WAS THE CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF 'BAILOUT' AUTHORITY

WAS THE CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF

„BAILOUT‟ AUTHORITY TO TREASURY

SECRETARY HENRY PAULSON REALLY

SO “UNPRECEDENTED?”: A HISTORICAL

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF

TREASURY SECRETARY AUTHORITY

DURING FINANCIAL CRISIS

ZACHARY CORMIER



I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 390

II.SUMMARY OF THE ―CRISIS‖ LEADING TO THE EMERGENCY

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 ...................................... 393

III.ANALYSIS OF THE EESA AND THE POWER THAT WAS

AUTHORIZED TO TREASURY SECRETARY HENRY

PAULSON ................................................................................................ 400

A. Paulson‘s Authority under the EESA ................................................ 401

B. Congressional Guidance of Paulson‘s Authority .............................. 404

C. Oversight of Paulson‘s Authority ...................................................... 404

D. Impact of Paulson‘s Bailout Authority .............................................. 408

E. Summary and Conclusion of Paulson‘s Authority ............................ 408

IV.THE BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TREND TO

MAGNIFY TREASURY SECRETARY AUTHORITY IN THE

MIDST OF CRISIS: ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1789-1795) ............. 408

A. The Public Credit Crisis .................................................................... 409

B. The First National Bank .................................................................... 416

C. The Whiskey Rebellion ..................................................................... 417

D. Final Summary and Comparison of Alexander Hamilton‘s

Powers ............................................................................................... 418

V.THE LONG LINE OF IMMENSLY POWERFUL TREASURY

SECRETARIES DURING TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ................. 419

A. Salmon P. Chase and the Financial Crisis of the Civil War

(1861-1864) ....................................................................................... 419

1. The Birth of Greenbacks: Chase‘s Authority to Print Money

Out of Thin Air ........................................................................... 420

2. Chase and the Nation‘s First Federal Income Tax ...................... 421



Zachary R. Cormier, Esq. J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law (2009); B.B.A., Financial

Managment, University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Managment (2006). Zachary currently

works as a Litigation Associate for the New Mexico law firm of Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris and

Sisk, P.A.

390 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

3. Chase‘s National Banking System .............................................. 421

4. Salmon P. Chase Conclusion ...................................................... 421

B. William McAdoo: World War I and the European Investment

Crisis (1913-1918) ............................................................................ 422

C. William H. Woodin (1933) & Henry Morgenthau Jr. (1934-

1945): Control over Banks and Gold During the Great

Depression ......................................................................................... 423

VI.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 425

I. INTRODUCTION

The time had come for Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to urge Congress

to give him more power, a lot more power. It was the middle of September 2008,

the United States‘ financial thermometer was about to pop as the spark that was the

United States housing and mortgage crisis had grown into a raging financial wild

fire.

The housing bubble burst of 2006 had kindled a ‗mortgage default crisis‘

that proceeded to bankrupt homeowners and lenders nationwide.

The ‗crisis‘

grew and grew, spreading uncontrollably, until at last the investment ties to the

‗Main Street‘ mortgage lenders caught ablaze and nothing could stop the crisis

from roaring into Wall Street.

Financial giants burned, markets boiled over.

Investors threw their panic like gasoline onto the towering flames, unloading

securities in fear of a free fall.

The Treasury Department did what it could to

contain the insatiable inferno, but still it continued to rage, with no signs of

relenting.

The immense heat of the mounting crisis bore down perhaps most sharply on

Paulson and the rest of those that worked, and indeed lived, in the Treasury

building (which at this point remained open around the clock, every day, with only

a tuna-fish and peanut-butter sandwich buffet to sustain those that tried to save the

economy).

It had become apparent to Paulson by this time that despite his best

efforts, the financial crisis was on the verge of completely exploding. On

September 20, 2008, Paulson proposed the Troubled Asset Relief Program

Congress, a $700 billion capped bailout plan that created ―a taxpayer-backed entity

that would acquire mortgage-backed bonds from banks‖ at Paulson‘s discretion.

Paulson‘s enormous plea was crammed tightly within a two-and-a-half page

See infra note 20 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 36–37, 39 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.

Daniel Gross, The Captain of the Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2008, available at http://www.

newsweek.com/id/160119/page/1.

Text Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://www.ny

times.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html?_r=1&ref=business.

Gross, supra note 7, at 3.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 391

document in the hopes of being quickly passed by Congress.

Although lean, this

proposal was crowded. In addition to requesting the power to grant up to $700

billion to buy ―troubled assets‖ (representative of one individual effectively

controlling five percent of the national gross domestic product),

Paulson also

asserted that this power should be free from any congressional or judicial review.

The panicked and weary nation stopped to take a collective gasp at the magnitude

of Paulson‘s request: was the Secretary of Treasury going to become the most

powerful person in the world?

Even after Congress poured amendment after amendment into Paulson‘s

proposal, striking section eight‘s no review clause and adding numerous measures

of oversight, the nation and its leaders could not help but grimace to various

degrees at Paulson‘s eventual powers under the Emergency Economic Stabilization

Act of 2008 (―EESA‖).

The reaction was extreme. Historians and political

scientists alike quickly jumped to labeling Paulson as the most powerful Treasury

Secretary in the nation‘s history.

Many jumped even farther, begrudgingly

See Draft Proposal, supra note 8; Massimo Calabresi, Congress and the Bailout Plan: Business

As Usual, TIME, Sept. 23, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1843642-

1,00.html.

[Paulson] and his team had been working on his proposal for more than six

months, in the event that more piecemeal approaches like the bailout of Bear

Stearns or the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac didn‘t stop the bleeding.

When things looked like they were headed for a crisis at the beginning of last

week [(September 15)], he had a team up literally all night working with the

Federal Reserve to frame a deliberately vague proposal that could make it

through Congress. The key issue was to get something that could pass, and

quickly, as failure would produce a panic that would be unstoppable. What they

came up with was the broad, three-page plan giving the Treasury $700 billion to

buy back Wall Street‘s toxic mortgage-backed assets and eventually repackage

and sell them.

Id.

Maura Reynolds & Peter G. Gosselin, Bailout Tab: $700,000,0000 Democrats Seek Oversight,

L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/21/nation/na-wallstreet21.

See Draft Proposal, supra note 8, at § 8 (―Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of

this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court

of law or any administrative agency.‖).

Ryan Ellis, Tax Policy Director at Americans for Tax Reform, believed that Congress was

―appointing a financial dictator. Ellis continued stating, ―. . . .Congress is giving a member of the

executive branch virtually unlimited power for the entire economy.‖ John Ward, Bill Gives Paulson

Unprecedented Power, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2008/oct/03/bill-would-hand-paulson-unprecedented-authority/. Former House Speaker Newt

Gingrich believed that ―[a] plan that relies on the former chairman of Goldman Sachs presiding over

disbursing hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street is a terrible concept and inevitably will lead to

crony capitalism and the appearance of—if not the actual existence of—corruption.‖ Id. House

Representative Louie Gohmert further stated that ―[s]ince this country started, since the Constitution in

1787 . . . this country has never done anything like this, given this much power to one person.‖

Gohmert further stated, ―It‘s just wrong to our principles of American democracy to give one person

this kind of power.‖ Id.

Richard Sylla, New York University financial historian, stated:

Nothing quite of this scale has happened since the early years of the country

when Alexander Hamilton wrote the Treasury act to give him the power to

borrow and intervene in markets . . . . And in Hamilton‘s case, Congress quickly

clipped his wings, and no successor not even under President Franklin D.

Roosevelt at the height of the Depression exercised quite such unfettered power

again.

392 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

anointing Paulson as one of the most powerful men to have held any United States

office.

Buzzwords like ―financial dictator‖ became commonplace, the

―unprecedented‖ descriptor appeared so often next to the mention of the EESA that

one might figure it was part of the Congressional title.

But, was the EESA really so ―unprecedented?‖ Yes, the $700 billion cap for

the newly established Troubled Asset Relief Program was historically significant

and indeed its management authorized great power, but when this power is

considered carefully in context with other powers given to Treasury Secretaries in

times past, Paulson hardly seems to be the unprecedented power-wielding giant

that many made him out to be. As many had seemingly forgotten, Congress has

been lifting Treasury Secretary authority to such heights since the ink had barely

dried upon the United States Constitution.

History places the EESA and Paulson at the back of a long line. Does the

EESA‘s ―leap‖ in authorized power really surpass the leap taken when Congress

authorized Alexander Hamilton to establish and manage a bailout of the early

American financial system worth 7/8 of the total national debt?

Or did the EESA

give more power to Paulson to address the 2008 financial crisis than that which

Congress gave Salmon Chase to essentially print money out of thin air to repay

Civil War debts?

Or can it be said that the size of the 2008 bailout will shake up

the financial landscape more than it had been shaken when William G. McAdoo

personally shut down the New York Stock Exchange for more than four months?

United States Treasury Secretaries have faced financial crises stemming

from a multitude of varied causes throughout the nation‘s 232-year history.

Reynolds, supra note 11. John Ward of the Washington Times argued:

Historical precedent for a Treasury secretary this powerful is hard to find:

Alexander Hamilton enforced taxes by leading an army to suppress the whiskey

rebellion; William G. McAdoo shut down the New York Stock Exchange during

World War I; Salmon P. Chase issued currency during the Civil War that he later

ruled unconstitutional as a Supreme Court justice; and Robert Morris personally

guaranteed promissory notes during the days after the Revolutionary War, when

the nation had virtually no credit. Mr. Paulson‘s authority in the bill, as written

Thursday, is likely to surpass all of those.

Ward, supra note 13. Peter Grier of the Christian Science Monitor further stated, ―Henry Paulson Jr.

has become one of the most famous and, perhaps, consequential US Treasury secretaries since

Alexander Hamilton assumed the office on Sept. 11, 1789.‖ Peter Grier, Treasury Chief Paulson on

Verge of Historic New Powers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 23, 2008, available at

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0923/p01s06-usec.html.

John Ward of the Washington Times further believed that ―[i]n all of American history, it is

likely that no government official besides a wartime president has ever been given as much power over

taxpayer money as Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. would receive under the $700 billion

financial rescue plan.‖ Ward, supra note 13. Julian Zelizer, a political history professor at Harvard‘s

John F. Kennedy School of Government stated that:

[Paulson‘s authority] ranks with the top list of delegations of power, especially

since there‘s some flexibility for Treasury in deciding what to do with all this

money . . . . Zelizer further stated, ―You don‘t like to give power over finance

and taxes to people who are not democratically accountable like Congress . . . .

Id.

See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

See infra note 173 and accompanying text.

See infra note 212 and accompanying text.

See infra note 229 and accompanying text.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 393

Depending upon the severity and need of each crisis, Treasury Secretaries have

historically been granted very powerful authority to seek financial and economic

stability. The 2008 financial crisis, although unique in one sense, stands at the

back of a long line of financial challenges that have called for the acting Treasury

Secretary to seek and effectuate monumental powers. This article will analyze the

powers given to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson under the EESA and compare

such powers to those exercised by other Treasury Secretaries during past times of

financial crisis.

Part II of this article will summarize the financial crisis leading to the EESA.

Part III will consist of an analysis of the authority and power given to Paulson

under the EESA. Part IV will begin to shed light on how precedented Paulson‘s

EESA powers really were, as the section will define the genesis of a congressional

trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of financial crisis by

examining the trend‘s first and truly most powerful proponent, Alexander

Hamilton. Part V will further show that Paulson stands in the back of a rather long

line of extremely powerful Treasury Secretaries by briefly noting some of the most

historic residents of the line. Finally, Part VI will provide a brief conclusion to the

article.

II. SUMMARY OF THE ―CRISIS‖ LEADING TO THE EMERGENCY

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008

Paulson had seen the economy boil to the crisis point for some time. The

dominos began tipping with the housing bubble burst in mid-2006, giving way to

widespread mortgage defaults and lender bankruptcies throughout 2007 and

2008.

By the spring of 2008, the effect of the drastic increase of loan defaults

(especially sub-prime loan defaults) began to weigh down on investment banks

nationwide.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, ―the Washington-based quasi-

governmental firms that together guaranty or insure $5.4 trillion in mortgages,‖

became increasingly strained.

With the financial crisis alive and snowballing,

Paulson attempted to combat the spread of mortgage defaults by bringing together

the New Hope Coalition, ―an industry-led group that would modify mortgages

before foreclosure.‖

Despite such efforts by Paulson, and several interest rate

Gross, supra note 7, at 2.

[T]he housing bubble burst in mid-2006; borrowers started defaulting on

mortgages and lenders began going belly up. The mortgages had been packaged

into exotic securities, sliced and diced and sold as bonds and purchased by

investment banks and hedge funds. Because lenders, executives and traders had

convinced themselves that home prices would never fall, anything went. The

result was debt layered on debt, piled on top of debt, supported by small amounts

of cash. And so as Americans in increasing numbers defaulted on their

mortgages in 2007 and 2008, it kicked off a domino effect. The value of the

mortgage-backed bonds fell, as did that of the financial instruments based on

those bonds. Banks were forced to write down the value of their holdings and

raise new cash from foreign sovereign-wealth funds—only to report fresh losses

as the housing market weakened.

Id.

Id. at 3.

394 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

cuts by the Federal Reserve, the financial crisis rolled into Wall Street with a full

head of steam as the investment giant Bear Sterns

announced that it had become

insolvent.

The ramifications of an investment bank like Bear Sterns failing would have

been disastrous for a vast number of individuals, businesses, and financial

institutions; a vicious blow to an ever-weakening economy. Paulson intervened in

March of 2008, brokering a deal in which the investment bank JPMorgan Chase

received credit from the Federal Reserve to purchase Bear Sterns at a bargain

price.

The move helped to avoid the immediate breakdown of the financial

market; however, Paulson must have known this could not be the end, as the crisis

ball was still barreling through Wall Street with several more investment banks in

its path.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to feel the pressure of vast mortgage

defaults into the summer.

In July of 2008, Congress granted Paulson the

authority to aid the troubled institutions if he believed it to be necessary for

financial rebound.

Paulson was optimistic that this action would not be

necessary however, as he had hoped that the promise of federal support to Fannie

Mae and Freddie Mac would be enough to rally investor trust in the companies

they insured.

Unfortunately, his hopes in the already rattled investors would not

prove to be fruitful.

On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac essentially went from

‗quasi-governmental institutions‘ to ‗nationalized‘ institutions as Paulson

announced that the federal government would guaranty their debt and provide

them with much needed capital.

Not more than a week after this unprecedented

bailout, Lehman Brothers (―Lehman‖), another Wall Street investment giant, came

to Paulson seeking a Bear Sterns-like rescue.

Paulson was concerned that a

Bear Sterns was the fifth largest U.S. securities firm at the time of the August announcement.

Alison Fitzgerald, As ‘Biggest Crisis’ Hit, Congress Held Nose and Backed Bailout, Oct. 6, 2008,

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a2PslgpVvrCI&refer=home.

Gross, supra note 7, at 3.

Id.

Paulson knew the plan flew in the face of the free-market philosophy to which

he, and all his colleagues on Wall Street, clung so fiercely. But this was a special

case. When commercial banks failed, a tried-and-tested procedure kicked in: the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. took charge and made insured depositors whole.

But there was no existing protocol or regulatory framework to deal with the

failure of an investment bank. And because of its massive levels of debt and

significance in the markets for credit-default swaps—a sort of insurance policy

against investment losses—Bear Stearns had the capacity to harm hundreds of

financial institutions.

Id. When asked about the intervention in the Bear Sterns deal, Paulson told Newsweek, ―The Federal

Reserve believed—and I supported them—that it was the right thing to come in and intervene.‖ Id.

Id.

Id. Paulson commented on such optimism to Newsweek:‖‗If you‘ve got a bazooka, and people

know you‘ve got it, you may not have to take it out.‖ Id. Newsweek translated this statement as

follows: ―if the market knew the companies had a federal backstop, investors would be more likely to

give them more time to work out their troubles.‖ Id.

Id.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 395

―backstop‖ precedent would have been set if he gave similar aid to Lehman.

precedent of federal aid may have given other similarly situated institutions the

idea that they really were ‗too big to fail‘ and thus encouraged such institutions to

take greater risks, sending a message that there was a net to catch them if they

were to fall.

Paulson also believed that a Lehman failure would not have

presented the same kind of dire consequences to the economy that the Bear Sterns

failure had.

Paulson notified Lehman that he would not be coming to their

rescue.

Lehman filed for bankruptcy soon afterwards, a signal that is thought to

have motivated the already teetering Merrill Lynch to quickly strike a deal with

Bank of America.

However, Paulson‘s strong-handed signal would not prove to be so frugal

after all, as only days later the ever-snowballing financial crisis rolled into the

doors of AIG; another financial giant that posed catastrophic economic

consequences for failure.

September indeed proved to be the culmination of the

crisis. On September 16, 2008, Paulson announced that the federal government

was going to spend $85 billion to bailout AIG in exchange for an eighty percent

stake in the company and the power to install a new Chief Executive Officer.

AIG essentially became as nationalized as the once private Fannie Mae and

Freddie Mac.

The financial market was at full panic as every investment bank and firm

was suspected to be the next giant to fall. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley‘s

stock began to freefall as investors rushed to get out, ―threatening to force them

into mergers with other firms.‖

Even money market funds became tainted with

suspicion as investors continued to pull their confidences.

When banks

nationwide began to refuse capital even to each other, Paulson knew the time had

come for drastic measures.

September 20, 2008 had arrived. Paulson brought

his plight to Congress in a two-and-a-half page proposal for a $700 billion capped

bailout to be unilaterally controlled by the Treasury Department.

Although the

proposal was one that would lead to historic powers for him as the Secretary,

Paulson took no pleasure in its submission.

Gross, supra note 7, at 3.

Id.

Id. Paulson later stated at a press conference that he ―‗never once considered that it was

appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving Lehman Brothers.‘‖ Id.

Id.

Gross, supra note 7, at 3; see also CBS News & Associated Press, U.S. Announces $85 Billion

Bailout of AIG: Federal Reserve Makes Emergency Loan to Keep Global Insurance Giant Afloat, Avoid

Deepening Financial Crisis, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/

main4453942.shtml.

Gross, supra note 7, at 3.

Id.

Gross reported:

It was a message [Paulson] never expected to deliver. Henry Paulson—free-

market thinker, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and Treasury secretary to a

396 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

Even though many in Congress agreed that some intervention would likely

be necessary, it was an uphill battle for Paulson to push his proposal through

Congress.

The day after Paulson proposed his initial bailout plan, he appeared on

several popular morning talk shows in an attempt to gain public support.

Within

days, Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke appeared before the

Senate Banking Committee

and the House Financial Services Committee to

testify regarding the bailout plan.

Paulson was met with a great deal of

opposition from both Republicans and Democrats on the issues of oversight and

judicial review.

Several leaders of Congress further voiced their concerns of

conservative Republican president—was unveiling to the world a massive

taxpayer bailout of the American financial system. Afterward, as he headed into

yet another weekend of nonstop work with his team, carrying the weight of the

troubled markets on his shoulders, the former college-football star was clearly

conflicted about what he‘d just proposed. ―It‘s very unpleasant for me, but it‘s a

lot more attractive than the alternative . . . . We can spend a lot of time talking

about how it happened and how we got here. But we have to get through the

night first.‖

. . . .

While bailouts are regrettable and expensive, Paulson argues that one is needed

to restore confidence in the system. ―We‘re going to have housing issues and

mortgage issues for years . . . . The key is to get stability.‖

Id. at 1, 4.

See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

Id.

Jennifer Yousfi, Paulson and Bernanke Testify Before Congress in Favor of $700 Billion

Government Banking Bailout, MONEY MORNING, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.moneymorning.com/2008

/09/23/government-bailout-plan/.

Joseph Goldstein, Bernanke, Paulson Face Tough Audience: Senate Banking Committee

Members Stand Against $700B Bailout, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/

business/bernanke-paulson-face-tough-audience/86508/; see also Real Clear Politics, Paulson’s

Testimony to the House Services Committee, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/

2008/09/paulsons_testimony_to_the_hous.html.

See Glenn Greenwald, Growing Right-Wing Opposition to the Paulson Plan, SALON, Sept. 22,

2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/09/22/paulson/. Connecticut Senator Christopher

Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, was disturbed by Paulson‘s request to be free from

judicial review. Jason Linkins, Dirty Secret of the Bailout: Thirty-Two Words that None Dare Utter,

HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/22/dirty-secret-of-the-

bailo_n_128294.html. Senator Dodd ―proposed a bailout legislation of his own, which critically

call[ed] for ‗an oversight board that not only include[d] the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the

SEC, but congressionally appointed, non-governmental officials‘ and . . . require[d] the President to

appoint an ‗independent inspector general to investigate the Treasury asset program.‘‖ Id. In Senator

Dodd‘s legislation, section eight was effectively stripped from the bill. Id. Senator Dodd‘s proposal

would have given deference to Paulson as the acting Treasury Secretary; however, it would retain

judicial review: ―‗Any determination by the Secretary with regard to any particular troubled asset

pursuant to this Act . . . shall not be set aside unless such determination is found to be arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.‘‖ Rod Smolla, Is Paulson’s

Bailout Bill Unconstitutional?, SLATE, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2200817/pagenum/all/.

Robert Kuttner of The American Prospect believed that the lack of judicial review in Paulson‘s proposal

set his plan for intervention apart from others like it throughout history. Robert Kuttner, Paulson’s

Folly, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=paulsons

_folly.

The differences between this proposed bailout and the three closest historical

equivalents are immense. When the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the

1930s pumped a total of $35 billion into U.S. corporations and financial

institutions, there was close government supervision and quid pro quos at every

step of the way. Much of the time, the RFC became a preferred shareholder and

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 397

bailing out the large financial firms over the average individual struggling through

the down economy.

Many members of both parties doubted that the bailout,

even as large as it would be, would have any meaningful effect on the crisis.

Others were more concerned about to whom specifically they would be giving

such power and authority.

The majority seemed to believe that Paulson was

indeed a well-qualified and trustworthy individual;

however, Paulson‘s proposal

often appointed board members. The Home Owners Loan Corporation, which

eventually refinanced one in five mortgage loans, did not operate to bail out

banks but to save homeowners. And the Resolution Trust Corporation of the

1980s, created to mop up the damage of the first speculative mortgage meltdown,

the savings and loan collapse, did not pump in money to rescue bad investments;

it sorted out good assets from bad after the fact, and made sure to purge bad

executives as well as bad loans. And all three of these historic cases of public

recapitalization were done without suspending judicial review.

Id. Kuttner further criticized Paulson‘s plan with the following claims:

It includes no oversight of his own closed-door operations. It merely gives

congressional blessing and funding to what he has already been doing, ad hoc.

He plans to retain Wall Street firms as advisers to decide just how to cut deals to

value and mop up Wall Street‘s dubious paper. There are to be no limits on

executive compensation for the firms that get relief, and no equity share for the

government in exchange for this massive infusion of capital. Both Obama and

McCain have opposed the provision denying any judicial review of decisions

made by Paulson . . . .‖

Id.

Kuttner reported:

House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said he would

want to add several features to the Paulson plan, including relief for homeowners,

a new stimulus package, and limits on CEO compensation. Said Frank, ―It would

be a grave mistake to say that we‘re going to buy up the bad debt that resulted

from the bad decisions of these [private sector] people and then allow them to get

millions of dollars on the way out. . . . It‘s kind of hard to tell the average

American that we‘re going to continue to have foreclosures that destabilize

neighborhoods and deprive cities of revenues they need, but we‘re going to buy

up the [banks‘] bad paper.‖

Id.

Jennifer Parker of ABC News reported that Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, the most senior

member of the Banking Committee, was very hesitant about the plan‘s success. Jennifer Parker, Bush

Administration Tells Congress to Act Quickly or Risk Recession, ABC NEWS Sept. 23, 2008,

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PersonalFinance/Story?id=5865241&page=1. Senator Shelby stated,

―We have got to look at some alternatives.‖ Id. at 1. Shelby further stated, ―I have long opposed

government bailouts for individuals and corporate America alike.‖ Id. at 2. He continued, ―We have

been given no credible assurances that this plan will work. We could very well send $700 billion, or a

trillion, and not resolve the crisis.‖ Id. Representative Joe Barton of Texas disagreed with the proposal

of adding to the ever-increasing national debt: ―I‘m kind of an old- fashioned guy, and I think we ought

to pay for what we do as a government, but instead we‘re talking about adding $1.5 trillion to our

national debt and forcing our children to pay the cost.‖ Kevin G. Hall & Dave Montgomery, Senate

Passes $810 Billion Economic Bailout, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/

congress/story/53357.html.

See Ward, supra note 13.

The Senate unanimously confirmed Paulson‘s appointment as Treasury Secretary in 2006. See

United States Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/history/secretaries/hm

paulson.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).

Before coming to Treasury, Paulson was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

of Goldman Sachs since the firm‘s initial public offering in 1999. He joined

Goldman Sachs Chicago Office in 1974 and rose through the ranks holding

several positions including, Managing Partner of the firm‘s Chicago office, Co-

head of the firm‘s investment Banking Division, President and Chief Operating

398 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

would require Congress to place an enormous amount of trust also in an unknown

person, as it would grant power that would carry through to the Treasury Secretary

of the next administration.

As significant as this opposition was, Paulson‘s greatest critics quickly

appeared to be free-market conservative Republicans, as they were mortified by

the massive market intervention.

Even with the full support of President Bush, it

appeared that Republicans were not going to support the plan.

Seeing that the

momentum was breaking down, Vice President called a special meeting with

House Republicans on September 25th to try to rally support for Paulson‘s

proposal.

The meeting was a failure, ending with only more contentions between

Officer, and Co-Senior partner. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Paulson was a

member of the White House Domestic Council, serving as Staff Assistant to the

President from 1972 to 1973, and as Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of

Defense at the Pentagon from 1970 to 1972.

Id.

Ward, supra note 13. Ward reported that,

The concern from some critics is not with Mr. Paulson, whom they view as

focused on fixing the economic crisis. Their worry is what happens after Mr.

Paulson leaves.

Mr. Paulson will not likely remain as Treasury secretary under the next

administration, even if he is kept on board for a few months during the transition,

as Democratic presidential nominee Sen. Barack Obama has said he might do.

That makes the next person to hold these extraordinary powers - which last for

two years - an unknown quantity.

―We‘re going to hand these powers off to someone we don‘t even know. And

that‘s a wild card to me,‖ said Jim Rickards, who served a decade ago as general

counsel for Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose failure in the

late 1990s required a bailout by other banks and financial firms.

Id. at 3.

See Fitzgerald, supra note 24. A group of free-market Republicans known as the Republican

Study Committee agreed upon the ―Ten Conservative Concerns With The Treasury Bailout,‖ an

alternative that ―included suspending the capital gains tax, ending mark-to-market accounting rules and

privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.‖ Id. For a copy of the Ten Conservative Concerns with the

Treasury Bailout, see TCCTB, http://www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/092308_10conservconcerns

bailout.pdf.

Several Republicans even began bringing plans of their own, some of which looked like

diametric opposites of Paulson‘s strategy. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24. ―[A] group of House

Republicans led by Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia circulated an alternate plan calling for Wall

Street firms to buy insurance on mortgage- backed securities while cutting taxes and relaxing

regulation.‖ Id. The Republicans plan was just one of many alternatives proposed by political and

economic leaders. Senator Hillary Clinton proposed the Home Owner Loan Corporation (HOLC), a

plan that would focus on rebuilding the economy by allowing homeowner‘s to avoid foreclosure as had

been done during the 1930‘s Great Depression. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Let’s Keep People in their

Homes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223

0767702474045.html. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary

Fund, recommended a similar approach to Paulson‘s in focusing upon ―liquidity provision; purchase of

distressed assets; and capital injections into financial institutions.‖ Dominique Strauss-Kahn, A

Systematic Crisis Demands Systematic Solutions, Sept. 22, 2008, at http://www.imf.org/external/

np/vc/2008/092208.htm. Financial investment leader Warren Buffet agreed to an extent with Paulson‘s

bailout plan; however, he urged that the Federal Government must buy the ―troubled assets‖ of financial

institutions at the market price rather than Paulson‘s proposed ―hold-to-maturity‖ as the maturity price

was unrealistically favorable to banks. Henry Blodget, Even Warren Buffet Agrees: Bernanke Bailout

Price Plan a Joke, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henry-

blodget/even-warren-buffett-agree_b_128919.html.

Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 399

Republicans.

Another meeting was held later on September 25th between Congressional

leaders at the White House to discuss the status of Paulson‘s proposal.

Staff

members and aides of the representatives reported that when House minority

leader John Boehner stated that ―House Republicans were not on board . . . [t]he

meeting erupted in shouting.‖

It was reported that as:

[T]he meeting broke up and participants stormed out, Paulson followed

[Democratic Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank]

and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Paulson, pleading with Pelosi to keep the deal

alive in spite of the partisanship, got down on one knee and begged her to push

on . . . .

With tensions high within both parties, House Democrats put the proposal to

a vote as an amendment to HR 3997 on September 29th.

Several Paulson

supporters were optimistic, including President Bush, but as a large number of

‗no‘ votes began coming in, it was apparent that the amendment would fail.

Both

Democratic and Republican leaders continued to plead with party members to pass

the plan, as the vote was held open for forty minutes, ―nearly triple the usual

[fifteen] minutes‖ allotted for voting.

―Pelosi could be seen on the floor pleading

with fellow Democrats Bennie Thompson and Jesse Jackson Jr. to change their

‗no‘ votes to ‗yes.‘ Thompson repeatedly shook his head ‗no‘ at the speaker.

When the gavel went down, the bill fell [twelve] votes short.‖

The Dow Jones

Industrial Average fell nearly 500 points during the vote alone, finally closing the

day down 777 points.

As financial markets continued to fall, the Senate took Paulson‘s proposal to

vote on October 1st as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (―EESA‖) of

2008, an amendment to HR 1424.

The Senate passed the bill with overwhelming

approval seventy-four to twenty-five.

Many members of the Senate believed that

the bill would pass on House vote as two ―sweeteners‖ were added to motivate

votes from numerous constituencies: ―a tax cut and extended federal protection for

Id. Fitzgerald reported that ―Indiana Republican Mike Pence said it was ‗very evident‘ after the

meeting that ‗there is a growing discontent among Republicans.‘‘‘ Id.

Id.

Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

Id.

Congressman Michael Conaway, a Texas Republican, waited to see where the

vote was going as he tried to decide. An accountant by training, he said he

understood the risks posed by securities backed by foreclosed mortgages, yet still

opposed bailing out those responsible for them. One of the last to vote, he said he

stood in front of the machine with a hand on both the ―yes‖ and ―no‖ buttons and

paused. After a moment, he pressed ―no.‖

Id.

Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

Ron Haruni, U.S. Senate Passes Economic Bailout Bill, WALL STREET PIT, Oct. 1, 2008,

available at http://wallstreetpit.com/2008/10/senate-passes-economic-bailout-bill/.

400 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

bank deposits . . . .‖

Furthermore, numerous measures of oversight had been

added to the original proposal in addition to striking the ‗no review‘ clause.

The

bill returned to the House for a vote on October 3rd and passed 263-171,

undoubtedly to Paulson‘s great relief.

After two weeks of excruciating

negotiations, Paulson‘s once clear-cut two and a half page proposal now stood as

the EESA,

a ―450 page [statute,] laden with tax breaks and other measures

unrelated to the crisis.‖

Even so, the essence of Paulson‘s $700 billion capped

bailout proposal was now law.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EESA AND THE POWER THAT WAS

AUTHORIZED TO TREASURY SECRETARY HENRY PAULSON

The amendment to HR 1424 was the 450-page manifestation of the two

weeks of hard political negotiations that followed Paulson‘s initial bailout

proposal. Paulson‘s two and a half page proposal, concise and pure in its purpose

to address the financial and economic crises through a broad bailout, became the

bulletin board on which hundreds of political add-ons were pinned. However, as

convoluted as it was, still lying beneath the blanket of both conservative and liberal

flavored add-ons was the beating heart of a monumental $700 billion bailout plan

to be managed by Paulson. Thus, underneath the political mess and chains of

oversight was a grant of extreme power. As many have argued, the EESA may

have made Henry Paulson not only the most powerful Treasury Secretary to date,

but also perhaps one of the most power political officers in American history.

Fitzgerald, supra note 24. Many considered the new bill to have actually been an $810 billion

bailout as another $110 billion in tax breaks was further provided for businesses and individuals. See

Hall, supra note 50.

See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765

(2008).

The White House said layers of oversight have been added in the . . . two weeks

of negotiations to ensure transparency and integrity in the process. [White House

spokesman Tony Fratto stated that,] ―[t]he government has nuclear programs that

don‘t have as much oversight, reporting and surveillance . . . [Whereas] [t]he bill

will give the Treasury secretary ‗a lot of decision-making authority,‖ there will

be an ―unprecedented amount of oversight and supervision . . .

Ward, supra note 13.

See Dave Burdick, House Bailout Bill Friday Vote: YEA – 263, NAY – 171, HUFFINGTON POST,

Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/02/house-bailout-vote-encore_n_131222.html.

See Draft Proposal, supra note 8.

Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

Stephen S. Kudenholdt, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Order No.

14108, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES

305 (Practising Law Institute, 2008).

The initial plan that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted to Congress

was short and simple. It gave Secretary Paulson $700 billion and the authority to

use all of the tools of the capital markets to remove distressed assets from

institutional balance sheets and to manage, workout, finance, repackage and sell

those assets, without the constraints of mark-to-market accounting, capital

charges, credit concerns or other impediments to private institutions. Although

Congress greatly expanded the final bill, with a few significant exceptions, the

Secretary has retained the broad authority that he requested.

Id.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 401

The general purpose of the entire HR 1424 amendment was:

To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure

certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and

preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting

taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain expiring

provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes.

As the EESA was the amendment‘s most powerful tool to accomplish this

general purpose, the Act had a much more specific purpose:

(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury

can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States;

and

(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a manner that—

(A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life

savings;

(B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth;

(D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority.

In essence, Congress acted to: (1) equip the Treasury Secretary with broad

and powerful tools (such as the $700 billion capped bailout and authority to further

insure/guaranty other assets) in order to restabilize the United States financial

system; and (2) guide the use of such powers for the mutual benefit of businesses

and individual taxpayers alike through oversight and public accountability.

A. Paulson’s Authority under the EESA

The main ‗authority and facility‘ given to Paulson under the EESA was the

power to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (―TARP‖) as a vehicle for a

$700 billion capped bailout plan.

Under the TARP, Paulson could establish the

―Office of Financial Stability‖

in order ―to purchase, and to make and fund

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, § 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766

(2008).

Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 309-10.

The centerpiece of the Program is the Secretary‘s ability to purchase troubled

assets from ailing financial institutions in an attempt to stem the write-downs and

losses being taken by such institutions. By establishing ‗market‘ prices for

troubled assets and providing liquidity to the market, the Program also seeks to

encourage private participants to begin purchasing mortgage related and other

structured products as well.

Id.

Although Paulson is given the authority to manage the overall TARP, the EESA required that

the Office of Financial Stability ―be headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, appointed by the

402 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

commitments to purchase, troubled assets

from any financial institution, on such

terms and conditions as are determined by the [Treasury] Secretary, and in

accordance with [other provisions of the EESA] and the policies and procedures

developed and published by the Secretary.‖

Paulson‘s authority under TARP

allowed him to immediately purchase $250 billion of troubled assets to be held

outstanding without any further authorization from Congress.

Paulson could then

raise the limit of outstanding troubled assets to $350 billion upon the President

submitting ―a written certification‖ to Congress indicating ―that the Secretary

needs to exercise [such] authority.‖

The final step of authorized power allowed

Paulson to double the limit of outstanding troubled assets owned by the federal

government to $700 billion with another ―written report‖ submitted to Congress by

the President.

Upon establishing the TARP, Paulson was additionally authorized to

guaranty and insure other troubled assets (and set the premiums for such

guarantees) with only minor limitations.

Thus, within only the first few pages of

the EESA, Congress anointed Paulson with the power to directly intervene in the

financial market to the extent of purchasing $700 billion of financially ―troubled‖

assets (and indeed to have a greater effect than $700 billion as Paulson could also

insure/guaranty even more assets).

Paulson‘s intervention power became even greater when he was given broad

authority to manage these programs and the assets they purchased. First, as to

management of the programs themselves, EESA section 101(c) granted Paulson

the primary execution authority to take actions that he deemed were ―necessary to

carry out the authorities‖ in the EESA.

Section 101(c) went on to provide a brief,

yet substantial, list of just a few of these powers of execution.

Paulson had the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.‖ Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,

Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008).

―Troubled assets‖ were considered to be any ―residential or commercial mortgages and any

securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each

case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary

determines promotes financial market stability . . .‖ § 3(9)(A), 122 Stat. at 3767. Additionally, a

―troubled asset‖ could be ―any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the

Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which

is necessary to promote financial market stability . . .‖ § 3(9)(B), 122 Stat. at 3767. Kudenholdt notes

that although section 3(9)(A) focused on a particular group of securities, section 3(9)(B) allowed

Paulson to include many other types of financial assets in the Program after consultation with the

Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and notice to Congress. Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 308.

Emergency Econ. Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat.

3765, 3767 (2008) (emphasis added).

§ 115(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3780.

§ 115(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3780.

§ 115(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3780. The ―written report‖ required more than just Presidential

certification. The report was required to ―[d]etail the plan of the Secretary to exercise the authority.‖

Id. The power to raise the outstanding troubled asset limit to $700 billion does not actually become

effective until fifteen days after the President submits the written report, so long as a joint resolution

opposed to the report is not filed within this time period. Id.

§102(a)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. at 3768-69.

§ 101(c), 122 Stat. at 3768.

EESA section 101(c)‘s list of powers to carry the bailout into effect was not a limitation on any

other power Paulson might deem necessary. ―The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the

Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 403

direct authority to hire and manage employees that would administer the TARP.

In purchasing or guarantying troubled assets, Paulson had the authority to enter

into contracts on behalf of the Federal Government and to further designate

―financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government.‖

In the spirit of ―[minimizing] cost to taxpayers‖ for the management of the

extensive amount of assets to be held by the TARP, Congress further authorized

Paulson the ―flexibility‖ to create financial agents of his own to ―purchase, hold,

and sell troubled assets and issue obligations.‖

Importantly, Congress did not

restrict the number or type of financial ―vehicles‖ that Paulson could establish.

Finally, in order to make sure that Paulson‘s executive powers were truly

complete, Congress then broadly authorized Paulson to issue ―such regulations and

other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the

authorities or purposes of‖ the EESA.

Second, in addition to such administrative authority over the program itself,

Paulson was further given broad powers to manage the hundreds of billions of

dollars worth of troubled assets that were purchased through the EESA‘s

application. EESA section 106(b) stated that Paulson ―. . . shall have authority to

manage troubled assets purchased under this Act, including revenues and portfolio

risks therefrom.‖

Additionally, section 106(a) stated that Paulson may ―. . . at

any time, exercise any rights received in connection with troubled assets purchased

under this Act.‖

Paulson was essentially given the complete authoritative control

over managing the funds acquired so that he could sell or reinvest such funds to

maximize return on the taxpayer‘s investment.

Whereas Paulson was given other powers throughout the EESA, the most

consequential were these powers to execute and manage the likely $700 billion

following . . .‖ Id. (emphasis added). As the Kudenholdt observes, ―[o]nce purchased, troubled assets

may be managed, financed and sold as the Secretary sees fit.‖ Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 307.

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(1), 122 Stat.

3765, 3768 (2008).

§§ 101(c)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3768.

§ 101(c)(4), 122 Stat. at 3768.

Paulson‘s freedom to establish such financial ―vehicles‖ was further broadened by the Federal

Government‘s further freedom from tax constraint and liability. As Kudenholdt notes,

[Paulson] will not have to consider the tax, limitation of liability and bankruptcy

issues that private institutions must consider when forming entities to hold assets.

As a result, the form of vehicle used will likely relate more to convenience,

flexibility and suitability for the assets being held and the types of obligations

that may be issued. In some of the recent transactions with troubled financial

institutions, the Federal Reserve Bank has utilized limited liability companies

(where private parties shared an interest in the acquired assets) and pass-through

trusts.

Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 315.

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(5), 122 Stat.

3765, 3768 (2008).

§ 106(b), 122 Stat. at 3773.

§ 106(a), 122 Stat. at 3773 (emphasis added).

See § 106(c), 122 Stat. at 3773 (―The Secretary may, at any time, upon terms and conditions and

at a price determined by the Secretary, sell, or enter into securities loans, repurchase transactions, or

other financial transactions in regard to, any troubled asset purchased under this Act.‖); § 113(a)(2), 122

Stat. at 3778 (―. . . the Secretary shall hold the assets to maturity or for resale for and until such time as

the Secretary determines that the market is optimal for selling such assets . . .‖)

404 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

bailout of troubled institutions in the United States financial market. However, as

part two of the EESA purpose expressed, these powers were given to Paulson with

strong guidance and oversight. As members of Congress went to great length to

guide and hedge the broad powers given to Paulson, it is important to view

Paulson‘s authority over the bailout plan in the context of the EESA‘s oversight

provisions.

B. Congressional Guidance of Paulson’s Authority

Congress understood that Paulson needed broad and flexible powers in order

for the bailout to be most effective and efficient in addressing the financial crisis.

Even so, Congress did not want to hand over the keys to the $700 billion vault

without at least giving Paulson some small bit of advice on how to spend it. Like

the father who cannot help but give his teenager one last lecture of guidance before

handing over the keys to the car, Congress delivered section 103‘s

―considerations‖ for Paulson to review before ‗punching‘ the brand new bailout

vehicle‘s gas pedal.

Congress reminded Paulson to protect taxpayer interests in seeking

maximum return to seek stability for financial markets and prevent further

disturbance, ―to help families keep their homes,‖ to remember the towns and

counties that have been affected, and to protect American ―jobs, savings, and

retirement security.‖

Congress further urged Paulson to think in the long-term

when investing, to ensure that the TARP would not discriminate against certain

financial institutions, to remember smaller institutions that serve low to moderate-

income areas, and to consider the ―utility of purchasing other real estate owned and

instruments backed by mortgages on multifamily properties . . .‖

C. Oversight of Paulson’s Authority

Of course, Congress had not left $700 billion in Paulson‘s hands on guidance

alone. For as much as Congress had granted immense power to Paulson in the

EESA, it also set up several substantial measures of disclosure,

limitation,

See §§ 103(1)-(3), (7), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770.

See §§ 103(4)-(6), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770. Congress further provided Paulson with outside

guidance under section 101(b) by requiring him to ―consult with the [Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System], [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], Comptroller of the Currency, Director of

the Office of Thrift Supervision, Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and the

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development‖ when exercising his authority under the EESA. §

101(b), 1222 Stat. at 3768.

Congress required Paulson to disclose more specifics about how the program would work

through publishing the ―program guidelines.‖ § 101(d), 122 Stat. 3768. Paulson‘s ―program guidelines‖

had to disclose: (1) mechanisms for purchasing troubled assets; (2) methods for pricing and valuing

troubled assets; (3) procedures for selecting asset managers; and (4) criteria for identifying troubled

assets for purchase. Id.

One of the most important measures of limitation upon Paulson‘s power was duration. § 120(a),

122 Stat. at 3788. Section 120(a) stated that all of the ―authorities provided [to Paulson] under sections

101(a), excluding section 101(a)(3), and 102 shall terminate on December 31, 2009.‖ Id. Either

Paulson or the next Treasury Secretary could have however extended such authority nearly another year

by submitting a written certification for extension to Congress. § 120(b), 122 Stat. at 3788 (which

allowed for an extension to last no later than two ―years from the date of enactment of [the EESA]‖).

The subsequently appointed Secretary Tim Geithner was required to include in such a certification a

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 405

accountability,

and oversight to check Paulson‘s exercise of such power. The

two major instruments of oversight used by Congress were oversight boards. The

first of these boards was the Financial Stability Oversight Board (―FSOB‖)

established by EESA section 104.

The FSOB‘s primary purposes included

reviewing the exercise of power taken by Paulson under the TARP, making

recommendations to Paulson concerning future exercises of power, and reporting

―any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or malfeasance to the Special Inspector

General for the [TARP] or the Attorney General of the United States.‖

100

The

FSOB also retained the authority to ―ensure‖ that Paulson‘s continuing policies for

the TARP were: (1) congruent with the Congress‘ stated purposes for the EESA;

(2) ―in the economic interests of the United States;‖ and (3) ―consistent with

protecting taxpayers.‖

101

Additionally, the FSOB had the option of creating a

Credit Review Committee to further evaluate Paulson‘s exercise of power in

purchasing troubled assets.

102

The second oversight board instituted by the EESA was the Congressional

Oversight Panel (―COP‖)

103

established by section 125.

104

The duty of the COP

was to continually ―review the current state of the financial markets and the

regulatory system‖ and submit several reports

105

to Congress on its findings.

106

―justification of why the extension is necessary to assist American families and stabilize financial

markets, as well as the expected cost to the taxpayers for such an extension.‖ Id.

In addition to numerous measures of oversight, Paulson was required to further submit several of

his own reports to Congress concerning the exercise of his newly granted authority under the bailout

plan. First, Paulson was required to submit an extensive report to various Congressional committees

every thirty days which includes: (1) an overview of the actions he has taken in connection with his

EESA authority; (2) ―obligations and expenditures‖ of section 118 funding since the last report with an

estimated projection for the next period; and (3) a ―detailed financial statement‖ that meticulously

discloses the details of all financial actions taken by Paulson under his EESA authority. § 105(a), 122

Stat. at 3771-72. Paulson was required to further submit a ―Tranche‖ report to Congress every time the

TARP breached a new $50 billion plateau of purchased assets. § 105(b), 122 Stat. at 3772. Along with

all of this, Paulson was required to provide a justification with every report for the prices the TARP was

paying. Id. Paulson was also required to submit a ―regulatory modernization report‖ to Congress by

April 30, 2009. §105(c), 122 Stat. at 3772. This report was required to analyze ―the current state of the

regulatory system and its effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial markets, including

the over-the-counter swaps market and government-sponsored enterprises, and providing

recommendations for improvement . . .‖ Id at 3772-73.

§ 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770. The FSOB is a five member board comprised of the: (1) Chairman

of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;(2) Treasury Secretary; (3) Director of the

Federal Housing Finance Agency; (4) Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission; and (5)

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. § 104(b), 122 Stat. at 3771.

100

§ 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770.

101

§ 104(e), 122 Stat. at 3771.

102

§ 104(f), 122 Stat. at 3771.

103

The COP is a five member board comprised of : (1) one member appointed by the Speaker of

the House of Representatives; (2) one member appointed by the minority leader of the House of

Representatives; (3) one member appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; (4) one member

appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; and (5) one member appointed by the Speaker of the

House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate, ―after consultation with the minority

leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.‖ § 125(c)(1), 122 Stat. at

3792.

104

§ 125, 122 Stat. at 3791-92.

105

The COP was required to provide ―general reports‖ to Congress every thirty days pertaining to

the use, impact, and effectiveness of Paulson‘s power under the EESA. §125(b)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at

3791. The COP was further required to submit a ―special report on regulatory reform‖ to Congress by

no later than January 20, 2009:

406 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

The COP was given several powers in order to fulfill its duty as the panel could:

(1) hold hearings with the authority to receive evidence and sworn testimony; (2)

enlist agents; and (3) obtain direct information from any department or agency of

the United States.

107

In addition to these two oversight boards, Congress also anointed two

governmental officials with the authorization to personally oversee how Paulson

exercised his powers under the EESA. The first of these officials was the

Comptroller General of the United States. EESA section 116(a) authorized the

Comptroller General to conduct ―ongoing oversight‖ of literally every component

of Paulson‘s execution of the TARP.

108

The Comptroller General could

investigate all ―activities and performance of the TARP and of any agents and

representatives of the TARP . . . including vehicles established by the

Secretary.‖

109

In addition to this general oversight power, the Comptroller General

could further ―audit the programs, activities, receipts, expenditures, and financial

transactions of the TARP and any agents and representatives of the TARP . . .

including vehicles established by the Secretary.‖

110

Congress ordered Paulson to

do much more than just submit to such extensive oversight. EESA section 116

required Paulson to allow constant Comptroller ―presence,‖ as Paulson had to

provide the Comptroller General sufficient ―space and facilities‖ within the

Treasury Department to conduct the oversight.

111

If that weren‘t enough, Congress

further ordered the Treasury Department to pay the bill of its own oversight as

EESA section 116(a)(2)(C) stated that ―[t]he Treasury shall reimburse the

Government Accountability Office for the full cost of any such oversight activities

as billed therefor by the Comptroller General.‖

112

[A]nalyzing the current state of the regulatory system and its effectiveness at

overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting consumers, and

providing recommendations for improvement, including recommendations

regarding whether any participants in the financial markets that are currently

outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system, the

rationale underlying such recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in

existing consumer protections.

§ 125(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3792.

106

§ 125(b), 122 Stat. at 3791-92.

107

§ 125(e), 122 Stat. at 3793.

108

§ 116(a), 122 Stat. at 3783.

109

Id. Similar to the COP, the Comptroller General was required to continually investigate

whether Paulson‘s performance under the TARP met the purposes of the EESA in advancing

foreclosure mitigation, cost reduction, stability in financial markets, and protection of taxpayers. §

116(a)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at 3783. The Comptroller General was to evaluate ―[t]he financial condition

and internal controls of the TARP‖ along with the characteristics of its purchases, obligations, and

disposition of assets. § 116(a)(1)(B)-(D), 122 Stat. at 3784. Additionally, the Comptroller General was

required to monitor the TARP‘s operations efficiency, compliance with all other laws, efforts in

avoiding conflicts of interest among agents and representatives, and ―efficacy of contracting procedures

pursuant to section 107(b).‖ § 116(a)(1)(E)-(H), 122 Stat. at 3784. While ―overseeing‖ the TARP, the

Comptroller General was given complete access to all TARP related information. § 116(a)(2)(B), 122

Stat. at 3784.

110

§ 116(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3785. Whereas the Comptroller General had the general power to audit

upon discretion, he or she was required to conduct at least one annual audit per year. § 116(b)(1), 122

Stat. at 3785. The Comptroller General‘s annual audit required the TARP to ―prepare and issue to the

appropriate committees of Congress and the public audited financial statements.‖ Id.

111

§ 116(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. at 3784.

112

§ 116(a)(2)(C), 122 Stat. at 3785.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 407

The Comptroller General was not the only official keeping a personal eye

upon Paulson‘s exercise of power in the TARP. Congress concurrently established

the ―Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief

Program.‖

113

The Inspector General had the authority to investigate and audit the

―purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the Treasury under

any program established by the Secretary under section 101, and the management

by the Secretary of any program established under section 102 . . .‖

114

The

Inspector General could be involved in the oversight of every troubled asset

Paulson purchased under the bailout plan, as among the articles of information the

Inspector General was required to report to Congress

115

was ―an explanation of the

reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase each such troubled asset.‖

116

Similar to the Comptroller General, Congress did not stop at just requiring Paulson

to submit to the official‘s oversight. EESA section 121(g) required Paulson to

allocate $50 million of the funding set aside for his use under EESA section 118 to

provide funding for the Inspector General to fulfill the oversight duties.

117

In addition to these major instruments of oversight, Congress also hedged

Paulson‘s exercise of power by installing a measure of judicial review in EESA

section 119, effectively scrapping the ―no review‖ clause from Paulson‘s

proposal.

118

EESA section 119(a)(1) subjected Paulson‘s exercise of power to the

general judicial review provisions provided in ―chapter seven of title 5 [of the]

United States Code‖ and directed the adjudicator to find and set aside any of

Paulson‘s actions ―. . . that are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or not in accordance with law.‖

119

Even though this highly sought-after

judicial review existed in Congress‘ final grant of power to Paulson, there was

significant debate over whether it is a true check on his authority as EESA section

119 also provided substantial limitations on the types of parties that can bring

suit

120

and more importantly upon the equitable relief that may be granted.

121

113

§ 121(a), 122 Stat. at 3788.

114

§ 121(c), 122 Stat. at 3788-89 (emphasis added).

115

The Inspector General was required to collect and summarize information such as the complete

listings of every purchased troubled asset, the names of each financial institution that sold the assets, a

detailed biography of every ―person or entity hired to manage such troubled assets,‖ and a list of all

insurance contracts that have been issued by Paulson under section 102. §§ 121(c)(1)(B), (D)-(E), (G),

122 Stat. at 3788-89. The Inspector General was also required to keep a current estimate of the ―total

amount of troubled assets purchased‖ by any section 101 program. § 121(c)(1)(F), 122 Stat. at 3789.

The Inspector General is broadly equipped to acquire such information by sections 121(c)(2), 121(d),

and 121(e).

116

§ 121(c)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 3789 (emphasis added).

117

§ 121(g), 122 Stat. at 3790.

118

See Draft Proposal, supra note 8.

119

§ 119(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3787.

120

Section 119(a)(3)‘s ―limitations on actions by participating companies‖ provided that ―[n]o

action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any person that divests its assets with respect

to its participation in a program under‖ under the EESA. The only exception to this limitation was if

Paulson were to waive the limitation expressly in a contract with the company or individual. §

119(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3787.

121

The major limitation on equitable relief against Paulson was EESA section 119(a)(2)(A): ―. . .

no injunction or other form of equitable relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant

to section 101, 102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a violation of the Constitution.‖ David Zaring,

blogger for the Conglomerate, believed that this limitation effectively canceled out the judicial review.

See David Zaring, Judicial Review in the Bailout Bill, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.org/

408 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

D. Impact of Paulson’s Bailout Authority

Given that the 2008 crisis was considered by many to have had ―an

unprecedented amount of uncertainty as to the extent of either its causes or

effects,‖ the impact (or non-impact) of Paulson‘s bailout authority will not truly be

ascertainable for quite some time.

122

It may well be that the $700 billion bailout will calm the financial markets, be

sufficient to prevent further collapses among insurers, banks and investment

houses, and perhaps even prove to be far less costly to taxpayers than its $700

billion price tag when assets acquired by the federal government . . . at steep

discounts are later sold at a profit. Such a ‗soft landing‘ is far from certain,

however. The bailout seeks to stabilize the financial and credit markets primarily by

purchasing mortgage-backed securities, the worth of which is highly suspect.

123

E. Summary and Conclusion of Paulson’s Authority

The EESA granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson tremendous authority

to establish, execute, and manage a $700 billion capped bailout of the United

States financial system. His power was not only defined simply by the magnitude

of its reach, but also by the enormity of the microscope that Congress continually

hovered above him through the EESA‘s extensive oversight. All of this

considered, there is no doubt that Paulson will be remembered as a historically

powerful government official.

Paulson was given great power to address a dire financial crisis, but in

context, was he really the most powerful Treasury Secretary in United States

history? Was the scope of the authority given to Paulson under the EESA really an

―unprecedented‖ leap by Congress? The next section of this article will begin to

show that the answer to these questions is no, as the section will define the genesis

of a Congressional trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of

financial crisis by examining the pattern‘s first and truly most powerful proponent,

Alexander Hamilton.

IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TREND TO MAGNIFY

2008/10/judicial-review.html. Zaring stated that ―it looks a bit like the bill provides for [arbitrary and

capricious review] in one section, and then takes it away, by taking away equitable relief, in the other

section.‖ Id. Zaring‘s main contention was that the arbitrary and capricious review granted by EESA

section 119(a) was itself considered to be an equitable relief by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Doe v.

Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 619 n.1 (2004) (―referring to the ‗the general provisions for equitable relief within

the Administrative Procedure Act‘ and citing a section of the same Title 5, Chapter 7 referenced in the

bailout bill‘s judicial review provisions‖)). Zaring did not believe that ―someone who thought that . . .

Paulson underpaid for a particular mortgage backed security [could] sue . . .‖ under the arbitrary and

capricious standard. Id. Zaring conceded however that some sort of declaratory judgment might be

available to such a plaintiff in asserting that Paulson had made a sale that was plainly inconsistent with

the EESA. Id. Either way, Zaring pointed out that under Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), the

Treasury Department could ―use its broad powers to set up a mandatory administrative appeals process,

which . . . would keep plaintiffs out of the courts until they had exhausted their administrative remedies,

and which would give the courts an adjudicated process to look at (and, hopefully for Treasury, rubber

stamp).‖ Id.

122

Alan C. Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Government Posed by the Housing

and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV‘T L. REV. 259, 271 (2009) (emphasis added).

123

Id. at 271-72.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 409

TREASURY SECRETARY AUTHORITY IN THE MIDST OF CRISIS:

ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1789-1795)

A. The Public Credit Crisis

The infant United States presented newly elected President George

Washington with a multitude of challenges upon his taking office in the spring of

1789, none more complex and critical to the future of the Union then the state of

the nation‘s finances. Fighting the War of Independence against England had

caused the Continental Congress to retain debt from ―. . . more creditors than any

other government in the world.‖

124

The vast majority of the Revolutionary War

debt, or as political leaders called it ―the price of liberty,‖ had not yet been ―settled

since independence due to the ‗embarrassment of a defective constitution‖ under

the Confederation.

125

By 1789 the United States‘ foreign debt totaled over $10

million (with $1.6 million more in arrears of interest).

126

The nation‘s domestic

debt, largely comprised of war certificates and bonds issued to former Continental

soldiers and suppliers, amounted to more than $40 million with accrued interest.

127

All in all, the newly formed federal government was in a $50 million hole; a virtual

anvil around the neck of its hopeful Constitution.

Adding to the financial strain of the nation was the fact that the individual

states also owed both domestic and foreign investors an aggregated $25 million,

128

which only a few states had made significant progress in paying.

129

The size of the

national and state debts was only the beginning of the problem however, as the

organization and subsequent management of the domestic debt could be described

as nothing short of chaotic.

130

Furthermore, faith in the fledgling United States

124

JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 230

(Transaction Publishers 2004) (1959).

125

MARIE B. HECHT, ODD DESTINY: THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 180 (1982).

126

MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.

127

Id. See also MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1970).

The total owed to individuals amounted to more than 40 million dollars. Of

which about one-third was accrued interest. Many of the certificates had

originally been issued to pay soldiers and officers of the army; others had been

given to farmers and merchants by commissary officers. Many of the bonds had

been purchased by patriotic investors who had later been obliged to sell them at a

loss; some of the securities, like some certificates and warrants, had changed

hands several times.

Id.

128

JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (1982).

129

―Massachusetts and South Carolina had large unpaid obligations on the war account; North

Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Georgia had paid off most of their war debts; the other states had less

at stake.‖ MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.

130

See MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.

The domestic debt consisted of a chaos of virtually worthless paper money; loan-

office certificates; IOU‘s signed by the Quartermaster commissary generals;

lottery prizes (the government had conducted lotteries but had been unable to pay

the winners in cash); certificates given to soldiers and officers in lieu of pay;

indents (paper certificates representing interest debt). Hardly a means of going

into debt known to the governments of the eighteenth century had been omitted

by the Continental Congress . . .

Id.

410 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

financial system was low and diminishing, significantly compounding the problem

of borrowing and repayment.

131

Many historians believe that the success of Washington‘s administration, and

indeed the sustained future of the whole nation, rested upon how Washington

addressed the nation‘s mounting financial crisis.

132

Washington turned to Robert

Morris, former Superintendent of Finance under the Confederation, for guidance in

asking, ―[w]hat are we to do with this heavy debt?‖

133

Morris‘ only answer for the

President was a referral: ―[t]here is but one man in the United States who can tell

you; that is Alexander Hamilton.‖

134

Washington appointed Hamilton, his long-

time friend and confidant,

135

to be the first Treasury Secretary of the United States

on September 11, 1789.

136

Hamilton‘s exercise of power in addressing the post-

Revolutionary financial crisis and further creating the initial American financial

system has caused many to consider him to be the most influential, powerful, and

indeed controversial Treasury Secretary in United States history.

137

The sheer size and nature of the national debt forced Hamilton to face a

critical market intervention dilemma from the outset of his service. Whereas the

majority agreed that all foreign debt should be repaid, many wanted Hamilton to

consider an arbitrary cancellation of the domestic debt altogether.

138

In the face of

national bankruptcy, the argument for canceling the domestic debt was supported

131

The United States‘ revenue from taxation failed to even meet the interest of the government‘s

obligations. Id. at 231. Hamilton would later define the problem as a rather vicious cycle. Id. at 230.

Hamilton had always contended that the government could not endure without

credit ‗commensurate with the utmost extent of the lending faculties of the

community‘; but credit could not be established until provision had been made

for the existing debt. Little could be done toward disposing of the existing debt,

however, until the government had regained its ability to borrow. Truly the

finances of the United States were a dilemma wrapped in a paradox.

Id.

132

Cooke believed that ―[t]he success of Washington‘s administration largely hinged on its

adoption of fiscal policies that would revive confidence in the fledgling nation, both at home and abroad

. . .‖ COOKE, supra note 128, at 73. Miller further expressed that ―[t]he success of the Constitution and

the very existence of the republic depended upon the skill with which the financial obligations of the

government were handled.‖ MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.

133

HECHT, supra note 125, at 177.

134

Id.

135

Hamilton served as Washington‘s ―chief of staff‖ and ―principal and most confidential aide,‖

during the Revolutionary War. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 90, 91 (2004). Washington

considered Hamilton to be like a surrogate son during their time in the war, even referring to him as

―my boy.‖ Id. at 87.

136

HECHT, supra note 125, at 177. The Senate would go on to confirm Hamilton as the Treasury

Secretary later that same day. Id.

137

See generally RICHARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATION

285 (1957). As to the founding of the initial American financial system:

Hamilton came into Washington‘s cabinet with a seven-point program: (1) the

restoration of public credit; (2) a sound system of taxation; (3) a national bank;

(4) a sound currency; (5) the promotion of commerce; (6) the encouragement of

manufactures; and (7) a liberal immigration policy. In his public papers he made

it clear that the carrying out of this program was not to be at the expense of

agriculture, but would result in the building of a balanced economy which would

benefit all economic groups. His program was brilliantly presented to the nation

in a series of bold and masterful reports.

Id.

138

MILLER, supra note 124, at 231.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 411

both by a basic call for national self-preservation and a rationale that the United

States had in a sense already fulfilled a greater obligation to creditors in providing

them with liberty through the defeat of England.

139

Whereas Hamilton held that

the federal government did have the power to cancel debt,

140

he concluded that it

would not be ―just‖ to do so in this case as he sincerely believed that the United

States could fulfill its debt obligations upon reform of policy.

141

Even though Hamilton had refused such an extreme measure, market

intervention was still on his mind. In October of 1789, only weeks after

Hamilton‘s appointment, Congress requested that Hamilton submit a proposal to

address the public credit crisis.

142

Hamilton responded two months later with his

historic First Report on the Public Credit.

143

Similar to Paulson, Hamilton

submitted a three-part proposal

144

involving measures of far-reaching market

intervention that required Congress to give Hamilton and the Treasury Department

a tremendous amount of power.

145

First, Hamilton proposed that the Treasury

Department, acting on behalf of the President, be authorized to borrow money and

use excess tax revenue as necessary to pay down the entirety of the foreign debt

owed to France, Holland, and Spain over the next fifteen years.

146

This was the

least controversial part of Hamilton‘s plan as it was generally agreed that the

priority for the United States was to protect its financial reputation with foreign

nations.

147

Second, Hamilton proposed that the federal government address the domestic

debt by allowing the Treasury Department to offer the speculators which held the

controversial war bonds and certificates

148

a redemption of their securities in

139

Id.

140

―The highest law of the state, [Hamilton] admitted, was self-preservation; when its existence

was at stake, a government could alter the terms of contracts, discriminate between various groups of

creditors and declare its obligations null and void.‖ Id.

141

Id. Hamilton expressed this belief in stating that if he were to ―establish that a government may

decline a provision for its debts, though able to make it . . . and you overthrow all public morality . . .

You have anarchy, despotism, or what you please, but you have no just or regular government.‖ Id.

142

Id. at 231-32.

143

MYERS, supra note 127, at 60.

144

In sum, Hamilton‘s report would seek to explain how ―the debt could be paid, to whom it

should be paid and what was to be done with the state debts dating from the Revolutionary War.‖

MILLER, supra note 124, at 232.

145

MYERS, supra note 127, at 60-62.

146

Id. at 60-61.

147

Id. at 61.

148

The majority of men who had been originally ―paid‖ with the war certificates were veteran

soldiers and suppliers of the Revolutionary War. See generally MILLER, supra note 124, at 232-34.

These veterans, and often their widows or orphans, were met with hard times after the war. Id. Many

of them were forced by their circumstances to sell the war securities to speculators ―often at a fraction

their nominal value . . .‖ Id. at 232. Due to this sad situation, a widespread ―equity‖ debate spread

throughout Congress pertaining to who should be justly paid for the outstanding war certificates and

bonds. Congressman Aedanus Burke ―proposed that a discrimination should be made between the

original holders of the public securities and their assignees and that a scale of depreciation be prepared

accordingly.‖ HECHT, supra note 125, at 184. James Madison, who would eventually become

Hamilton‘s greatest opponent in getting his report passed by Congress, joined Burke‘s proposal, ―even

after Burke withdrew it . . .‖ Id. Madison would go on to later publicly criticize Hamilton on the

Congressional floor for not discriminating against the speculators, ―dwelling at length upon the plight of

the widows, orphans and ex-soldiers who had been defrauded by unconscionable speculators.‖ MILLER,

supra note 124, at 240-41. ―What would it profit the federal government, [Madison] asked, if in

412 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

exchange for a new contract that reduced the interest that the government was

obligated to pay.

149

In essence, Hamilton proposed a bailout of the securities to

further strengthen investor confidence, as the offer to buy them at face value was

substantially higher than the securities‘ market value before his report was

submitted.

150

Indeed, many of the speculators stood to gain nearly an eighty-five

percent profit, as it was not unusual for financially troubled veterans to have sold

their securities for fifteen cents on the dollar.

151

New securities would be issued

by the federal government to ―. . .be exchanged for outstanding obligations at their

specie value at the rate of 100 to 1.‖

152

Similar to Paulson, Hamilton was proposing a wide scale bailout of the

United States financial system to promote stability and attract further

investment.

153

However, with Hamilton, the scale in context was much larger.

gaining the rich, it lost the affections of the people – the certain consequence of permitting this ‗shower

of gold‘ to fall upon the rich alone?‖ Id. The situation looked even more repulsive as the government

buyout of the speculators‘ securities would in turn be paid for by the original veterans, as they would be

forced to pay federal taxes covering the purchase. The issue continued to boil over as many thought

that rich northern speculators were particularly preying upon the poorer veterans of the south and ―were

urging refunding in order to obtain a huge unearned profit.‖ See MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.

Hamilton, a former veteran himself, put aside thoughts of the unfortunate situation to see the drastic

financial consequences that would come from not honoring the correct holder of the security. Id. The

security itself stated that ―the amount thereon specified should be paid to the bearer, thereby creating,

said Hamilton, a contractual relationship that made them as much the property of bona fied purchases

‗as their houses or their lands, their hats or their coats.‘‖ Id. The Continental Congress had previously

assured foreign investors that purchased such securities that they would be paid as the securities‘

holder. Id. ―If the federal government now attempted to discriminate in the name of equity between

different types of creditors, Hamilton was prepared to renounce all hope that foreigners would ever

again trust their money to the perfidious republicans across the Atlantic.‖ Id.

149

―In exchange for the security afforded by the funding system, Hamilton proposed to take what

he called ‗a stout Slice‘ from the accrued interest owing the public creditors . . . Roughly, this deduction

amounted to an interest rate of 41/2 instead of 6 per cent upon the national debt.‖ MILLER, supra note

124, at 236. Two-thirds of the new deal would bear a six percent interest rate from 1791 as the final

one-third would not begin accruing interest until 1800. MYERS, supra note 127, at 61. ―The arrears of

interest would be paid in securities bearing only [three] percent.‖ Id.

150

As the government redemption, or bailout, of the securities became more certain, the prices to

buy such securities skyrocketed to a twenty percent premium. MYERS, supra note 127, at 62. ―Since

1787 there had been much speculative buying and selling of Continental and Confederation certificates

of indebtedness and bills of credit on the prospect that they might be redeemed by the new Federal

government. Speculation reached its climax while the funding program was under debate.‖ MORRIS,

supra note 137, at 286-87. ―Since Hamilton‘s report had been submitted to Congress, the speculators

had been busy buying all the securities in sight, even going to the length of chartering ships to carry

their agents to the southern states before the news of Hamilton‘s report reached that region.‖ MILLER,

supra note 124, at 239.

151

JOHN S. PANCAKE, THOMAS JEFFERSON & ALEXANDER HAMILTON 161 (1974).

152

MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.

153

Jerry Bowyer of Forbes.com believed that Hamilton‘s Report on Public Credit and Paulson‘s

bailout plan were exceedingly analogous. Jerry Bowyer, Ron Paul Vs. Alexander Hamilton, FORBES,

Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/03/bailout-constitutional-hamilton-oped-cx_jb_1003

bowyer.html. Bowyer explained that:

[W]e‘ve been here before. As George Washington was taking the oath of office,

U.S. credit markets were in full meltdown. America faced a credit crisis in which

debt obligations were being purchased by banking houses at [twenty-five] cents

on the dollar. Paulson‘s predecessor was a guy named Hamilton, and Bush‘s

predecessor was a guy named Washington. Hamilton wrote up a plan (called

―Report on the Public Credit‖) in which he proposed that the Treasury

department buy the troubled securities from the private sector, thus restoring the

collapsing credit market . . . Hamilton‘s case was simple. When any part of a

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 413

Congress and the media continually called the $700 billion bailout plan

―unprecedented,‖ but if one looks closely at the Hamilton bailout, the context

shows that Hamilton asked for a taxpayer funded program that represented 4/5 of

the total national debt.

154

In order for Paulson‘s power under the bailout plan to

truly be unprecedented, the EESA would needed to have capped the bailout plan at

just over $8 trillion; more than eight times the current maximum.

155

Hamilton had

essentially asked for eight times the reach of Paulson‘s power by only the second

point of his proposal; and still, he was far from done.

Third, and most controversially, Hamilton proposed a full-scale assumption,

or rather a further bailout, of the states‘ aggregated $25 million debt.

156

At first

glance this appeared to be a step in the wrong direction, as the bailout would raise

the national debt by more than fifty percent to almost $80 million with interest

included.

157

However, Hamilton was confident that he could similarly proffer a

bargain with the holders of the state obligations to cut interest rates because of the

added confidence the new Constitution

158

and his debt management system would

provide their securities.

159

With these lesser interest rates, Hamilton believed his

debt management system would more than provide for steady repayment of the

national debt through an established ―Sinking Fund,‖ which would ―receive

nation participates in a massive repudiation of debt, the creditworthiness of the

whole nation is damaged. Hamilton saw this as a national problem in need of a

national solution. He argued that the whole nation would benefit from a return to

a well-functioning credit market, with low interest rates fueling growth.

Hamilton believed that if the Constitution gave executive power to the president,

then that included the authority to create specific institutions and programs

necessary to exercise that power . . . . [T]he Treasury bought up the paper,

America‘s credit markets were restored quickly, and although we‘ve had a few

rough patches, the ensuing 218 years have gone pretty well so far.

Id.

154

The domestic debt represented stood at $40 of the $51.6 million national debt. See MYERS,

supra note 127, at 61.

155

According to the Huffington Post and the U.S. National Debt Clock, the outstanding public debt

of the United States as of October 7, 2008 surpassed $10 trillion. See Scott Bittle & Jean Johnson,

National Debt Passes $10 Trillion, No One Notices, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2008,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-bittle-and-jean-johnson/national-debt-passes-10-t_b_132732.html;

see also U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).

156

MILLER, supra note 124, at 235.

157

Id.

158

See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 160-61. Specifically,

The new Constitution had conferred upon Congress the power to tax, and

Congress had already in the summer of 1789 enacted tariff duties on imports and

tonnage duties on shipping entering American ports. The assurance of an

income, the audacity and boldness of the young Secretary, the return of

prosperity after the depression of the 1780‘s – all these things inspired

confidence . . . . It was this public confidence that resulted in the sale of the entire

bond issue within a few weeks of its being put on the market.

Id. at 161.

159

Instead of annual appropriations by the [state or federal] legislature toward debt

retirement, the creditors of the [federal] government were offered by Hamilton

permanent appropriations inviolably dedicated to the payment of interest and

principal. Every guarantee possible under the Federal Constitution against

popular ‗instability‘ and ‗caprice‘ was given public creditors . . .

MILLER, supra note 124, at 236. Indeed, the individuals that held the state war obligations were the

same speculators that held the national securities involved in the domestic debt portion of Hamilton‘s

proposal. Id. at 234-35.

414 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

surplus revenues from import and tonnage duties, interest saved on government

securities which were redeemed, and proceeds from the sale of public lands.‖

160

Hamilton‘s proposal for the federal government to assume state debt was not

just an action to help the ―the people of the United States [who] labored under a

heavy load of state debts‖ by way of taxes;

161

it was a power play. Hamilton was

one of the chief proponents of the Federalist Party, which believed that the greater

power in the federal-state relationship should exist within the federal

government.

162

Hamilton was sure that ―if all the public creditors receive their

dues from one source, distributed by an equal hand, their interests will be the same.

And, having the same interests, they will unite in the support of the fiscal

arrangements of the Government.‖

163

Hamilton wanted this support to be centrally

united under the federal government and feared that with both the federal

government and the states having large debts on their books, both entities would be

forced to compete for the ―allegiance of the creditor class and for the citizens‘ tax

dollar.‖

164

Thus, a shift of taxpayer investment from the states to the federal

government meant a shift of taxpayer allegiance and support to the federal

government.

165

In essence, Hamilton was asking Congress to vest him with the

power to single-handedly sway the coveted allegiance of the investor class

American by tying him to the financial success of the federal government.

160

MYERS, supra note 127, at 63.

160

MYERS, supra note 127, at 63.

161

MILLER, supra note 124, at 234.

162

Id. at 193, 195.

The principle theme of The Federalist is that the purpose of the Constitution is

the establishment of an energetic and efficient national government

notwithstanding the powers reserved to the states. Even though Hamilton

deferred to the new kind of federalism created by the Constitution, it is clear from

his essays that his sympathies lay wholly with nationalism. Reference to ―the

streams of national power‖ and ―the Fabric of American Empire‖ reveal that even

while he was justifying the federalist system he was dreaming of the centralized

system that he hoped would emerge from the chrysalis of federalism.

Id. at 195.

163

Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).

164

Id.

The result, Hamilton feared, would be that the states would attempt to pre-empt

(as the Constitution, by recognizing concurrent taxation, permitted them to do)

the remaining objects of taxation and that the affluent citizens of the United

States would be divided against themselves, the state creditors seeking to

strengthen the states while the holders of federal securities endeavored to

aggrandize the powers and the revenues of the national government.

Id. Miller further explained:

Hamilton regarded concurrent taxation as ―‗the Gordion-knot of our political

situation.‖‗ In The Federalist he observed that the only way concurrent taxation

could be made workable was for each government to exercise ―reciprocal

forbearance‖ by respecting the rights of the first occupant. As Secretary of the

Treasury, Hamilton left no doubt that he intended the federal government to do

the occupying, while forbearance was to be practiced by the states.

MILLER, supra note 124, at 235.

165

―With all the creditors, state and national, gathered into the fold of the federal government,

Hamilton‘s vision of a powerful national government, supreme over the states, would begin to assume

concrete reality.‖ Id. Miller believed that ―Hamilton‘s constant objective was to bind [speculators and

investors] to the national government by the durable ties of ‗Ambition and Avarice.‘‖ Id.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 415

Although Paulson‘s request for authority under his bailout proposal was met

with a notable amount of controversy, it pales in comparison to the uproar which

followed Hamilton‘s request for power under his report, especially as to the

assumption of state debts.

166

James Madison, one of the leaders of the Republican

Party, opposed Hamilton‘s proposal in Congress on the grounds that it forced

citizens of states that had already paid off a large amount of their war debts to now

pay federal taxes for the debts of other states.

167

Much like Paulson‘s later

opposition, Hamilton‘s opposition further feared that giving Hamilton the power to

assume state debts would greatly ―magnify‖ his power, as well as that of the

federal government.

168

Hamilton‘s opponents won the initial battle of the state assumption portion

of his proposal, as it was defeated in the House thirty-one to twenty-nine.

169

This

was not the proposal‘s death however, but rather its transformation into a political

bargaining chip. Republican leaders James Madison and Secretary of State

Thomas Jefferson agreed in a ―behind-the-scenes‖ meeting with Hamilton to drop

their opposition of the state assumption bill in exchange for an agreement to

support having the ―new national capital at a site on the banks of the Potomac.‖

170

With this alliance in place, the assumption of state debt became the final piece of

Hamilton‘s proposal to become law.

171

With the measures of the Report on Public Credit passed, Hamilton was

authorized to use a great amount of discretion in managing

172

what stood as a

bailout worth 7/8 of the national debt – more than twelve times the amount Paulson

would ever control under the EESA.

173

Additionally, with almost every significant

investor in the young nation now tied to Hamilton‘s policy favoring the federal

government, Hamilton also single-handedly held the power to drastically shift

political favor to the federal government during the time when the nation‘s

foundation was being laid. Although Paulson‘s management of the TARP has had

substantial economic consequences, it will have nowhere near the lasting political

166

Many of the political leaders of the time felt that Hamilton‘s Report on the Public Credit was

the first great controversy of the new nation, almost tearing the new union to bits. Id. at 238.

. . . Hamilton‘s report fell like a bolt from the blue, utterly destroying the

President‘s hope that his administration would inaugurate an era of good feelings.

In John Marshall‘s words, Hamilton‘s financial program ―seemed to unchain all

those fierce passions which a high respect for the government and for those who

administered it, had in a great measure maintained.‖ Before the storm blew itself

out, some Americans were seriously considering disunion.

Id.

167

See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 164-65. This complaint is not much different than the

complaints made by modern taxpayers who oppose paying taxes to bailout corporations.

168

See MORRIS, supra note 137, at 287.

169

PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165.

169

PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165.

170

MYERS, supra note 127, at 62; see also PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 166.

171

MYERS, supra note 127, at 62.

172

See id. at 63.

173

With the bailout of the domestic debt ($40 million) and state war debts ($30 million after

interest) represented $70 million of the $80 million national debt (the other $10 million being attributed

to the country‘s foreign debt). See supra notes 128, 156-57. The EESA‘s maximum bailout of $700

billion represented barely over seven percent of the current national debt, which continued to soar past

$10 trillion. See supra note 155.

416 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

and legal effect that Hamilton‘s use of this political power has had on the nation‘s

governmental system. The evidence of this was quickly seen as Hamilton used the

exercise of his newly authorized power and influence in establishing the United

States‘ first national bank.

B. The First National Bank

Hamilton‘s next major goal in addressing the public debt was the

establishment of a public bank, a modern tool he believed the federal government

needed for ongoing financial management.

174

To this effect, Hamilton eventually

submitted his historic Report on a National Bank to Congress in late 1790,

effectively requesting that Congress establish the Bank of the United States.

175

With Congress having already firmly placed their trust in Hamilton by granting

him great power and discretion in managing the public debt crisis, the issue of the

bank itself was only moderately controversial as the bill proposing Hamilton‘s

bank passed both houses of Congress convincingly.

176

However, State-rights

oriented leaders such as Madison and Jefferson recognized that lying within

Hamilton‘s proposal was a request for immense authority as Hamilton implicitly

asserted that Congress had the constitutional authority to establish a national

bank.

177

With the foundational scope of Congress‘ constitutional authority at issue,

the debate that ensued became one of the most divisive and consequential political

power struggles in United States history. It was not a fight over a bank, but over

power. Since the bank bill had passed both houses of Congress, Madison and

Jefferson took their argument to President Washington who had yet to sign the bill

into law.

178

Principally, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress was

authorized by the Constitution to act only upon its enumerated power under Article

I and ―measures indispensably necessary to give effect to [these enumerated]

174

MYERS, supra note 127, at 66. Specifically, Hamilton saw that a public bank would be a great

utility for the Treasury department in terms of ―short term loans and for bills of exchange with which to

make payments‖ for foreign debt. Id. Additionally, Hamilton believed that a national bank would

substantially aide the country‘s sprouting economy as it would grow the United States‘ ―circulating

capital‖ and ―[facilitate] payments for business and government.‖ Id. Furthermore, ―Hamilton hoped to

embody his ideal of a partnership between government and the business community by which

government would stimulate and direct the activities of businessmen and receive in return part of their

capital in the form of loans.‖ MILLER, supra note 124, at 260. Hamilton based his beliefs in a large

part on the historical effects of the Bank of England. Id.

175

Id.

176

See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264. Hamilton did ask for a considerable amount of executive

power in proposing the bank as it would be ―bank of deposit, to act as the fiscal agent of the

government, and to loan the government money.‖ MILLER, supra note 124, at 261. Furthermore,

Hamilton‘s proposal pushed the new country to unprecedented grounds among national governments, as

the federal government would purchase $2 million (twenty percent) of the bank‘s stock; something even

England did not do with its own public bank. MYERS, supra note 127, at 67-68. Although the bank

was managed by private citizens (the government would only be allowed to appoint five of the twenty

five directors), Hamilton was personally authorized to inspect the bank‘s books. Id. at 68. Even with

all of these increases in power and changes to the nation‘s financial landscape opponents of the bank‘s

bill ―did not hope to defeat the bill, only to make some changes.‖ HECHT, supra note 125, at 198.

177

See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264.

178

Id.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 417

powers.‖

179

Accordingly, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress could not

establish a national bank because it was neither an enumerated power under Article

I nor ―indispensably necessary‖ to effectuate any of its other enumerated

powers.

180

Hamilton held the exact opposite view, arguing that the Constitution

gave Congress general enumerated powers and the implied powers to effectuate

such enumerated powers in the most effective manner (what is ―necessary and

proper,‖ not just as ―indispensably necessary‖).

181

Washington sided with

Hamilton and his interpretation, signing the bank bill into law.

182

In establishing such substantial power for Congress, Hamilton again

procured great power for his own office by managing the public debt crisis through

the execution of the First Bank of the United States. Although the United States

Bank would have its ups and downs in subsequent time periods, Hamilton‘s Report

on a National Bank was essentially the birth of the federal banking system; another

lasting thumbprint on the nation. In addition to further broadening his own

authority and influence on the national economy, Hamilton again tremendously

increased the power of the federal government within the federal-state relationship.

Congress now had been assured of far-reaching implied powers, which

consequentially won the Treasury Department an equally broad power of execution

(the lasting effect memorialized within the Supreme Court‘s approval in

McCullough v. Maryland).

183

C. The Whiskey Rebellion

Whereas Hamilton‘s most financially consequential powers came through

the before mentioned public credit crisis bailouts and establishment of the Bank of

the United States, perhaps the greatest single display of Hamilton‘s authority

during his time as the Treasury Secretary came in his leading the Western Army to

squash the ―Whiskey Rebellion‖ in 1794.

184

Hamilton, having taken full control of

managing the assumed state debts, convinced Congress to place a large federal

excise on manufactured whiskey in his Second Report on the Public Credit in

1791.

185

Grumblings amongst whiskey manufacturers began immediately upon the

passage of the excise, eventually climaxing in 1794 within western counties of

Pennsylvania through armed actions against Hamilton‘s revenue officers and an

assault on Pittsburgh.

186

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

See id. at 263-65. Hamilton believed that ―the Bank of the United States was a necessary and

proper means of carrying into effect the regulation of commerce between the states and of providing for

the public credit and defense.‖ Id. at 266.

182

MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.

182

MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.

183

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

184

See MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-09.

185

Id. at 396. Hamilton had originally proposed the whiskey excise in his First Report on the

Public Credit to no avail. Id. However, with Hamilton‘s power and discretion in managing the

assumed states‘ debts now fully in motion, Congress ―had very little to say in the matter . . . [and] the

excise became law in early 1791.‖ Id. The excise on whiskey was a costly eight cents per gallon, or

about ―twenty-five percent of the net value of the product.‖ Id. at 397.

186

Id. at 405.

418 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

After personally convincing the Supreme Court that the federal government

needed to resort to force to successfully oppose the insurrection, Hamilton set out

with President Washington to lead the 13,000-man army (a force roughly the size

of the Continental Army that fought in the Revolutionary War)

187

against the

―whiskey boys.‖

188

Once it had been decided that the army would have to cross

the Allegheny Mountains to meet the insurrection forces, Washington returned to

Philadelphia to see to other pressing matters.

189

Although Governor Lee of

Virginia was supposed to have been the ranking official with Washington‘s

departure (as it was a multi-state militia force), Hamilton was reputed to have been

―the real leader‖ of the forces and would ―[run] the show.‖

190

―Hamilton issued

orders in his own name‖ and even rebuked the acting governor of Pennsylvania,

General Thomas Mifflin (another supposed ranking official).

191

It was reported

that Hamilton ―indulged in the airs of a commander-in-chief and, capitalizing upon

his friendship with Washington, made his influence felt in every department of the

army.‖

192

Soldiers of the army could hardly believe ―[t]hat they were in the

presence of a mere Secretary of Treasury.‖

193

Hamilton led the troops across the

Alleghany Mountains and captured 150 members of the insurrection (including the

―whiskey boys‖ spokesman Hugh Henry Brackenridge); effectively dispersing the

opposing forces and ending the rebellion.

194

D. Final Summary and Comparison of Alexander Hamilton’s Powers

It is clear that in context, the EESA‘s $700 billion capped bailout did not

give Paulson the ―unprecedented‖ power that many had claimed. In the face of an

analogously dire financial crisis, Hamilton was given greater deference to establish

and manage a bailout of the United States financial system that was worth 7/8 of

the nation‘s total debt; an amount comparatively twelve times larger in scope than

the bailout under Paulson.

195

Furthermore, Hamilton used his authority over state

debt to tie the United States‘ investor class to the federal government, ultimately

leveraging this authority to establish a national bank and secure broad implied

Revenue officers were terrorized – sometimes at gun point – into resigning their

offices; United States marshals were forcibly prevented from serving processes

upon rioters; and the United States mail was seized by armed bands. Early in

August, 1794, a meeting of armed men was held at Braddock‘s Field and

preparations were made to attack Pittsburgh; the assault was averted only when

the citizens, realizing that they could not withstand the attackers, marched out to

join them.

Id.

187

See NationMaster.com, Whiskey Rebellion, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/

Whiskey-Rebellion (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).

188

MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-07.

189

Id. at 408-09.

190

Id. at 409.

191

See id; Encyclopedia.com, Thomas Mifflin Facts, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-

Mifflin.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).

192

MILLER, supra note 124, at 409.

193

Id.

194

See id. at 409-13.

195

See supra text accompanying note 173.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 419

powers for Congress in the process.

196

With the momentum of such authority and

power, Hamilton raised heavy excises for the federal debt and led an army of

13,000 men to defend his purposes.

197

Thus, Hamilton was granted far more

authority by Congress and exercised such power to a far greater extent (and to a

much greater consequence) than was ever possible for Paulson.

The principle of a congressional pattern was established with Hamilton;

extreme financial and economic challenges led Congress to grant the acting

Treasury Secretary equally extreme measures of authority to seek resolution.

Although Hamilton is likely to have been the most powerful and influential

proponent of this pattern, the next section of this article will show that he really

was just the beginning. Section V will shed light upon the continuation of this

pattern by briefly examining a few of the more notable Treasury Secretaries that

have faced critical financial challenge in subsequent United States history; thus

putting Paulson not at the front, but rather at the back of a rather large line.

V. THE LONG LINE OF IMMENSLY POWERFUL TREASURY

SECRETARIES DURING TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS

A. Salmon P. Chase and the Financial Crisis of the Civil War (1861-1864)

The five years leading to the civil war were not only wrought with bitter

political conflict, but also severe financial and economic crisis.

198

On the heels of

such crises, the national debt had doubled during 1857-1860 to $60 million, with

the Treasury balance hovering meagerly around $3.6 million.

199

In order to meet

current obligations, the Treasury resorted to paying exorbitant twelve percent

interest rates.

200

Even congressmen went without salary for several weeks in

1860.

201

With this load on the nation‘s back, or rather on the ‗Union‘s‘ back, the

United States prepared to wage and finance the most expensive war in its young

history.

202

When President Abraham Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase as his

Treasury Secretary in 1861, he essentially handed him a $75 million national debt,

a paper-thin checkbook, and the guarantee that the looming war would only make

matters worse.

203

Chase was confident of a quick defeat of the Southern Army and

proposed an optimistic $320 million revenue plan for the next year to be

196

MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.

197

Id. at 406-07.

198

There had been a large financial panic in 1857 that caused banks to fail nationwide and sunk the

United States into recession through the beginning of the Civil War. See generally JAMES L. HUSTON,

THE PANIC OF 1857 AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 13-34 (Louisiana State University Press

1987).

199

MYERS, supra note 127, at 149.

200

IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN

FINANCE, 1865-1879, at 13 (Princeton University Press 1964).

201

MYERS, supra note 127, at 149.

202

UNGER, supra note 200, at 14-15.

203

See ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR

AND RECONSTRUCTION 16-17 (The Johns Hopkins Press 1959).

420 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

accomplished in large part by issuing federal securities.

204

However, the Union‘s

defeat at the Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861 assured a long war with the

Southern Army

205

and illuminated just how insufficient Chase‘s financial

projections had been.

206

―The soldiers needed to be paid‖ and Chase had to find a

way to do it.

207

1. The Birth of Greenbacks: Chase’s Authority to Print Money Out

of Thin Air

Chase reported the anticipated Treasury deficit in his Annual Report in 1861,

causing a public panic that froze gold trading on the market, which in turn caused

further crisis as the gold specie that backed the national coin became scarce in

Treasury reserves.

208

The Treasury did the unthinkable: it ceased to pay coin for

its debt obligations and dropped the ―gold standard‖ for the foreseeable future.

209

With the revenue crisis now further compounded by the lack of physical money,

the federal government‘s growing war debt appeared impossible. Chase needed

more power, new power; he needed to make money appear out of thin air.

In the face of such a meltdown, that‘s exactly what Congress let him do. By

way of three Legal Tender Acts from 1862-1863, Congress authorized Chase to

issue and spend the nation‘s first non-specie ―legal tender paper money‖ or

―greenbacks‖ up to the staggering amount of $450 million.

210

For the first time

ever, a Treasury Secretary paid for debt through a currency that was backed by

promises alone.

211

Essentially, Congress granted Chase perhaps the greatest power a Treasury

Secretary could ever have asked for, the ability to print money at will. The United

States $10,000 bill features a portrait of Chase as a monument to this tremendous

power and to the ramped inflation it would later cause.

212

However, the monument

which would perhaps best depict the magnitude of Chase‘s greenback power was

later erected by Chase himself, as he would rule as Chief Justice of the United

States Supreme Court that the authority given to him under the Legal Tender Act

to issue the greenbacks (the very power that he had pleaded for and exercised only

seven years earlier) was unconstitutional.

213

204

Id. at 19.

205

See JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA

219 (Henry Holt & Company 2003).

206

SHARKEY, supra note 203, at 19-20.

207

GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 219.

208

UNGER, supra note 200, at 14.

209

Id.

210

Id. at 14-15.

211

GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220.

Secretary Chase, who only six months earlier had warned against the danger of

irredeemable paper, now took the position of ―regretting exceedingly‖ the

―necessity,‖ and accepting it as ―the mode most useful and least hurtful‖ to the

general interest . . . . The Act . . . provided for an issue of notes to be ―lawful

money and legal tender in payment of all debts public and private . . . .‖

MYERS, supra note 127, at 155.

212

GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220.

213

See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 421

2. Chase and the Nation’s First Federal Income Tax

In order to further boost revenue for a war that cost nearly $2 million per

day,

214

Chase proposed that Congress install the nation‘s first federal income

tax.

215

Congress agreed to the proposal and granted Chase the truly unprecedented

power to collect taxes on income through the Revenue Act of 1861.

216

Congress

further empowered Chase to collect the nation‘s first income tax by creating the

Internal Revenue Board (which would later become the Internal Revenue Service)

in 1862.

217

Similar to Chase‘s greenback power, his monumental power to collect

income taxes was later ruled to be unconstitutional (only to be brought back to life

in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution).

218

3. Chase’s National Banking System

Congress‘ authorization for the issuance of greenbacks concurrently

provided Chase with a platform to seek further power for a government-backed

national banking system that would provide for a common national currency.

219

Indeed, Chase did more than advocate for such a system, he ―. . . demanded it as an

instrument of war policy and hinted that he would resign if the scheme did not

receive Congressional approval.‖

220

Upon President Lincoln‘s further insistence,

Congress passed the National Bank Act in 1863,

221

authorizing Chase to directly

involve the United States in banking for the first time in its history.

222

Chase‘s

National Bank Act was a move so vast and dramatic that one author believes that,

―[i]t was only in the midst of such a war that such a bill could have been

passed.‖

223

4. Salmon P. Chase Conclusion

In terms of receiving ―unprecedented power,‖ there are few, if any, Treasury

Secretaries that are comparable to Salmon Chase. In order to meet the financial

crisis surrounding the Civil War period, Congress authorized Chase to issue and

spend $450 million of non-specie greenbacks, collect taxes from income, and

214

CHARLES F. RITTER, JAY COOKE in LEADERS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A BIOGRAPHICAL

AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 99 (Charles F. Ritter & Jon L. Wakelyn eds., Greenwood

Publishing Group 1998).

215

David L. Mowery, Salmon Portland Chase: Lincoln’s Able Financier, Mar. 14, 2004,

http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ohio%20in%20the%20war/bios/

mowery_salmon%20chase.html#_edn16.

216

MYERS, supra note 127, at 159.

217

Salmon Chase – United States Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/

history/secretaries/spchase.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).

218

See Pollock v. Farmers‘ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).

219

See MYERS, supra note 127, at 162; SHARKEY, supra note 203 at 224.

220

SHARKEY, supra note 203, at 226 (citing ANDREW MCFARLAND DAVIS, ORIGIN OF THE

NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 88 (Government Printer‘s Office, 1910)).

221

MYERS, supra note 127, at 163.

222

See supra note 217.

223

MYERS, supra note 127, at 163.

422 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

establish a national banking system.

224

All three of these powers were firsts in

American history and proved to be tremendously powerful tools for the Treasury

Secretary to influence the national economy.

B. William McAdoo: World War I and the European Investment Crisis

(1913-1918)

The buildup to World War I brought unease amongst investors worldwide.

Unfortunately, a great bulk of this uneasiness fell upon the United States, as it was

one of the few nations of financial power that did not have a central banking

system in place.

225

In the spring of 1914, European investors finally panicked and

began cashing in their United States based securities and currency for gold specie

at catastrophic levels, causing a full-scale gold run.

226

This created an immediate

financial crisis, as the Treasury Department and major banks would not be able to

cash out the entirety of the demand.

227

With the nation‘s gold and financial

confidence bleeding uncontrollably, the United States dollar and its financial

markets were quickly brought to the edge of a freefall.

228

Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo needed to act quickly and

decisively. On July 31, 1914, McAdoo ordered the New York Stock Exchange

(―NYSE‖) to be shut down to prevent any further run on capital.

229

Many were

outraged as McAdoo‘s action admittedly fell somewhere high upon the tyrannical

spectrum; however, it did ultimately serve its purpose as the gold run abroad was

quickly halted.

230

With such financial consequences on the line, Congress left the

action unchallenged, as McAdoo would continue to keep the NYSE closed for an

unprecedented four straight months.

231

While the foreign security problem had been met, McAdoo still needed to

stop the bank run domestically. McAdoo decided to essentially bailout the United

States financial system by pumping the market full of ―emergency currency,‖ thus

allowing banks to continue to supply capital while retaining gold specie.

232

Unlike

many of his predecessors, McAdoo did not have to plead with Congress for this

power, as Congress had already established this magnified authority for Treasury

Secretary George Cortelyou

233

in the recent banking crisis of 1907 through the

224

See supra note 210, 216, 221.

225

Daniel Gross, The Unknown Financial Hero: The Amazing Story of William McAdoo and How

He Saved the American Economy, SLATE, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2162467.

226

Id.

227

Id. See also WILLIAM L. SILBER, WHEN WASHINGTON SHUT DOWN WALL STREET: THE

GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1914 AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA‘S MONETARY SUPREMACY 4 (2007).

228

See SILBER, supra note 227, at 32. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 27, 1914 that,

―Conditions which have not been witnessed before by some of the oldest operators prevailed in the

foreign exchange market on Monday. A well-nigh complete state of demoralization characterized the

market, and where rates were quoted they fluctuated with a violence that deterred operators from

transacting in the majority of instances . . . .‖ Id. See also Gross, supra note 225.

229

See SILBER, supra note 227, at 4; Gross, supra note 225.

230

Gross, supra note 225.

231

See SILBER, supra note 227, at 4; Gross, supra note 225.

232

See Gross, supra note 225; SILBER, supra note 227, at 4.

233

See George Cortelyou – United States Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/

education/history/secretaries/gbcortelyou.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 423

Alrdrich-Vreeland Act.

234

Congress submitted to the necessity of the new

mounting crisis and continued to let this bailout power run to McAdoo as he

eventually issued the emergency currency.

235

In addition to this national bailout,

McAdoo would further organize a bailout of New York City‘s massive foreign

debt, a move that one author called the single-handed introduction of the ―[T]oo

Big Too Fail doctrine‖ into the American financial system.

236

Having stopped the bleeding of American gold and confidence, McAdoo

wanted to pull the nation (and its gold reserves) up from financial gloom and back

into prosperity. McAdoo pushed Congress‘ deference even further by persuading

them to establish the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, a government entity that

would provide domestic shippers insurance to ship American cargo across the war-

ridden Atlantic Ocean to Europeans that were in great need of products like

cotton.

237

With McAdoo‘s Bureau hedging the risky voyages, European traders

paid for American goods with much of the gold that had been retracted.

238

McAdoo‘s act of restoring the nation‘s gold reserves allowed banks to retire the

emergency currency and gave him the confidence to reopen the NYSE.

239

With

stability in the national market restored, McAdoo pushed the nation into the

powerful realm of global financial lenders as he introduced the first United States

Federal Reserve Banking System in the fall of 1914.

240

C. William H. Woodin (1933) & Henry Morgenthau Jr. (1934-1945):

Control over Banks and Gold During the Great Depression

The Great Depression presented the United States with a frightening

monetary crisis in 1933. With the American dollar actually depreciating,

Americans frantically exchanged whatever currency or security they could for

gold.

241

This widespread demand drained the Federal Reserve‘s gold supply

almost past the point of the legal minimum and forced newly-elected President

Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take immediate action.

242

Roosevelt relied upon the

World War I Trading with the Enemy Act (―TEA‖) to order that all commercial

banks be closed until his administration could approve reopening on a bank-by-

bank basis.

243

Essentially, Roosevelt declared a war upon the Great Depression.

Widespread criticism arose over whether the TEA actually granted such power,

causing Roosevelt to seek post-action confirmation from Congress through an

amendment to the TEA.

244

234

See SILBER, supra note 227, at 4; Gross, supra note 225.

235

Gross, supra note 225.

236

SILBER, supra note 227, at 4; see also Gross, supra note 225.

237

See Gross, supra note 225.

238

Id.

239

See id.; SILBER, supra note 227, at 4–5.

240

See Gross, supra note 225.

241

Blanchard, Gold Confiscation: Will It Happen Again?, http://www.blanchardonline.com/beru/

confiscation_1933.php. (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id.

424 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

The amendment was proposed as the Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933

(―EBRA‖), a bill that would not only have confirmed Roosevelt‘s previous actions,

but would also have granted the President and his Treasury Secretary William

Woodin great unilateral power going forward.

245

Congress met within an

emergency session and passed the EBRA on a ―voice vote‖ without actually seeing

or debating the text of the bill.

246

With the weight of the worst economic crisis in

history bearing down upon the United States, Congress once again deferred and

greatly magnified the Treasury Secretary‘s power.

247

In order to meet the

monetary crisis, the EBRA authorized Woodin to confiscate ―any or all gold coin,

gold bullion, and gold certificates‖ from any individual or corporation.

248

Additionally, the EBRA allowed Roosevelt to grant Woodin the sole discretion and

authority to decide which commercial banks could reopen.

249

Essentially, Woodin

now personally controlled all the gold and banks in the entire country without any

check on his power.

Woodin fell ill and passed this power to Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1934.

250

Morgenthau soon discovered that because he physically controlled all the gold in

the United States (which had been turned over to the federal government by

executive order), he also reigned over the gold markets.

251

Morgenthau met with

Roosevelt every morning by his bedside to eat breakfast and arbitrarily set the

price of gold in an increasing trend to encourage inflation.

252

All the while,

Congress continued to differ without challenge. Morgenthau described the process

in his diary:

The actual price of gold on any given day made little difference. The

amounts settled on were generally arbitrary. One day, for instance, the bedside

conference decided on a rise of [twenty-one] c[ents]; ―It‘s a lucky number,‖ the

President remarked, ―because it‘s three times seven.‖

245

Id.

246

See William F. Jasper, From Henry Morgenthau to Henry Paulson, NEW AMERICAN, Oct. 31,

2008, http://www.thenewamerican.com/history/american/473. ―Rep. Ernest Lundeen of the Minnesota

Farm Labor Party, one of the few who refused to cave in to FDR‘s legislation-by-hysteria campaign,

rebuked his fellow members of Congress for their willingness to pass a bill they had not seen, read, or

debated. He noted that the bill had been ‗driven through the House with cyclonic speed,‘ and argued:

‗We must not allow ourselves to be swept off our feet by hysteria.‘‖ Id. On the evening of March 9,

1933, with Congress hastily assembled, the President delivered to the floor of both houses a single copy

of his emergency banking bill. Since there was no time to print copies of the bill, it was simply read to

the assemblies upon its introduction. At 8:30 p.m., Congress hurriedly put the President‘s proposal to a

vote and overwhelmingly passed it. The vote was taken when every bank in the country had been

closed for four straight days, and there was enormous pressure on Congress to allow the banks to open.

Unable to justify a delay to debate, several congressmen were pressured to pass the bill even though

they opposed many of its provisions. Due to the short period of time prior to the enactment, some

congressmen‘s votes were not recognized and there was no roll call vote allowed in the House. To this

day, the legislative intent behind the bill remains unclear. Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent

Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 266–67

(2000).

247

See Jasper, supra note 246.

248

Emergency Banking Relief Act, ch. 1, § 3, 48 Stat. 1, 2 (1933) (repealed 1947).

249

See BLANCHARD, supra note 241.

250

The United Stated Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/history/

secretaries/hmorgenthaujr.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).

251

See Jasper, supra note 246.

252

Id.

2010 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ‗BAILOUT‘ 425

. . . If anybody ever knew how we set the gold price through a combination

of lucky numbers and so forth, I think they would really be frightened.

253

VI. CONCLUSION

There has been no great gap between Alexander Hamilton and Henry

Paulson. Since the Treasury Department‘s creation, financial crisis has almost

continually caused Congress to magnify the Treasury Secretary‘s authority to great

and ―unprecedented‖ heights. Members of this elite line have initiated and

controlled massive public and private bailouts,

254

printed money at will,

255

flooded

financial markets with emergency currency,

256

controlled financial markets,

257

shut

down financial markets,

258

confiscated all the gold in the country,

259

and led a

13,000-man army to enforce treasury excises.

260

Paulson was simply the most

current member of this growing line, a recent proponent of the Congressional

pattern to inflate Treasury Secretary power during times of financial crisis.

Indeed, Congress granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson historic

authority to address the 2008 financial crisis through the EESA‘s $700 billion

capped bailout plan. However, as broad and consequential as this authority was,

analysis of past financial crises and Treasury Secretary authority has shown that

such heightened power was by no means ―unprecedented.‖ In fact, the EESA was

proof that the longstanding Congressional pattern to magnify Treasury Secretary

authority during financial crisis will likely continue indefinitely. This conclusion

is substantially relevant to the business, legal, and political realms for two main

reasons.

First, the business, banking, and finance world should be aware that financial

crises have frequently resulted in Treasury Secretaries becoming intimately

involved in either greatly empowering or greatly restricting business and market

action. Although such actions have been very contextual, this history gives the

business world a general precedent to rely upon in predicting future intervention

and planning accordingly. At the very least, for planning purposes, such history

should prevent members of the business world from ruling out any plausible

Treasury Secretary intervention measure on the premise that such a measure would

be too powerful or ―unprecedented.‖

261

253

Id.

254

See supra notes 173, 236 and accompanying text.

255

See supra note 212 and accompanying text.

256

See supra note 232 and accompanying text.

257

See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.

258

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

259

See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

260

See supra note 188 and accompanying text.

261

For example, this principle was immediately applicable to Paulson‘s successor, Treasury

Secretary Timothy Geithner, in his request for broadened authority in 2009. In his efforts to further

address the financial crisis stemming from 2008 and to ensure a broader capability to address future

financial crises, Geithner requested authority from Congress to be able to ―seize large insurers,

investment firms and hedge funds, leaping beyond [the] present authority to seize only banks.‖ FOX

NEWS, Geithner Seeks Power to Seize Imperiled Firms, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/

elections/2009/03/24/fed-treasury-chief-grilled-aig/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). Essentially, Geithner

proposed that the federal government assume the new authority to seize almost any financial institution

426 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II

Second, Congress and other political leaders must recognize that American

history has shown that financial crises often necessitate a concentration of power in

the Treasury Secretary. Recognition that a longstanding Congressional trend exists

to greatly empower Treasury Secretaries during times of crisis should give future

political leaders confidence to empower the Treasury Secretary if this action would

be the most effective and efficient solution to a crisis. This recognition should

prevent the unnecessary political delay of congressional leaders getting hung-up on

hesitations that empowering the Treasury Secretary is somehow novel or un-

American. Whereas Congress must always delegate power responsibly with

measures of oversight and checks on unilateral power, recognition of Treasury

Secretary history should also prevent Congress from over-burdening or

‗handcuffing‘ the Secretary when the crisis calls for an efficient use of power.

Congress must remember that the Treasury Secretary‘s capability to act quickly

and efficiently is the very aspect that sets the office apart as an effective tool.

This is not to say that this historical precedent mandates that Congress

recklessly give the Treasury Secretary power for the sake of granting power, as

instances such as Salmon Chase‘s greenback power proved to have long-lasting

detrimental effects on the economy.

262

Rather, this historical precedent simply

calls political leaders to not be so hesitant to consider the option that Congress has

used to address so many of this nation‘s crises: a grant of power, even

tremendously broad and ―unprecedented‖ power, to the Treasury Secretary.

that ―totter[ed]‖ on the line of failure. See Binyamin Applebaum & David Cho, U.S. Seeks Expanded

Power to Seize Firms, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/23/ AR2009032302830.html. Many recognized that ―[g]iving the

[Geithner] authority over a broader range of companies would mark a significant shift from the existing

model of financial regulation, which relies on independent agencies that are shielded from the political

process.‖ Id. On cue, this recognition caused many in the media to quickly throw around their favorite

‗U‘ word. See, e.g., Suzanne Malveux, Geithner to Seek Unprecedented Powers, Insiders Say, CNN

POLITICS, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/24/geithner.powers/ index.html.

Political leaders echoed these sentiments as House Minority Leader John Boehner told reporters that

Geithner‘s request was asking for ―an unprecedented grab of power.‖ FOX NEWS, supra note 162. As

shocked as everyone appeared to have been, the conscious observer and planner should have been

completely prepared for Geithner‘s request no matter how ―unprecedented‖ it was, as it was a plausible

option given the context of the crisis leading to the request. Although Geithner‘s request asked for new

authority, it was a logical step as non-depository financial institutions (those which the FDIC did not

have seizure authority over) were enormous contributors to the financial crisis. Id. Geithner pointed

out the logic himself. ―As we have seen with AIG, distress at large, interconnected, non-depository

financial institutions can pose systematic risks just as distress at banks can. The administration

proposes legislation to give the U.S. government the same basic set of tools for addressing financial

distress at non-banks as it has in the bank context.‖ Id.

262

See supra note 212 and accompanying text.