Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-C-15-007317 OT

Circuit Court for Baltimore County

Case No. 03-C-15-007317 OT

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2264

September Term, 2017

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PETER IRELAND

BEREN RIFFEY, ET AL.

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Berger,

Arthur,

Kenney, James A., III

(Retired Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

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Opinion by Berger, J.

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Filed: March 4, 2019

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other

document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the

rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

— Unreported Opinion —

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The sole issue in this appeal is the appropriateness of the circuit court’s award of

attorney’s fees to Beren and David Riffey, appellees. The Riffeys’ lawsuit against Peter

Ireland, appellant, was based upon Ireland’s alleged breach of contract, common law fraud,

and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and Maryland Consumer

Protection Act in connection with the performance of a home improvement contract.

On appeal, Ireland asserts that the circuit court erred by awarding attorney’s fees

because the jury did not specifically award damages on the line designated on the verdict

sheet for the violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Notably, the jury did

award damages for separate counts of fraud and consumer debt violations. For the reasons

explained herein, we perceive no error and shall affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The Riffeys entered into a contract with Ireland for landscaping and various other

home improvement services at their residence at 3 Opie Road, White Marsh, Maryland.

On July 10, 2015, the Riffeys filed suit against Ireland, alleging that he violated the law by

operating without a valid home improvement license, made material misrepresentations

regarding the work he was going to perform on the Riffeys’ property, overcharged and/or

double billed for work performed, failed to perform work in a workmanlike manner, failed

to pay his subcontractor, and illegally attempted to collect money from the Riffeys.

The case was tried before a jury over three days in August 2017. The jury found in

favor of the Riffeys on all counts and determined that Ireland violated the Consumer Debt

Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. The jury further determined

that Ireland was liable for breach of contract and fraud. The jury awarded damages in the

— Unreported Opinion —

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amount of $7,500.00 for the violation of the Consumer Debt Collection Act and $950.00

for breach of contract. For the fraud claim, the jury awarded economic damages in the

amount of $7,500.00, noneconomic damages in the amount of $15,000, and punitive

damages in the amount of $15,000.00. The jury did not award separate damages for the

violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.

The Riffeys subsequently filed a petition for attorney’s fees, which the circuit court

granted. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before this Court on appeal is the proper interpretation of the

Maryland Consumer Protection Act’s fee-shifting provision, codified at Md. Code (1975,

2013 Repl. Vol.), § 13-408 of the Commercial Law Article (“CL”). The parties agree that

we apply the non-deferential de novo standard of review when determining whether the

circuit court’s decision to award attorney’s fees was legally appropriate. See, e.g.,

Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 277 (2011).

Ireland asserts that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the Riffeys

because the jury’s verdict, as recorded on the verdict sheet, did not specifically award

damages for Ireland’s violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. The Riffeys

respond that because the jury awarded damages for fraud as well as for Ireland’s violation

of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act -- which are per se violations of the

Maryland Consumer Protection Act -- the attorney’s fees award was legally appropriate.

The fee-shifting provision of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act provides that

“[a]ny person who brings an action to recover for injury or loss under this section and who

— Unreported Opinion —

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is awarded damages may also seek, and the court may award, reasonable attorney's fees.”

CL § 13-408(b). The Maryland Consumer Protection Act expressly prohibits “unfair,

abusive, or deceptive trade practice . . . in . . . [t]he offer for sale, lease, rental, loan, or

bailment of consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services.” CL § 13-303(2).

The Act further prohibits “unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practice . . . in. . . [t]he

collection of consumer debts.” CL § 13-302(5).

The definition of “unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices” is set forth in

CL § 13-301, which provides that “unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices include

any . . . fraud . . . with the intent that a consumer rely on the same in connection with:

(i) [t]he promotion or sale of any consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer

service . . . .” CL § 13-301(9). The definition further includes the “[v]iolation of a

provision of . . . Title 14, Subtitle 3 of [the Commercial Law] article, the Maryland

Consumer Debt Collection Act.” CL § 13-301(14)(iii).

The verdict sheet submitted to the jury in this case separately asked the jury to

determine:

• Whether Ireland violated the Consumer Debt Collection

Act;

• Whether Ireland violated the Maryland Consumer

Protection Act;

• Whether Ireland entered into a contract with the Riffeys,

and, if so, whether Ireland breached his contract with the

Riffeys; and

• Whether Ireland committed fraud.

— Unreported Opinion —

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The verdict sheet also provided separate lines for the award of damages for each of the

injuries. The jury found that Ireland liable for violations of the Consumer Debt Collection

Act and Maryland Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, and fraud. The jury

awarded damages for the violation of the Consumer Debt Collection Act, breach of

contract, and fraud, but did not award separate damages for the Maryland Consumer

Protection Act violation.

Ireland interprets the fee-shifting provision of the Maryland Consumer Protection

Act as a two-part test that is a “pre-requisite to an aggrieved individual’s ability to seek

and be awarded attorney’s fees.” Ireland asserts that in order to recover attorney’s fees

under this section, an “aggrieved individual must 1) bring an action for violation of the

Consumer Protection Act; and 2) be awarded damages for the aforesaid violation of the

Consumer Protection Act.” Ireland contends that the jury’s failure to specifically award

damages on the line designated for the Consumer Protection Act violation on the verdict

sheet precludes the Riffeys’ award of attorney’s fees. In our view, Ireland’s interpretation

of the statute is unsupported and ignores the fact that violations of the Maryland Consumer

Debt Collection Act and fraud are themselves violations of the Maryland Consumer

Protection Act. See CL §§ 13-301(9), 13-301(14)(iii), and 13-303(1). Critically, the jury

found that Ireland was liable both for fraud and the violation of the Maryland Consumer

Debt Protection Act and awarded damages for both.

Indeed, courts have acknowledged the interrelated nature of the Maryland

Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. In Bradshaw

v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 719, 732 (D. Md. 2011), the United States

— Unreported Opinion —

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District Court for the District of Maryland addressed allegations of violations of both Acts

together, explaining as follows:

The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) prohibits

“unfair or deceptive trade practices,” Md. Code Ann., Com.

Law § 13-301, and expressly designates as “unfair or deceptive

trade practices” those that constitute any violation of the

MCDCA. Id. § 13-301(14)(iii). Essentially, Plaintiffs allege

that Hilco’s unlicensed filing of lawsuits against the class

members violates the MCDCA’s prohibition on attempting, or

threatening to enforce a right with knowledge that the right

does not exist, and that violation, in turn, provides the basis for

the MCPA violation. Each statute creates a private right of

action for victims of debt collectors that violate its provisions.

See id. § 14-203 (MCDCA) and § 13-408(a) (MCPA).

Because the foundation of Plaintiffs’ MCPA claim relies on an

alleged underlying violation of the MCDCA, and noting the

interrelation of the two statutes, this Court will address both

Acts together.

The Bradshaw court found a violation of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and

explained that “because violations of the MCDCA are expressly designated as ‘unfair or

deceptive trade practices’ under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, this Court also

finds that Hilco has violated that statute as well.” Id. at 733.

In the present case, as in Bradshaw, the violation of the Maryland Consumer Debt

Collection Act constitutes a violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. The

jury’s finding of fraud -- an expressly designated example of an “unfair or deceptive trade

practice” -- similarly constitutes a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. See

CL § 13-301(9). Although the damage awards for these violations were listed separately

on the verdict sheet, the fact remains that the Riffeys were awarded damages for violations

— Unreported Opinion —

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of the Consumer Protection Act through the damages the jury awarded for fraud and the

violation of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act.

We are not persuaded by Ireland’s attempt to analogize this case to cases he cites in

support of his assertion that the circuit court erred by awarding attorney’s fees.

CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142 (1992), involved the issue of whether the leasing

of an unlicensed dwelling unit could constitute a violation of the Maryland Consumer

Protection Act when the tenants suffered no actual loss or injury as a result. The tenants

had been granted summary judgment by the trial court, and the Court of Appeals reversed,

holding that actual loss or injury is an element of a Maryland Consumer Protection Act

claim. Id. at 158-59.

Ireland’s reliance on Galola v. Snyder, 328 Md. 182 (1992), is similarly misplaced.

In Galola, the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as in CitaraManis in

determining that “[a] tenant is not entitled to damages under § 13-408(a) of the CPA solely

upon proof that the leased property was not licensed as required by law; rather, the tenant

must prove actual loss or injury caused by the lack of licensure.” Id. at 185-86. Unlike the

situations presented in CitaraManis and Galola, in the present case, the jury specifically

found that the Riffeys suffered actual injury due to Ireland’s fraud and violation of the

Consumer Debt Collection Act.

We recognize that the verdict sheet submitted by the jury in this case awarded no

separate damages for Ireland’s violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Nonetheless, as

Ireland cites Galola in a string cite but does not attempt to explain how Galola is

analogous.

— Unreported Opinion —

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we have explained, the record reflects that the Riffeys were awarded damages for Ireland’s

violation of the Consumer Protection Act via the damage awards for fraud and the violation

of the Consumer Debt Collection Act. The jury was not required to specifically find that

fraud and the Consumer Debt Collection Act violation constituted violations of the

Consumer Protection Act because they constitute violations of the Consumer Protection

Act as a matter of law. See CL § 13-301(9); 13-301(14)(iii). Moreover, we have explained

that “the verdict sheet itself is a tool for the jury to utilize in deciding its verdict but it does

not constitute the verdict.” Ogundipe v. State, 191 Md. App. 370, 382 (2010), aff’d, 424

Md. 58 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 966 (2012). The Court of Appeals characterized the

verdict sheet similarly, explaining that “[t]he verdict sheet is merely a tool used to aid the

jury in reaching its verdict; it therefore does not bind the jury or the court to its contents.”

424 Md. at 72-73.

The attorney’s fees awarded in this case were authorized by the clear and

unambiguous language of the Consumer Protection Act. Furthermore, the award of

attorney’s fees is consistent with the purpose of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.

See Washington Home Remodelers, Inc. v. State, Office of Attorney Gen., Consumer Prot.

Div., 426 Md. 613, 630 (2012) (“The CPA . . . constitutes remedial legislation that is

intended to be construed liberally in order to promote its purpose of providing a modicum

of protection for the State’s consumers.”). We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not

err by granting the Riffeys’ petition for attorney’s fees.

At oral argument, counsel for the Riffeys specifically requested that we remand

this case to the circuit court for consideration of whether attorney’s fees should be awarded

— Unreported Opinion —

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JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

for expenses incurred in connection with this appeal. Maryland Rule 2-706 sets forth the

procedure by which a party may seek in the circuit court an award of attorney’s fees

incurred in connection with an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for

certiorari. We take no position whatsoever with respect to whether appellate attorney’s

fees should be awarded in this case.