CRS-10
43
Some information, such as meal preferences, which could be used to infer religious
affiliation, and health considerations will not be made available. Goo, Sara Kehaulani,
“U.S., EU Will Share Passenger Records,” Washington Post, 29 May 2004, p. A2.
44
Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: US-EU Passenger Name Record
Agreement Signed,” 28 May 2004, [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3651].
45
Federal Register. Vol. 68 No. 148 Friday August 1, 2003. P. 45266; U.S. General
Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, GAO Testimony GAO-04-504T, 17 March 2004,
p. 17
46
U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation
of Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, GAO Testimony GAO-04-504T, 17
March 2004, p. 17
Concerns about privacy protections had also dissuaded the European Union
(EU) from providing any data to TSA to test CAPPS II. However, in May 2004, the
EU signed an agreement with the United States that would have allowed PNR data
for flights originating from the EU to be used in testing CAPPS II, but only after TSA
was authorized to use domestic data as well. As part of the agreement, the EU data
was to be retained for only three-and-a-half years (unless it is part of a law
enforcement action), only 34 of the 39 elements of the PNR were to be accessed by
authorities,
43
and there were to be yearly joint DHS-EU reviews of the
implementation of the agreement.
44
Another obstacle was the perception of mission creep. CAPPS II was originally
intended to just screen for high-risk passengers who may pose a threat to safe air
travel. However, in an August 1, 2003, Federal Register notice, TSA stated that
CAPPS II could also be used to identify individuals with outstanding state or federal
arrest warrants, as well as identify both foreign and domestic terrorists (not just
foreign terrorists). The notice also states that CAPPS II could be “linked with the
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program” to
identify individuals who are in the country illegally (e.g., individuals with expired
visas, illegal aliens, etc.).
45
In response to critics who cited these possible uses as
examples of mission creep, TSA claimed that the suggested uses were consistent with
the goals of improving aviation security.
46
Several other concerns had also been raised, including the length of time
passenger information was to be retained, who would have access to the information,
the accuracy of the commercial data being used to authenticate a passenger’s identity,
the creation of procedures to allow passengers the opportunity to correct data errors
in their records, and the ability of the system to detect attempts by individuals to use
identity theft to board a plane undetected.
In August 2004, TSA announced that the CAPPS II program was being canceled
and would be replaced with a new system called Secure Flight. In the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-334), Congress included
a provision (Sec. 522) prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for “deployment or
implementation, on other than a test basis,” of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, “or other
follow on/successor programs,” until GAO has certified that such a system has met