmeshed in Iranian
military adventures by furnishing arms and technical expertise; the influx of Americans could
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
24
create social problems in Iran, making Americans the target of xenophobic feeling or political
dissent; and the Iranians could direct their frustrations against the United States should Tehran
fail to meet its ambitious modernization goals. At worst, Sullivan predicted, the United States
might be expelled from the country.
79
In advance of the Shah’s May 1975 visit to Washington, Assistant Secretary (ISA)
Ellsworth surveyed Iran’s increasingly troubled internal situation for the secretary. The Shah had
“tightened the screws even further” on Iranian media, rejected a parliamentary system, and
abolished a token opposition party. He now had to confront “a steady and determined terrorism”
specializing in the assassination of Iranian security and intelligence personnel. Even though the
State Department spoke of a “mature” bilateral relationship while Kissinger quietly sought an oil
agreement with Iran, Ellsworth saw the United States losing influence with the Shah and even
enabling his repressive policies. To the defense secretary, he wrote, “[T]o a considerable extent,
our policy in the Gulf area is actually the Shah’s policy.” Ellsworth hoped that Ford and
Kissinger would “remind the Shah that our relationship can flourish only on a two-way street,”
and that U.S. use of Iranian facilities plus arms sales agreements “will not suffice as return
traffic.”
80
Ellsworth and Schlesinger were of similar minds, and their concerns grew after the
Shah departed Washington. Two months later, in July, Ellsworth warned, “DoD is doing much
more for Iran than Iran is doing for us, even when the long run is taken into account, and even
when Iranian payments are weighed in the assessment.”
81
In an effort to nudge the bilateral defense relationship in a more sustainable direction,
Schlesinger and Ellsworth lobbied the State Department to send an additional civilian defense
representative to Iran to supervise and coordinate all DoD activities there and report findings to
the U.S. ambassador. Kissinger initially rejected the idea. On August 2, 1975 the Under
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
25
Secretary of State for Management, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, warned the secretary of state (who
was traveling in Europe at the time) that there was a “major scandal brewing” among DoD
representatives, military contractors, and the Iranian government, and that management of the
U.S. military sales programs in Iran “is, at best, a mess … at worst, there are major
illegalities.”
82
In a separate telegram, State Department staffers identified a half-dozen major
problems stemming from the huge expansion ($9 billion in orders, $7 billion in deliveries) of the
U.S. security assistance program.
83
The flood of U.S. weapons begged for oversight, and
Kissinger ultimately approved the move. The new defense representative, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Controller) Eric Von Marbod arrived in Iran in September 1975
and stayed in the role until March 1977. His primary responsibilities included providing advice
on defense matters to the U.S. ambassador to Iran; keeping the Pentagon informed of DoD
activities in Iran; and improving the interface among DoD, U.S. Embassy, and the Iranian
defense personnel.
84
In early September Schlesinger delivered a formal memo to President Ford expressing the
concerns he and his OSD subordinates had been harboring for over two years, and
recommending a major review of U.S. defense and security interests regarding Iran. In
presenting the memo on September 2 the defense secretary told the president: “Iran has an
almost limitless appetite and has so much on its plate they can’t digest it.” In addition, the
expanding population of U.S. nationals in Iran could “provoke anti-Americanism and terrorism”
and, should Iran’s political situation turned “sour,” a large American population there could
leave Washington “very vulnerable.”
85
Still, the secretary’s memo made the case that although it
was in the United States’ interests for Iran to remain a strong regional military power, there were
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
26
fundamental questions about whether the policy of supporting an apparently open-ended Iranian
military buildup would continue to serve American long-term interests.
86
Kissinger, an architect of Nixon’s 1972 agreement with the Shah, was unpersuaded and
resisted making fundamental changes to U.S.-Iran defense cooperation. The White House
delayed and then broadened Schlesinger’s proposed Iran review, tasking it for action only after
President Ford dismissed Schlesinger and appointed Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense in
November 1975. As Kissinger had explained to Schlesinger the month before, ‘The President
agrees with your recommendation,” but “would prefer, however, that the review be extended as
well to our defense and security policies in the entire Gulf region.” Moreover, Kissinger wrote,
such a study, via a national security study memorandum, could “most usefully be undertaken
after the major decisions have been made concerning our overall policy on arms transfers…and
our revised defense relationship with Israel.”
87
President Ford formally ordered the study of
Persian Gulf policy, NSSM 238, in February 1976.
88
The final report—delayed by the White
House—supported the Carter administration’s review of arms transfer policy in 1977.
89
Secretary Rumsfeld generally took a more detached approach to the details of the U.S.-
Iran defense relationship, as he also did with U.S.-Saudi ties. One of his most influential actions
on Iran policy was appointing Ellsworth to serve alongside Clements as DoD’s second deputy
secretary of defense in late 1975. That post gave Ellsworth’s skepticism added prominence, and
he continued to warn of possible repercussions if the United States continued business as usual
with Tehran. Most notably, in February 1976 he issued new guidance to senior DoD leaders for
evaluating and approving sales of military equipment to Iran. Tehran had begun worrying about
inflation’s effects on its U.S. weapons orders, which, as Iran’s oil revenue began dropping, made
it more difficult to purchase weapons that were suddenly more expensive. Ellsworth saw this as
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
27
giving Washington—and DoD—new leverage over the relationship. “In today’s environment,”
he wrote, “it is all the more important that DOD consideration of Iranian requests be most
thorough and that we avoid any advocacy role.” As it always had, the United States would still
weigh other nations’ abilities to meet Iran’s weapons requests when considering whether to
approve sales of U.S. weapons to the Shah’s government. But now, Ellsworth instructed, this
third-party factor would not “short-circuit or skew a complete deliberation of the merits” of
Iran’s requests by U.S. authorities.
90
For Kissinger, who continued to favor greater aid to the Shah, it was confirmation that
under Rumsfeld DoD continued to play the role of spoiler in the Iran relationship. “Ellsworth and
Defense are viciously anti-Iran,” Kissinger complained to President Ford in August 1976:
“Between Treasury and DoD they are on a vicious campaign” against Tehran, and “they are
going after the Shah.” President Ford replied that “The Shah is a good friend.… He didn’t go
along with the embargo…. I will talk to Don [Rumsfeld] because I think Iran is very important to
us.”
91
By the end of the Ford administration, more than $10 billion in arms had been sold to the
Iranians, and the military assistance pipeline was jammed with programs that would extend for
decades.
Limits for the Small Gulf States
As U.S. policy focused heavily on the “twin pillars,” Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. officials
delivered limited military assistance to the small Arab countries in the Gulf region. In the cases
of Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, DoD considered the main security threat to be internal,
notably threats from Arab revolutionary elements hostile to U.S. interests. Washington refused to
sell sophisticated offensive weapons to these states—delivering instead only internal security
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
28
items. According to Defense officials, advanced offensive weapon systems would undermine
regional stability—and divert resources from the pressing needs of civil society. Among the
small Gulf states, Kuwait alone received offensive weapons. A strong Kuwait, Washington held,
promoted regional stability by deterring Iraqi.
92
Given their short tenures at Defense, Secretaries Richardson and Rumsfeld devoted little
attention to the small Gulf states. Clements handled most matters related to these countries
during the Nixon-Ford era. For his part, Schlesinger met with several heads of state, or their
representatives, and occasionally discussed Bahrain, Kuwait, and other small Gulf states with
U.S. government colleagues. To some degree, Saudi Arabia and Iran represented external threats
to these Gulf countries. At the same time, DoD viewed the prospect of Saudi or Iranian
intervention to restore order and stability as potentially desirable. “If one of the Gulf states blows
up, could we have the Saudis take it?” Schlesinger asked offhandedly during an August 1974
meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft.
93
In general Schlesinger viewed matters related to the
small Gulf states through the prism of the Soviet threat. The expansion of Soviet power in the
Persian Gulf, he warned the Kuwaiti ambassador in January 1975, would severely diminish the
freedoms Kuwait enjoyed.
94
That same month Oman’s Sultan Qaboos asked Schlesinger how the
United States would react if the Soviet Union intervened in the Gulf. The U.S. response would
be “very quick,” Schlesinger said. “The Soviets must be warned off,” he added, as “Soviet
domination of the Middle East would be a catastrophe for the industrialized states and the world
as a whole.”
95
Building a Permanent Presence on Diego Garcia
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
29
The routine deployment of naval forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Persian Gulf during the oil
embargo highlighted the challenges of projecting sea power to an area that lacked supporting
bases. The Pentagon could move forces into the area but could not keep them supplied for an
extended period. Without support facilities in the Indian Ocean, U.S. ships were dependent on
fuel and ammunition transported from U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay in the Philippines. Admiral
Zumwalt observed that carrier task force operations in the Indian Ocean with such long supply
lines, “taxed our logistics support capabilities to the absolute limit.” The new deployments near
the Gulf also reduced the ability to support U.S. forces in other key areas in the Western Pacific.
Secure bunkering and facility support from Arab countries was not a reliable option in the
immediate wake of the October War because they perceived the United States as Israel’s chief
supporter. Even friendly Bahrain announced an intent to end homeporting privileges for the U.S.
Navy (although in the end these privileges were extended).
96
The deficiencies exposed during repeated U.S. naval deployments made finding bases in
the Gulf region an urgent priority. The Arab oil embargo helped drum up support beyond the
military to expand the U.S. presence in the Middle East, and over time the strategic importance
of such a presence gained wide acceptance across the Nixon and Ford administrations. “This
might be a good time to do it [expand U.S. military presence in the region] as a reaction to the
Middle East. Now it can be interpreted as ‘shoring up’ our Middle East policy,” Schlesinger
remarked during a meeting with Kissinger, Admiral Moorer, Scowcroft, and CIA Director
William Colby on November 29, 1973.
97
An undated interagency study, likely completed about a
year after the embargo, opened with the observation that the embargo, together with the October
War, “changed our perceptions dramatically,” and precipitated “an acute awareness of our new,
and growing, dependence on petroleum imports.”
98
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
30
The imperative to secure oil supplies dovetailed with Schlesinger’s interest in preventing
Soviet inroads and influence in the Gulf. The Soviets had moved rapidly to try and fill the
vacuum left by the British retreat from the Middle East. Between 1968 and 1972 the number of
days Soviet combat ships were present in the western Indian Ocean increased eightfold. The
expected reopening of the Suez Canal (closed to international shipping since the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War) would allow the Soviets to maintain a larger force in the region, and from
Schlesinger’s perspective, this made an expanded U.S. presence even more pressing.
99
In a letter
to a skeptical Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Schlesinger outlined the department’s rationale for an expanded U.S. presence in the Indian
Ocean, saying it would provide “a clear signal to the Soviets of our resolve” to maintain a
credible military capability there, and would have “a salutary effect on the Soviets by
underscoring our strategic mobility” while demonstrating our “capability to meet contingency
situations involving friendly governments.” Expanded U.S. presence in the region, the secretary
added, would deter others from interfering with commerce in the area.
100
The island of Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean’s Chagos Archipelago, part of
British Indian Ocean Territory, emerged as the Pentagon’s preferred location for a base. Under a
1968 agreement between Washington and London, the U.S. Navy operated a communications
facility on the remote island. U.S. facilities, upgraded in early 1973, included an 8,000-foot
runway, a deep-water area, and a communications station. However, while the British allowed
U.S. ships and aircraft to use Diego Garcia for transit, conducting military operations from the
island required British approval. This limited U.S. operational flexibility. As Schlesinger told
Kissinger, “We have to … get the British off our back.”
101
In January 1974 the British conceded
to revisions of the agreement and granted the United States permission to use facilities for
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
31
regional operations. London demanded “consultation,” however, if the Americans planned to
deploy nuclear weapons or amphibious forces to the island.
102
The two sides further revised the
arrangement in March to give the Americans forces more independence.
103
U.S. bases on Diego Garcia would be vital to U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf during
the decades that followed, but securing congressional support to develop military facilities there
proved difficult. The downward political pressure on the defense budget occasioned by the end
of the Vietnam War hampered DoD’s drive to expand Diego Garcia. Schlesinger made his case
for a budget supplement of $29 million for the expansion of U.S. support facilities on the island
in March 1974, arguing that U.S. interests would be served by a more regular military presence
in the Indian Ocean, given the situation in the Middle East and the worldwide growth in Soviet
naval capabilities and deployments. He also maintained the funds would “limit the costs of
Indian Ocean deployments and provide greater flexibility in the types of forces the United States
would have available in that area of the world.”
104
Schlesinger’s plea failed to move Congress
until the spring of 1975, when the Secretary produced satellite photographs showing Soviet
construction of fuel tanks, a long runway, a communications station, and a missile-handling
facility in the Somali city of Berbera, on the Red Sea. U.S. officials later visited the area at the
invitation of the Somalis. Moscow suggested that its naval facility at the port was actually a meat
processing plant, prompting Schlesinger to comment that the Soviets must be handling
“Bunyanesque oxen” in Berbera.
105
The photographs of the Soviet buildup galvanized key
supporters in Congress, including Senator Stennis, who that summer described Diego Garcia as
an “absolute necessity” if the United States were to be able to keep open sea lanes leading to
Persian Gulf oil.
106
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
32
By 1976 the sense of crisis in the Gulf had eased, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended only three Indian Ocean deployments over the next 15 months. Even so, in
August, Secretary Rumsfeld directed that each deployment deliver a “substantial presence and
operations in the Arabian Sea area,” cementing Schlesinger’s decision to maintain a regular
naval presence near the Gulf. The persistent efforts of some in Congress to derail plans for Diego
Garcia failed to reverse the Ford administration’s policy.
107
The Defense Department’s involvement in the Persian Gulf region expanded as the nation’s
interests there grew after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The Nixon and Ford administrations
pursued a “twin pillars” approach to the Persian Gulf. In turn, Saudi Arabia and Iran became the
largest recipients of U.S. military assistance—and buyers of U.S. arms—in the world. U.S. naval
activities and plans for future operations in the Gulf grew as the United States pursued a more
robust military presence in the region. The development of facilities on Diego Garcia enabled the
sustained deployment of U.S. forces in the critical region. On the surface, by the end of the Ford
administration, U.S. actions had strengthened the American position in the Persian Gulf,
including reliable access to oil. However, like the 1973 embargo, major events in the region
during the Carter administration would create a new set of challenges for the United States. In
responding to the Islamic revolution in Iran, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Saudi
militants, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. defense officials would rely on the
foundation set during the Nixon-Ford era.
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
33
Endnotes
1. Memcon, Kissinger, Rush, Clements, and Casey, 26 Oct 1973, 5:30 p.m., subj: Meeting with Oil
Company Executives, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:647–655 (doc 230); for impact of the oil embargo, see
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 570–614.
2. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, undated, subj: Department of Defense General
Summary, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:37–39 (doc 10).
3. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, undated, subj: Department of Defense General
Summary, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:37–39 (doc 10); memo, President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs Kissinger to President Nixon, 22 Oct 1970, subj: The Persian Gulf, FRUS 1969–1976, E-4 (doc
91).
4. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975, 13–15,
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-
150705-323; for an overview of Nixon’s policy toward Iran, see Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and
the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5. Carrington to Cabinet, 2 Apr 1973, as cited in Tore Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the
Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies Out of Clients
(Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 127.
6. Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping
of a Region (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 189–206.
7. Remarks on Transmitting a Special Message to Congress on Energy Policy, 18 Apr 1973, Nixon Public
Papers 1973, 301–319 (doc 127).
8. NSSM 174 to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central
Intelligence, 8 Mar 1973, subj: National Security and U.S. Energy Policy, 8 Mar 1973, FRUS 1969–1976,
36:431–432 (doc 171).
9. Ibid.; NEI 20/30–70, 14 Nov1970, subj: Security of Oil Supply to NATO and Japan, FRUS 1969–1976,
36:136–151 (doc 61).
10. Memo, DCI Schlesinger to President Nixon, 20 Apr 1973, subj: Intelligence Précis, FRUS 1969–
1976, 36:454–455 (doc 178). For direct and indirect communication about Saudi Arabia’s oil supply to
the United States not being secure without progress on the Arab-Israeli political front, see Bronson,
Thicker Than Oil, 115–116.
11. NIE 30–1–73, 7 Jun 1973, subj: Problems in the Persian Gulf, FRUS 1969–1976, E-9, pt. 2, 17–31
(doc 5).
12. Memo, Odeen for Kissinger, 11 Aug 1973, subj: NSSM 174 Executive Summary, FRUS 1969–1976,
36:517–522 (doc 192).
13. Memo, Porter to Rogers, 17 Aug 1973, subj: SRG Meeting on NSSM 174: International Aspects of
Energy, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:533–535 (doc 194); President Nixon, Press Conference, 5 Sep 1973, as
cited in Nixon Public Papers 1973, 732–743 (doc 246) (quote); Special Message to Congress on National
Legislative Goals, 10 Sep 1973, Nixon Public Papers 1973, 761–786 (doc 253).
14. For example, see memcon, The Shah, Ambassador Zahedi, Secretary Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary
Clements, Ambassador Hill, Vice Admiral Peet, Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes, Major General Brett,
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
34
Mr. Alne, and Ambassador Helms, 26 Jul 1973, subj: Meeting with the Shah of Iran, FRUS 1969–1976,
27:113–118 (doc 29).
15. William Burr, ed., “State Department Intelligence and Research Predicted 1973 Arab-Israeli War:
Key INR Memo Published for the First Time,” 5 Mar 2013, National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 415, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB415/.
16. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Rush, Moorer, and Colby, 9 Oct 1973, subj: Special WSAG-
Principals Only, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552618.pdf.
17. Memcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, 10 Oct 1973, The Kissinger telephone conversations: A verbatim
record of U.S. diplomacy, 1969–1977, Acc KA11127, DNSA.
18. MFR by CJCS (M-81–73), “Israeli-Arab Conflict, 1973,” 9 Oct 1973, Moorer Diary, as cited in
Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1973–1976, 170.
19. Iraq did not participate because it did not consider the action sufficiently severe. A.F. Alhajji, “The
1973 oil embargo: Its history, motives, and consequences,” Oil and Gas Journal 103, no. 17 (2005),
https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-103/issue-17/general-interest/the-1973-oil-embargo-its-
history-motives-and-consequences.html; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 859, 872–873; Anthony Cave
Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of ARAMCO and the Saudi Kings (New York: Houghton, 1999),
295.
20. Memo, Acting ASD(ISA) Eagleburger Sedef Richardson, 15 Feb 1973, subj: U.S. Policy in the
Persian Gulf, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2: 1–6 (doc 1); Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, “Proposed
Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd
sess., 21 Feb 1974, 6, 12, 14, and 20 Mar 1974, 131.
21. Zumwalt testimony, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean: Hearings,
21 Feb 1974, 6, 12, 14, and 20 Mar 1974, 156.
22. Ibid.
23. BG Wickham notebook, entries for 26 Oct 1973 and 19 Nov 1973, Schlesinger Papers.
24. See Richard Levine, “The Debate over Diego Garcia,” 4 Apr 1974, Wall Street Journal, 18.
25. “Indian Ocean Strategy,” undated, Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study
Memorandum 199, FRUS 1969–1976, E–8 (doc 77); CINCPAC Command History, 1974, 1:254–255, as
cited in Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1973–1976, 198.
26. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Wickham and Scowcroft, 5 Sep 1973, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552607.pdf
.
27. Memcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, 10 Oct 1973, The Kissinger telephone conversations: A verbatim
record of U.S. diplomacy, 1969–1977, Acc KA11127, DNSA.
28. BG Wickham notebook, entry for 29 Oct 1973, Schlesinger Papers.
29. NIE 30-1-73, “Problems in the Persian Gulf,” 7 Jun 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 17–31
(doc 5).
30. Moorer Diary, entry for 24 Nov 1973, box 9, Acc 218-98-0033A, JCS Records, NARA.
31. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, and Scowcroft, 3 Nov 1973, National Security
Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552628.pdf
.
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
35
32. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, Rush, and Scowcroft, Memorandum of
Conversation, 29 Nov 1973, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford
Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552638.pdf
.
33. Jeffrey Robinson, Yamani: The Inside Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 102.
34. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:691–693 (doc 244).
35. See Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger Speaks of Force as Last Step ‘In the Gravest Emergency’ Over
Oil,” New York Times, 3 Jan 1973.
36. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, and Scowcroft, 3 Nov 1973, box 2, National
Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552628.pdf.
37. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, and Scowcroft, 29 Nov 1973, 1:20 – 2:38 p.m.,
National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552636.pdf
38. “Excerpts From the Kissinger News Conference,” New York Times, 22 Nov 1973.
39. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 880.
40. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, 36:691–693 (doc 244).
41. Ibid.
42. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, and Colby, 24 Oct 1973, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552626.pdf
.
43. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, and Colby, 22 Jan 1974, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552654.pdf
; also see Memcon, Kissinger
and Schlesinger, 28 Nov 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, 1969–1977, DNSA.
44. For example, see Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia
Changed the Blance of Power in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).
45. Telegram, Secretary of the Department of State to the Ambassador of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia,
Telegram, 6 Mar 1974, 2128Z, subj: Joint US-Saudi Economic Commissions, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-
9, pt. 2, 371–374 (doc 104).
46. Memo, JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer to SecDef Schlesinger, 1 Feb 1974, subj: US Basing and
Facility Requirements in the Middle East/Indian Ocean Area, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 83–84
(doc 15).
47. Ibid., 83–84 (doc 15).
48. Memcon, Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral Moorer, and Prince Fahd, 6 Jun1974, subj: Saudi-US
Security Cooperation Meeting, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 400–410 (doc 112).
49. Bronson, Thicker Than Oil, 124.
50. Telegram, Ambassador of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Secretary of the Department of State,
11 Mar 1974, subj: Joint U.S.-Saudi Economic Commissions: Saudi Enthusiasm, FRUS 1969–1976, vol.
E-9, pt. 2, 374–377 (doc 105).
51. Memcon, Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral Moorer, and Prince Fahd, 6 Jun 1974, subj: Saudi-US
Security Cooperation Meeting, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 400–410 (doc 112).
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
36
52. Ibid.
53. Memo, Principal Deputy ASD(ISA) Jordan to Deputy SecDef Clements, 5 Oct 1974, subj: Status
Report on DOD Actions as Regards Arabia and YAR—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, FRUS
1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 420–426 (doc 118); memo for the record, Prince Turki, Schlesinger, and
Clements, 22 Nov 1974, subj: Discussion Between Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia and Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 429–432 (doc
121).
54. Memo for the record, Prince Turki, Schlesinger, and Clements, 22 Nov1974, subj: Discussion
Between Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Clements, folder Saudi Arabia 091.112 1974, box 73, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records, WNRC;
Bernard Gwertzman, “‘Milestone’ Pact is Signed by U.S. and Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, June 9,
1974, 1, 9.
55. Tensions over the pace of FMS to Saudi Arabia remained. See memcon, Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-Aziz al
Sa’ud, Abdul Aziz al-Tuwaijiri, Ali Abdallah, Donald H. Rumsfeld, M. Staser Holcomb, William P.
Clements Jr., Eugene V. McAuliffe, James H. Noyes, William A. Fifer, and Richard D. Lawrence, 6 Jul
1976, subj: Meeting with Saudi Prince Abdallah, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 605–608 (doc 182);
see also memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 18 Sep 1976, The Rumsfeld Archive, Rumsfeld Library,
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4366/1976-09-
18%20From%20Eugene%20V.%20Mcauliffe%20re%20Visit%20of%20Saudi%20Foreign%20Minister
%20Prince%20Saud%20Bin%20Faisal%20.pdf.
56. “U.S. Company Will Train Saudi Troops to Guard Oil,” 9 Feb 1975, New York Times, as cited in
Bronson, Thicker Than Oil, 127; DIA Intelligence Appraisal, Saudi Arabia: National Guard
Modernization, 11 May 1976, folder Saudi Arabia 000.1-399 1976, box 81, Acc 330-79-0049, OSD
Records, WNRC.
57. “Stennis Begins Inquiry into U.S. Training of Saudi Units; Senate Armed Services Panel Head Asks
Pentagon to Explain Contract with Vinnell Corp. of Alhambra,” Los Angeles Times, 11 Feb 1975; “U.S.
Defense Contractors’ Training of Foreign Military Forces,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Political and Military Affairs, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 20 Mar 1975; Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald R. Ford,
1975, 2:1893–1896 (doc 698).
58. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Scowcroft, 2 Aug 1974, subj: Notes on Chiefs of Mission
Meeting, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 107–111 (doc 22).
59. U.S. News and World Report, 26 May 1976, 38–39.
60. Telegram, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to SecState Kissinger, 21
May 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 473–474 (doc 138).
61. Telegram, Kissinger to Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 23 May 1975, subj: Saudi Reaction to Schlesinger
Statements, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 479–480 (doc 141).
62. Nomination of Donald Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, 94th Congress, 1st sess., 12–13 Nov 1975.
63. Memo, McAuliffe to Rumsfeld, 1 Oct1976, The Rumsfeld Archive, Rumsfeld Library,
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4488/1976-10-
01%20From%20Eugene%20V.%20McAuliffe%20re%20Middle%20East%20Trip%20.pdf.
64. Memcon, Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-Aziz al Sa’ud, Abdul Aziz al-Tuwaijiri, Ali Abdallah, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, M. Staser Holcomb, William P. Clements Jr., Eugene V. McAuliffe, James H. Noyes, William
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
37
A. Fifer, and Richard D. Lawrence, 6 Jul 1976, subj: Meeting with Saudi Prince Abdallah, FRUS 1969–
1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 605–608 (doc 182).
65. Memo, McAuliffe to Rumsfeld, 18 Sep 1976, The Rumsfeld Archive, Rumsfeld Library,
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4366/1976-09-
18%20From%20Eugene%20V.%20Mcauliffe%20re%20Visit%20of%20Saudi%20Foreign%20Minister
%20Prince%20Saud%20Bin%20Faisal%20.pdf.
66. Memcon, Carter, Mondale, Rumsfeld, 22 Nov 1976, The Rumsfeld Archive, Rumsfeld Library,
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/151/1976-11-
22%20Memorandum%20of%20Conversation%20with%20President-elect%20Jimmy%20Carter.pdf.
67. Memo for the record, undated [Apr 1976], subj: Acting ASD/ISA Visit to Saudi Arabia, 21–24 March
1976 – Overview, folder Middle East 333 1976, box 75, Acc 330-79-0049; Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy 1973–1976 (classified version), 391.
68. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, subj: Saudi Arabia, FRUS 1977–1980,
28:451–461 (doc 143).
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Memo, Kissinger for SecState and SecDef, 25 Jul 1972, subj: Follow-up on the President’s Talk with
the Shah, Ford Library Digital Collections; for context, see Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah, 46–
52.
72. Memcon, The Shah, Ardeshir Zahedi, Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral Moorer, Hill, Major General
Brett, and Helms, 24 Jul 1973, subj: Meeting between the Shah of Iran and the Secretary of Defense,
FRUS 1969–1976, 27:89–94 (doc 26).
73. Memcon, The Shah, Zahedi, Schlesinger, Clements, Hill, Peet, Noyes, Major General Brett, Alne, and
Helms, 26 Jul 1973, 11:45 a.m.–12:45 p.m., subj: Meeting with the Shah of Iran, FRUS 1969–1976,
27:113–118 (doc 29); see also memcon, The Shah, Ardeshir Zahedi, Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral
Moorer, Hill, Major General Brett, and Helms, 24 Jul 1973, subj: Meeting between the Shah of Iran and
the Secretary of Defense, FRUS 1969–1976, 27:89–94 (doc 26).
74. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Staff Report,
U.S. Military Sales to Iran (Washington, DC: GPO, Jul 1976).
75. For Ellsworth bio, see https://history.defense.gov/DOD-History/Deputy-Secretaries-of-
Defense/Article-View/Article/585216/robert-f-ellsworth/; Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic
Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985), 15–17.
76.
The flights would be conducted under the cover story of Americans training the Iranians on the use of
P-3s. See telegrams, Secretary of the Department of State to Ambassadors of the Embassies in Iran and
Saudi Arabia, 4 Nov 1973, 0255Z subj: USS Hancock Task Force, FRUS 1969–1976, 27:153–154 (doc
42, note 3).
77. Believed to refer to 1.9 million dollars. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, and
Scowcroft, 28 Dec 1973, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Collection
036600064, Ford Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552648.pdf
.
78. OASD(ISA) Paper, U.S. Policy for Iran, Oct 1974, folder Iran 1974, box 64, Acc 78-0011; Clements
comment on memo, Schlesinger to President Ford, 2 Sep 1975, subj: DoD Activities and Interests in Iran,
FRUS 1969–1976, 27:429 (doc 142, note 4); memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, and Wickham,
22 Oct 1974, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Collection 036600064,
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
38
Ford Library, Collection 031400271, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552834.pdf
.
79. Memo, ASD(P&E) Sullivan for SecDef Schlesinger and Deputy SecDef Clements, 23 Jan 1975, subj:
The Growing U.S. Involvement in Iran, FRUS 1969–1976, 27:299–300 (doc 99).
80. Ellsworth to Schlesinger, Overview: Visit of the Shah of Iran, 16 May 1975, attached to Briefing
Book for Visit of the Shah of Iran, 15 May 1975, folder Iran 091.112 1975, box 65, Acc 330-78-0058,
OSD Records, WNRC.
81. Memo, ASD(ISA) Ellsworth for SecDef Schlesinger, 25 Jul 1975, subj: Iran, FRUS 1969–1976, 27:
413–415 (doc 138).
82. Telegram, Ingersoll, Maw and Eagleburger to SecState Kissinger, 2 Aug 1975, 1951Z, subj: Proposed
Assignment of Defense Representative to Tehran, Tosec 80313/183077, FRUS 1969–1976, 27:415–418
(doc 139).
83. Telegram, Ingersoll, Maw and Eagleburger to SecState Kissinger, 2 Aug 1975, 1951Z, Tosec
80313/183077, subj: Proposed Assignment of Defense Representative to Tehran, FRUS 1969–1976,
27:415–418 (doc 139).
84. United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present and Future, Report
of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula Pursuant to H. Res 313
(Washington, DC: GPO, Dec 1977),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015078699140;view=1up;seq=1
.
85. Memcon, Ford, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, 2 Sep1975, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of
Conversation Collection, Collection 036600152, box 15, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553215.pdf
.
86. Memo, SecDef Schlesinger to President Ford, 2 Sep1975, subj: DoD Activities and Interests in Iran,
FRUS 1969–1976, 27:424–430 (doc 142).
87. Memo, Clinton E. Granger and Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Staff for SecState
Kissinger, 23 Sep 1975, subj: Defense Request for Study of Relations with Iran, FRUS 1969–1976,
27:434–436, note 6 (doc 145).
88. NSSM 238 to Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central
Intelligence, Director of Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, 13 Feb 1976, subj: U.S. Policy Toward
the Persian Gulf, National Security Adviser’s Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nssm238.pdf
.
89. Sick, All Fall Down, 18.
90. Memo, Clements for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel,
Director of Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Defense Representative to Iran, Directors of Defense Agencies, 24 Feb 1976, subj: DoD
Interests and Activities in Iran, Collection: Iran, The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977–1980, DNSA, Acc
IR01020.
91. Memcon, President Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, 3 Aug 1976, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553524.pdf
.
92. Memo, Acting ASD(ISA) Eagleburger to SecDef Richardson, 15 Feb 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-
9, pt. 2,1–6 (doc 1).
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld
39
93. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Scowcroft, 2 Aug 1974, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552738.pdf
.
94. Memcon, Shaikh Salim Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Abdul Razzak, Schlesinger, Clements, Ellsworth,
Noyes, Wickham, Sumner, Grimsley, and Sick, 30 Jan 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-9, pt. 2, 217–221
(doc 50).
95. Memcon, Qaboos, Sayyid Tarik Bin Taimur, Yahya Omar, Schlesinger, Clements, Noyes, Wickham,
Maj. Gen. Gordon Sumner Jr., Lt. Col. Peter M. Dawkins, Mr. William Codus, and Sick, 10 Jan 1975, 3–
4 p.m., subj: Meeting of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, FRUS 1969–1976, vol E-9, pt. 2, 682–687 (doc 215).
96. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, “Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean,”
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 21 Feb 1974, 6, 12, 14, and 20 Mar 1974, 131.
97. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer, and Scowcroft, 29 Nov 1973, Collection
036600062, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552636.pdf
.
98. “Indian Ocean Strategy,” undated, Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study
Memorandum 199, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-8 (doc 77).
99. For example, see memcon, Qaboos, Sayyid Tarik Bin Taimur, Yahya Omar, Schlesinger, Clements,
Noyes, Wickham, Maj. Gen. Gordon Sumner Jr, Lt. Col. Peter M. Dawkins, Mr. William Codus, and
Commander Gary Sick, 10 Jan 1975, 3–4 p.m., subj: Meeting of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, FRUS 1969–
1976, vol E-9, pt. 2, 682–687 (doc 215).
100. Ltr, Schlesinger to Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services Stennis, 29 Jan 1974,
FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-8 (doc 66).
101. Memcon, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer and Colby, 22 Jan 1974, National Security Adviser’s
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Collection 031400107, Ford Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552654.pdf
.
102. For example, see “Indian Ocean Strategy,” undated, Study Prepared in Response to National
Security Study Memorandum 199, FRUS 1969–1976, E–8, doc 77.
103. P.E. Barringer, “New US-UK Agreement on Diego Garcia,” Talking Points for Admiral Peet with
SecDef, folder Indian Ocean 323.3 (Jan-Mar) 1974, box 64, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records, WNRC;
also see “Indian Ocean Strategy,” undated, Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study
Memorandum 199, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E–8 (doc 77).
104. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975, 14,
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-
150705-323.
105. John W. Finney, “Diego Garcia May Perform the Same ‘Facility’ Service for the U.S.,” New York
Times, 6 Jul 1975.
106. “Senate Approves Indian Ocean Base,” New York Times, 29 Jul 1975.
107. Memo, Rumsfeld for Brown for JCS Chairman, 31 Aug 1976, subj: Indian Ocean Deployment
Planning Guidance for FY 197T–1977, folder Indian Ocean 1976, box 70, Acc 330-79-0049;
Congressional Research Service, Congress and Foreign Policy—1976, 86-757 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1977), 216.
