President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force

THE PRESIDENT’S

COMMISSION ON AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER

ARMED FORCE

FEBRUARY 1970

-

Official editions of the report of The President’s

Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force may

be freely used, duplicated, or published, in whole or

in part, except to the extent that, where expressly

noted in the publications, they contain copyrighted

materials reprinted by permission of the copyright

holders.

Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 78-605447.

ii

Dear Mr. President:

Thomas s. Gates

PRESIDENT’S COMM,SSlON ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

71‘ 1*51so* CL,. *.w.

w.**I*~TO*. D.C. 2054s

February 6, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

It was an honor to be named by you to membership on the President’s

Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. I looked forward

to serving on this Commission because it confronts an extremely

important issue. Unfortunately, a combination of a minor illness in

December and an operation at the beginning of January prevented

my participating in the last five Commission meetings during which

specific recommendations and various drafts of the report were

discussed.

Because I was able to play only a small part in its shaping I did not

feel it was proper for me to sign the report, and advised the Chairman,

Thomas Gates, accordingly in late December.

I am writing now to express my regret at not being able to sign this

report. Although I have been unable to share in its specific recom-

mendations, I would like to endorse the basic idea of moving towards

an all-volunteer armed force, and to express my hope that you will

be able to take steps in the near future to reduce reliance on

conscription.

Respectfully,

/

Roy Wilkins

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon

The White House

Washington, D. C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE MARCH 27, 1969

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

ANNOUNCING THE CREATION

OF THE COMMISSION

To achieve the goal of a” all-volunteer force we will require the best

efforts of our military establishment and the best advice we can

obtain from eminent citizens and experts in many related ‘helds of

national endeavor. For this purpose, I have today appointed a”

Advisory Commission on a” All-Volunteer Armed Force under the

Chairmanship of the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., former Sec-

retary of Defense.

I have directed the Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for

eliminating conscription and moving toward a” all-volunteer armed

force. The Commission will study a broad range of possibilities for

increasing the supply of volunteers for service, including increased

pay, benefits, recruitment incentives and other practicable measures

to make military careers more. attractive to young men. It will

consider possible changes in selection stahdards and in utilization

policies which may assist in eliminating the need for inductions. It

will study the estimated costs and savings resulting from an all-

volunteer force, as well as the broader social and economic implica-

tions of this program.

The transition to a” all-volunteer armed force must, of course, be

handled cautiously and responsibly so that our national security is

fully maintained. The Commission will determine what standby

machinery for the draft will be required in the event of a national

emergency and will give serious consideration to our requirements

for a” adequate reserve forces program.

I have instructed the Department of Defense and other agencies of

the Executive Branch to support this study and provide needed

information and assistance as a matter of high priority.

vii

PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

Thomas Gates

CHllRYlM

Thomas Curtis

Frederick Dent

Milton Friedman

Crawford Greenewalt

Alan Greenspan

Chairman of the Executive Committee of

Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., former

Secretary of Defense. New York City

Vice-President and General Counsel,

Encyclopedia Britannica, former

Congressman from Missouri and ranking

Republican on Joint Economic Committee,

United States Congress. St. Louis, Missouri

President, Mayfair Mills, Spartanburg,

South Carolina

Paul Snowdon Russell Distinguished

Service Professor of Economics,

University of Chicago. Chicago, Illinois

Chairman, Finance Committee,

E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co.

Wilmington, Delaware.

Chairman of the Board, Townsend-

Greenspan &Co. Economic consultants.

New York City

VI”

Alfred Gruenther

Stephen Herbits

Theodore Hesburgh

Jerome Holland

John Kemper

Jeanne Noble

Lauris Norstad

W. Allen Wallis

Roy Wilkins

Former Supreme Allied Commander,

Europe. Washington, D. C.

Student, Georgetown University Law

Center. Washington, D. C.

President, University of Notre Dame,

Chairman, US. Commission on Civil

Rights. South Bend, Indiana

President, Hampton Institute.

Hampton, Virginia

Headmaster, Phillips Academy.

Andover, Massachusetts.

Professor, New York University.

Vice President, National Council of Negro

Women. Former member, National

Advisory Commission on Selective Service.

New York City

Chairman of the Board of Owens-Corning

Fiberglass Corp. Former Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe. New York City

President, University of Rochester.

Rochester, New York

Executive Director, NAACP.

New York City

ix

COMMISSION STAFF

Executive Director

William H. Meckling

Diictors of Research

Deputy Executive Director

Dr. Stuart Altman

David I. Callard

Dr. Harry J. Gilman

David Kassing

Editor

Dr. Walter Y. Oi

Richard J. Whalen

Research Projects

Lt. Cal. Ames Albr-Potential

for Civilian Substitution (U.S.

A ml y)

Robert Barre-Oficer Rrcrrrit-

“lent

Lt. Cal. Herman Boland-Re-

serve Requirements and Sup-

ply (U.S. Army)

Dr. Alvin Cook-Air Force En-

listment

Alan Fechter-Army Ettlistmmts

Brian Forst-Personnel Reqrtire-

nwnts

Burton Gray--Navy Enlistments

Dr. Harry Grubert--Navy Reen-

listments

Ronald N. Hansen-The Con-

scription Tax

Stewart Kemp-Recruiting Prac-

tices

Mordechai Lando-Conscription

of Physicians

James McConnell-Conscription

in Europe

Judith Blaine

Mary Clark

Patricia Flanary

Eleanor Gages

William Holahan

Research

J. Houston McCulloch-Civilian

Earnings

Gary Nelson-Arnry Rrenlist-

mmts

Dr. Dave M. O’Neil-Costs of

Military Personnel Turnover

John L. Rafuse-Conscription in

America

Dave Resume--Utilization of

Skills by the Armed Forces

Dr. Larry Sjaastad-The Con-

scription Tax

David Stigler-Conscription and

the Constitution

John Sullivan-Qlralitative Re-

quirements of Enlisted Men

Dr. Rodney Weiher--Navy Re-

enlistments

Dr. Robert White-Air Force

Enlistnwnts

Capt. Robert Wilburn-Air

Force Reenlistments (U.S. Air

Force)

Dr. Desmond P. Wilson--Vet-

cram in Society

Assistants

Jesse Horack

Andrea Horn&t

Ruth Kurtz

Joanne Linnerooth

Mary Ostrander

x

Data Processions

James Parsells

Shelia Rafferty

tmce statI

Dimitrios Drivas

Robin D. Margenau

Candy Haga

Warren Parker

Dorothy Hitselberger

Marty Roberts

Rose Lawrence

Allaire Williams

Consulting Organizations

Center for Naval Analyses

Institute for Defense Analysis

Rand Corporation

CONTENTS

Part1

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

PROTECTING THE FREE SOCIETY 5

Chapter 2

THE DEBATE 11

Chapter 3

CONSCRlPTION ,IS A TAX

Chapter 4

MILITARY PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Chapter 5

COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT

OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Chapter 6

OFFICER PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION

Chapter 7

RECRUITMENT

Chapter 8

CONSCRIPTION OF PHYSICIANS

Chapter 9

RESERVES

Chapter 10

THE STANDBY DRAFT

Chapter 11

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

Chapter 12

OBJECTIONS TO AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Chapter 13

CONSCRIPTION IN AMERICA

Chapter 14

RECENT FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

WITH VOLUNTARISM

Chapter 15

ALTERNATIVES TO AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Appendix A

BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES

Appendix B

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPENSATION

Appendix C

REVIEW OF THE 1966 DEPT. OF DEFENSE DRAFT STUDY

203

23

35

49

69

83

87

97

119

125

129

159

169

173

117

197

xiii

PART I

INTRODUCTION

The Commission’s report consists of two parts-the first,

Chapter I and 2; and the second, Chapters 3 through 15.

In Chapter 1 we take up the questions we recognized as

critical from the outset: Is an all-volunteer force feasible? Are there

practicable reforms in present procedures that will maintain voluntary

forces of the size and quality deemed necessary for national security?

Chapter 1 summarizes the considerations underlying our conclusion

that an all-volunteer force is feasible and lists our recommendations

for major reforms.

Chapter 2 deals with another set of questions: Regardless

of whether an all-volunteer force is feasible, is it desirable? Will

voluntary recruitment weaken our democratic society and have

harmful political and social effects? The Commission has studied

such issues at great length, in the light of whatever relevant evidence

we could assemble. Chapter 2 notes some of the main objections

raised to ending conscription and summarizes our responses to them.

In Part II of the report, the Commission presents the pertinent

evidence gathered during its inquiry and the analysis underlying its

recommendations which form the essential background of the

Commission’s findings.

Of course, the members of the Commission, in expressing

their individual views on this broad range of issues, would choose

a variety of phrases to express their particular emphases and there-

fore should not be held individually responsible for each and every

sentence of the report.

1

CHAPTER 1

PROTECTING THE FREE SOCIETY

Since the founding of the republic, a primary task of the

government of the United States has been to provide for the

common defense of a society established to secure the blessings

of liberty and justice. Without endangering the nation’s

security, the means of defense should support the aims of the

society.

The armed forces today play an honorable and important

part in promoting the nation’s security, as they have since our

freedoms were won on the battlefield at Yorktown. A

fundamental consideration that has guided this Commission is

the need to maintain and improve the effectiveness, dignity, and

status of the armed forces so they may continue to play their

proper role.

The Commission has not attempted to judge the size of the

armed forces the nation requires. Instead, it has accepted a

range of estimates made for planning purposes which anticipate

maintaining a total force in the future somewhere between

2,000,OOO and 3,000,OOO men.

We unanimously believe that the nation’s interests will be

better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an

effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers

and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in

this direction; and that the first indispensable step is to remove

the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in

the armed forces.

The United States has relied throughout its history on a

voluntary armed force except during major wars and since

1948. A return to an all-volunteer force will strengthen our

freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed on the expression

of the patriotism that has never been lacking among our youth,

promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and enhance their

dignity. It is the system for maintaining standing forces that

minimizes government interference with the freedom of the

individual to determine his own life in accord with his values.

The Commission bases its judgments on long-range

considerations of what method of recruiting manpower will

strengthen our society’s foundations. The Commission’s

members have reached agreement on their recommendations

only as the result of prolonged study and searching debate, and

in spite of initial division. We are, of course, fully aware of the

current and frequently emotional public debate on national

priorities, foreign policy, and the military, but are agreed that

such issues stand apart from the question of when and how to

end conscription.

To judge the feasibility of an all-volunteer force, it is

important to grasp the dimensions of the recruitment problem

in the next decade. If conscription is continued, a stable

mid-range force of 2.5 million men (slightly smaller than

pre-Vietnam) will require 440,000 new enlisted men per year.

To maintain a fully voluntary stable force of the same effective

strength, taking into account lower personnel turnover, we

estimate that not more than 325,000 men will have to be

enlisted annually. In recent years about 500,000 men a year

have volunteered for military service. Although some of these

volunteered only because of the threat of the draft, the best

estimates are that at least half - 250,000 men - are “true

volunteers.” Such men would have volunteered even if there

had been no draft, and they did volunteer in spite of an entry

pay that is roughly 60 percent of the amount that men of their

age, education, and training could earn in civilian life.

6

The often ignored fact, therefore, is that our present

armed forces are made up predominantly of volunteers. All

those men who have more than four years of service - 38

percent of the total - are true volunteers; and so are at least a

third of those with fewer than four years of service.

The return to voluntary means of raising and maintaining

our armed forces should be seen in this perspective. With true

volunteers now providing some 250,000 enlisted men annually,

a fully volunteer force of 2.5 million men can be achieved by

improving pay and conditions of service sufficiently to induce

approximately 75,000 additional young men to enlist each year

from the 1.5 million men who will annually turn 19 and who

will also meet the physical, moral, and mental requirements. A

voluntary force of 3.0 million men would require 400,000

enlistments each year, or 150,000 additional volunteers from

the 1.5 million eligible 19-year olds. Smaller forces would

require fewer than 75,000 additional volunteers annually.

Reasonable improvements in pay and benefits in the early years

of service should increase the number of volunteers by these

amounts.

In any event, such improvements are called for on the

ground of equity alone. Because conscription has been used to

provide raw recruits, the pay of men entering the services has

been kept at a very low level. It has not risen nearly as rapidly

as the pay of experienced military personnel, and it is now

about 60 percent of comparable civilian pay. Similarly, the pay

of first- term officers has not been kept in line with the pay of

more experienced officers, or with comparable civilians.

Correcting this inequity for first-term enlisted men and

f&t-term officers will add about $2.7 billion to the defense

budget in fiscal 1971. Regardless of the fate of the draft, the

Commission strongly recommends elimination of this

discrimination against first-termers.

If the Commission’s recommendations are put into effect

for fiscal 1971, they will entail a budget increase of an

estimated $3.3 billion for the following expenditures:

Basic pay increase

(Billions) $2.68

Proficiency pay

.21

Reserve pay increase .I5

Additional medical corps expense .12

Recruiting, ROTC and miscellaneous 08

s3.24

7

The additional proficiency pay is required to attract

individuals in the first term with special skills and talents. The

additional reserve pay extends the increase in pay provided for

the active-duty forces to the reserves. and is called for as a step

toward a voluntary reserve. The additional outlay for a

voluntary medical corps is for increased pay to medical officers.

for medical student fellowships. and. where possible, for

contracting with civilian physicians to provide medical services

now rendered by military physicians.

Because most of this budget increase takes the form of

personal income, $540 million of it will be recovered by the

Treasury in federal income tax collections. The net increase in

the budget in fiscal 1971 after taking these tax collections into

account, will be $2.7 billion.

The Commission recommends that these additional funds

be provided effective July I. 1970. We believe, on the basis of

our study, that the increased pay and other recommended

improvements in personnel management will provide enough

additional volunteers during the transition to achieve an

all-volunteer force by July I. 197 I.

When force levels are stabilized, the additional

expenditures needed in the transition to a voluntary force will

be partly offset by savings engendered through lower turnover

and a reduction in the number of persons in training status.

Combining the expenditures to eliminate the present

inequity for first-turners, and other steps necessary to move to

an all-volunteer force with the savings that will accrue. the

Commission estimates that the added budget required to

maintain a fully voluntary force on a stable. continuing basis is:

S I .S billion for a 2.000.000 man force

$2. I billion for a 2300.000 man force

$4.6 billion for a 3.000.000 man force

These are net amounts. reflecting the personal income tax

collections that would be recovered.

Although the hrtdgrrctr,~~ e.~~errse of a volunteer armed

force will be higher than for the present mixed force of

volunteers and conscripts, the

actuul cost

will be lower. This

seemingly paradoxical statement is true because many of the

costs of manning our armed forces today are hidden and are not

8

reflected in the budget. Men who are forced to serve in the

military at artificially low pay are actually paying a form of tax

which subsidizes those in the society who do not serve.

Furthermore, the output of the civilian economy is reduced

because more men serve in the military than would be required

for an all-volunteer force of the same strength. This cost does

not show up in the budget. Neither does the loss in output

resulting from the disruption in the lives of young men who do

not serve. Neither do the costs borne by those men who do not

serve. but who rearrange their lives in response to the possibility

of being drafted. Taking these hidden and neglected costs into

account, the actual cost to the nation of an all-volunteer force

will be lower than the cost of the present force.

The Commission has attempted to allow for the

uncertainties of the future. In the event of a national emergency

requiring a rapid increase in the number of men under arms, the

first recourse should be to ready reserves, including the National

Guard. Like the active duty forces, these reserves can and

should be recruited on a voluntary basis. Whatever advantages

may be claimed for it, conscription cannot provide emergency

forces: it takes many months of training for civilians to become

soldiers. However, to provide for the possibility of an

emergency requiring a major increase in forces over an extended

period, we recommend that machinery be created for a standby

draft,

to take effect by act of Congress upon the

recommendation of the President.

The draft has been an accepted feature of American life

for a generation, and its elimination will represent still another

major change in a society much buffeted by change and alarmed

by violent attacks on the established order. Yet the status quo

can be changed constructively, and the society improved

peacefully, by responsible and responsive government. It is in

this spirit that the Commission has deliberated and arrived at its

recommendations. However necessary conscription may have

been in World War II, it has revealed many disadvantages in the

past generation. It has been a costly, inequitable, and divisive

procedure for recruiting men for the armed forces. It has

imposed heavy burdens on a small minority of young men while

easing slightly the tax burden on the rest of us. It has

introduced needless uncertainty into the lives of all our young

men. It has burdened draft boards with painful decisions about

who shall be compelled to serve and who shall be deferred. It

9

has weakened the political fabric of our society and impaired

the delicate web of shared values that alone enables a free

society to exist.

These costs of conscription would have to be borne if they

were a necessary price for defending our peace and security.

They are intolerable when there is an alternative consistent with

our basic national values.

The alternative is an all-volunteer force, and the

Commission recommends these steps toward it:

I. Raise the average level of basic pay for military

personnel in the first two years of service from $180

a month to $315 a month, the increase to become

effective on July I, 1970. This involves an increase in

total compensation (including the value of food,

lodging, clothing and fringe benefits) from $301 a

month to $437 a month. The basic pay of officers in

the first two years should be raised from an average

level of $428 a month to $578 a month, and their

total compensation from $717 a month to $869 a

month.

2. Make comprehensive improvements in conditions of

military service and in recruiting as set forth

elsewhere in the Report.

3. Establish a standby draft system by June 30, 1971 to

be activated by joint resolution of Congress upon

request of the President.

10

CHAPTER 2

THE DEBATE

“We have lived with the draft so long,” President Nixon

has pointed out, “that too many of us accept it as normal and

necessary.” Over the past generation, social, political, and

economic arrangements have grown up around conscription that

touch our lives in a great many ways. The elimination of the

draft will inevitably disrupt these arrangements and may be

disturbing to some. But beyond these narrow, often overlooked

interests lie broader considerations which have prompted

defenders of conscription to argue that an all-volunteer armed

force will have a variety of undesirable political, social, and

military effects.

In our meetings we have discussed the opposing arguments

extensively. As our recommendatiohs disclose, we have

unanimously concluded that the arguments for an all-volunteer

force are much the stronger. Yet, there can be no question of

the sincerity and earnest conviction of those who hold the views

we have rejected. In fairness to them, and to acquaint the

Nation with both sides of the issues, this chapter summarizes

11

the main arguments raised against the volunteer force and offers

answers to them. In succeeding chapters (noted in parentheses)

these arguments are taken up in detail.

A general point should be made here. The elimination of

conscription admittedly is a major social change, but it will

not

produce a major change in the personnel of our armed forces.

The majority of men serving today are volunteers. And many

who are now conscripted would volunteer once improvements

were made in pay and other conditions of service. Therefore,

the difference between an all-volunteer force and a mixed force

of conscripts and volunteers is limited to that minority who

would not serve unless conscripted and who would not

volunteer in the absence of conscription. An all-volunteer force

will attract men who are not now conscripted and who do not

now volunteer but who will do so when military service imposes

less of a financial penalty than it currently does.

Contrary to much dramatic argument, the reality is that an

all-volunteer force will be manned largely by the same kind of

individuals as today’s armed forces. The men who serve will be

quite similar in patriotism, political attitudes, effectiveness, and

susceptibility to civilian control. The draft does not guarantee

the quality of our armed foraes, and neither will voluntarism.

There are no simple solutions or shortcuts in dealing with the

complex problems that must always concern us as a free people.

Arguments against an all-volunteer force fall into fairly

distinct, though sometimes overlapping categories, one of which

is feasibility. Summarized below are some of the main

objections under this heading.

Objection 1: An all-volunteer force will be very

costly - so costly the Nation cannot afford it.

Answer: The question of how much the armed forces

cost is confused with the question of who bears those

costs. It is true that the budget for a voluntary force

will generally be higher than for an equally effective

force of conscripts and volunteers; but the cost of the

voluntary force will be less than the cost of the mixed

force. This apparent paradox arises because some of

the costs of a mixed force are hidden and never

appear in the budget.

12

Under the present system. first-term servicemen

must bear a disproportionately large share of the

defense burden. Draftees and draft-induced

volunteers are paid less than they would require to

volunteer. The loss they suffer is a tax-in-kind which

for budget purposes is never recorded as a receipt or

an expenditure. We estimate that for draftees and

draft-induced volunteers the total tax amounts to $2

billion per year: an average of $3.600 per man. If

Government accounts rrtlected as income this

financial penalty imposed on first-term servicemen. it

would become clear that a voluntary force costs less

than a mixed force. One example of real cost savings

that will accrue is the reduction in training costs as a

result of the lower personnel turnover of a voluntary

fODX.

Conscription also imposes social and human

costs by distorting the personal life and career plans

of the young and by forcing society to deal with such

difficult problems as conscientious objection (chapter

3).

Objection 2: The all-volunteer force will lack the

flexibility to expand rapidly in times of sudden crises.

Answer: Military preparedness depends on forces in

being, not on the ability to draft untrained men.

Reserve forces provide immediate support to active

forces, while the draft provides only inexperienced

civilians who must be organized, trained. and

equipped before they can become effective soldiers

and sailors - a process which takes many months.

The Commission has recommended a standby draft

which can be put into effect promptly if

circumstances require mobilization of large numbers

of men. History shows that Congress has quickly

granted the authority to draft when needed (chapter

IO).

Others contend that an all-volunteer force will have

undesirable political and social effects. Some of these objections

are given below.

13

Objection 3: An all-volunteer force will undermine

patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that

each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his

country.

Answer: Compelling service through a draft

undermines respect for government by forcing an

individual to serve when and in the manner the

government decides, regardless of his own values and

talents. Clearly, not all persons are equally suited for

military service - some are simply not qualified.

When not all our citizens can serve, and only a small

minority are needed, a voluntary decision to serve is

the best answer, morally and practically, to the

question of who should serve (chapters 3 and 12).

Objection 4: The presence of draftees in a mixed

force guards against the growth of a separate military

ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority,

our freedom, and our democratic institutions.

Answer: Historically, voluntary service and freedom

have gone hand in hand. In the United States and

England, where voluntarism has been used most

consistently, there is also the strongest tradition of

civilian control of the military. There are

responsibilities to be met in maintaining civilian

control, but they must be exercised from above

rather than at the lowest level of the enlisted ranks.

They reside in the Halls of Congress, and in the White

House as well as in the military hierarchy.

In either a mixed or volunteer force, the

attitudes of the officer corps are the preponderant

factor in the psychology of the military; and with or

without the draft, professional officers are recruited

voluntarily from a variety of regional and

socioeconomic backgrounds. It is hard to believe that

substituting a true volunteer for a draftee or a

draft-induced volunteer in one of every six positions

will so alter the military as to threaten the tradition

of civilian control, which is embodied in the

Constitution and deeply felt by the public. It is even

less credible when one considers that this substitution

14

will occur at the lowest level of the military ladder,

among first-term enlisted men and officers, and that

turnover of these first-term personnel in an

all-volunteer force will be approximately

three-fourths of that in a comparable mixed ~force.

The truth is, we already have a large professional

armed force amounting to over 2 million men. The

existing loyalties and political influence of that force

cannot be materially changed by eliminating

conscription in the lowest ranks (chapter 12).

Objection 5: The higher pay required for a voluntary

force will be especially appealing to blacks who have

relatively poorer civilian opportunities.

This,

combined with higher reenlistment rates for blacks,

will mean that a disproportionate number of blacks

will be in military service. White enlistments and

reenlistments might decline, thus leading to an

all-black enlisted force. Racial tensions would grow

because of white apprehension at this development

and black resentment at bearing an undue share of

the burden of defense. At the same time, some of the

most qualified young blacks would be in the

military - not in the community where their talents

are needed.

Answer: The frequently heard claim that a volunteer

force will be all black or all this or all that, simply has

no basis in fact. Our research indicates that the

composition of the armed forces will not be

fundamentally changed by ending conscription.

Negroes presently make up 10.6 percent of the armed

forces, slightly less than the proportion of blacks in

the Nation. Our best projections for the future are

that blacks will be about 14 percent of the enlisted

men in a conscripted force totalling 2.5 million

officers and men, and 15 percent in an all-volunteer

force of equal capability. For the Army, we estimate

that the proportion of blacks will be 17 percent for

the mixed force and 18 percent for the voluntary

force as compared to 12.8 percent in the Army

today. To be sure, these are estimates, but even

15

extreme assumptions would not change the figures

drastically.

If higher pay does make opportunities in an

all-volunteer force more attractive to some particular

group than those in civilian life, then the appropriate

course is to correct the discriminations in civilian

life - not introduce additional discriminations against

such a group.

The argument that blacks would bear an unfair

share bf the burden of an all-volunteer force

confounds service by free choice with compulsory

service. With conscription, some blacks are compelled

to serve at earnings below what they would earn in

the civilian economy. Blacks who join a voluntary

force presumably have decided for themselves that

military service is preferable to the other alternatives

available to them. They regard military service as a

more rewarding opportunity, not as a burden. Denial

of this opportunity would reflect either bias or a

paternalistic belief that blacks are not capable of

making the “right” decisions concerning their lives

(chapter 12).

Objection 6: Those joining an all-volunteer force will

be men from the lowest economic classes, motivated

primarily by monetary rewards rather than

patriotism. An all-volunteer force will be manned, in

effect, by mercenaries.

Answer: Again,

our research indicates that an

all-volunteer force will not differ significantly from

the current force of conscripts and volunteers.

Maintenance of current mental, physical, and moral

standards for enlistment will ensure that a better

paid, volunteer force will not recruit an undue

proportion of youths from disadvantaged

socioeconomic backgrounds. A disproportionate

fraction of the 30 percent presently unable to meet

these standards come from such backgrounds, and

these men would also be ineligible for service in an

all-volunteer force. Increasing military pay in the first

term of service will increase the attractiveness of

military service more to those who have higher

16

civilian earnings potential than to those who have

lower civilian potential. Military pay is already

relatively attractive to those who h3w very poor

civilian alternatives. If eligible. such individunls are

now free to enlist and. moreover, are free to remain

beyond their first term of service when military pay is

even more attractive.

Finally. how will

“mercenxirs”

suddenly

emerge in the armed forces as a result of better pay

a II d other conditions of service? The term

“mercenary” applies to men who enlist for pay alone.

usually in the service of a foreign power. and

precludes all other motives for serving. Those who

volunteer to serve in the urmed forces do so for a

vnricty of reasons. inclnding a sense of duty.

Eliminating

the financial prnalty first-term

servicemen presently suffer. and improving other

conditions of service, will not suddenly change the

motives and basic attitudes of new recruits. Also. can

we regard as mercenxies the career commissioned

and noncommissioned officers now serving beyond

their first term? (chapter I?).

Objection 7: An all-volunteer force would stimulatr

foreign military adventures, foster an irresponsible

foreign policy, and lessen civilian concern about the

use of military forces.

Answer: Decisions by a government to use force or to

threaten the use of force during crises are extremely

difficult. The high cost of military resources, the

moral burden of risking human lives. political costs at

home and overseas. and the overshadowing risk of

nucle;~ confrontation ~ these and other factors enter

into such decisions. It is absurd to argue that issues of

such importance would be ignored and the decision

for war made on the basis of whether our forces were

entirely voluntary or mixed.

To the extent that there is pressure to seek

military solutions to foreign policy problems, such

pressure already exists and will not be affected by

ending conscription. The volunteer force will have the

17

same professional leadership as the present mixed

force. Changes in the lower ranks will not alter the

character of this leadership or the degree of civilian

control.

A decision to use the all-volunteer force will be

made according to the same criteria as the decision to

use a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers

because the size and readiness of the two forces will

be quite similar. These military factors are key

determinants in any decision to commit forces.

Beyond initial commitment, the policy choice

between expanding our forces by conscription or by

voluntary enlistment is the same for both the

all-volunteer force and a mixed force of conscripts

and volunteers. The important difference between the

two forces lies in the necessity for political debate

before

returning to conscription. With the

all-volunteer force, the President can seek

authorization to activate the standby draft, but

Congress must give its consent. With the mixed

system, draft calls can be increased by the President.

The difference between the two alternatives is crucial.

The former will generate public discussion of the use

of the draft to fight a war; the latter can be done

without such public discussion. If the need for

conscription is not clear, such discussion will clarify

the issue, and the draft will be used only if public

support is widespread (chapter 12).

Other critics of an all-volunteer force argue that it will

gradually erode the military’s effectiveness. Some of their main

concerns are taken up below.

Objection 8: A voluntary force will be less effective

because not enougli highly qualified youths will be

likely to enlist and pursue military careers. As the

quality of servicemen declines, the prestige and

dignity of the services will also decline and further

intensify recruiting problems.

Answer: The Commission has been impressed by the

number and quality of the individuals who, despite

conscription, now choose a career in the military. The

18

fact that we must resort in part to coercion to man

the armed services must be a serious deterrent to

potential volunteers. A force made up of men freely

choosing to serve should enhance the dignity and

prcstigc of the military. Every man in uniform will be

serving as a matter of choice rather than coercion.

The Commission recognizes the importance of

recruiting and retaining qualified individuals. hit has

recommended improved basic compensation and

conditions of service, proficiency pay and accelerated

promotions for the highly skilled to make military

career opportunities more attrxtive. These

improvements, combined with an intensive recruiting

effort, should enable the military not only to

maintain a high quality force but also to have one

that is more experienced, better motivated, and has

higher morale (chapters 4, 5, 7, and 12).

Objection 9: The defense budget will not be increased

to provide for an all-volunteer force, and the

Department of Defense will have to cut back

expenditures in other areas. Even if additional funds

are provided initially, competing demands will, over

the long term, force the Department of Defense to

absorb the added budgetary expense of an

all-volunteer force. The result could be a potentially

serious deterioration of the nation’s overall military

posture.

Answer: Ultimately, the size of the military budget

and the strength of our armed forces depend upon

public attitudes toward national defense. Since World

War II, our peacetime armed forces have been

consistently supported at high levels. The public has

supported large forces because it has felt them

essential to national security. The change from a

mixed force of volunteers and conscripts to an

all-volunteer force cannot significantly change that

feeling.

The contention that an all-volunteer force is

undesirable because it would result in smaller defense

forces raises a serious issue regarding the conduct of

government in a democracy. Conscription obscures a

19

liiLO,l 0 7” s

part of the cost of providing manpower for defense.

When

that

cost is made explicit, taxpayers may

decide they prefer a smaller defense force. If so, the

issue has been resolved openly, in accord with the

Constitution,

and in the best tradition of the

democratic process. Those who then argue that too

little is being devoted to national defense are saying

that they are unwilling to trust the open democratic

process; that, if necessary, a hidden tax should be

imposed to support the forces they believe are

necessary (chapters 3 and 12).

20

PART II

CHAPTER 3

CONSCRIPTION IS A TAX

Any government has essentially two ways of accomplishing

an objective whether it be building an interstate highway system

or raising an army. It can expropriate the required tools and

compel construction men and others to work until the job is

finished or it can purchase the goods and manpower necessary

to complete the job. Under the first alternative, only the

persons who own the property seized or who render

compulsory services are required to bear the expense of building

the highway or &using project. They pay a tax to finance the

project, albeit a tax-in-kind. Under the second alternative, the

cost of the necessary goods and services is borne by the general

public through taxes raised to finance the project.

Conscription is like the first alternative .~~ a tax-in-kind. A

mixed force of volunteers and conscripts contains first-term

servicemen of three types ~ (I) draftees (2) draft-induced

volunteers and (3) true volunteers. Draftees and draft induced

volunteers in such a force are coerced into serving at levels of

compensation below what would he required to induce them to

23

volunteer. They are, in short, underpaid. This underpayment is

a form of taxation. Over 200 years ago, Benjamin Franklin, in

commenting on a judicial opinion concerning the legality of

impressment of American merchant seamen, recognized the

heart of the issue, and even estimated the hidden tax. He wrote:

“But if, as I suppose is often the case, the sailor who is pressed

and obliged to serve for the defence of this trade at the rate of

25s. a month, could have ~.lSs, in the merchant’s service,

you take from him 50s. a month; and if you have 100,000 in

your service, you rob that honest part of society and their

poor families of &250,000. per month, or three millions a year,

and at the same time oblige them to hazard their lives in

fighting for the defence of your trade; to the defence of which

all ought indeed to contribute, (and sailors among the rest) in

proportion to their profits by it; but this three millions is more

than their share, if they did not pay with their persons; and

when you force that, methinks you should excuse the other.

“But it may be said, to give the king’s seamen merchant’s

wages would cost the nation too much, and call for nm~e

taxes. The question then will amount to this; whether it be

just in a community, that the

richer

part should compel the

poorer to fight for them and their properties for such wages as

they think tit to allow, and punish them if they refuse? Our

author tells us it is legal. I have not law enough to dispute his

authority, but

I

cannot persuade myself it is

equitable.”

The levy of taxes-in-kind is not a modern innovation. Such

taxes have existed throughout history. The impressment to

which Benjamin Franklin objected is an example. Also, it was

common practice in the Middle Ages to require specific service

of citizens in farming, construction, defense and other activities.

Traditionally, however, in the United States, taxes-in-kind have

been rejected for three

reasons.

First, they deprive individuals

of their freedom to pursue their careers where and how they

choose -in essence their tight to liberty and the pursuit of

happiness. Second, they are often accompanied by serious

inequities; i. e., a few people are forced to bear the burden of

accomplishing a

task

for the general good of the government

and its citizens. Third, they tend to conceal taxes and

government expenditures so that both the general public and

public officials are misinformed as to the costs of government

services.

Under conscription, each inductee and reluctant volunteer

is compelled to render services to the government. He is

24

required to pay a tax - a tax paid (and collected) in kind rather

than cash - but the form of the payment does not alter the

substance of the relationship. The amount of the tax is the

difference between the pay that the inductee or reluctant

volunteer actually receives as a first-term serviceman and the

pay that would be required to induce him to enlist. Even true

volunteers who serve in a mixed force are paid less than they

would receive in a volunteer force. In that sense, they too are

taxed by conscription.

Prevailing government accounting practices do not

recognize taxes paid in kind. Therefore, the tax on first-term

servicemen never gets recorded in the budget either as revenue

or as expenditure. In an all-volunteer force, the additional

military compensation will be paid in cash or other benefits,

and the taxes to make those payments will be collected in cash.

Recorded budget expenditures will have to be increased to

reflect these payments. This is the source of the budget

“increase” we have estimated for an all-volunteer force. If

current government accounting practices fully reflected

revenues and expenditures, whether in money or in kind, there

would be not a budget increase, but a budget decrease.

The real significance of the larger recorded budget for an

all-volunteer force is the adjustment of the burden of defense

costs. What appears on the surface to be an increase in

expenditures is actually a shift in the tax burden from first-term

servicemen to taxpayers at large. If government accounts

reflected taxes-in-kind, tax revenues from first-term servicemen

would go down with the inauguration of an all-volunteer armed

force, and (assuming a balanced budget) tax revenues from the

genera1 public would go up.

This shift in tax burden lies at the heart of resistance on

“cost” grounds to an all-volunteer armed force. Indeed, this

shift in tax burden explains how conscription gets enacted in

the first place. In a political democracy conscription offers the

general public an opportunity to impose a disproportionate

share of defense costs on a minority of the population.

We have made estimates of the amount of the tax-in-kind

imposed on draftees and draft-induced enlistees for the period

immediately prior to Vietnam, adjusted to reflect changes in

civilian and military compensation through 1969. The tax can

be separated into two components: first, the financial loss

suffered by draftees and draft-induced enlistees because their

25

total military compensation (including veterans benefits) falls

short of the income they would have earned in civilian life; and

second, the additional burden measured by the excess of

military over civilian compensation that would be required to

induce these same individuals to become true volunteers. We

estimate that the financial loss due to the first of these, the

difference between military compensation and potential civilian

earnings, was $1.5 billion for draftees or draft-induced

volunteers in the pre-Vietnam force. To induce these same

individuals to become true volunteers we estimate would have

required an additional $500 million. Thus the total implicit tax

on draftees and draft-induced volunteers was $2.0 billion.

This implies an average tax rate of 48 percent of the

income that draftees and draft-induced enlistees would have

earned in civilian life. Taking into account the personal income

tax they paid, their total tax rate was 5 I percent. In 1967, the

average personal income tax paid by all persons whose gross

earnings were equal to the amount that would have been earned

by draftees and draft-induced enlistees as civilians, was less than

IO percent of that gross income. Since draftees and

draft-induced enlistees have fewer than the average number of

dependents, it is estimated that they would have paid perhaps as

much as 15 percent of their gross income in personal income

tax. Hence, draftees and draft-induced enlistees are bearing a

tax burden over three times that of comparable civilians.

This concept of the tax does not include the income loss

suffered by true volunteers whose military compensation is held

below the level which would be required to maintain an

all-volunteer force, nor does it include the amount by which

all-volunteer pay rates would exceed the pay levels at which

some of the current draftees and draft-induced enlistees would

enter on a voluntary basis. The sum of these two amounts has

been estimated at $ I .25 billion annually, again for the period

immediately prior to Vietnam.

As is pointed out in detail later in this chapter, the concept

of the implicit tax considered above does not fully encompass

the costs of conscription. Prospective inductees also incur costs

in their efforts to escape conscription ~ costs which manifest

themselves in a variety of ways such as additional college

attendance, movement

into occupations which

carry

deferments, immigration, etc. Indirect evidence suggests that

26

these costs may be 1.5 times the implicit tax, or about $3.0

billion. They can be viewed as the cost of collecting the implicit

tax. Thus for each $1 .OO of tax-in-kind collected, an average of

$2.50 is foregone by the public. Quite apart from

considerations of equity and freedom, this feature of

conscription is enough to call it into question.

The fact that conscription imposes a tax is not in itself

immoral and undesirable. Taxes are required to enable

iovernment to exist. What is of questionable morality is the

discriminatory form that this implicit tax takes; and even more,

the abridgement of individual freedom that is involved in

collecting it.

The tax is discriminatory because the first-term servicemen

who pay it constitute a small proportion of the total

population. During the next decade the number of males

reaching age 19 each year will average 2.2 million. To maintain

a stable mixed force of 2.5 million men at present relative

military/civilian pay levels, draft calls will average about

100,000 per year. We estimate that draft-induced enlistments

might be 75,000 per year. Therefore the draftees and draft-

induced enlistees paying the tax-in-kind will represent only 8

percent of the male population reaching age 19 each year.

The extent of the discrimination resulting from

conscription depends on the proportion of the population

forced to serve, and on the level of compensation provided to

those who serve. When a large fraction of the population is

conscripted as it was, for example, in World War II, the tax is

levied on a larger fraction of the population. Even then,

however, the discrimination is by no means eliminated. Not

everyone eligible to serve does so. Moreover, such wars do not

occur every generation, hence some generations never pay

though they benefit from the defense provided by others. Even

in World War II, the 16.4 million men who served in the armed

forces represented only 12 percent of the total population, 17

percent of the adult population and 56 percent of the adult

male population between I8 and 45.

Defenders of conscription often argue that every young

person has the duty to serve his country. The above discussion

makes it clear that the real question is not whether young

people have such a duty, but whether that duty does not extend

to the entire populace. Is it right and proper that a large tax be

confined to a small fraction of our young able-bodied males in

27

order to relieve taxpayers in general from having to pay higher

taxes?

In addition to being discriminatory, conscription as a tax is

also generally regressive, falling on individuals whose income is

low. The amount of benefits in the form of defense that

individuals receive as a consequence of the tax is not related to

the amount of tax they pay. Finally, and most importantly, the

tax requires payment in kind, rather than money, and the

payment in kind takes the form of involuntary service.

It is unlikely that any Congressman would ever propose

enactment of a general tax of the kind now imposed by the

draft. If one ever were proposed, it would have little chance of

being approved by Congress. If approved by Congress, it is hard

to imagine that it would be held constitutional by the courts.

This is a hidden tax which persists only because it is obscure.

No tax is perfect, of course, but it is hard to imagine a means of

imposing the cost of defense, or any other Government activity

for that matter, more in conflict with accepted standards of

justice, equality and freedom in the United States.

THE COST OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The larger budget required to sustain an all-volunteer

armed force is frequently referred to as the “cost” of such a

force. We have deliberately refrained from using that language.

We have done so in order to stress the difference between “costs”

on the one hand and “budget expenditures” on the other.

Budget expenditures need not correctly reflect costs. Indeed, as

we have indicated above, government accounting practices do

not recognize the expenditure in kind implicit in conscription.

To that extent the cost of a mixed voluntary/conscript force is

consistently understated in the budget. But the cost of such a

force is also understated in other ways.

When the hidden costs of conscription are fully

recognized, the cost of an all-volunteer armed force is

unquestionably less than the cost of a force of equal size and

quality manned wholly or partly through conscription. The

all-volunteer costs are lower for four reasons.

I. Conscription leads to low reenlistment

rates among

first-term servicemen, thereby increasing turnover rates. Most

inductees and draft-induced volunteers are not seriously

28

interested in careers in the military. First-term reenlistment

rates for inductees pre-Vietnam were about one-fourth as high

as for enlistees. In an all-volunteer force, first-term reenlistment

rates will be higher than those currently experienced because

those who enlist will be more likely to choose the military as a

career. Moreover, the term of service for inductees is only two

years while regular army enlistments are three years and Air

Force and Navy enlistments are four years. With an all-volunteer

force these longer terms of enlistment will also reduce turnover

and the need for accessions.

Both factors will generate real cost savings. For a mixed

voluntary/conscript force of 2.5 million men we estimate that

annual first-term accessions in FY 1977 to 1979 would have to

be 452,000.For an all-volunteer force with equal effectiveness,

accessions would be only 342,000, or 110,000 less. Lower

accessions will mean a smaller training establishment; that is,

fewer trainers, trainees and support personnel and less training

equipment and facilities. We estimate this will reduce the cost

of a stable 2.5 million man peacetime force by $675 million per

year.

In addition to the savings in training costs, there will also

be savings in the number of personnel who are in a non-effective

status because of transfers generated by high personnel

turnover. An all-volunteer force will have fewer separations,

hence fewer changes of status to accommodate separations. This

also will result in cost savings. The number of servicemen in

ineffective status will decline as will transportation and

administrative costs. We estimate that these savings will be $68

million per year for a stable peacetime force of 2.5 million men.

In our study we have recognized these particular cost

reductions by appropriately reducing the required size of the

forces. Thus, a mixed voluntary/conscript force of 2.5 million

men is equated to an all-volunteer force of 2.44 million. The

latter represents the same effective force as the former taking

account of the savings in training and transients which we

estimate will accrue.

2. Conscription

induces the military services to use

manpower inefficiently. They make manpower decisions on the

basis of the costs as they perceive them, namely, those that are

reflected in their budget. Because budget expenses significantly

understate the cost of first-term servicemen, the services are led

29

to use more of them than they otherwise would. This is not

because they are profligate or inept. By minimizing the costs as

they see them of meeting specific security requirements, they

are behaving as the nation would want them to behave. The

problem arises because conscription greatly understates these

costs.

When military compensation is raised to a level consistent

with an all-volunteer armed force, the services will find it

desirable to economize on manpower. In particular, they will

discover ways to substitute non-human resources for manpower

in a wide variety of activities. They will find it desirable to

mechanize tasks now performed manually, and to emphasize,

even more than at present, durability, reliability and ease of

maintenance in the design of equipment and vehicles and in the

construction of facilities. It would be a prodigious research

effort to examine each activity for potential savings from such

substitutions. Moreover, as a practical matter, there will be a

long pericd of transition before the process of effecting such

substitutions is completed. For these reasons we have not

attempted to estimate the total savings that could result from

labor-saving substitutions if the forces were all-volunteer.

We have, however, examined one area of potential

substitutions; namely, that of using civilians instead of military

personnel in particular positions. Conscription leads to the

assignment of servicemen to some billets which could be filled

by civilians at lower costs. If a civilian is hired, the Defense

Department must pay the full cost thereof, but if a first-term

serviceman is used the price is only his military compensation.

An extensive study was conducted of specific billets where

potential savings from such substitutions exist. These savings

accrue because military training costs are reduced or because a

civilian can be hired at a salary below the real cost of a

serviceman performing the same task, that is, below the salary

required to fill the position with a volunteer. We estimate that

for a force of 2.5 million men, 117,000 civilians could be

substituted for servicemen at a savings of perhaps $100 million

per year.

3. Conscription, whether by lottery or by Selective Service, is

relatively insensitive to the alternative value of the draftee in

the civilian economy and to his tastes for military employment.

Thus, suppose a draftee or draft-induced volunteer is compelled

30

to enter the service who would do so voluntarily only if he were

offered $8,000 per year. If there exists a true volunteer who

would be equally productive in the military, prepared to enlist

for $6,000 per year, the difference of $2,000 is an additional

real cost imposed by the draft. The $2,000 can reflect either a

difference in the productivity of the two persons in the civilian

economy, or differences in taste for military life. Whichever it

is, the loss is a real cost (and a waste) in precisely the same sense

as is any other cost.

4. Finally, there are many subtle costs imposed by

conscription that are no less real for their subtlety. Their effects

ramify throughout society, impinging on a variety of individual

and institutional decisions.

The costs imposed on potential draftees are perhaps the

most obvious. The draft erodes ideals of patriotism and service

by alienating many of the young who bear the burden.

American youths are raised in an atmosphere where freedom

and justice are held dear. It is difficult for them to cope with a

situation which falls far short of these ideals just as they enter

adulthood. The draft undermines identification with society

just at the age when young men begin to assume social

responsibilities. It thwarts the natural desire of youths to

commit themselves to society.

Many of the implicit costs of the draft arise out of the

system of deferments and exemptions currently in effect, and

out of the qualification requirements for military service.

Young men distort their career and personal plans to take

advantage of opportunities to postpone or avoid being drafted.

They enter college when they otherwise would not. They stay

in school longer than they otherwise would. They accept

employment in positions they otherwise would not take. They

marry and have families before they otherwise would. There is

no doubt that the costs of these distorted choices are real and

often cruelly high. Popular support for making 19 the year of

primary draft eligibility stems largely from the desire to reduce

uncertainty and improve opportunity for personal planning.

“Channeling” young men into colleges, occupations, marriage

or fatherhood is not in their best interests nor those of society

as a whole.

The procedures of the selective service system also impose

hidden costs. In many ways the young registrant is denied due

31

process of law. He is confronted with an intricate legal maze

and denied the right of counsel and judicial review during its

normal operation. To get his case before the courts, the

potential draftee must risk jail sentences of up to five years. The

operation of the draft abridges constitutional rights in many

other ways. For example, a registrant must get permission to

travel outside the country. In addition to the loss of rights,

there is the problem of determining who is entitled to

exemption as a conscientious objector. These, decisions are

inherently difficult to make, and are harmful both to the group

deciding and the persons requesting conscientious objector

status. The process weakens the political fabric of our society

and threatens the delicate web of shared vaIues that alone

enables a free society to exist. These problems are completely

avoided by an all-volunteer force.

Each problem faced by the individual registrant has a

counterpart in the institutions with which he must deal. In

addition to draft-induced volunteers for the military, selective

service results in draft-induced college students, draft-induced

ministerial students, draft-induced husbands and fathers, and

draft-induced employees in exempt occupations.

The draft creates unnecessary problems for the military.

Selection by lottery compels some to serve who have neither a

talent nor a taste for military life, resulting in misfits and

maladjustments to military service. Draftees who cannot adjust

must nevertheless serve out a two-year tour. These men present

morale and disciplinary problems which otherwise would not

arise. Some spend much of their military service in

confinement, because it is so difficult for them to adjust to

military service. Dissent within the military presents particularly

ticklish problems for the armed forces of a free nation. The

problems raised by the forced military service of those who are

unwilling or unable to adjust to military life will be largely

overcome by voluntary recruiting.

Because of the influence of the draft, our schools and

colleges must choose among more applicants than would

normally apply. Inevitably they admit some young men more

interested in exemptions than education. The presence of these

individuals adds to the forces of disruption on the campus,

imposing costs on all members of a university community.

Employers, too, must sort out true volunteers from

draft-induced applicants for jobs which provide exemptions.

32

For example, when school teachers are deferred, some young

men will become teachers for a short time, even though they

would rather follow another profession. They will stay in

teaching only as long as they require an occupational

deferment. This results in higher turnover and less experienced

and less dedicated teachers for the young of the country.

It is difficult to add up these costs and measure their

overall impact on society. Yet it is easy to cite examples of

serious problems created by the draft, which voluntary

recruiting would eliminate.

33

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

In planning

for an all-volunteer armed force, the size and

quality of future military forces are critical variables. Small

forces or those of low quality, could be raised on a voluntary

basis, even if military compensation were reduced. Very large

forces or those of high quality would require substantial

increases in military pay.

The size of active duty forces since World War II, shown in

table 4-1, has fluctuated widely. After reaching a peak of 3.6

million men during the Korean War, the armed forces slowly

declined in size toward an apparent equilibrium level of 2.5 to

2.6 million men. Although the Vietnam War reversed this trend,

the President’s budget message of April 1969 suggested that,in a

post-Vietnam environment, active duty force levels be stabilized

at a level of 2.0 to 2.5 million men.

Because of the uncertainties surrounding force plans for a

post-Vietnam environment, the Commission decided to analyze

the manpower and budgetary implications of four alternative

active duty force levels, 2.0, 2.25, 2.5, and 3.0 million men.

These four force levels cover a reasonable range of alternative

peacetime active duty forces that might be needed to insure

national security.

TABLE 4-I.-Active duty force strength

[selected fiscal years 1950-69 and projections]

Fiscal war

Total

DOD Active duty as

lmillions)

oercent

of 18-45 male Domhtion

The armed services’ demand for the nation’s manpower

resources is indicated by the size of the active duty forces as a

percentage of the male population 18-45 years of age,shown in

the last column of table 4-1. The comparatively small force of

2.5 million men in FY 1960 represented 7.9 percent of this

male population. In light of the projected growth of the male

population, all four alternative force levels constitute smaller

percentages of the projected 18-to-45-year-old male population

in 1975.

Over the past two decades, the structure of the armed

forces has changed substantially (see table 4-H). The service

structure is important because the Army is the only service that

has consistently required draftees to meet its strength

objectives. (The Navy and Marine Corps have occasionally

issued draft calls to meet temporary shortfalls, but the Air

Force has never used the draft.) Prior to Korea, the Army made

up 41 percent of all active duty forces. The post-Korean

reduction in forces of the late 1950’s was accompanied by a

shift which gave larger shares of the defense responsibility to

36

the Navy and Air Force. Since the escalation of American

involvement in Vietnam, the ground combat forces of the Army

and Marine Corps have become a larger fraction of the force, as

shown in table 4-H. The service distribution of the four future

forces shown in table 4-H reflects a slight reversal of the trend

of the late 1950’s. The Army, for example, represents 40

percent of the 2.5-million-man force compared with only 35

percent for the 1960 active duty force. The relative size of the

Army in force plans is important because the projected

shortfalls in recruitment are largest for the Army.

TABLE 4-Il.--Distribution

of active defy force

strength

by service

[selected fiscal years 195049 and projections]

Distribution (percent)

Navy

Marine Corps Air Force

26 5

26

22 7 28

22 7 33

25 7 33

25 7 31

22 9

25

24 6

25

24 6

27

25 9 29

26 6

29

Substantial numbers of civilians and reservists supplement

the active duty forces in the overall defense manpower picture,

as shown in table 4-111. The ratio of civilians to active duty

personnel [column (5) of table 4-1111 has declined over the past

15 years. Many positions in the force structure currently

manned by uniformed servicemen could be staffed with civilians

at lower budgetary costs and with no loss in immediate

effectiveness. In addition, the substitution of civilians for

servicemen reduces the demands for new recruits. Civilians

typically need less training, involve fewer transfers of personnel,

and require lower levels of compensation, especially in an

all-volunteer force. Civilians, however, are only imperfect

37

substitutes for uniformed personnel, because they cannot be

involuntarily mobilized and moved in the event of an

emergency. The scope of civilian substitutions is, therefore,

limited by the military’s need to provide positions for rotational

assignments and career development.

TABLE 46Ill.-Active duty, civilian, and paid drill reserve strength

[in thousands] FY 7947-1969

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

(6)

Ratios:

Fiscal

Total Total

Paid drill Ratios: paid drill/

year DOD’ civilian reserve civ/DOD DOD

1947.~ .~~~~~~~~~~ 1,563 1,060 231 .67 .15

1952~ ~~~~~~~~ 3,636 1,650 506 .45 .14

1957.~ ~.~~~~~~~

2,796

1,429 1,047

.51 .37

1962~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2,606 1,241 669

.44 .32

1965~~~~~ 2,655

1,164

933

.44 .35

1969~~~~~~~~~ 3,460 1,456 960

.42 .26

. Active duty military Delson"el only.

A position-by-position analysis of the opportunities for

civilian substitution was not possible within the scope of this

study because of limitations of time and resources. However, a

careful aggregative study of individual occupational specialties

was conducted, ranking the various occupations by the degree

to which they were purely military. This study concludes that

approximately 95,000 positions in a force of 2 million men

could be staffed by civilians with no loss in effectiveness. Larger

civilian substitutions could be achieved at larger force levels.

The budgetary savings (in constant 1969 prices) which would

result from carrying out the proposed civilian substitution

programs range from $90 million for the 2.million-man force to

$125 million for the 3-million-man force. If these programs are

implemented, the proportion of total defense manpower which

is civilian will increase from 31 percent to about 34 percent,

thereby reversing the trend of the past I5 years.

The reductions in the size of each of the active duty

uniformed forces that would result from civilian substitution

are shown in table 4-IV. The impact of civilian substitution on

required accessions is slow to take effect, and its fullimpact is

not felt until 1978. Rotation policies and the size of overseas

deployment have an important effect on the potential for

38

civilian substitutions. The potential is greatest in the Air Force,

where the majority of the force is stationed in the continental

United States. In the Army and Marine Corps the opportunities

are limited by relatively large overseas deployments and

rotation policies.

TABLE 4-W.-Substitution potential a// services

[in thousands]

Size force Army NWY USMC USAF DOD

2.0 million

Officer

Enlisted .~~..

Total

2.25 million

Officer

Enlisted......

Total

2.5 million

Officer

Enlisted......

Total

3.0 million

Officer..~..-~~~

5.2 5.1 0.6 9.4 20.3

0.0 6.6 6.6

59.7 75.3

5.2 13.9 7.4 69.1 95.6

5.9

5.6 0.7 10.3 22.5

0.0

9.6 7.9 66.0 63.7

5.9

15.4 6.6 76.3 106.2

6.6 6.2

0.6

11.3 24.9

0.0 10.6 6.9 72.2 91.9

iii 17.0

9.7 63.5 116.6

6.9

7.0

0.9

12.4 29.2

Enlisted~.-... 0.0 12.1 10.2 79.1 101.4

=

- -

T0ka-m.~~ 19.1 11.1 91.5 130.6

When the forces have reached their post-Vietnam

equilibrium levels, a program of civilian substitutions should be

ildtiated and carried out over a three-to-four-year period. Too

rapid replacement of uniformed personnel by civilians might

seriously impair the attractiveness of military careers. It is also

recommended that civilian manpower ceilings be relaxed to

enable the Department of Defense to follow more rational

manpower management policies. Prior attempts to accomplish

civilian substitution (in fiscal years 1952, 1955, 1962, and

1965), were curtailed, abandoned, or even reversed because of

civilian manpower and budget ceilings. The Department of

Defense should have the flexibility to vary the ratio of civilians

to military personnel within a total budget constraint. To

establish an economic balance between civilian and military

39

personnel. the Department of Defense should undertake a

position-by-position analysis, review the criteria to determine

whether a particular position should be militxy or civilian. and

develop better data to estimate the real economic costs of

military and civilian personnel.

Trained reservists provided much of the manpower for the

rapid expansions of active duty forces during the Korean War

and the Berlin crisis of 1961-67. However, reserves have not

been activated in significant numbers for the Vietnam War.

Reference to table 4-111 reveals that the size of the paid reserve

forces has remained stable over the past decade. Details

regarding the size and composition of the reserves in an

all-volunteer force are more fully discuwd in Chapter 9.

EFFECTIVE FORCE STRENGTHS

The six of the active duty forces does not directly reflect

defense capability. The servicemrn who have already completed

basic military and technical training are the ones who provide

defense capability. Recruits. instructors, and support personnel

at training bases only indirectly contribute to defense by

supplying future trained personnel. In addition to these

non-effective training billets. other positions in the active force

structure must be set aside for personnel in transit between

duty assignments or interned as patients and prisoners. With

lower personnel turnover, each recruit spends a smaller fraction

of his service career in training or in other forms of

non-effective status. Because it will have fewer non-effective

men. an all-volunteer force can be smaller than a mixed force of

conscripts and volunteers but still provide the same effective

strength.

Personnel ttwnovrr in an all-volunteer force will be reduced

for sevrral reasons. If the draft is continued. it is projected that

about 42 percent of accessions into the Army (for a force of 3.5

million men) will be drafters who serve for only two years,

compared with three and four-year tours for voluntary

enlistments. Moreover. the re-enlistment rates of draftees and

draft-motivated volunteers are considerably lower than those of

men who voluntarily choose military service. Finally. the pay

increase needed to move to an all-volunteer force includes

somewhat higher pay for second-term enlisted men. which will

further increase the reenlistment rate.

40

When these factors are taken into account, we estimate

that the turnover of enlisted

personnel in an all-volunteer Army

will be only I7 percent per year, compared with 26 percent for

a mixed conscript/volunteer Army of the same size. With this

reduction in turnover, the enlisted strength of an all-volunteer

force could be 5 percent less than that of a mixed force, while

retaining the same number of effective men in non-training and

non-transient positions. Put another way, I3 percent of a mixed

force is assigned to non-effective positions at training bases or

in transit, while only 9 percent of the all-volunteer force will be

so occupied. These manpower savings are greatest for the Army,

which is projected to realize the sharpest reduction in personnel

turnover rates as a result of moving to a voluntary system.

In developing estimates of overall accession requirements

for uniformed personnel, the sizes of all-volunteer forces were

reduced to provide the same effective strengths as the four

mixed forces in table 4-11. The manpower savings that derive

from lower personnel turnover are evident from the data in

table 4-V, which shows enlisted strengths for forces of equal

effectiveness.

TABLE 4-V.-Equal eifectiveness all-volunteer and draft forces

[in thousands]

DOD DOD Army

Army

Total enlisted enlisted enlisted enlisted

strength strength strength

strength

(in millions) (draft) (all-volunteer) (draft) (all-volunteer)

2.0 .~~~.~~~~.~~~~~~ 1,713 1,663 642 624

2.25~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1.930 1,666 721 692

2.5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~.... 2,146 2,069 666 627

3.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~. 2,597 2,559 1,120 1,047

The higher retention rate for true volunteers inevitably

produces a more experienced force. Our projections indicate

that, by 1980, 45 percent of Army enlisted men will have four

years or more of service experience, as compared with 31

percent for a mixed force of the same size. Since experience

involves on-the-job-training, a more experienced force is more

productive than a less experienced one. Military officers agree

41

that one career enlisted man is worth more than one first-term

serviceman, but few officers are willing to indicate the precise

trade-offs. Although the all-volunteer and mixed forces in table

4-V have the same numbers of effective men in non-training and

non-transient positions, the all-volunteer forces actually provide

greater effectiveness because they possess more experience.

The concept of effective force strength is equally

applicable to officers. Because officers typically receive their

training before they are commissioned, it is difficult to estimate

their non-effective training time. Moreover, training times and

costs vary widely, being highest for an Academy graduate who

goes on to night training, and lowest for a chaplain who receives

a direct appointment.

In estimating the budgetary savings resulting from lower

turnover among commissioned officers, we have disregarded

non-effective training times. We have instead based our

estimates on the arerage cost of $12,000 for training an officer

in either the college or non-college officer training schools that

have been used in the past to meet fluctuating demands for

officers.

REQUIRED ACCESSIONS UNDER ALTERNATlVE

MANPOWER PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS

The tlow of accessions (voluntary enlistments and

draftees) required to maintain a given force depends on the size

of the force and the losses from active duty ranks. These

requirements can be met either on a purely voluntary basis or

through a mixture of enlistments and inductions. With an

all-volunteer force, smaller flows are required for two reasons.

First, true volunteers serve longer, thereby reducing losses due

to separations upon completion of initial obligated tours.

Second, the same effective force strength can be maintained

with a smaller total active duty force.

The annual flows of accessions required to sustain the four

mixed force levels using a lottery draft are presented in the first

and third columns of table 4-VI. If the draft is abolished and all

recruits are true volunteers, the same effective force strength

can be maintained by the smaller annual flows of required

accessions shown in the last two columns of table 4-VI. An

all-volunteer force with the same effective strength as a

2.5.million-man mixed force requires 25 percent fewer

accessions per year than the mixed force. The reduction in

42

TABLE

4-W.--Required accessions lo enlisted ranks

[annual averages FY 1979-67 in thousands]

Continued draft

All-volunteer

DOD

Army

total strength draft

(in millions) DOD

CAIS

Armv DOD Armv

2.0 ~~~~~~~~ 312 19 136 259 104

2.25~~~~.~~. 362 46 170 290 116

2.5 440 96 235 332 146

3.0 ~~~~~~~~ 564 164 340 410 192

required accessions resulting from the move to an all-votunteer

force is considerably smaller for officers. The projections in

table 4-VI pertain to the period 1979-81 after the greater

retention rates for an all-volunteer force have taken effect. In

the transition to stable force levels, accession requirements for

the all-volunteer forces are slightly higher especially in the case

of the Army, where the average annual requirements for FY

1973-75 are 188 thousand, compared with 148 thousand for

FY 1979-81.

QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTIVE

DUTY FORCES

Members of the armed services today must possess more

skills than their predecessors in World War II and Korea. This

trend is indicated by the data in table 4-VII which shows the

occupational’mix of enlisted men in the Department of Defense

and the Army. In 1953, 18 percent of all enlisted men were

assigned to ground

combat occupations that require

comparatively little technical skill. The proportion of enlisted

men in these relatively unskilled occupations has declined over

time. Indeed, the projections of the force structure in a

post-Vietnam environment show that only 11 percent will be in

the ground combat forces. The declining importance of the

ground combat forces cannot be attributed to a relative

reduction in the size of the Army. In the Army occupational

structure, the percentage of enlisted men in the ground combat

occupations is projected to fall from 29 percent in FY 1963 to

2 1 percent in the forces of tomorrow. The services’ demand for

highly skilled men to staff electronics and other technical

occupations has climbed over time.

43

TABLE 4-VII.-Percentage distribution of enlistedmen

by major occupation

[selected fiscal years. 1945-741

Occupation

16 14 14 15

10

10 13 15 10 11

7 6 8 14

17

20 16 19 16 16

23 26 25 24 24

7 8 7 7 7

15 13 12

12 13

35 32

5 9

7 a

19 16

12 14

3 5

19 16

29 26 21

9 7 7

9 15 16

19 19 22

16

16 17

4 4

4

14 13 13

Two features of the changing occupational structure of the

armed services are important. An increased demand for skilled

personnel characterizes the civilian economy as well as the

services. Thus, the services must compete with the civilian

sector for those youths who in increasing numbers enter the

labor force with more education and greater technical

background than young men two decades ago. The other aspect

of this phenomenon is the growing similarity of the military’s

skill requirements to those of the civilian sector. Various

estimates suggest that 20 to 30 percent of active duty billets are

directly related to combat missions. The remaining positions are

required for logistical support, administration, maintenance and

training ~ all of which have counterparts in the civilian

economy.

QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTED MEN

Admission to the enlisted ranks of the military services is

now limited to men who satisfy three kinds of criteria: mental,

44

physical, and moral. The physical and moral standards have

remained stable over the past two decades. Although mental

standards have exhibited some short-run variations. they have

generally risen over time. The mental ability of a recruit is

measured by his score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test

(AFQT). Recruits are divided into five mental groups. Men in

the lowest mental group. group V. are exempt by law from

military service. The mental group distribution of accessions in

the two war years, FY 1953 and FY 1969. are shown in table

4-VIII, along with a distribution for a recent peacetime year,

FY

1965.

TABLE 4-VIII.-Menial group distribution Of enlistments and

inductions: DOD

[in thousands]

Mental

group

FY 1953 FY 1965 FY 1969

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

The proportion of accessions in the top three mental

groups was 63 percent in 1953, at the peak of the Korean

expansion, and 76 percent in 1969, at the peak of the Vietnam

expansion. During the intervening years the proportion in

Categories I-111 was higher, reflecting the selectivity possible

with the draft during peacetime. Another indication of the

quality of enlisted personnel is the fraction of voluntary

enlistees who are high school graduates. The proportions for

1959 and 1969 are given in table 4-1X.

The services argue that they must have high-quality

recruits for the following reasons:

I. The machinery of modern warfare requires recruits

who have the mental capability to absorb complex

technical training.

2. Training costs can he reduced by limiting enlistments

to highly qualified individuals, even though men with

45

less mental ability could be taught the requisite skills

with enough training investment.

3. The disciplinary problems created by men in the

lowest mental group contribute to administrative

costs and detract from force effectiveness.

4. Given the normal attrition and losses due to

non-re-enlistment, the services must have a large

fraction of highly qualified recruits to provide the

raw material to staff the non-commissioned officer

ranks.

Are the services’ quality standards too high? Mental

standards were raised significantly between 1957 and 1965,

when enlistments of individuals in mental group IV (AFQT

scores of IO to 30) were limited. In late 1965, the Department

of Defense initiated the New Standards Program (Project

lOO,OOO), which directed the services to accept 100,000 mental

group IV enlistments each year. The services complied and also

redesigned many training programs to place less emphasis on

written and verbal skills and more on manual talents.

Experience gained from this program shows that men with

lower AFQT scores and less schoolivg can achieve acceptable

levels of performance. Moreover, the new-standards men have

not caused appreciably greater disciplinary problems.

In our study the number of Category IV enlistees has been

limited to a maximum of 20 percent in any service. The

recommendations for enlisted compensation are therefore

designed to provide that a minimum of 80 percent of the

accessions be from categories I through III. In addition, the

recommendation in chapter 5 to expand the use of proficiency

pay and to encourage accelerated promotions provides a

46

selective mechanism to help sustain the quality of military

personnel. When these are combined with more intensive

recruiting and improvements in military personnel management,

the services should be able to maintain the high quality of their

forces.

41

CHAPTER 5

COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT

OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Pay is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary

motivating force for joining or remaining in the military

services. A sense of duty, a desire for adventure or travel,

society’s esteem for military service, a desire for training, the

quality of military life and the general conditions of military

service - all affect individuals’ decisions. Some of these

non-pecuniary factors are beyond the control of the services.

Others, however, can be controlled, and the Commission is

recommending a number of changes in military manpower

procurement and management practices to improve the

non-monetary conditions of military life and thereby help

increase the attractiveness of military careers. These steps will

contribute to the attainment of an all-volunteer force, but are

not sufficient in themselves. Military compensation in the early

years of service is now so low that it will not sustain an

all-volunteer force of the quality desired. Until that condition is

corrected, an all-volunteer force caimot be realized.

Our studies show that the increments in pay, and therefore

49

the incremental budgetary outlays, necessary to provide a

voluntary force in the 1970’s of about the same size as our

pre-Vietnam force are fairly small; that they are, in fact, only

about as great as those that are required to correct the

inequities that have developed in the structure of military

compensation during the 21 years that the draft has been in

effect.

The increase in military compensation that is required to

sustain an all-volunteer force of any given size depends upon

three factors: (a) the number of accessions that will be needed

each year, (b) the number of truly voluntary accessions that are

forthcoming at current levels of pay, and (c) the extent to

which increases in compensation increase the flow of

volunteers. The annual flow of accessions required to maintain

the projected all-volunteer forces was discussed in chapter 4.

The extent of voluntarism in the present force is summarized in

table S-1. The next to the last line of table 5-I shows that even

under the extremely low levels of entry pay that prevailed in

the pre-Vietnam period, the vast majority of those in the then

current active duty forces were true volunteers (2.1 of the 2.6

million or about 77 percent of the total force were true

volunteers). Indeed, the estimated number of true volunteers

even in the Vietnam period (2. I million) represents a significant

fraction of any of the four projected forces the Commission has

considered.

The number of volunteers in table 5-I suggests that the

forces under study can be attained on a voluntary basis.

However, the data also show that unless pay is increased, there

will be shortfalls in first-term enlistments, particularly in the

Army. For instance, in 1965, true volunteers constituted 76

percent of the total DOD enlisted forces. In the Army, however,

only 65 percent of enlisted men were true volunteers.

For a stable force of pre-Vietnam size, the remaining 35

percent of Army enlisted men (either draftees or draft-induced

volunteers) could have been replaced by true volunteers,

through increasing voluntary enlistments by about 5 1,000 men

per year. Similarly, the entire armed forces in I965 could have

been put on a voluntary basis by adding about 4,000 officer and

84,000 enlisted true volunteers per year. As discussed in chapter

4, smaller forces would actually require even fewer additional

true volunteers. With a continuously rising population 17 to 21

50

TABLE 6-l.-Number of volunteers on pre-Vietnam and Vietnam active duty

[thousands]

June 30,1965

1,974

1,022 53

968

1,006 418 90

328

2,981

1,440

144 1,297

766 291 22 269

1,772

710 112

598

81.1 59.5 49.3 78.2 46.1

years of age. the task of providing these additional volunteers is

not insurmountable.

The problem of attracting more officer volunteers is

discussed in detail in chapter 6. It is important to note here that

the shortfall of officer volunteers is small ~ especially in view of

the discrimination which has prevailed in the treatment of pay

for first term officers. Between 1948 and 1965, or between the

year the post World War II draft law was first passed and the

most recent peacetime year, the average basic pay of officers

with two or more years of military service increased 45 percent

while that for officers with less than two years of service

increased only about I3 percent.

The history of discrimination against first term enlisted

men is even more striking. During the I948 to 1965 period the

pay of enlisted personnel with two or more years of service

increased about 45 percent compared to 4 percent for those

with less than two years of service. During the period

1948-1969 the same comparisons show increases of 111 percent

and 60 percent respectively. In other words, the basic pay for

enlisted recruits increased little more than half as much as that

for those with two or more years of service.

Comparisons with civilian pay in table 5-11 also point to

the relatively low levels of entry pay. Columns 4 and 5 of table

5-11 show the ratios of regular enlisted and regular officer

compensation to the earnings of their respective civilian

counterparts. Although; in general, officers fare relatively better

than enlisted men, officer compensation in the first two years

of service is below that of comparable civilians. Similarly, based

on regular compensation, enlisted pay during the first two years

of service is less than 60 percent of comparable civilian pay.

Comparisons based on total military and civilian compensation

(column 5 of table S-11) also reveal that enlisted entry pay is

significantly below that which the average first-term serviceman

would have earned in the civilian economy.

THE EFFECT OF PAY ON RECRUITING AND

RETAINING VOLUNTEERS

The data presented in table 5-11 suggest the importance of

pay as an inducement to enter and remain in the military. For

example, the deficits for the officers are smaller than for

enlisted personnel. That result is to be expected given that

officer entry pay is relatively higher than enlisted entry pay.

52

TABLE 5-Il.-Enlisfed men’s and comparable civilian compensation profiles by length of service

[1970 pay rates] 1

Y%iE

of

service

Total military

Regular

compen-

military sation as a

compensation percent of

Regular Total Total as a percent of total civilian

military

military civilian

total civilian compen-

compensation :! compensation z comwnsation 1

compensation sation

$ 2,776 $ 3,251

$ 5,202 53.4 62.5

3,357 3,935 5,803 57.8 67.8

4,496 5,275 6,370 70.6 82.8

4,909 6,249 6,908 72.2 90.5

5,783 8.516 7,409 78.1 114.9

6,172 8,151 7,876 78.4 103.5

6,636 8,741 8,306 79.9 105.2

6,845 9,125 8,691 70.8 105.0

7,242 9,505 9,065 79.9 104.9

7.715 9,825

9,327

82.7 105.3

8,290 10,643 9,956 83.3 106.9

8,964 11,611 10,298 87.0

112.8

10.483 14.047 10,723 97.8 131.0

Footnotes are found at the end of tile table,

TABLE 5-Il.-Continued

Officers’ and comparable civilian compensation profiles by length of service [1970 pay rates] 1

Total military

Regular compen-

military sation as a

Years

compensation

Regular

percent Of

Total Total

as a percent of total civilian

Of military military civilian total civilian

compen-

service compensation 2

compensation 3

compensation 4 compensation sation

1 ~.~~~~ $ 7,337 $ 6,422 $ 8.558 65.7 98.4

2 ~~~~~~~~ 7,566

6,740 9,291 61.5 94.1

3 .~~~~~~~~~~~.... 9,145 10,732 9,957 91 .a 107.6

4 ~~~.~~~~~~~ 10,906 12,674 10,556 103.3 122.0

5 ~~~~~~ 11,963 14,466 11,089 107.9 130.6

6 ~~~~ ~~~ 12,277 15,050 11,555 106.2 130.2

7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~.... 12,779

15,600

12,021

106.3 132.1

8 .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 12,056

16,214

12,466

103.0 129.6

9-10 ....~~~~~~~~~~~~ 13,245 16,759 13,243

100.0 126.5

11-12 .~~...~..~...~~~ 14,056 10,144 14,669 95.7 123.5

13-16 ~~~~.~~~~.~ 14,966 19,545 15,844 94.6 123.4

17-20 ....~~~~~~~~~~~~

16,159 21,290 16,470 96.1 129.3

21 + ~~~~ ~~~ 19,142 26,771 17,765 107.6 150.7

TABLE WI.-Footnotes:

Voluntary enlisted deficits are highest in the Army. This result

too, is to be expected, given that entry level pay is lowest for

enlisted personnel and that the non-monetary conditions of

service are less attractive in the Army than in the other three

military services.

In addition to this indirect evidence, we have used several

methods to estimate directly the effect of increases in first and

second term pay on voluntary enlistments and reenlistments.

Based on these studies, and on the observed impact on retention

of proficiency pay and the variable reenlistment bonus, we

estimate that a IO percent increase in the current value of

first-term regular military compensation will result in an

increase of about 12.5 percent in the voluntary enlistment rate

from the 17 to 21 year old civilian population. In the case of

the Army, a 40 percent pay raise would increase the voluntary

enlistment rate from about 1.388 to about 2.079 per 100 men

in the 17 to 21, age cohort. The same percentage increase in

officer compensation will induce a roughly comparable rise in

the voluntary enlistment rate from the college population.

The Commission’s compensation recommendations are

designed both to eliminate past inequities and to assure the

services a flow of enlistments of the quantity and quality that

will be required to maintain a base force of about 2.5 million

men and women. Smaller forces could be maintained with

smaller increments in pay, while larger forces would require a

larger increase in pay.

The Commission has made two kinds of pay

recommendations, those requiring implementation prior to or

concomitant with the transition to an all-volunteer force, and

those equally necessary for reasons of equity and efficiency, but

not essential to the achievement of an all-volunteer force. In the

former category are increased basic pay, the extension of skill

differentials to the first-term population, and an increase in

hostile fire pay. In the latter category are the development of a

military salary system comparable to that in the civilian sector,

including the substitution of cash for some benefits that are

now provided in-kind, and the modification of the present

retirement system, including the introduction of vesting.

56

Basic Pay

The recommended increases in basic pay are designed to

provide the Army with the quantity and quality of volunteers

required for an overall force level of approximately 2.5 million

men. The evidence is overwhelming that, if compensation is set

at levels which satisfy Army requirements, the other services

will be able to attract enough qualified volunteers to meet their

respective requirements.

The Commission urges that its recommendations be

enacted with a minimum of delay and recommends an effective

date of July 1, 1970. Since there is a good chance that civil

service and military pay will also increase during fiscal 197 1, we

have assumed a basic pay increase of 8 percent on July 1, 1970

for all military personnel. The pay rates in table S-111 reflect a

combination of that across-the-board increase with the

recommended pay raises designed to achieve an all-volunteer

force of 2.5 million men. The latter increase raises the current

value of enlisted basic pay during the first-term of service by

about SO percent. The recommended increase for those in their

second term of service is about 9 percent. Officers in their first

3 years of service receive a 28 percent basic pay raise.

Table S-111 shows that these recommended increases

merely “straighten” the regular military compensation line;

they give individuals in their initial years of service about the

same pay relative to civilian compensation as the career force

receives. These pay raises for first-term personnel are justified

on equity grounds alone.

This recommended pay increase will add $2.69 billion to

the budget in fiscal year 1971, but this added outlay will be

smaller in future years if forces decline to the 2.5 million man

level and, also, as a result of the further manpower reduction

produced by lower turnover in the ah-volunteer force which will

decrease the force strengths required to provide a given level of

defense capability (see chapter 4). Since military pay is either

high or low only in relation to civilian earnings, annual

adjustments in military pay will be necessary to ensure that

they remain competitive.

The pay recommendation incorporated in table S-111 is

intended to apply to the 2.0, 2.25, and 2.5 million forces, but

they are actually in excess of those required for either the 2 or

57

TABLE 5-Ill.--Recommended pay profiles for enlisted personn.6l for July 7.1970

Regular Total

military military

compensation compensation

as a percent of as a percent of

Years Regular Total Total Total

Of military military civilian civilian

service compensation 1

compensation 2

compensation 3 compensation

1 ..~. $ 4,498 $ 5,041 86.5 96.9

2 4,917 5,631 84.7 97.0

3 5,311 6,237 83.4 97.9

4 5,735

7,195 83.0 104.2

5 8,143 9,131 4 82.9 123.2

6 6,530 8,597 82.9 109.2

7 6,880 9,055 82.8 109.0

8 7,203 9,582 82.9 110.3

9-l 0 ......~~~~~~ 7,510 9,838

82.8 108.5

11-l 2 ..~~~~~~.... 7,721 9,745 82.8 104.5

13-16 ~~~...~ 8,296 10,550 83.3 106.0

17-20 ~~~~~ 8,989 11,816 87.1 112.8

21 + ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 10.489 14.053 97.8 131.1

TABLE 5-lll.-Continued

Recommended pay profiles for officers for July 1, 1970

Regular

Total

military military

compensation compensation

as a percent of as a percent of

Years Regular Total Total

Total

Of military

military civilian civilian

service compensation 1 compensation 2 compensation 3 compensation

1 .~.. $ 0,868 $ 9,952 103.6 116.3

2

9,635 10,608 103.7 116.3

3 _.._....... 10,315 11,902 103.6 119.5

4 10,923 12,865 103.5 122.1

5

~. 11,999

14,520

108.2

130.9

6

12,313 15,077 106.6 130.5

7

~. 12,810 15,897 106.6 132.2

6

12,890 16,243

103.2

130.1

9-10 .~~ ._....... 13,271 16,756

100.2

126.5

1 l-l 2 . -~~~

14,080 18,128

95.6

123.4

13-16 ..~~ 15,006 19,534

94.7 123.3

17-20 .._.. -..~ 16,192

21,293 98.3 129.3

21 + ..~.~~~ 19,166

26,757 107.9 150.6

1. *, B”d ? see footnotes *, 3, and . resceBctivB,y 0, table WI ear ,hB de,initionO 0, reg”,*r military conlpe”.

Sam”, total mi,itw campnsation, and tota, CiYilian compnsa,ion.

d se0 tootnote r Of tam 5-i I.

2.25 million man forces. Indeed, the figures in table S-l suggest

that no pay increase is required to provide an all-volunteer force

of 2 million men and that a relatively small increase over

current levels is required to induce the additional volunteers

necessary for a 2.25 million man force. The Commission

recommends this pay raise for all three of the above named

forces on equity grounds alone. The 3.0 million man

all-volunteer force will require a pay increase above that shown

in table 5-111. The extra increase required for the 3 million man

force would add $2.21 billion more to the budget in the years

1977-1919.

Skill Differentials

The basic pay recommendations in table S-III are designed

to cover the majority of the enlisted force. However, the armed

forces must attract some persons with special skills or unusual

aptitudes. The military services have the authority to offer

higher pay to suyh individuals by offering higher grades when

they enter service or by increasing the speed of promotion. To

some extent both of these practices are being followed by the

services. These practices should be broadened and formalized,

to make military careers more attractive to high quality

personnel.

To ensure further the maintenance of the quality of

military personnel, proficiency pay should be made available to

those in critical occupations after the satisfactory completion of

advanced training. Currently, proficiency pay is available only

to those in the career force. These recommendations should

enable the services to satisfy their needs for exceptional

personnel. It is estimated that an additional $214 million per

year will be required to cover the expenditures for this purpose.

Hostile Fire Pay

Military service demands a high degree of personal

commitment and exposes most servicemen to risks and

hardships that are generally greater than those found in the

civilian economy. Beyond that, a small fraction of the military

force is sometimes required to serve under conditions of risk to

life and limb that are not only greater than those faced by most

service personnel, but exceptionally high even among those

serving in a combat zone.

60

As a matter of equity as well as to provide compensation

flexibility in conflict situations, the Commission recommends

that a new and higher maximum level of hostile fire pay of

$200 per month be enacted. Eligibility for this maximum level

of hazardous duty pay should be restricted to those who in the

course of their duties are regularly exposed to hostile fire and

only for the period of such exposure. The current levels of

hazardous duty pay should be provided to others in the combat

zone who take higher than normal risks but are not regularly

exposed to hostile fire.

Since the specific number of individuals who will serve

under such extreme hazardous conditions is likely to be small,

we have not estimated the budgetary implications of this

proposal.

Development of a Military Salary

System of Pay

Military pay today is a conglomeration of current and

future pay and benefits that are difficult to enumerate and even

more difficult to measure and evaluate. Military pay lacks

visibility. It functions as a continuous source of controversy. It

is inequitable. It is inefficient in attracting and retaining desired

personnel.

All of these deficiencies, and especially the last two, result

from the different ways of paying individuals performing the

same task, and from the large proportion of pay that is provided

either in-kind or as retirement income. This in-kind and

deferred compensation has little value for a new recruit or a

first-term setiiceman trying to decide whether to reenlist.

Recognizing these defects, a Department of Defense study

group recommended the introduction of a “salary” system of

pay in which allowances for quarters and subsistence would

have been combined with basic pay to provide a “salary”. The

Commission supports this recommendation.

Retirement Vesting

Because military retirement benefits are budgeted each

year out of current funds, servicemen have never acquired

vested retirement rights except those which arise after one has

served long enough (19% years) to be eligible to retire. This

policy has a number of undesirable effects.

61

First, because retired pay is deferred it has little value for

an individual in his early years of service, even if he is seriously

considering a military career. It is worth nothing to the

serviceman who does not plan to make the military a career.

Yet, the armed forces need both non-career and career

personnel.

Retirement benefits have the additional disadvantage of

being worth too much to the individual who is beyond his tenth

or eleventh year of service. He cannot afford to separate from

the service because of the benefits for which he will qualify

after another 9 or 10 years. Because of this potential loss, the

military rarely discharges individuals who have served more than

say, IO years.

Also, the substantial retirement income available after 20

years of service (when some enlisted men are only 37 years old)

induces many individuals to retire as soon as they are eligible.

The combination of retirement income and civilian earnings is

very attractive. Men who retire early are often those with

superior civilian earning opportunities and they are precisely the

individuals the services would like to retain longer. The

Department of Defense group organized to study compensation

recognized the shortcomings of the present retirement system.

They recommended: increasing military pay sufficiently to

enable military personnel to contribute 6% percent of their

salaries annually to their retirement account without any loss in

net income, the introduction of partial vesting after 5 years of

service, and a reduction in the retirement income available in

the years prior to the normal retirement age. The

recommendations incorporated provisions to ensure that those

who entered the services under the old retirement system would

suffer no loss.

The Commission supports these recommendations

regarding retirement benefits. The Commission also believes

that it would be equitable and desirable to give officers and

enlisted men the same vested retirement rights as civil service

employees currently have.

Compensation-in-kind and Fringe Benefits’

Many recommendations have been made for increasing

military compensation-in-kind including improved housing,

62

educational programs, dental care for dependents, etc. The

quality of military life needs to be improved generally, and such

programs would surely contribute to that end.

Nevertheless, we have decided against recommending

general increases in such benefits or in income-in-kind items of

pay. We have done so because the military pay package already

has a substantially larger proportion of such items than is found

in the civilian sector of the economy and because we believe

that general increases in non-cash pay would be an inefficient

means of compensating military personnel.

Funds that are used to construct and maintain housing can

also be used to increase basic pay, and funds to sponsor

educational programs can be used to provide dental care for

dependents. Thus, the question is not whether such benefits are

desirable, but whether they are the most effective form of

compensation. Providing compensation in cash has an inherent

advantage in that context ~ it allows each individual to decide

how he or she will use whatever he earns. He can thus get the

full value of whatever costs are incurred by the government in

paying him. When he is compensated in non-cash form,

however, the value of what he receives is often less to him than

its cost to the government. Meanwhile, he is encouraged to

consume more of particular goods or services than he otherwise

would. Non-cash pay also tends to result in inefficient patterns

of compensation by favoring some individuals (heavy users of

these items) over others, independent of performance. For

example, most military non-cash pay is of little value to young

men and women. Therefore it is not very effective in helping to

attract and retain new personnel. Finally, as was learned in the

Defense Department

study,

the effect of non-cash

remuneration on enlistments and retentions is attenuated

because such compensation is not very visible. While

compensation-in-kind is sometimes justifiable for tax reasons in

the civilian economy, that reason does not apply to military

compensation since the government is both payer of the cash

compensation and recipient of whatever taxes are collected.

However, special circumstances in the military often

warrant pay-in-kind. At remote bases, housing and other

services often would not be available unless provided under

military auspices, and in many instances, military personnel are

63

required to live on base. Under such circumstances

accommodations and services should be made attractive and

efficient so as to enhance the conditions of military life.

MANAGJZMENTOFMILITARYPERSONNEL

The Commission believes that in addition to the

recommendations above there are several opportunities available

to increase voluntarism, particularly among higher quality

personnel, by improving the conditions of military service and

the quality of military life.

Terms of Enlistment

One of the conditions of military service that distinguishes

it from civilian employment is the practice of requiring enlisted

personnel to obligate themselves for specific limited terms of

service. An enlisted man is required periodically to declare his

intentions to remain in the military, and he is permitted to

resign only when he reaches such a decision point. We believe

that this policy is not necessary, and that it adversely affects the

attractiveness of military service. We recommend elimination of

the present system of obligated terms of service so that enlisted

personnel would be recruited and retained on the same basis as

commissioned officers. Within the limits prescribed below, this

means that enlisted men would generally be granted discharges

upon request.

The right of enlisted men to a discharge should be limited

in the following ways:

(a) The Defense Department should have the authority

to deny such discharges in an emergency, just as it

does with officers.

(b) Enlisted men should be obligated to fulfill terms of

service commensurate with the cost of the training

they receive. This should apply not only to new

recruits, but also to those receiving advanced training.

The Defense Department should undertake a study to

determine the length of obligated service to be

required for various training programs. Such a study

would specify a minimum term of service for new

recruits. We do not contemplate that it would be

64

reasonable to require terms of service of less than

approximately two years for recruits.

(c) The Defense Department should have the right to

deny discharges to enlisted personnel who have

received orders for overseas, duty or sea duty.

If the Defense Department adopts this policy as to

obligated terms of service, the services should simultaneously

establish procedures for periodic reviews designed to identify

and separate servicemen who are not performing satisfactorily.

Though this change may appear dramatic, the

abandonment of the present system of fixed enlistment terms

should not create serious problems for the military. Such a

system has not harmed the officer corps. The increased freedom

of choice should make military service more attractive and

enhance the dignity of an enlisted career.

Choice o/f Military Occupation

The Commission recommends an expansion of the current

program whereby enlistees are permitted to specify their choice

of occupation as a condition of enlistment. Such a policy

should increase the efficiency of manpower utilization within

the military and, also, by reducing the uncertainty of military

life, increase the attractiveness of a military career.

The Commission believes that expansion of the existing

program will not weaken the services’ ability to fulfill their

mission, even though it may increase somewhat the cost of

managing the recruitment facilities. The services do not appear

to have experienced any ill effects from their present policy of

giving individuals a choice of their service branch and, to a large

extent, their occupational field.

Lateral Hiring

Many of the functions performed in a modern military

organization have parallels in the civilian economy, for example,

construction, supply and logistics, personnel management,

equipment

and facilities maintenance, research and

development, and medical service. With minor exceptions the

officers and the enlisted personnel who staff these functions in

the military are products of the military personnel system. They

enter the service as untrained recruits, take basic and advanced

65

formal or on-the-job training, and acquire the experience

necessary to function effectively while on a military assignment.

The similarity between military and civilian functions, however,

suggests that military positions might in many instances be

filled by already skilled individuals who transfer from the

civilian economy.

Lateral hiring ~ the hiring of skilled personnel into the

armed services at pay grades commensurate with their training

and experience - offers the services an opportunity to enlarge

the manpower pool from which they draw. In the past they

have resorted to lateral hiring to procure personnel with special

skills. During World War II the practice was used extensively,

not only for enlisted personnel but also for officers. Also, the

military has consistently permitted doctors, dentists and

lawyers to enter the services at officer ranks above the usual

entry level.

Currently, the largest enlisted lateral hiring program is the

Navy’s “Direct Petty Officer Procurement Program” which has

been used since 1965 to man Naval construction battalions.

Under this revival of the World War II Seabee program over

5,000 civilian construction workers have been hired into pay

grades E4 through E7 with a service obligation of two and

one-half years. The program is apparently a success. Draft

pressure, higher pay and the shorter service obligation (two and

one-half rather than the normal four years) have allowed the

Navy to be highly selective.

The Army has used lateral hiring to recruit medical and

dental technicians at entry pay grades of E4 and E5. Each

lateral enlistee receives about 16 weeks of basic and advanced

training. The Army also plans to introduce a program for

selected engineer occupational fields which are significantly

undermanned.

These examples, however, are the exception rather than

the rule. On balance, the services have used lateral hiring

sparingly. At worst they have limited the payment of

reenlistment bonuses to those who re-enlist within six months

of discharge so that a qualified trained veteran who has been

out longer is offered no special incentive to return.

There are, of course, inherent limits to lateral entry. Not

all military occupations have civilian counterparts, and even

where such counterparts exist it may be less costly for the

military to provide

the training and experience.

66

Notwithstanding the limiting considerations, the military are

sacrificing an important opportunity by severely restricting the

use of lateral entry. Moreover, lateral entry would help dissolve

the barrier which some feel separates the military from civilian

society.

Entitlements

At present, enlisted men who are not E4’s with four or

more years of service are not entitled to dislocation allowance

and reimbursement of family travel expense when .they are

ordered to a new duty station. This discrimination imposes an

unnecessary hardship on first-term servicemen. The Commission

recommends that entitlement to reimbursement of family travel

expense and dislocation allowance be extended to all enlisted

personnel.

67

CHAPTER 6

OFFICER PROCUREMENT

AND RETENTION

Regardless of the type of procurement system used, the

officer corps is a crucial element in the effectiveness of any

military establishment. An all-volunteer armed force must

attract an adequate supply of officers from the limited number

of individuals in the population who possess the necessary

leadership qualities and motivation.

In recent years the major portion of the officer corps has

been recruited from the ranks of college graduates. While it is

important to continue to attract college-graduate officers. the

decision to staff the officer corps almost entirely with college

graduates was somewhat arbitrary and came about in part

because of the favorable recruiting climate provided by the

draft. Without the draft, a college- graduate officer corps will be

more difficult to recruit and will require higher pay levels than

one which includes home non-college graduates. To balance the

need for highquality officers with the extra cost that a

voluntary all college graduate force will entail. we assume in our

estinlates that about 90 percent of the officers entering the

69

service each year will be college graduates. It is expected that

most non-college graduates will either have graduated from

two-year college programs or have at least two years of college.

Staffing the non-specialist portion of the officer corps in

an all-volunteer armed force will be somewhat easier than

recruiting the enlisted force. Two main reasons underlie our

optimism. First, except during the Vietnam escalation of recent

years, little difficulty has been encountered in recruiting new

officers from among college graduates. While the draft has been

an important positive factor in this recruiting, the flow of

volunteers has been impressive in view of the relative ease with

which college graduates could avoid military service through the

middle 1960’s.’ Also to be taken into account is the relatively

large proportion of first-term officers who remain in the

military beyond their obligated period of service. Over 70

percent of officer personnel are currently beyond their

obligated period of service and, therefore, can be considered

career officers.

The second reason for optimism stems from the large and

growing pool of educationally qualified young men who will be

available in the 1970’s for military service as officers. Since

1960, the number of male college graduates has grown from

230,000 per year to 390,000 per year ~ an increase of 70

percent. By 1980, this number will increase 25 percent more to

490,000 amx~ally.~ With an armed force of 2.5 million, the

annual requirement for new officers is not likely to exceed

30,000. This number can be met by recruiting about 7 percent

of the yearly graduating classes of U.S. colleges and universities

in the mid-l 970’s.

PROCUREMENT

Most commissioned officer procurement programs are

designed chiefly to attract college graduates. These sources of

officers can be divided into four major groups: Reserve Officer

Training Corps (ROTC) and other in-college programs. Officer

Candidate programs. service academies. and direct

appointments. In addition. there are a number of programs

which provide Warrant Officers. Limited Duty Officers. and

Temporary Officers. By and large this range of programs has

met the needs of the services even when these have changed

rather drastically. The smne major programs. perhaps modified

in form, can be expected to supply the hulk of new officers in

an all-volunteer armed force.

RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) AND

OTHER COLLEGE PROGRAMS

By far the largest single source of newly commissioned

officers is the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Designed

primarily for four-year colleges. it accounted for 26 percent of

all new officers in the period just preceding the Vietnam war.

(See table 6-l.) An additional IS percent of officers

commissioned in FY 1965 were obtained from a variety of

in-college programs. Chief among these are the Reserve Officer

Corps (ROC) in the Navy and the Platoon Leader Corps (PLC)

in the Marine Corps. The major distinction between these

programs and the ROTC program is that military training is

provided entirely during the summer at special training centers

run by the military. whereas the ROTC cadet receives a major

portion of his training at his university during the school year.

Because of the long lead time - two to four years - required

for increasing the supply of officers from these sources. their

relative importance declined during the rupid troop build-up in

the early stages of the Vietnam War.

The importance of ROTC officers varies considerably from

service to service. In FY 1965. they accounted for about 60

percent of newly commissioned Army officers, slightly less than

35 percent of new Air Force officers. and less than IS percent

of new Navy officers. In the Marine Corps only about 7 percent

of the new officers were commissioned through the Navy-run

ROTC program. The great majority of Marine officers were

recruited from the PLC program.

At the completion of an ROTC student’s college education

he is required to serve a minimum term of obligated service.

This minimum currently varies from service to service and

according to the type of program. All scholarship recipients,

regardless of service. must serve four years of active duty. For

71

non-scholarship holders, the minimum is two years in the Army,

three in the Navy and Marine Corps, and four in the Air

Force. The two-year Army obligation was in part designed to

be consistent with the active duty obligation of a draftee. We

have assumed in our projections that in a voluntary force the

minimum Army ROTC obligation will be three years.

During the last few years, a number of schools either

ended their ROTC programs, or indicated they planned to do so

in the near future. While it is not clear whether these are

isolated events or the beginning of a trend, there is little doubt

that some type of college recruiting program will continue in

the future. For planning purposes, we assumed that ROTC will

continue to be the major source of new officers for the Army

and Air Force. The problem of declining ROTC enrollment is

discussed later in the chapter.

A number of Department of Defense studies have recently

been undertaken concerning the future of ROTC. While

differing somewhat in goals and procedures, all recommend an

increase in the number of ROTC college scholarships. We

endorse this recommendation and encourage the use of such

scholarships as a way of attracting applicants not likely to enter

the program without them - especially those whose skills or

aptitudes are in short supply in the military. In our projections

of potential officer supply without a draft, we assumed an

increase of 4,500 scholarships a year for each service (Marine

Corps included in Navy total) producing 1,000 additional

ROTC officers a year per service (See table 6-H). The total cost

of such a program will be between $25 and $30 million per year

and is included in our estimates of the increased budgetary

expenditures associated with the creation of an all-volunteer

officers corps.

With an all-volunteer armed force, one must expect that

fewer students will volunteer for ROTC training, particularly in

the first two years. Hence many schools may find that they can

no longer operate viable programs. To insure that ROTC

instruction remains available to interested students, it may be

advisable in the future to establish area training centers. Thus

students from a number of schools in one geographic region

could participate in the same training program.

Serious consideration should also be given to the increased

use of scholarship and non-scholarship Reserve Officer Corps

and Platoon Leader Corps-type programs. Unlike the present

7s

Fiscal

Year

1971

1972

1973

2

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

TABLE 6-IL-Army commissioned officer requirements and potential supply in an all-volunteer force

[2.5 million man force /eve/]

Potential supply

ROTC ocs

~__

Scholar- Nonscholar- College Noncollege

Academy' ship'

ship:' graduates4 graduates;' Others B

Total

900 1,400 11,200 200 1,000 1,400 16,100

900 1,500 8,000 300 1,000 500 12,200

1,000 2,000 5,700 300 1,000 600 10,600

1,000 2,500 3,200 400 1,000 1,000 9,100

1,000 2,500 3,100 500 1,000 700 6,800

1,000 2,500 4,100 500 1,000 700 9,800

1,000 2,500 5,100 500 1,000 800 10,900

1,000 2,500 6,000 600 1,000 800 11,900

1,000 2,500 6,800 600 1,000 800 12,700 9,000 +3,700

1,000 2.500 7,300 600 1,000 800 13,200 9,400 +3,800

Required

accessions

16,800

5,300

7,100

11,400

6.700

8,500

9,900

9,500

Estimated

SUrplUS

Or

shortage

- 700

+ 6,900

+3,500

-2,300

+ 100

+1,300

fl,OOO

+2,400

ROTC. such programs do not require the stationing of

permanent units on ij great nx\ny campuses. With the

introdu&ion of an iill-volunteer force and the reduction in the

size of each ROTC unit. the per-graduate expense is likely to

rise. If much of the military training can be provided during the

summer in training stations which receive applicants from many

schools. there is a good possibility that substantial savings can

be realized.

OFFICER CANDIDATE PROGRAMS

While officer candidate

progmms were originally

established to train officers recruited from the enlisted ranks.

they have increasingly been used in recent years to supplt‘ment

the flow of new college graduates into the officer corps. The

large demand for new officers created by the Vietnam buildup.

however, required the Army, in particular, to allow significant

numbers of non-college graduates to enter its OCS program.

OCS programs are more responsivr than ROTC to changes in

military requirements, requiring a lead time of three to nine

months as opposed to two to four years for the ROTC. With an

all-volunteer force. each service will require more flexibility in

the recruiting of officers. In addition to new college graduates.

the services will doubtless seek to attract somewhat older

civilians who desire to enter one of the more specialized and less

physically demanding branches of the military. Such volunteers

will require some military training. which is likely to be most

efficiently provided through OCS-type programs.

ACADEMIES

A small but highly important number of new officers are

commissioned annually by the service academies. Ranging in

size from about 3 percent of the annual number of entering

officers in the Army to more than 6 percent in the Navy.

academy graduates form an important component of each

service’s officer corps. Their high career motivation is clearly

shown by the fact that upon completion of their obligated tour

of active duty (now 5 years). between 80 and 90 percent can be

expected to remain in the service. as opposed to less than 50

percent for ROTC scholarship graduates and under 1-5 percent

for OCS graduates.

With the planned expansion of the U.S. Military Academy

and.the Air Force Academy. academy graduates in 1973 will

77

number about 1,840. For the foreseeable future, even with an

all-volunteer force, we do not anticipate a need to increase

further the size of the academies. Such expansion would be very

costly and it is also highly desirable that military officers

continue to be recruited from a wide range of civilian colleges

and universities.

DIRECT COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS

Each service requires many individuals possessing

non-combat type skills available in the civilian population.

These include chaplains, lawyers, physicians, dentists, and

specially trained technicians. Because of the importance and

special problems connected with the recruitment of physicians,

a separate study was undertaken by the Commission. The

highlights of this study are reported in chapter 8. By and large,

because appointment officers perform the same tasks in the

military as in the civilian sector, they usually receive no extra

military training. Such direct appointments have accounted for

about 20 percent of new officers each year.

Since a major portion of these officers would not have

entered military service without the draft, an all-volunteer force

will necessitate more in-service training and further increases in

the substitution of civilians for military personnel. In addition,

we would suggest that procedures be established to attract

civilians who already possess the necessary training, by offering

advanced officer grades. Such lateral hiring generally should be

limited to those specialties which require an individual to

possess technical skills learned in the civilian sector and to those

tasks and functions which must be performed by a military

officer.

WARRANT, LIMITED DUTY AND TEMPORARY

OFFICERS

Each service includes men who hold the rank of officer but

who are not considered part of the regular commissioned officer

corps. Included in this group are Warrant Officers, Limited

Duty Officers and Temporary Officers. Such ranks are designed

for non-college graduates who occupy positions which require

greater technical skills and carry larger responsibilities than the

enlisted grades. In most instances, such officer ranks are

awarded to superior enlisted personnel. The Army, however,

actively recruits civilian two-year college graduates and men

78

with some college for their helicopter pilot warrant officer

p*0gMlL

The increased availability of four-year college graduates

during the 1960’s resulted in a decline in the use of these

programs. Expanded officer requirements during the Vietnam

buildup have reversed this trend. To facilitate the transition to,

and the maintenance of, an all-volunteer armed force, we

assumed in our analysis that greater use will be made of these

sources of officer manpower.

PROJECTED SUPPLY OF ARMY OFFICERS IN AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The problem of maintaining a voluntary Officer Corps is

more difficult in the Army than it is in the other services. If the

level of officer compensation is high enough to meet Army

accession requirements, it will also be adequate for the Air

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. For that reason the analysis of

officer supply f&uses on the Army.

The most important source of supply of Army officers is

ROTC. We have derived estimates of the number of Army

officers which ROTC will produce in an all-volunteer

environment for the period 1971 to 1980, from an analysis of

ROTC enrollments at schools where participation is voluntary

These projections are calculated on the assumption that: (I) the

draft is ended in 197 1; (2) the level of war intensity declines by

1972 to the pre-buildup level of 1964; and (3) military pay

relative to civilian earnings is increased to comparability, as

described in chapter 5, table 5-111.

The ROTC supply figures are shown in table 6-11 along

with estimates of supply from the other officer procurement

programs. Because of the special benefits inherent in receiving

an ROTC scholarship or enrolling in the U.S. Military Academy,

we anticipate that both programs will continue to be fully

subscribed in an all-volunteer armed force, and will produce the

expected number of annual accessions. The technique for

estimating output from the other procurement sources is

summarized in the footnotes to table 6-I.

The total potential flow of men into the Army officer

corps will continue at a high level through FY 1972 because of

draft-induced volunteers remaining in the pipeline. The lowest

level of Army ROTC entrants, we estimate, will be in FY 1975.

19

Most officers commissioned in that year would have entered the

ROTC program in 1971 ~ a time when the negative impact of

the war on enrollments will probably be at its height. After FY

1975, as the war’s impact on past enrollments diminishes and

more men enter as a result of the pay raise, potential supply will

increase. Except for FY 1974, the estimated supply will be

more than adequate to meet anticipated accession requirements

to maintain the Army Officer Corps in a 2.5 million man force

without the draft. This one year shortfall can easily be offset by

permitting more accessions in the previous two years. Hence, we

feel justified in concluding that the recommended all-volunteer

pay profile plus anticipated increases in the ROTC scholarship

program will be sufficient to maintain the officer corps for each

service at required levels for an all-volunteer armed force of 2.5

million or less. In the late 1970’s the supply estimates shown in

table 6-11 are sufficient to staff the officer corps in a 3.0 million

volunteer armed force. To insure that the required number of

accessions for such a larger force would be forthcoming,

however, we have included in our cost estimates for the 3.0

million man force a further increase in officer pay.

RETENTION

In an all-volunteer force, more officers will stay beyond

their initial obligated period of service than with a draft. Those

who today constitute true volunteers ~ individuals who would

have entered military service without the draft ~, will make up a

larger proportion of first-term officers, and their demonstrated

higher retention experience will increase overall first-term

retention.

First-term retention in the current force varies

considerably from one procurement source to another and from

one service to another. For those procurement programs

including a large concentration of draft-motivated volunteers,

which will not be as important in an all-volunteer force, the

proportion remaining beyond the obligated period of service is

relatively low. In this category, in particular, are

college-graduate OCS officers in the Army and Navy where

first-term retention rates are less than 30 percent. At the other

end of the spectrum, at least 80 out of every 100 academy

graduates can be expected to remain beyond their obligated

80

period of service. Overall, the Air Force has the highest

first-term retention rate and the Army, the lowest.

The impact on turnover of eliminating the draft can be

appreciated by analyzing the results of a Department of Defense

survey of active duty personnel. As shown in table 6-111, among

officers serving their original obligated tour of duty, 46 percent

of those who indicated they would have entered the military

without the draft said they planned to remain on active duty

until retirement. Of those who were considered draft-motivated

volunteers, only 16 percent said they expected to remain in the

service.

The survey results generally confirm expected differences

in retention between services and sources of commission. From

all sources of commission, the Army is revealed to have the

smallest proportion of career-motivated first-term officers,

while the Air Force has the largest. For each service, even

among those who were considered to be draft-motivated

volunteers, academy graduates consistently record the highest

overall expected retention rate. High retention rates are also

shown for ROTC and OCS entrants into the Air Force and OCS

graduates in the Army. During the period prior to the survey,

both the Air Force and Army OCS programs jncluded mostly

non-college graduates. These results reveal the high career

motivation of such officers and suggest that, if difficulty is

experienced with recruiting new college graduate officers in an

all-volunteer environment, serious consideration should be given

to expanding the non-college officer commissioning programs.

Another interesting aspect of these results is that among

the “true volunteers”

recruited through the more

draft-motivated procurement programs, such as college-graduate

OCS, the proportion expecting to make a career in the military

was relatively small. This suggests that even with an

all-volunteer force and more career-oriented accessions,

turnover still will be substantial and a continuous flow of

civilianeducated college graduates will enter the force each

year.

Although these derived career rates are lower than actual

first-term rates, the relative differences between the true

volunteer rate and the draft-motivated volunteer rate were used

to estimate the increase in officer retention that will accompany

a shift to an all-volunteer force.

81

TABLE

&Ill.-Expected career retention rate of first-term officers by service and source of commission 1

1964

Source of Commission

Academy

0.60

.65

.27

.64

.66

.41

.59

.63

.16

.53

-

.60

.67

.26

ROTC ’

0.26

.42

.lO

.I7

.31

.06

.18

.2a

.09

.36

.43

.21

.43

ocs

(college

graduate)

0.16

.24

.14

-

.15

.25

.14

.19

.24

.13

ocs

(noncollege

Direct

graduate) 5 appointment

0.44 0.16

.62 .31

.27 .06

.46 .12

.63 .31

.27 .04

- .24

- .36

- .13

- .67

- -

.44 .15

.55

-

.62

.27

.19

-

.27 .05

CHAPTER 7

RECRUITMENT

An expanded and more effective recruiting effort will help

supply an all-volunteer force with the desired quality of

enlistees. The Commission therefore suggests that the armed

services devote an increased proportion of their resources to

recruiting and especially to Army recruiting. Studies indicate

that a relatively small increase in recruiting expenditures would

produce as much as a 10 to 20 percent rise in enlistment rates.

Also, modification of existing procedures and increased

financial support should yield substantial gains in recruiter

productivity.

Since 1961, as shown in table 7-1, the relative proportion

of the military’s manpower budget devoted to recruiting has

remained constant and the number of recruiters has also not

increased.

In view of the increased need for enlistments since 1965,

the stability of relative recruiting expenditures and the number

of recruiters are surprising. They reflect the low priority

assigned to recruiting so long as the draft is available to ensure

an adequate supply of manpower for the lower ranks. Clearly,

elimination of the draft will increase the need for effective

recruiting and the budget required. Even if conscription were to

continue, the services should devote increased resources to

attracting “true” volunteers rather than settling for draftees

because the former are more likely to make the military a

career.

TABLE

7-l.-Recruiting resources, 1961-69

Total recruiters

all services

7,114

7,219

7,070

6,903

7,056

7,241

7,371

7,176

6,987

Obviously, the military benefits more from its investment

in an individual who chooses to enlist for three years than from

another who is drafted for two. If instead of drafting 33 men

who will serve for a total of 66 years (2 years each), the Army

can recruit 22 men for a total of 66 years (three years of service

each), it will need to train I I less men over that three-year

period. Since one trainer (or supporting person) is required for

I I recruits each year, enlisting rather than conscripting 22 men

will save one trainer. In fiscal 1965, average enlistments per

recruiter were roughly 55. A study conducted that year

indicated that additional recruiters easily achieved an annual

minimum of 22 enlistments and thus “saved” one trainer.

Therefore, regardless of whether the draft is maintained, there

seems substantial opportunity for the productive addition of

more recrujters.

Recruiters play an important role in influencing young

men to enlist in the armed services. Ideally, recruiters should be

dedicated career men who are skilled in the art of salesmanship.

Highly qualified men are in great demand within any institution

and the services cannot necessarily have their best men serve as

84

recruiters. Nevertheless, a prospective recruiter should have a

positive attitude toward the military as a profession, some

aptitude for a public relations role and a genuine desire to

undertake recruiting duty. There is no reason why able

recruiters should be automatically rotated to other assignments.

Instead, successful recruiters should be allowed to extend their

tours of duty, while the unsuccessful are assigned elsewhere.

Every recruiter should receive adequate training hefore

assignment to the field. Such training may be more valuable iI. it

involves greater student participation and less memorization of

information and procedures. It would also be desirable for

recruiters in the field to share their experience with trainees in

school.

Also recommended is an improved incentive system for

recruiters. Recognition of successful recruiters could take the

form of financial compensation such as extra pay or bonuses as

well as accelerated promotions.

We also advocate elimination of the present system under

which each district, city and individual recruiter receives an

enlistment quota. Substantial evidence indicates that this

system eliminates the incentive to seek enlistees in excess of

one’s quota.

In addition, the quotas are not always set at appropriate

levels. Studies show that cities which do not meet their quotas

usually have significantly higher enlistment rates, and that

additional recruiters in cities where quotas are met would

substantially increase enlistment rates. Elimination of the quota

system ahd institution of more positive incentives should result

in higher productivity per recruiter.

In allocating additional resources to recruiting, two- and

three-man offices in cities should receive greater priority than

one-man offices in smaller communities. Studies have shown

that more recruiters at stations in large cities yield greater

returns than an equal increase in the number of recruiters in

one-man offices in small towns. A greater concentration of

recruiting efforts at such stations should be coordinated with

more indirect selling and advertising in these larger markets.

More advertising in mass media will be both required and

rewarding once an all-volunteer force has been instituted, for

the elimination of conscription will coincide with improved

incentives in the military. Visits to high schools by recruiters,

films, performances by special military units, and other

85

appearances will continue to contribute to a positive image for

the military.

The British have used such supplementary techniques as

the “buddy” system in which enlisted men help persuade their

friends to volunteer. This and other new techniques should be

tested, especially during the transition to an all-volunteer force.

86

CHAPTER 8

CONSCRIPTION OF PHYSICIANS

The very troublesome problem of conscription of medical

doctors has been the subject of independent inquiry by the

Commission. Our studies suggest that a variety of steps can be

taken to reduce the need for such conscription. Each of these

measures will individually contribute something toward

eliminating the doctor draft. but we are not certain that they

are adequate. Fortunately, given the reduction in forces now

planned and the students already committed to military service,

there is time not only for further study, but for

experimentation with some of the measures suggested, such as

increased compensation for military physicians and fellowship

programs for medical students.

Eighty percent of all male physicians in the United States

under 35 have served in the armed forces or have held reserve

commissions. No other group in our society has had such heavy

relative demands placed upon it for military service. Only four

percent of male physicians under 35 who are eligible for service

have not yet served. In the last four years. more than 4,500

87

doctors entered active duty service annually - fully 60 percent

of the number graduating from medical schoo1 each year.

Physicians also suffer the greatest financial loss by having

to serve. The pay and allowances received by a young doctor

entering military service are approximately one-half the amount

he could earn as a civilian. Despite relatively rapid promotions,

special pay, continuation pay, etc., a medical officer is

significantly underpaid throughout his career. Primarily for this

reason,

doctors

do not usually remain in the military. Sixty

percent of all military doctors have served less than two years.

Table 8-I summarizes the size and character of the health

service in the armed forces as of January 1, 1969. It

encompassed 242 hospitals and 450 reporting dispensaries, and

employed over 200,000 people. The patient population slightly

exceeded 10,000,000, only 3% million of whom were active

duty personnel. The other 6% million were civilians; either

dependents of active duty personnel or retirees or their

dependents.

Official accounting for medical services puts the annual

budget at $2 billion. Our studies place the expenditures at a

considerably higher figure

- about

$3.25 billion. Moreover, the

latter estimates accept military earnings as the cost of both

enlisted and officer personnel. If the services of those personnel

were priced correctly, that is, at their value in the civilian

economy, the cost of military medical service would be even

larger. We estimate that the expenditure on medical services

rendered

by

the military medical corps is about $325 per capita

as compared to $254 per capita for the entire U.S. population

in 1967. The quality of the health care rendered by the military

medical corps is generally considered to be very high.

Both the size of the patient population and the personnel

requirements in table 8-1 reflect the build-up for Vietnam.

Those magnitudes will decline with active duty force

reductions.

Table 8-11 presents data on the utilization of military

medical facilities

by

type of beneficiary in 1969, and highlights

a neglected aspect of conscription. Perhaps one-half of the

physicians now conscripted into service are actually serving a

civilian population. Despite the increased need for medical

services for active duty personnel as a result of Vietnam, 47

percent of hospital admissions and 48 percent of outpatient

88

TABLE 8-l.-Department of defense medicalservices

visits

involved dependents and retired personnel. Presumably,

the proportion will be even larger in the post-war environment.

A large centralized health organization has been developed,

not just to serve active duty military personnel, but to serve a

89

TABLE .S-Il.-Medical care provided at fixed medical facilities

in fiscal year 1969

broad clientele in specialties ranging from obstetrics (146,000

babies delivered in 1969) and pediatrics to geriatrics. Indeed,

patient care is only a part of the organization’s activity. It

sponsors a variety of medical education and training programs

as well as an extensive program of medical research. The

desirability of these services is not in question. Good medical

care is an attractive inducement to prospective volunteers, and

it is one of the more important morale factors for career

military personnel. What is in question, however, is whether it is

either necessary or advisable to sustain that care with doctors

who are compelled to serve.

The professional manpower required to provide these

services is drawn from a wide variety of sources but virtually

none of the entrants are true volunteers. All but a handful enter

because of the threat of being drafted. If the draft is eliminated,

dramatic action will be required to insure the continuation of

health care now provided by the military medical system.

We have assumed that, whatever steps are taken to convert

to a fully voluntary military medical service, the quantity and

quality of care supplied to the present patient population will

be maintained. Within that constraint there are two courses of

action open in converting the system to volunteers. One is to

90

decrease the requirement for military physicians by substituting

civilians in their stead. The other is to increase the number of

physicians willing to volunteer by improving earnings and other

conditions of employment.

EXPANDED USE OF CIVILIANS TO PROVIDE

MEDICAL CARE

A shift of some fraction of military patient care to civilian

physicians can be accomplished in either of two ways: (1) by

establishing a medical insurance program for some portion of

the patient population - the most likely candidates being

retirees and their dependents or the dependents of active duty

servicemen, or (2) by engaging civilian physicians to staff some

military medical facilities.

A medical insurance scheme is already in effect for retired

personnel, and for dependents who can demonstrate that care

provided by the military is not available to them. Patients under

such a plan obtain medical services from a civilian physician or

in a civilian hospital and are reimbursed for the costs. While the

substitution of private medical insurance for directly rendered

health care is an appealing possibility, it has a number of

disadvantages. Shifting patients to the civilian sector would, at

least in the near term, further raise costs there. Physicians

released from the military could shift to civilian health care, but

the hospitals, equipment, etc. could not readily be shifted. To

the extent that these military facilities are replaced by a system

of private medical insurance, the armed services would reduce

their ability to expand available medical care to meet a crisis.

Also, substitution of private medical insurance would mean

losing the advantages of a unified health care system for the

highly mobile population of active duty dependents.

The substitution of civilian physicians for military doctors

within the existing organization could be effected on an

individual position basis, but substitution on the scale required

is probably possible only through contracting with organized

groups of doctors to operate military hospitals or other medical

facilities. The present organizational format for most of the

health service of the armed forces can best be described as

hospital-based group practice.’ Hospital-based group practice

‘me remainder consists or la*@ an* Smsll medics, ““its in direct support of

combat units.

91

has proved a most efficient form of medical organization in the

civilian economy. The Permanente medical groups. for example.

provide economical health care for 7 million subscribers in the

facilities of the Kaiser Health Foundation. The Defense

Department might on a similar basis negotiate contracts with

groups of physicians to exe for patients in existing military

hospitals. Such civilian medical groups would have a number of

advantages. They would preserve the hospital-based

organizational format. and the advantage of a unified system.

They could eliminate duplication of facilities in areas where

more than one service maintains health facilities. Where military

facilities are under-used, the group practice might be expanded

to include otherwise ineligible civilians. There would be less

turnover of medical personnel and more female doctors.

Professional staffing would be easier and less expensive because

the physicians would not have to experience many of the

disadvantages associated with medical service in the military.

But there are also some disadvantages. With the size of the

military medical corps reduced, the number of physicians

available for service in a conflict like Vietnam will be smaller.

Also. the peacetime rotation of those remdining may be

increased and their assignments made less attractive. Conversion

of military hospitals to civilian contruct operation can proceed

only on the basis of careful study of each individual installation.

Moreover. care must be taken to preserve desirable assignments

for career medical officers and to provide bases for medical

education and training. In addition. a careful analysis will be

necessary to determine the minimum number of doctors

required on active duty by length of service -“- an analysis based

on realistic contingency plans and on rotation base

requirements for planned force levels.

INCREASING THE NUMBER OF

PHYSICIANS WHO VOLUNTEER

Physicians. like other active duty personnel, make career

decisions on the basis of a wide variety of pecuniary and

non-pecuniary aspects of the careers under consideration. These

include potential earnings. available facilities and equipment.

security. prestige. opportunities for further education and

research. type of patient, patient/physician relationships, etc.

The attractiveness of military medical careers can no doubt be

enhanced by improving some of the non-pecuniary factors.

92

However. the gap between civilian and military medical income

is now so large, and the number of true volunteers is so small,

that such improvements do not touch the heart of the problem.

Something substantial must be done about pecuniary rewards

for military physicians to obtain a voluntary military medical

corps. There are again two major alternatives. One is to provide

stipends to medical students in exchange for a commitment to

serve for a specified period. The other is to raise the pay of

medical officers.’ The extent to which reliance is placed on one

or the other of these two depends upon the size career medical

force it is desirable to maintain. Stipends for medical students

will provide a broad base of young physicians, most of whom

will not elect careers in the military. Increasing the pay for

medical officers on the other hand will significantly effect

retention. Indeed the compensation schedule for physicians

should be designed specifically to provide efficiently the desired

number and length of service distribution of doctors. In this

regard, the military’s retirement system is inefficient within the

context of the medical corps because it permits military

physicians to retire with full benefits (about half salary) after

20 years of service and embark on a civilian career. After twenty

years, these doctors are relatively young and still capable of

serving effectively.

A variety of forms of subsidies to medical students are

feasible. Differences between civilian and military earnings for

doctors suggest that a stipend of $5,000 per year paid to

medical students over seven years (four years of medical school,

one year of internship, and two years of residency) would

produce a significant flow of volunteers willing to commit

themselves to three years of active duty. Variations on this basic

arrangement could include larger stipends for shorter periods or

smaller stipends for shorter service commitments. Such stipends

could be tied into already existing plans for bringing medical

students into the military.

Data to use as a basis for reliable estimates of the effect of

compensation on the number of physicians who would enter

the military or the number who would remain there are not

available. For that reason, a provisional approach to medical

pay seems advisable. Data on civilian earnings for medical

doctors. are available, and have been used to develop the

compensation profiles shown in table S-111. Columns 3 and 4 of

table S-111 give the annual salary and continuation pay for

medical officers as of July 1, 1969. At present medical officers

TABLE 8-W.-Proposed compensation for medical officers

Physician

Medical

Active Officer Annual continua- Physician officer

service rank

salary ' tion pay2

pay

total salary

$11,034.38

11,455.58

11,793.98

12.319.58

12.99998

12,999.98

13,801.18

14.115%

14,952.98

15,888.98

18.859.12

17.084.18

18,779.78

19,719.38

19.719.38

21.170.18

0

$2,82i

2,950

3,120

3,358

3,549

3,855

4,041

4,278

5,701

8,185

$ 1,800 $12,834

1.800 13.258

3,800 15,058

5,400 17,194

7,200 19,520

9,000 22,000

10.800 23.800

12.800 28.201

12,800 29,023

12,800 29,888

12,800 30,873

12,800

31,845

12,600 31,845

12.800 32,808

12,800 32.808

12.800 33,339

12,800 35,421

12,800 38,595

12.800 38,020

12,800 38.020

12,800

39,955

with 2-6 years of active duty also receive an additional $150 a

month as special physician pay. Column 5 sets forth a new

schedule

of physician pay as follows:

94

Third year of duty $300 a month

Fourth year of duty $450 a month

Fifth year of duty $600 a month

Sixth year of duty

$750 il month

Seventh year of duty $900 a month

Eighth year of duty $ I.050 a month

The last column of table S-111 gives the sum of these three

components of compensation. The total salaries shown in

column 6 compare reasonably well with those of physicians in

group practice, except in the early years where they are lower

to take account of the student stipends discussed above. If

student support is not undertaken, or if individuals wish to join

the military who have not participated in the fellowship

program, the total salary in the early years would have to be

adjusted upward.

We believe that the salary schedule derived in table S-111 is

a major step towards a fully voluntary medical corps, and

recommend that it be put into effect at the same time as the

recommended pay increase for the rest of the force, July I,

1970.

TRANSITION TO A VOLUNTARY MEDICAL CORPS

The transition to a voluntary medical corps will be greatly

facilitated by planned reductions in force levels. As a result of

draft pressure, many medical students have already committed

themselves to service under the various programs now in effect.

With those already committed and with prompt action on

stipends for graduate students and increased pay for military

physicians, it should be possible to eliminate the conscription of

doctors concurrently with the ending of the draft for other

military personnel.

Because of uncertainties over the extent to which

substitution of civilians will be possible, our estimates of the

budget increase required to move to a voluntary medical service

are imprecise. Given the recommended pay increase, the

fellowship program, and the cost of civilian staffed hospitals, we

estimate that an additional $150 million to ‘$200 million of

expenditures will be required.3

CHAPTER 9

RESERVES

INTRODUCTION

The Commission recognized from its first meeting the need

for special attention to the problem of the reserve forces.

Surveys indicate that perhaps 75 percent of the enlisted

personnel fulfilling their initial six-year military service

obligation in the reservcs are there only because of the draft. II

conscription is eliminated, how are these forces to be manned’?

Research directed to that question indicates that planned

resewes can be maintained on :tn all-volunteer basis at

reasonable levels of compensation. Analysis of the reserve

problem, however, suffers seriously from a lack of data. Even

though special care was taken to provide against errors of

estimation, the assessments of what is required to maintain an

all-volunteer reserve force are much more tenuous than those

for the active duty force.

U.S. reserve forces have: two primary functions: first, to

supplement the active duty forces as needed; second, to help

91

maintain domestic peace and assist in time of civil disaster. The

latter is largely the responsibility of the National Guard.

Currently. about one million officers and men in the

Ready Reserve receive pay for participating in reserve

training ~ two-thirds of them are in the Army Reserve (USAR)

and Army National Guard. More than 80 percent of the men in

the paid reserve are orguked and trained as units which are

designed to fit into the structure of the active forces. Should

these men be called to active duty, it is intended that they

perform in their respective units. The remaining 7-O percent,

about I65.000 men, un be called as individuals to augment

active forces. In addition to paid reservists. there are I .3 million

unpaid reservists in the Rudy Reserve pool who may be called

up as individuals.

DISCUSSION

In an emergency the President is authorized to cull to

active duty as many as one million Ready Reservists (IO USC

673). Reserves in the Standby and Retired categories can be

called only with the approval of Congress. Table ‘1-l shows how

reserve manpower (less mobilized strength still on active duty)

was allocated into recall categories on June 30, 1969. Table 9-11

summarizes the major units which that strength provided in FY

1969.

RESERVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The impact of planned reductions in active duty forces on

reserve force manning requirements is still very uncertain. Four

projected active duty forces have been analyzed. spanning the

range that is generally considered reasonable, from 2.0 million

to 3.0 million men. A similar procedure has been followed in

analyzing the reserves. We have associated a reserve force, by

service, with each of the four active alternatives. The projected

strengths shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 9-111 are based on

the relationship between active and reserve forces prior to

Vietnam. ’

TABLE

9-I.--Defense department resar~e forces’

June 30,1969

[thousands]

Paid drill Ready Reserve Officers Enlisted Total

30.4

32.2

19.0

2.7

10.3

10.1

104.7

19.3

124.0

96.3

103.7

323.6

649.6

356.5

229.1

113.7

46.4

73.1

34.9

855.7

37.7

693.4

1.169.0

322.2

205.0

2,609X

369.0

261.3

132.7

49.1

63.4

44.9

960.4

57.0

1 ,017.4

1,267.3

425.9

526.6

3.259.4

TABLE

9-Il.-Major reserve units

June 30,1969

Army Reserve Naval Reserve

Air Force Reserve

13 training divisions 35 destroyers and

14 wings (45 squadrons)

3 brigades destroyer escorts

6 military airlift

2 maneuver area 26 boats and craft

6 tactical airlift

commands

36 air squadrons

Army Guard

Marine Reserve Air Guard

6 divisions 1 division 21 wings (92 squadrons)

16 brigades 1 air wing

12 fighter

3 reconnaissance

2 air refueling

7 militafv airlift

There is reason to doubt, however, that there was a real

requirement for the pre-Vietnam levels of paid-drill strength.

The public record is clear that the Army was reluctant to accept

the minimum strength levels mandated by Congress. The Air

99

TABLE 9-ill.-Alfenrafive active and reser”e strength /eVe/S

[thousands]

Reserves

- Ur

Imodified Modified

enlist< ed strength ’

enlisted strength *

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Mixed

Volunteer Mixed

Volunteer

force

force 2 force force 2

628.3 639.5 554.9 566.5

707.5 712.4

624.8 632.3

786.0 785.5

694.1 696.3

838.8 829.8

740.9 734.9

Active duty

(1)

Total

(2)

force Enlisted

level

strength

2,000 1,697.l

2,250 1,902.7

2,500 2.107.6

3,000 2,581 .l

Force was similarly pressured into higher levels than it had

requested, although the Air Force found useful work for much

of the excess strength, largely in part-time support of the active

force’s mission. The tenuous nature of the pre-Vietnam reserve

requirements is also evident from independent research

undertaken by the Commission staff, which confirms that

reorganization

of the reserve forces could eliminate

approximately 113,000 men in paid drill status (“spaces”)

without significantly affecting reserve effectiveness.

Because of these apparent overstrengths, we have prepared

a second set of alternative reserve force levels to be associated

with the four alternative active levels. This second set modifies

the first by removing from the current level I 10,000 Army and

2,800 Air Force paid-drill spaces; (16,300 officer and 96,500

enlisted spaces). Proportional modifications are made in each

representative force level and are presented as “modified” levels

in table 9-111.

These force levels are set forth here to emphasize that

shortfalls from present levels in the reserves are not a serious

threat to national security. We believe that the recommended

pay increase for the active duty component (which is

automatically effective for the reserves) will provide enough

100

reserve enlistments to meet the larger requirements in table

9-111. If that turns out not to be true, or if transitional problems

develop, reserve strength could decline moderately from the

unmodified levels in table 9-111 without posing a serious

national security problem.

RESERVE NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS

The critical variable in determining the feasibility of a

voluntary reserve force is the number of enlistments from

civilian life that will be required annually. That number depends

on: (I) annual reserve losses (which depend on the reserve

Fe-enlistment rate), and (2) annual prior service enlistments

(those who join the reserves after active duty). Columns 3 and 5

of table 9-IV show estimates of the number of civilian

enlistments required annually to maintain each of the forces

shown in columns 2 and 4 on a stable basis.

TABLE WV.-Annual civilian enlistments required for

volunteer resewe alternatives 1

[thousands]

Active Unmodified Civilian Modified Civilian

force enlisted enlistments enlisted

enlistments

level strength 1 required strength ’ required

2,000 639.5 90.0 566.5 76.2

2,250 712.4 97.2 632.3 81.6

2,500 785.5 106.2 698.3 88.6

3,000 629.6 102.6 734.9 84.0

1 Re.e”,,stmentl are e*tlm.ted to be 13 percent Of ,orce strength: prior llervice enllstmenls

“my Wilh BC,,W ,OlSBI. ThB der,YatIo” 0, me*e estimates is dexlibed beIoW.

For comparison, the annual number of civilian enlistments

in the reserves (excluding the “2 x 6” program) averaged

122,000 during the last eight years.

THE SUPPLY OF RESERVE MANPOWER

Like the active forces, the paid drill reserve contains a

mixture of true volunteers and men who serve chiefly or solely

to discharge the military service obligation imposed by law. The

proportion of men who willingly undertake regular drill training

is strikingly different for officers than for enlisted men.

According to a 1969 Defense Department survey of reserve

101

pcrsonncl, X0 pcrccnl d 0lTiwrs drill volut~l;~rily. hot wly 27

pcrccnt or cnlistcd nwn do. I:or lhis rws011. our ;Inxlysis hx

focused on the cnlistcd scgmcnt 01’ a11 ;III-~~I~IIII~~~ rcww

force.

The prospect ot’ securing volunlccrs l’or ~cscrvc scrviw is

surely rclatcd to pay Icvcls. All too ol’tcn it is said that drill pay

is nearly irrelevant to ;I young man deciding whcthcr III tlcvolc

I‘ree time to unit activity. Yet ;~lmost one-third 01‘ mcu will1 less

than six years ol‘ scrvicc dcsuihc drill pay as one or the n~ost

significant fuctors in their dwision.

A typical reservist ;~ttends 4X training ;~sscmhlics lwx year.

Each assembly lasts four hours (:I small pcrccnt;~gc only three)

and assemblies are usually “multiple”: two on S;~turtlay. or l.our

on a weekend. On avcragc. the typical rcscrvist dcvotcs one I’ull

weekend each month to unit training and Irains for two weeks

on active duty each year. llis total investment ol’ time is 3 I2

hours. Counting basic pay alone. he earns 5642 ;I year if he is an

E4 (corporal) with four years ol‘ service (about $580 iC hc has

three years of service).

This is not a large amount compared to total family

earnings: median income for an E4 falls in the %7,000-SX.000

range. But the more meaningful economic comparison is with

part-time employment alternatives. Two-thirds of the E4’s are

married and more than half of them have working wives.

Two-thirds of the E4’s are 21-25 years old; and more than

one-third have children. The typical E4, in other words. closely

resembles the Department of Labor’s portrait of the typical

multiple job holder ~ “a comparatively young married man

with children who feels a financial squeeze.” According to the

Bureau of Labor Statistics, in May 1966, 5% percent of‘ 20-24

year-old working men held multiple jobs. They worked a

median I4 hours on their second job. In a full S2-week year,

they would work 728 extra hours.

For men who are interested in extra income, reserve

activity does not offer the earnings potential of part-time

civilian work because it is too infrequent. For some men it

could become an attractive alternative as a second job. Certainly

a necessary if not sufficient condition for voluntary reserve

participation is a level of drill pay attractive enough to make

military instruction preferable to other part-time activities.

While the pay level in the early years of service has been too low

to attract voluntarily the high quality of recruits which the

102

reserves have enjoyed over the past ten years, our studies show

that a more reasonable qualitative mix can be obtained

voluntarily.

Drill pay is now directly linked to active duty basic pay.

The present pay schedule is given in table 9-U. In one drill

period (usually four hours), a reservist earns an amount equal to

a full day’s pay for his regular service counterpart. His starting

level, if he enlists directly from civilian life, is about $1 .OO per

hour. (The federal minimum wage is $ I .60 per hour.) A man,

who has served four years with the regular forces and has

reached the ES (sergeant) pay grade, can earn $2.75 per hour at

drill training. At the career end of the scale, the rates are quite

attractive. A First Sergeant with over 16 years of service earns

$5.00

per hour.2

Our pay recommendations will increase these hourly rates

significantly in the lower grades. In his first year of service, a

recruit will earn $2.00~$2.50 per hour, approaching the pay that

a sergeant now receives. Drill pay will be increased above the

amount needed to maintain its present relation to civilian wages

as shown in table 9-V.

TABLE 9-V.-Drill-pay increase

by length of service

Years of service

Percent

O-l

69.6

l-2

64.4

2-3 23.7

3-4

19.5

4-5 8.3

5-6 7.9

6-7 4.9

7-8 7.2

6-10 5.0

In addition to basic pay, certain special and incentive

compensation, such as flying pay and parachute pay, is paid to

those on inactive duty at the daily active rate. While on active

duty, the reservist receives the same pay as the regular.

Occupational differentials, such as proficiency pay and the

variable reenlistment bonus, are not paid to reservists on either

active or inactive duty.

TABLE 9-W-Pay rates per training assembly (dollars)

[ettective July 1, 19691

010

09

08~~~ 48.44 49.69 51.07 51.07 51.07 54.88 54.68 57.47 57.47 59.85 62.47 64.85 67.46 67.46

07 ~~~ 40.24 42.99 42.99 42.99 44.90 44.90 47.50 47.50 49.89 54.80 58.66 58.66 58.66 58.66

$j 06 29.81 32.77 34.91 34.91 34.91 34.91 34.91 34.91 36.11 41.80 43.94 44.90 47.50 51.53

05 23.84 28.02 29.94 29.94 29.94 29.94 30.87 32.51 34.69 35.04 39.43 40.61 42.04

04 ~~~ ~~~ 20.12 24.47 26.13 26.13 26.59 27.78 29.68 31.34 31.42 34.20 35.16

03 ~~~~~ 18.70 20.89 22.31 24.71 25.88 26.83 28.27 29.66 30.40

02 ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~ 14.98 17.80 21.38 22.09 22.55

01 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 12.88 14.25 17.80

03' ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ 24.71 25.08 26.83 28.27 29.68 30.87

02' ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 22.09 22.55 23.27 24.47 25.42 26.13

01 -

.~~~~~~~~~~~~.~

17.80 19.00 19.71 20.42 21.13 22.09

w4 ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ 19.04 20.42 20.42 20.89 21.84 22.80 23.74 25.42 26.55 27.55 28.27 29.20 30.17 32.51

Footnotes are found at the en* Of fix table.

TABLE 9-W-Pay ratespertraining assembly (dollarsJ.-Continued

[effective July 1, 1969)

Pay

grade

w3

Yearsin pay grade

Under Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over Over

2

2 3 4 6 8 10

12 14 16 18 20 22

26

17.30 18.78 18.78 19.00 19.24 20.65 21.84

22.55 23.27 23.97 24.71 25.66 26.59 27.55

w2 .~

.~~~~

15.15 16.39

16.39 16.86

17.80

18.78 19.49 20.18 20.80 21.61 22.31 23.02 23.97

Wl

12.63 14.49 14.49 15.68 16.39

17.10

17.80

18.53 19.24 19.95 20.65 21.38

E9 ~~~~~~ ~.~

..~~.~~~~~

21.63 22.12

22.64 23.13 23.64 24.11 25.39 27.85

;;

VI E8 ~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~ 18.15 18.65 19.15 19.65 20.15 20.63 21.14 22.39

24.88

E7 ~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~

11.40 13.66

14.17 14.68

15.17

15.66 16.15 16.67 17.41 17.91 18.41 18.65 19.90 22.39

E6

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

9.82 11.93

12.43 12.93

13.44

13.92 14.43 15.17 15.66 16.15 16.41

E5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 8.49 10.46

10.95 11.44 12.19 12.69 13.18 13.66 13.92

E4

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~ 7.13 8.95 8.44 10.19 10.69

E3

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

5.16 7.20

7.71 8.20

E2 ~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~~ 4.25 5.96

El ~~~~~~~ .~~~~~.~.~~~~~ 4.10 5.46

El <4 mos. 3.83

Reservists are also entitled to pensions. Full retirement

credit is given for years served on active duty; partial credit is

given for years on inactive service. Retired pay is contingent

upon completion of twenty creditable years of service and

begins at age 60, at the pay scale then in effect.

Proposals are advanced from time to time to permit

payment of retired pay at age 50. If this were done and benefits

were not reduced, the cost of the retirement benefit would

double. Since retirement pay has little attraction for young men

whose primary job is in the civilian sector, this added

expenditure would do little to solve the recruitment problems

of the reserves.

Currently, about 850,000 enlisted men are in paid-drill

reserve status. If men temporarily called to active duty are

included, the paid-drill total averaged 836,000 over the eight

years prior to June, 1969. To maintain this level the reserves

have required an average annual inflow of 262,000 men. Of

these, 153,000 ~ nearly 60 percent - were men who entered

directly from civil life? The remaining 109,000 were personnel

with prior service.

Three sources of manpower are available to an

all-volunteer paid drill reserve:

I. Reenlistments - new commitments by those already

in the reserves. Re-enlistments affect losses and

thereby the level of accessions required to maintain a

given force;

2. Prior service enlistments - enlistments by those who

have been on active duty; and

3. Civilian enlistments ~ first enlistments by civilians.

RE-ENLISTMENTS

Reserve re-enlistments are a primary factor in determining

the number of new accessions required each year. Reenlistment

rates may be expressed as a proportion of average strength.

Measured in this way, reenlistment rates during the FY

1962-69 period are shown in table 9-VII.

These data imply that if the re-enlistment propensities of

the FY 1962-65 period could be re-established, a 20 percent

improvement (from 1.2 percent to 8.6 percent) in

TABLE 9-VII.-Paid-drill sfrengfh, re-enlistmenls. and

re-enlistment rates

[FY 7962-69 [thousands]

FY Strength R-enlistments Rate (percent)

1962 651.6 54.3

6.4

1963 620.3 59.5

7.3

1964

799.7 66.3 11.0

1965

818.7 61.1 9.9

1966 633.5 ‘80.9

9.7

1967

663.2 ‘66.4 7.9

1966

656.4 ‘51.5 6.0

1969 656.7 ‘43.3

5.1

1962-65~ 3,290.3 263.2

6.6

1966-69~ 3.409.8 244.1

7.2

,.~

f lnCl”deS BStimated 1.9 for Marine Cores.

The conventional and more useful way of analyzing

re-enlistment rates is to examine the proportions of separating

men who continue in service at a series of “decision points”

along the career path. Because actual rates are not wailable. we

used statements of continuation intentions provided by the

1969 attitude survey to approximate them. Table 9-VIII

displays re-enlistment intentions classified by length of service

and by obligated and voluntary drill categories. As one would

expect, interest in drill participation is higher in the voluntary

category; and it is markedly higher after the sixth year of

service.

What would have been the affect on reenlistments if the

1969 reserves had been composed entirely of volunteers? Using

reenlistment intentions as proxies for reenlistment rates, we

have estimated that “conversion” to a volunteer force would

have added nearly 33,000 reenlistments, an increase of

three-fourths over the number who actually did re-enlist in FY

1969. The reenlistment rate, expressed as a percentage of

‘average strength, would have improved from 5.1 to 8.8 percent.

(About half of this estimated gain occurred in the under-6 year

portion of the force, where the conventional re-enlistment

rate -

percent of men separating - rose from 6 percent, in

the mixed force, to 16 percent in the all-volunteer force.)

This comparison suggests that a shift to voluntarism would

raise the 7.2 percent reenlistment rate of recent years to 12.7

percent of average strength. The best reenlistment experience

in the eight years examined was FY 1964, when 88,000

re-enlistments equalled 11 percent of a mixed

volunteer/obligated force. Given the striking differences in

reenlistment attitudes between volunteers and non-volunteers,

the estimate that a voluntary force will attain reenlistments at

that level seems quite conservative.

One might assume an additional increase resulting from

reestablishment of the pre-1965 environment. If this were the

case, the reenlistment rate would become 15.2 percent of

average strength. We did not make that assumption; because the

earlier force included a larger proportion of volunteers and the

shift to voluntarism was, thus, already partly taken into

account.

We then estimated the effect which our proposed pay

increases would have on reenlistment behavior. Survey

responses indicate that modest increases in reenlistment will

occur. Higher pay will induce proportionately more

reenlistmenrs among men who now have the lowest inclination

to continue in reserve service. For instance, our studies show

that among those persons required to drill with from four to

six-years of service, a pay increase of 10 percent would be likely

to increase the reenlistment rate from 3.6 to 4.3 percent, an

increase of 20 percent. Reenlistment rates for those who drill

voluntarily would rise from 15.2 to 16.4 percent, only an 8

108

percent improvement. Volunteers with six-to- ten years of

service now tend to reenlist at very high rates - 50.7 percent

according to survey statements. A 10 percent increase in their

pay would raise their re-enlistment rate to 52.3 percent, a 3

percent improvement.

We propose to increase enlisted drill pay 6 percent after

the sixth year of service, when most decisions to continue in the

reserves are made. This increase will have both immediate and

longer-term effects on re-enlistments. The immediate result will

be to provide a moderate rise in reenlistments of those in the

first six years of service. Such men now usually leave the

reserves, but they are more responsive to pay changes than their

older colleagues. As volunteer enlistees gradually replace

draft-motivated men over the six years following conversion to

an all-volunteer force, reenlistment rates will improve at

accelerating rates until a higher stable rate is reached. Our

calculations indicate that, in an “all-volunteer” 1969 reserve,

re-enlistments as a percent of strength would have risen from

8.8 percent (after conversion) to 9.1 percent (after the pay

rise); and half of this gain would be realized in the under-six

year component of the force.

The recommended pay increase should improve the

position of reserve drill duty vis-a-vis other part-time

employment opportunities. If relative pay is maintained at the

recommended level in an all-volunteer situation, we estimate

that the combined effect of moving to a volunteer system and

increasing pay will increase the re-enlistment rate from the

current 7.2 percent to 13 percent, an improvement of 80

percent.

PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTMENTS

The man who separates from active service is a highly

prized candidate for service in a reserve unit. He has had two or

more years of training and experience which qualify him not

only for immediate assignment to fill a unit vacancy, but often

for a leadership role as well. Under present rules, geography

prevents full exploitation of this enlistment potential. Unless a

unit with a vacancy matching his grade and skill qualification is

convenient to his home and regular occupation, a veteran is

unable to participate. Because unit assignment specifies

location, many prior-service enlistments have been lost.

109

In the eight years spanning FY 1962-69, 4.8 million men

left active service. The reserve components recruited fewer than

900,000 of them into paid drill status. That total includes

substantial numbers who were obligated to join, some through

training “pay-back” agreements entered into during their active

service, but more through involuntary assignment (in the Army

Reserve) to achieve programmed strength levels. The number of

enlistments would have been still smaller had not the Navy

assigned a large fraction of reservists to paid-drill, individual

mobilization billets rather than to actual crews. Nearly 80

percent of paid-drill Naval reservists attend regular training

sessions during the year and report to a crew assignment for

two-week summer training. The Navy’s experience demonstrates

that it is not necessary to forfeit reserve enlistments because of

the self-imposed limitations of unit structure.

Prior-service recruitment experience between FY 1962 and

1969 deteriorated sharply except in the Navy, where the “2x6”

program provided a degree of stability. The drop was sharpest in

the Army components, especially the USAR, whose recruitment

rate fell from nearly 23 percent in the first four years to 6

percent in the last four. This decline is attributable chiefly to

wartime and the accompanying sharp rise in the number of

inductees separated: 70 percent of 1960-67 inductions were

released in the 1966-69 period. Another factor depressing

USAR recruitment was a ruling by the Defense Department in

June 1967 that involuntary assignments into paid-drill units

were to be used only if programmed strength could not

otherwise be attained.

Since the 1962-65 period approximates a non-war

recruiting situation, we have chosen that period as the basis for

estimates of enlistments in a post- Vietnam environment. As a

matter of policy, the reserves accepted prior-service men only

on a voluntary basis during that period, except the USAR. Even

sb, survey responses in 1964 show that fractions of the men in

the other components also regarded their service as involuntary.

These responses may be only the results of retrospection, but

they suggest that estimates of potential recruits ought to be

discounted for involuntary assignment in all components. The

adjusted rate is the number of enlistments multiplied by the

fraction who volunteered, the product then divided by the

number of separations from the parent service. Table 9-1X

presents the unadjusted and voluntary (or adjusted) rates which

II0

we applied to projected active separations in order to estimate

reserve gains from that source. The high level of voluntarism in

the National Guard, and to somewhat lesser degree in the Navy,

is striking.

TABLE

94X.-Percenf of active separations

enlisting in

reesewe components

[FY 1962-L%]

Voluntary

proportion

,944

,257

,811

,404

,943

,601

Vol”“tar;

enlistment

rate

8.0

5.9

25.5

4.1

4.4

3.6

Projected losses from the 2.5 million all-volunteer force are

342,300 in the 1977-79 period which would provide 47,800

prior service enlistments for the reserves. Projected losses from

the 2.25 million all-volunteer force of,the 1977-79 period are

302,500. We estimate that the reserves will be able to recruit

about 42,400 of them.

Substantially higher gains can be expected during the early

years of transition to a” all-volunteer force owing to high

separations from the active force. For instance, active

separations from a 197 I all-volunteer force are predicted to be

665,000. We estimate that the reserves could voluntarily enlist

92,000, or nearly double the number expected after the active

force is stabilized at 2.5 million. Table 9-X consolidates active

separations and projected gains into the reserves.

CIVILIAN ENLISTMENTS

In the presence of the draft, reserve service has provided a”

attractive opportunity for young me” to minimize the personal

cost of fulfilling their military obligation. Indeed, it has come to

be preferred by so many that queues of prospective enlistees

have formed which at times are longer than the entire annual

flow of enlistments. The reserves, unable to accept all

111

TABLE %X.-Projected active separations and paid drill gains, all-volunteer

active and reserve tomes, selected years

[thousands]

Component

Fate

(percent)

Average

1971 1972 1973

1977-79

Sep. Gains Sep.

Gains Sep. Gains

Sep. Gains

2.5 million active force

Army National Guard ~~~~~~~~ 6.0

32.5 25.8 23.7 11.9

Army Reserve ~~~..~~~~..~~..~~ 5.9 406 23.9

I

322

19.0

296

17.5

I

146

a.7

2.25 million active force

Army National Guard ..~..~~. 6.0

32.5 25.6 23.7

121

9.7

Arm” Reserve 5.9

406

23.9

322

19.0

296

17.5

I

7.2 ..~,..~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~

applicants. have exercised a high degree of selectivity. Table

9-X1 compares the educational attainment of reserve and active

duty personnel. In 1969. 94 percent of the paid drill reservists

had completed high school. over one-h;df had attended college,

and I h percent had been granted college degrees. This is a much

higher level of educational attainment than for the active duty

force. Only I.6 percent of paid-drill reservists were Negro, as

compared to IO.5 percent in the active forces. At the same time

fewer than 5 percent of paid drill reservists. but I5 percent of

active duty enlisted men. were under the age of twenty. Table

9-X11 compares reserve and active distribution by age.

TABLE

3-XI.-Educational attainment of enlisted men-FY 1969

[cumulative percent]

Paid drill reserves Active duty

-..

College graduates ~~~ 16.1

2.2

Some college .~ ~~~~~ ~~~~

54.4 21.5

High school graduates 93.9

62.7

TABLE

%X11.-Age of enlistedmen-FY 1969

[cumulative

percent]

Paid drill reserves Active duty

Under 19 .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~.~

1.2

5.6

Under 20 ~~~ .~ ~~~~~

4.6 15.2

Under 22 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

19.1

47.8

Under 24 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

40.9 66.9

Under 26 ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~.,

62.2 75.0

Men of this age and educational level are almost certain to

have little real interest in reserve service. The 1969 survey found

that three-fourths of the paid-drill reservists serving their initial

six-year obligation entered military service because of the draft.

Five years earlier the proportion was two-thirds. (Among 17-2 I

year olds in the I969 survey. the proportion was 55 percent.)

Evidence of strong draft motivation among reservists has

been interpreted to mean that a voluntary system will not work.

These draft motivation data. however. significantly overstate

the magnitude of the problem. As table O-XIII shows, draft

motivation is~strongly related to education and age: the younger

and less educated the reservist, the lower the draft motivation.

113

TABLE 9-XIII.-Percenf draft motivated by education attained

and by age, fiscal years 1964 and 1969

Educational attainment

1964 1969

College graduate ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..~~..~~.. ~~~~ 90

91

2-4 years’ college ~~~.~~~...~..~~.~~~~~~~ 77

a3

Under 2 years’ college ......~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 60

73

High school graduate ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..~. 43

70

Less than high school graduate ~~~~~~~~ 24

64

Age

21 ~~. ..~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~.~..~... 63

65

20 ~~~~~~~ ..~~~..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 70

76

19 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...~.. .~ ..~~...~~.~~~~~~~~~~~ 55

78

16 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~.....,,. .~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 41

65

Under la .~. ~~~~.~~...~~~~~~.~~~...~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 26

54

If recruitment is focused on a younger, less well-educated

group; the flow of volunteers will be substantially larger than is

implied by the draft motivation of the present force.

In estimating the number of civilian men who can be

recruited for reserve service, we have noted the large waiting

lists for reserve vacancies. These lists were built up because the

ability of the services to accept reserve enlistments has been

limited by their budgets and by the capability of the active

forces to provide initial training. At the same time, the services’

needs for new enlistments are governed by losses which follow a

complex cyclical pattern ,,

with crises such as Berlin influencing

losses in later years. The size of the queues has fluctuated as

capacity and needs varied, and it has not been possible to

estimate satisfactorily the additional number of volunteers who

might have been recruited if enlistments had been unlimited.

Table 9-XIV shows the size of waiting lists annually since 1965

(the first year for which data are available) and the number of

enlistments which occurred in the corresponding fiscal year.

While our estimates do not use data on the queue

explicitly, we have used the existence of the queues to justify

basing our estimates on recruitment in a high, pre-war

year - 1964.

As shown above, educational attainments and mental

qualifications have been inflated in the reserves under the

pressure of the draft. The reserves do not require such an

114

TABLE 9-XIV.-Numbers of men awaiting reserve enlistment

on January 1st and numbers enlisted, FY 1965-69

[thousands]

1965 1966 1967 1966 1969 1970

Waiting ~~~ 236.9 153.2 272.2 125.2

61.9 146.2

Enlisted (REP) 117.9 204.7 96.3

61.9 112.7 xx

educationally rich

force. Peacetime recruits should come

predominantly from among high school graduates and not from

those with some college experience. According to the 1964

survey: 43 percent of the high school graduates in their first

term of reserve service were draft-motivated w&tees; 55

percent of those 17-21 in the first term were draft motivated;

67 percent of those 17-24 were draft motivated; and 70 percent

of the last-named group, excluding the “2 x 6” program, were

draft-motivated. Even though that group contained far more

college men than is desirable for good retention, we have used a

draft motivation factor of 70 percent in projecting enlistments.

In 1964, 175,000 men enlisted from civil life. If 30 percent

were true volunteers, the true volunteers represented 0.7

percent of the 17-2 I year old pool. For our projections we have

assumed that at current levels of relative military/civilian pay.

civilian reserve enlistments each year would be 0.7 percent of

the 17-2 1 year pool. Our estimates take no account of the fact

that entry-level drill pay rose substantially more than earnings

of civilian production

workers

in the five years following 1964,

and therefore err on the conservative side.

We have no data from which to estimate the results of pay

increases on reserve enlistments. Our analyses of the problem of

recruiting into the active forces indicate that a pay increase of

one percent will produce a 1.25 percent increase in enlistment

rates; our estimates of reserve reenlistments suggest that a one

percent pay increase will generate only 0.8 percent

improvement in re-enlistments. Table 9-XV portrays projected

enlistments under each of these assumptions and at an

intermediate value.

SUMMARY

Table 9-XVI shows required reserve force strengths and

enlistments for stable forces corresponding to the 2.5 and 2.25

million man active forces. Table 9-XVI also shows three

TABLE !+XVI.-Reserve strengths and required and projected

civilian enlistments.’ FY 1977

Active Volunteer Required Modified

force res?rve enlistments reserve

2,250

712 97 632

2,500

766 106 696

Projected enlistments

(1) 99

(2) 107

(3) 117

Required

enlistments

62

69

projections of voluntary enlistments for the reserve forces. The

projected enlistments appear to be adequate for the reserve

forces associated with the 2.25 million force and 2.5 million

man active forces. Given the uncertainty which surrounds

projections of reserve enlistments and losses, however, further

116

steps beyond the recommended pay increase may be necessary.

Any further steps should await the results of experience with

higher pav during the next few years.

In that transition period, recruiting potential for the

reserves will be substantially enhanced by the large flow of

servicemen being separated now. Prior service enlistments, as we

saw in table 9-X, are expected to be significantly higher in the

197 I-73 period than they will later be for the stabilized force.

As a result, the requirement for civilian enlistments will be well

within recruiting capabilities in the early years.

This can be seen in FY 1972, for example, when extremely

high losses are expected. The currently planned reserve enlisted

strength for FY 1971 is 865,000 in the paid-drill category. That

strength is higher than the largest force level considered in our

analysis, but our study indicates that even that level could be

maintained in FY 1972 with volunteers. The re-enlistment rate

is expected to reach 9.2 percent by that year, so

that

an

estimated 79,600 men would re-enlist. Prior-service gains would

number 8 1,800. Losses are estimated at 243.000. To maintain

level strength

would therefore require 8 1,600 civilian

enlistments (losses less re-enlistments and prior service gains).

Using the most conservative evaluation of the effects of the

proposed pay increase, we have estimated that 90,300 civilians

can be persuaded to enlist.

117

CHAPTER 10

THE STANDBY DRAFT

Heeding its directive, the Commission has considered

“what standby machinery for the draft will be required in the

event of a national emergency.” The Commission recommends

that legislation be enacted to provide. once an all-volunteer

force is in effect:

I. A register of all males who might be conscripted

when essential for national security.

2. A system for selection of inductees.

3. Specific procedures for the notification. examination

and induction of those to be conscripted.

4. An organization to maintain the register and

administer the procedures for induction.

5. That a standby draft system can be invoked only by

resolution of Congress at the request of the President.

Because there have been several recent studies of the

operation of the Selective Service System. we have uot

119

undertaken

a re-examination of that subject. Instead, we have

formulated our recommendations for standby draft machinery

in fairly general terms. which would be consistent with a wide

range of specific systems.

Clearly the task of creating and maintaining a state of

military preparedness capable of dealing with threats to the

nation’s security is a vital one. The nation’s military readiness is

both actual and potential: active duty personnel are prepared to

act instantaneously; able-bodied but untrained and unorganized

civilian males are potential servicemen. This spectrum of

manpower can be divided into three groups in descending order

of their state of readiness: (1) active duty personnel, (2)

reserves. and (3) civilians. In planning standby draft machinery,

it is important to recognize that conscription is relevant only to

the civilian population.

The rationale for providing a standby draft is the possible

urgent need for the nation to act quickly. It is clear, however,

that a standby draft will not supply effective military forces in

being. All it can provide is a basis for acquiring eligible

manpower who must be trained, organized and equipped.

Effective forces can be available only

to

the extent that men are

organized, trained and equipped prior to an emergency. Under

current military policy, should a crisis arise, it is the function of

the Reserves to provide the first stage in the expansion of

effective forces. They are organized and at least partly trained

and equipped; hence they can be operationally ready in a

shorter time than new forces. The function of a standby draft is

to provide manpower resources for the second stage of

expansion in effective forces.

Much thought lies behind the recommendation that

Congressional approval be required to invoke conscription. An

important issue of national policy is obviously involved. The

alternative is to endow the Office of the President with the

independent power to call for activation of the standby

machinery. This has been rejected for several reasons.

Conscription should be used only when the size of forces

required for the security of the nation cannot be supplied by

the existing system. If Congressional approval is made a

prerequisite to the use of conscription, the necessity for

legislative action will guarantee public discussion of the

propriety of whatever action is under consideration. If

discussion yields a reasonable consensus, the nation’s resolve

120

will be clearly demonstrated and made less vulnerable to

subsequent erosion. If a consensus sufficient to induce Congress

to activate the draft cannot be mustered, the President would

see the depth of national division

before,

rather than after,

committing U.S. military power.

A standby system which authorizes the President to invoke

the draft at his discretion would capture the worst of two

worlds. On the one hand, it would make it possible for the

President to become involved in military actions with a

minimum of public debate and popular support. On the other

hand, once the nation was involved, especially in a prolonged

limited conflict, the inequities of the draft would provide a

convenient rallying point for opposition to the policy being

pursued.

It is important to emphasize that Congress has not been

reluctant to enact a draft when the President has requested it.

In the first World War, the United States declared war on April

I, 1917, the draft law was requested by President Wilson on

April 7, and it was signed into law on May 18. Prior to World

War II a draft bill was introduced into Congress on June 20,

1940, endorsed by the President on August 2, passed on

September 14, and signed into law September 16. When the

Korean War broke out on June 24, 1950, debate on extension

of the selective service law had been underway for some

months. Congress promptly discontinued debate and extended

the law for one year on July 9.

Because of the loss of personal freedom and the inequities

inherent in conscription, the draft should be resorted to only in

extreme situations. If the Office of the President has the power

to use the draft, there will be pressures to do so when

circumstances do not warrant it. The viability of an

all-volunteer force ultimately depends upon the willingness of

Congress, the President, the Department of Defense and the

military services to maintain (1) competitive levels of military

compensation, (2) reasonable qualification standards, and

(3) attractive conditions of military service. Under foreseeable

circumstances, such as serious budget constraints, there is a

danger that inaction by one or another of these parties might

force the President to resort to conscription when it is not

*Cllly necessary. If Congressional approval is made a

prerequisite to use of the draft, the danger of using it

unnecesarily or by default will be much reduced.

121

One of the fundamental principles embodied in the

Constitution is that taxes are to be levied only by Congress.

Since conscription is a form of taxation, the power to conscript

is the power to tax. Therefore, it is in keeping with the intent of

the Constitution to require Congressional approval for the

activation of the standby draft.

Finally, requiring Congressional approval for activation of

a standby draft will have little or no effect on the time required

for the nation to bring effective military power to bear when

needed. To repeat: conscription does not provide the nation

with military forces in being. Effective flexibility in response to

crisis can be achieved only to the extent that forces are already

partly or wholly organized, trained and equipped. The draft is a

vehicle for supplying men for gradual expansion, not for

meeting sudden challenges. This has been true, for example, in

Vietnam. Under our standby proposal, the delay introduced in

expanding the forces with conscripts cannot exceed the time it

takes for Congress to act. In practice the time lost will be even

less: preparations for organizing, training and equipping recruits

can proceed simultaneously with Congressional action.

MAXIMUM SIZE OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE.

No estimate has been attempted of the maximum size of a

force that could be provided on a voluntary basis. When it is

posed in this general form, the question of maximum size is not

a meanmgful one. The number of individuals who will serve

voluntarily depends on a variety of factors, more or less subject

to control, which change over time. One factor is the specific

set of circumstances which dictate the expansion of forces.

When the threat to national security is clearly serious, as it was

after Pearl Harbor, volunteers will be plentiful. For a limited

conflict in a distant and alien land, there will be less enthusiasm.

Willingness to volunteer also depends on the character and

terms of military service, on casualty rates, and on the public

esteem such service enjoys. Most importantly, the flow of

volunteers depends upon the level of military compensation.

Pay is important because it leads to more relevant

questions regarding the size of the voluntary force which can be

sustained. Other things being equal, if it is indeed true that

higher military compensation will result in more enlistments,

the question of the maximum size of a volunteer force becomes

one of how high the level of military compensation should be.

Ultimately, each of us faces the question: how heavily are we

willing to tax ourselves to pay for a volunteer force? The

question of the maximum size of a volunteer military force is at

bottom political and not economic. Conscription cannot

produce more manpower than already exists. The constraint is

political, and it is imposed by the reluctance of voters generally

to incur higher taxes even though they want forces large enough

to guarantee their security.

Whatever the ultimate limitations on the size of a

voluntary force, some relatively large forces have been

assembled on such a basis ~ for example, the Union forces in

the Civil War. By the middle of 1862, the North, without

conscription, had raised a force of approximately 670,000 men,

the vast majority of whom had made three year commitments.

This was 15 percent of the estimated male population, age 18 to

39, of the Union States. During World War I, Great Britain

rekd on volunteers until 1916. By that time, England had

raised an active duty force of nearly 2.7 million men, or 35

percent of her age 18 to 40 male population cohort.

Such examples are by no means conclusive, but they do

suggest that conscription is not necessarily required for conflicts

comparable in scale to those the United States has fought since

World War 11. The maximum active duty force levels reached

during the Korean and Vietnamese Wars were 3.7 million and

3.6 million respectively. The Korean War force represented 15

percent of the male population age 18 to 39 in 1952, and the

Vietnam War force represented 12.4 percent of the male

population age 18 to 39 in 1968. In prosecuting those wars with

conscripts, the nation imposed a heavy tax on a small segment

of the population. In all, 5.8 million men saw service during the

Korean War and 6.0 million during the Vietnam War. In neither

case was a serious attempt made to expand the forces with

volunteers, and in the Vietnam War little use was made of the

Reserves.

Historically, whenever conscription has been used, military

pay has fallen further behind comparable civilian earnings and,

as a result, enlistments have inevitably been discouraged. The

more conscription is used, the less incentive there is to maintain

military pay (especially for those in the lower ranks) at levels

sufficient to attract volunteers. This inverse correlation between

conscription and military pay (and therefore volunteerism) is

123

illustrated by the data in table IO-1 which compares military

pay and allowances to manufacturing earnings at different dates

in our history.

In the future, serious consideration should be given to

steps which would facilitate the expansion of forces through

voluntary means before invoking conscription. In particular

whenever expansion of forces is required to meet a limited

emergency, Congress and the President should give serious

consideration to enacting significant permanent or temporary

increases in military compensation.

TABLE l&l.-Comparison of annual military enlisted earnings with

average annual earnings in manufacturing

Manufac-

Percent

wring Of forces

earnings ? Ratio

drafted

$ 410 1.041 2

394

1.127 0

980 .aaa 59

2,469 ,643 61

3.721

,694 27

124

CHAPTER 11

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

A major share of our research has been devoted to

estimating the budgrt increases that will be required to sustain

an all-volunteer force. The results of that effort are summarized

in tables I I-I and I l-11.

Table 1 I-I presents our estimates of the additional

expenditures that will be required to put our recommendations

into effect in FY 197 I

Each of these sources of increased budget expenditures is

discussed elsewhere in this report.

Table 1 I-II summarizes the average budget increases

required to sustain all-volunteer forces with the same effective

strengths as the 2.0, 2.25, 2.5, and 3.0 million man mixed

forces for FY 1977 through FY 1979. We have chosen the

period 1977 through 1979 as fairly representing the differences

in budget requirements for the mixed and all-volunteer forces,

because at that time accession requirements will have stabilized,

and most of the savings resulting from an all-volunteer force will

have taken effect. All of the comparisons are made in constant

125

TABLE 11-L-Additional

budget expenditures for all-volunteer force

FY 1971

[billions]

TABLE 1

l-Il.-Additional budget expenditures for

all-volunteer

force

FY 1977-79 average

[billions]

1970 dollars; that is, there is no allowance for inflation. The

pay profiles used to compute total pay and allowances are those

set forth in chapter 5. For all of the mixed forces, we have used

the estimated pay for FY 1970, which includes an

across-the-board increase of 8 percent. For the 2.0, 2.25, and

126

127

CHAPTER 12

OBJECTIONS TO AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Critics argue that elimination of the draft will adversely

affect our society or our armed forces. Their main objections

are: (I) an all-volunteer force will become isolated from society

and threaten civilian control; (2) isolation and alienation will

erode civilian respect for the military and hence dilute its

quality; (3) an all-volunteer force will be all-black or dominated

by servicemen from low-income backgrounds; (4) an

all-volunteer force will lead to a decline in patriotism or in

popular concern about foreign policy; (5) an all-volunteer force

will encourage military adventurism.

There are several compelling reasons why an all-volunteer

force will not have the dire consequences some predict.

First, an all-volunteer armed force will not affect the

institutional framework within which the Department of

Defense and the military services now operate. The system of

manpower recruitment is only it small part of that framework.

An all-volunteer force does not impinge on the constitutional

roles of the President, who will remain Commander-inChief; or

129

the civilian service secretaries, who will remain responsible to

him; or Congress, which will continue as an independent

legislative and budgetary overseer. The change from a mixed

volunteer/conscript force to an all-volunteer force maintains

intact the legal structures that define the role and status of the

military services.

Second, this structure rests on deeply rooted and widely

held values. Americans firmly believe in a clearly defined and

limited military role, a belief derived from the Anglo-American

heritage of individual freedom and democratic political

processes. Defense of personal rights and liberties against all

threats, foreign and domestic, has been a constant theme in

English and American history. The English established

parliamentary control over the military through the Glorious

Revolution in 1688. The authors of the United States

Constitution recognized that military forces were necessary, but

they carefully circumscribed their role. They provided that the

President be the Commander-inChief of the forces and gave the

Congress the power to raise and support armies. Civilian control

of the military has concerned every generation of Americans

since I776 and this concern remains high today.

In 1940, when peacetime conscription was first proposed

in the United States, Senator Vandenburg reminded the Senate

of these long-held attitudes and traditions:

“I am opposed to tearing up one hundred and fifty years of

American history and tradition, in which none but volunteers

have

entered the peacetime Armies and Navies of the United

States, unless there is valid reason to believe that this reliance

in 1940 has become a broken reed for the first time in a

century and a half.

“There must have been sound reasons all down the years why

our predecessors in the Congress always consistently and

relentlessly shunned this thing which we are now asked to do.

These reasons must have been related in some indispensable

fashion to the fundamental theory that peacetime military

conscription is repugnant to the spirit of democracy and the

soul of Republican institutions, and that it leads in dark

directions. That certainly is my view.”

More recently, President Eisenhower reminded the nation

of these considerations in his Farewell Address:

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the

acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or

130

unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potcnlial

for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will

persist.

“We must never lel the weight of this combination endanger

our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing

for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can

compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military

machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so

that security and liberty may prosper together.”

In short, however the armed forces are recruited, a watchful

population will continue to be the strongest force limiting the

influence of the military in American society.

Third, there is much evidence that our society has more to

gain than to fear from an all-volunteer force. Throughout its

history, the United States has relied on volunteer military

forces, resorting to conscription only in time of clear danger.

Prior to 1948 conscription was abandoned after each major war

and voluntary recruitment reinstated. Only in the past twenty

years has the United States used the draft to raise a standing

military force. During the long periods of entirely voluntary

recruitment the United States never experienced a threat to

civilian control from the military. These voluntary military

forces were able to accomplish successfully the military tasks

required of them. The rush of volunteers at the outbreak of

every war demonstrates that a voluntary military did not

produce a decline in patriotism. Nor is there evidence in our

history that voluntary forces encouraged military adventurism.

Our national experience strongly indicates that a volunteer

force is likely to promote civilian control of the military,

improve the quality of the armed forces, foster continued

patriotism and help avoid military adventurism.

Lastly, the manpower policies of an all-volunteer force will

largely maintain the existing qualitative composition of the

armed forces. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the

main alternatives available to us for recruiting military

manpower. We have made projections of two future

forces ~ one a mixed volunteer-conscript force, the other an

all-volunteer armed force. In comparing the two alternative

forces, we use four categories: the career force, true enlistees in

their first tour of duty, draft motivated enlistees in their first

tour, and draftees. The career force contains men voluntarily

serving beyond any period of obligated service. True enlistees

131

117.4ili 0 1” 1”

are men who would have joined even if there were no draft.

Draft-motivated enlistees are men who say they would probably

not have joined if there were no draft. Draftees are, of course,

men inducted under Selective Service procedures. Table 12-I

shows the number of enlisted men in each of the categories for

the two alternative 2.5 million man future forces. The table

shows that 83 percent of the mixed force will be serving

voluntarily.

TABLE

12-I.-Composition of mixed and volunteer enlisted forces,

1980 [millions of men]

Volunteer force Mixed force

First-term force

Draftees

..~~.~~~.~~~~~~~ ~~~ None

,193 (9%)

Draft-induced volunteers .~~~.. None .162 (6%)

True volunteers ~~~~~~~~~~~~.~..~.~~~. 1.079 (52%)

,925 (43%)

Career force-volunteers ~~~~~~~~..~~~~ 1.010 (46%)

,848 (40%)

Total ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~ ..~~ 2.089 (100%)

2.146 (100%)

Since career men and true volunteers in the mixed force

will remain in a volunteer force, the potential differences in the

two forces are mostly limited to the kind of men who are draft

induced volunteers or draftees in the present mixed force.

Draft motivated volunteers are men who object less to

military service than the men who are drafted. A potential

draftee is presented with a forced choice. He can be drafted into

the Army for two years or he can enlist in the service of his

choice and get a better chance of serving in the branch and

occupation he prefers. Enlistment generally requires additional

time in service ~ one year extra in the Army, two extra years in

the Navy and Air Force. Draftees are not willing to serve this

extra time. But draft motivated volunteers are willing to trade

extra time in uniform for preferred service. These draft

motivated volunteers are the type who will find service in an

aH-volunteer force attractive. Improved compensation and

better conditions of service will appeal to the men who would

otherwise volunteer to avoid the draft. The major quantitative

difference between the projected all-volunteer force and the

projected mixed volunteer-conscript force is, therefore, the

presence of 193,000 draftees in the latter, nine percent of the

enlisted force.

Further, the qualitative standards for entry into the two

132

alternative forces will be the same. Identical mental, physical

and moral standards will act to reduce differences in the types

of men who man the two forces. Men who will not qualify to

enter the mixed force will also not qualify for the all-volunteer

force. For example, some 30 percent of America’s young men

do not presently qualify for military service. A disproportionate

share of these men come from a low income environment.

These men will continue to be ineligible for military service

whether or not they are attracted to military life.

Raising first-term military pay will increase the

attractiveness of the military more to young men with higher

earnings potential than to young men with lower earnings

potential. For those who have very poor civilian alternatives

even the present low level of first-term pay is relatively

attractive. In either the mixed force or the all-volunteer force,

men who have very poor civilian alternatives and who meet the

military’s standards will be able to enlist and reenlist. But the

low first-term pay of the present mixed force is a real obstacle

to recruiting men who have better civilian alternatives.

Increasing first-term pay for the all-volunteer force removes this

obstacle and should increase the flow of qualified enlistees. In

spite of low first-term pay an estimated 140,000 high-school

graduates entered the military as true volunteers during 1968.

Higher first-term pay certainly would have attracted some of

the remaining 1.2.million male high-school graduates who either

entered the labor force or continued their education.

The men attracted to an all-volunteer force will not

necessarily make military service their career, In fact, about 65

percent of tile men who enter the all-volunteer force will leave

after a single tour of duty. We estimate that turnover in the

all-volunteer force will be three-quarters of the turnover in a

comparable mixed force. As table 12-I shows, 52 percent of the

men in the projected voluntary force will be first-termers ~

only

slightly less than the estimated 60 percent in the

comparable mixed force.

The all-volunteer force will resemble a mixed volunteer

and conscript force in other ways. In the important area of

officer recruitment, the majority of new officers in the

all-volunteer force will come from ROTC, direct, appointments

and officer candidate school. Each year the military will

continue to draw new leaders into the service from the same

sources as it does today. Most of these men will enter at the

133

bottom and advance to higher levels just as officer personnel do

today.

Because we do not expect major changes in the

composition of the armed forces, we do not expect major

changes in the relationship oetween the armed forces and the

rest of society.

Beyond these general considerations, we felt obliged to

study several specific questions to insure that our conclusions

were valid. Assuming the change to an all-volunteer force might

affect the relations between the armed forces and society,

would it result in undesirable separation? How might the change

affect the racial composition of the forces? What might be the

consequences of a reduced flow of veterans from the forces into

society? How might the end of the draft and reliance on

all-volunteer forces affect the foreign policy decision-making

process? Much of the opposition to an all-volunteer force arises

because such questions have not been carefully explored.

Concerns about the all-volunteer force are often expressed

in emotionally charged terms - “mercenaries” - and rely on

leaps of the imagination to close the gaps where evidence is

lacking. It is easy to conjure up the threat of a more powerful

military establishment which would gain unwarranted influence

within the government, until one hears other voices claiming the

opposite - namely, that isolation of the military will lead to

reduced influence and a less effective force. Through these (and

other) objections runs the assertion that the military and the

rest of society will be “alienated.”

ISOLATION AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

The long-established institutional framework, firm public

attitudes, and the similarity of the future forces with or without

conscription will help prevent separation between the armed

forces and society if the United States adopts an all-volunteer

force. Still, critics feel that the high turnover of manpower

generated by the Selective Service System is a healthy

phenomenon. The flow of men into and out of the armed forces

is thought to generate a link between the services and civilian

society that will be weakened or lost with an all-volunteer force.

It is claimed that the constant inflow of civilian draftees with

limited commitment

to

the military guards against the growth

of a separate military ethos. It is further claimed that the

134

constant outflow of veterans to society makes society more

informed, more patriotic, and more alert to threats to national

life.

Concern about isolation of the military is heightened by

the knowledge that the men in an all-volunteer force would be

self-selected rather than chosen by their draft boards. The

change, some say. will result in an Army composed of

undesirable psychological types, men inclined to use force and

violence to solve problems. A mercenary army might develop.

The men in the military might come to serve the military’s

interests against society, leading eventually to loss of society’s

control over the armed forces. Isolation and alienation could

also operate on civilian society. As the military grew apart from

the rest of society, interest in military matters would diminish

and anti-military attitudes would develop. This would make it

difficult to attract high quality men into the armed forces and

the military’s stature would fall further. A cycle of

anti-militarism and falling prestige would ensue. Both the

quality of military leadership and the effectiveness of the

military as a fighting force would deteriorate. The experience of

other nations is sometimes cited to support fears of such

undesirable consequences.

We have examined the issues raised by those who fear

potential alienation of the armed forces. Some are mutually

contradictory. For example. an all-volunteer force cannot both

strengthen and weaken the influence of the armed forces. We do

not believe that an all-volunteer force such as we recommend

will become isolated or alienated from society.

Those who fear greater alienation from voluntary

recruiting exaggerate the difference between volunteer and

conscripted forces. We have already pointed out that the men in

both forces will be largely the same types. Moreover, the

turnover of the volunteer force will be three-fourths as large as

if conscription is retained. At a force level of 2.5 million men

the volunteer force must attract 325,000 men, the conscripted

force 440.000 men. Further, the men who join the volunteer

force will not all become long service professionals. An

estimated 2 15,000 men will leave after serving a single tour. As

a result. about half the men in the volunteer force will be in

their first tour of duty. The large infusion of new men will help

insure that neither force becomes isolated from society.

I35

The charge that the United States’ armed forces will

become

“mercenaries” is easiest to answer. The term implies a

single motive - monetary reward ~ which precludes patriotism

and all other motives for service. It is usually applied to those

who serve a foreign power. We simply cannot take the charge

seriously. Why should an all-volunteer force be a mercenary

force when our local police, F.B.I. agents, and federal marshals,

all entirely voluntary, are not? Changes in compensation and

conditions of service for the all-volunteer force will enhance the

attractiveness of the armed forces for citizens who will serve for

a variety of reasons. Many factors affect the choice between

military and civilian opportunities, and pay is weighed along

with the chance for interesting work, living conditions, travel,

opportunities for promotion and others.

To suggest that men who enlist to serve their country do

so only for pay is to demean the hundreds of thousands who

voluntarily serve today. More than half of all the men in today’s

forces are true volunteers. This includes one-third of the men

with less than four years service. Given today’s first-term pay

levels, these men must be motivated by other considerations,

including a high sense of dedication to their country. Whatever

motivates these first-term men will not disappear simply

because the draft is no longer used to compel other men to

serve and because conditions of service improve. Nor should we

expect that the recommended pay increases will diminish the

demonstrated dedication of the career force. On the contrary,

patriotism is now weakened by the fact that society initially

underpays men who volunteer and generally treats military

service as an activity which men will undertake only if

compelled to do so.

The charge that the all-volunteer force will be manned by

“hired killers” obsessed with violence is as empty as the talk of

“mercenaries.” Such men ~’ assuming they exist in significant

numbers - are free to join the present mixed force. If anything,

discipline of the violence-prone would be enhanced in a fully

professional volunteer force.

As for the feared possibility of military intervention in

political matters, this occurs when civilian political leadership is

weak and indecisive or when its legitimacy is called into

question. Those nations which have experienced military

interference in political affairs suffer ills entirely unrelated to

136

the

presence or absence of conscripts in

the ranks. Furthermore,

such interventions

usually arise from the officer corps. In the

two major nations which have relied on volunteer forces

throughout most of their modern history - the United States

and the United Kingdom ~ it is difficult to find anything

remotely resembling military intervention.

The modern history of Europe and Latin America reveals

no evidence that all-volunteer forces are more likely to

overthrow civilian leadership. But, major direct military

interventions in political affairs are not the only concern of

those who oppose an all-volunteer force as a threat to civilian

control of the military. They also fear that the military will

acquire excessive political and social influence. These fears

appear groundless. An all-volunteer force will not have any

more influence on the President, Congress or the rest of society

than the military now possesses. In fact, to the extent size alone

matters, the impact of an all-volunteer force will be less since it

will be somewhat smaller than a mixed force of equal

effectiveness. An all-volunteer force will have a larger budget,

but the additional funds will be used for compensation and will

not provide more control over real resources.

Elimination of the draft will also reduce somewhat the

military’s influence over the use of manpower resources in the

civilian sector. The Selective Service System frankly

acknowledges that it uses the draft to direct potential draftees

into activities it regards as vital to the nation:

The deferment of men from military service to pursue civilian

activities in the national interest has always been a function of

Selective Service. The Prospect of deferment has had the effect

of

influencing men to pursue such activities.

The

spectrum of skills vital to the nation’s capacity to survive

his steadily broadened. Its limits cannot be foreseen. It

embraces many civilian activities

as well as service in uniform.

Particularly since the beginning of the “space age” the breadth

of the concept of what cwxtitutes “service” in defense has

been difficult to fix. But it has been equally apparent that the

fullest development and wisest utilization by citizens of their

capabilities is vital to the nation.

In making decisions about manpower allocation, the Selective

Service System operates independent of any direct

Congressional review. This “channeling” process gives

137

deferments for defense related work and not for otherwise

similar non-defense work. The return to an all-volunteer force

would end this practice, and to that extent limit the military’s

influence on the setting of social priorities in America.

On balance the elimination of conscription may slightly

reduce the influence of the military, but the effect is so small as

to be negligible.

Behind fears that the military’s political power would be

enlarged lies a basic concern that an all-volunteer force would

develop its own rigid ethos. Even if the military did not have

increased political power, some fear it would use the power it

possessed in undesirable ways. Again, this fear assumes II greatly

exaggerated difference between an all-volunteer and a mixed

force.

The officer corps exercises the dominant influence on

military values. Elimination of the draft will not significantly

alter its composition. Officers will continue to be recruited

from all over the nation and from a variety of socio-economic

backgrounds. Further, the change to an all-volunteer force will

have no effect on top leadership, since these men have always

been professionals. There is little evidence that the views of

enlisted men have a significant impact on their thinking and

even less evidence that this impact depends upon how enlisted

men are recruited. If there is a separate military ethos, it will

persist in a mixed as well as an all-volunteer force.

Moreover, it is by no means clear that a problem exists at

all. There is now significant interaction between the military

and the rest of society. The military is not isolated from the

mass media which permeate all walks of life. Also, the forces

contain a wide variety of specialists, not only in air, sea and

ground combat, but also in all branches of engineering and

science, in computer applications, medicine and dentistry, law,

aviation, personnel management, ship building, and others.

These men are often in daily contact with their fellow

professionals in the civilian sector. Much specialist and officer

training takes place in the civilian sector. The Defense

Department employs more than one million civilians, and many

officers serve tours of duty which require daily contact with the

business community, academic institutions, and other civilian

organizations.

If the present degree of military and civilian interaction is

inadequate, conscription does not solve the problem. The

138

solution lies in taking further steps to reduce the separation

between the military and the rest of society. Many of the

benefits provided in-kind to military personnel increase that

separation. A serviceman can live on a base, shop in the

commissary and post exchange, send his children to a school

filled with children whose parents are also in the military, and

have his family’s medical needs attended to in a military

hospital. If more military compensation were paid in cash and

less of it in-kind, the military might be less isolated from the

rest of ‘society. Also, more of the training and education of

military personnel could be civilianized; and, as suggested

elsewhere in this report, medical services could be civilianized.

An aggressive expansion in the use of lateral entry, especially in

the officer corps, would provide leaders less identified with any

prevailing military ethos. These are some steps which might be

taken if the nation desires a closer identification between

military and civilian values. However, they may ,have an adverse

effect on morale in the military. By working and living together,

servicemen develop a rapport which is very important in

combat. One cost of having more civil-military integration may

be a less effective defense establishment.

ISOLATION AND MILITARY QUALITY

While some worry that an all-volunteer force will increase

the power of the military, others believe it will lead to the

deterioration of the military. They see the end of conscription

as causing public neglect, significant reductions in the defense

budget, a ge’neral declilie in the prestige of military service, and

a reduced quality of military personnel. In fact, the effect of

the all-volunteer force should be the reverse of this gloomy

picture. As it stands today the draft is a major source of

antagonism toward the military, which erodes public support of

the armed services. Because the draft is unnecessary, an

all-volunteer force offers an obvious opportunity to curb the

growth of anti-militaristic sentiment.

Of course, civil-military relations will never be

uncontroversial. They have not been so in the past, whether

manpower has been raised by conscription or voluntarism. The

military have a distinct and separate set of responsibilities of

fundamental importance to the survival of American society.

Military leaders seek assurance that they will be able to

accomplish successfully the tasks they may be called upon to

139

do. Uncertainty about potential threats rind our ability to cope

with them leads to differing judgments about the size of forces

required. These differences bring about conflict hetwesn the

demands of the military and the demands of other groups in our

society and will do so regardless of whether there is a draft.

The resolution of this conflict wilt vary depending on the

public’s evaluation of national priorities. During the 1930’s

defense expenditures averaged one percent of Gross National

Product, hut from 1955 to I964 they averaged nine percent of

Gross National Product. The strength of our armed forces is

hased on fundamental public attitudes toward national defense.

No doubt the shift to an all-volunteer force will have some

effect on those attitudes. Those who no longer face the threat

of conscription and those who oppose the draft on moral

grounds are likely to feel less hostile toward the milit;lry. while

those whose taxes are increased may he displeased. On balance,

it is difficult to see which of these factors will predominate.

More importantly. it seems clear that neither factor is

likely to have very much effect. Since World War II our

peacetimr armed forces have been consistently supported at

levels unparalleled in our history. This can hardly he explained

by the fact that we have also had conscription during these

years. The public lms supported the maintenance of large forces

htxausr it has felt that they were t‘ssential to notionat security.

The change fro&a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts to

an all-volunteer force wilt not dmmatioally change that feeling.

In recent years military service has been scorned and

condemned by some Americans. No doubt. the Vietnam War is

partly responsible. hut the draft has also contributed to the

military’s unpopularity. Young men are inevitably skeptical

about a career in an organization which has to use compulsion

to ohtoin recruits. Moreover, the low pay implies that society

plxes little value on ;I soldier. The termination of the draft

should immediately enhance the prestige of enlisted service. The

knowledge that those in the armed forces have freely chosen to

serve their country cannot hut improve their image in their

own eyes as well X

in the ryes of society. Our

recommendations regarding military compensation have been

discussed earlier. They should also go a long way toward

improving the image of ;I military career and they are aimed at

maintaining the quality of military personnel. Many of our

recomm~~~d;ltions for increasing the efficiency of military

140

personnel management will also enhance the image of military

life. Making the terms of obligated service for enlisted men the

same as those for officers, vesting retirement benefits,

encouraging lateral entry and similar changes will operate to

reduce the differences between military and civilian careers.

Military careers will become more professional and avoid the

stigma of being an unpleasant task that some men must be

forced to do temporarily.

The return to an all-volunteer armed force should improve

the “quality” of military life. Conscription enables the military

to ignore individual dignity and desire, secure in the knowledge

that the draft will replace those who do not like the military

system. The entire military “atmosphere” ~ the approach to

training, discipline, and treatment of individuals - must be

reexamined. In the modern army at most one-third of the men

serve in infantry or ground combat units, and the others serve in

technical, administrative and logistical billets. The appeal and

utility of military occupational training can be improved by

greater recognition that some individuals do not need the kind

of training traditionally given all recruits as potential

infantrymen. Assignment policies which minimize family

separation and which reduce the frequency of duty changes and

moves will also make military life more attractive.

Elimination of conscription will also affect the American

officer corps even though its recruits have always been

volunteers. The draft induces many men to volunteer for service

as officers to avoid being inducted as enlisted men. Thus the

prestige of military service has been hurt by the draft even in

the officer corps. Officers as well as enlisted men will benefit

from the changes the Commission is recommending. Pay will be

increased, particularly for junior officers. Change in conditions

of service and in the quality of military life will make military

careers more attractive to potential officers.

AN ARMY OF THE BLACK?

Members of both the white and Negro communities have

expressed concern that the all-volunteer force might fill its

enlisted ranks with the poor and the black. This concern is

linked to the recognition that to move to a voluntary force

requires a substantial increase in first-term military pay. Higher

pay, it is said, will increase the attractiveness of military service

primarily among lower income groups, where the proportion of

141

Negroes is high. A predominantly black enlisted force might

develop. This will result, according to some, in the black and

the poor bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of

defense: Some whites are concerned with the dangers of having

in the community a large number of blacks who have had

military training. They fear that these men will participate in

domestic disorders and riots.

There is no evidence that the black community would be

happy with an increase in the number of blacks in the military.

Increasing the attractiveness of the military will draw able

young males into the services because other job opportunities

are denied them. In most black communities there is a need for

able young black males to enter civilian careers, work on

community projects, and inspire the young. There is strong

evidence to suggest that the black community, more than the

white, looks at the “male drain” as extremely costly.

Many of these questions and concerns cannot be answered

rationally. Racial attitudes and fears are emotionally based.

Solid facts and the sound judgments are seldom cures for

prejudice. For example, those who fear “domestic disorders” as

a result of blacks serving in the military raise such unanswerable

questions. To bar blacks from the military because of these

fears will not solve the root causes behind domestic disorders.

Black participation in the military will neither quiet nor

aggravate domestic disorders.

The racial aspects of the relationship between the armed

forces and society have been given special consideration by the

Commission. We have concluded that the racial composition of

the armed forces cannot be fundamentally changed by ending

the draft. Even if higher pay appealed only to the “poor,” twice

as many whites as blacks would be attracted. The proportion of

blacks below the poverty line in 1967 was 3X percent while

only I I percent of whites were in the Same category. But, in

absolute numbers, more than twice as many whites (17.6

killion) as blacks (8.3 million) were below the poverty line.

The relevant comparison is between the racial mix of the

all-volunteer force and the racial mix of an alternative force of

conscripts and volunteers. We conclude that the similar

manpower policies of the two forces will result in similar racial

composition in the two forces. The mental, physical, and moral

standards for enlistment will ensure that neither force recruits

an undue proportion from minority groups or the poor. The

142

best estimate of the proportion of blacks in the all-volunteer

force is 14.9 percent, compared with 14.1 percent in a mixed

force of conscripts and volunteers. In the Army, the proportion

of blacks in the volunteer force is 18.8 percent; in the mixed

force it is 16.6 percent. At a 2.5 million man force level, only

five to ten thousand more blacks will serve in the enlisted

component of a volunteer force than in a mixed force.

Our estimates are based on a careful review of all aspects

of the racial composition of the armed forces. As a first step,

participation by whites and blacks in the military during the

1960’s was examined. Second, the detailed projections of the

alternative future forces were analyzed to determine the racial

mix of the 2.5 million man force in 1980. The number of blacks

in either force depends on the number of young black males in

the population, their qualifications for military service, the rate

at which the qualified enter the military, and the rate at which

they reenlist. Our analysis of these factors is based on data

provided by the Department of Defense and the Census Bureau.

Participation of Blacks in Present Forces

Because of racial differences in civilian earnings, even the

current levels of military pay are more attractive to blacks than

to whites. In 1966, the average annual income of a 24-year old

white high school graduate was $6013, for a black high school

graduate the same age average annual income was $4344. In the

military, the earnings of the two men would be nearly the same.

In spite of this relative attractiveness, the proportion of blacks

in the armed, forces has been slightly less than the proportion in

the U.S. male population.

During the late 1960’s, Negroes constituted from 9.0 to

9.5 percent of the total armed force. In June 1969, two percent

of the officers were Negro as were 10.5 percent of the total

enlisted force as shown in table 12-H. Both in total and in the

enlisted component alone, the proportion of Negroes was

somewhat less than their proportion (12 percent) in the young

male population. Negro participation in the Army in Southeast

Asia (I I .4 percent) is slightly less than their percentage in the

total Army (I 1.7 percent).

The forces of the 1960’s were, of course mixed forces of

volunteers and conscripts. However, the racial composition of

these forces is only partially the result of conscription, since

143

TABLE 12-Il.-Negro

participation

in the Armed Forces,

June 30.1969

[percent]

-

Officer

Enlisted Total

In SE Asia

Army ~~~~~.~.~~~~.~.~~~~ 3.2 12.6 11.7 11.4

Navy ~~~~~~~~~~~~

0.4 5.3

4.0

4.5

Marine Corpse 1.0 11.9

11 .o 10.3

Air Force...~ 1.6 10.6 9.2 10.5

-

DOD

total~~~~. .~~

2.0 10.5 iFI ii2

even under the draft a majority of the military are there on a

fully voluntary basis. The distinction between the first term

force and the career force is helpful in understanding the racial

composition of the armed forces. The first term force includes

draftees, draft motivated volunteers and true volunteers, men

who say they would have volunteered at current pay levels even

if there were no draft. The career force includes all men who

have voluntarily reenlisted.

The racial mix among true volunteers in the first term of

service and in the career force gives some insight into the racial

composition of the all-volunteer force. Table 12-111 shows that

blacks constituted only 12.7 percent of nearly 1.7 million

enlisted men serving voluntarily in 1969 Among true

volunteers, blacks are now serving in the armed forces almost

exactly in proportion to their numbers in the U.S. population.

About one-third of the men in the first term of service are true

volunteers. Of these men, 11.6 percent are black. The

proportion of. blacks in the career force is 13.1 percent - only

slightly higher than the percent in the U.S. population. The

same holds for women in the military who, of course, serve free

of the compulsion of the draft. In all cases, the proportion of

TABLE 12-Ill.-Blacks, as a percent of enlisted frue

volunteers

in the 1969 Armed Forces

Male Female

-

First term Career

Total

Arrnym~~~ ~.~~~~~~~ 16.4 19.2 17.7

15.4

Navy...~~~~~~~~~.~~.~.~ 6.0 7.0 6.5 6.2

Marine Corps~~~~-~~~.. 11.6

11.9

11.6

15.1

Air Force......~~~~~~~~~~~ 11.4 12.0 11.6 11.1

-

DOD total ....~~~~

11.6

13.1,

lG?

11.0

144

blacks is highest in the Army and lowest in the Navy. At

present. blacks constitute nearly 20 percent of the Army cxeer

enlisted force.

These proportions depend on the r;tcial mix among men

entering the two force components. The proportion of blacks in

the first term true volunteer force depends on the proportion of

blacks among true volunteers entering the militxy. Thr

proportion of blacks in the career force depends on the

proportion of re-enlistws who are black. The data in table

IXV shows blacks as a percent of the men flowing into the

ci,nx~ force. (The percentage given in the table should not be

confused with re-enlistment rotrs. Re-twlistmrnt rates are higher

for Negroes than for whites. but these drpcnd on the definition

of eligibility for re-enlistment. Since eligibility rates are lowrr

for Negroes than for whites. a comparison using rs-enlistment

rates overstates the proportion of Negroes entering the carrw

force.) The percentage of blacks among those w-enlisting at the

end of their first term of service has fallen shxply in recent

years. This is largely the result of a sharp decline in the

percentage of blacks among first term re-enlistws in the Army.

The decline in the percentage of blacks re-enlisting will

eventually lead to a decline in the percent of blacks in the Army

career force.

TABLE 1%IV.-Blacks as a percent of first-term reenlistments’

1965 1966

1967

1966 1969

Arrn~~~~~~

22.3 20.7

19.2

14.3 11.6

Navy~.~~ ~~~.~~.~..

6.6 6.4

7.1

6.5 6.6

Marine Corps ~..... 12.5 11.6 13.4 12.0 12.6

Air Forw~~~~..~. 15.1 10.9 15.1 13.0 14.0

DOD total 16.3 14.7 14.6 1G 11.4

I oats lo, ,965 to ,968 is calendar year. oats for 1969 is fiscal year.

In summary. in today’s force blacks do not serve

disproptionately to their numbers in the population. This is true

for the total force and for the true volunteer component alone.

Black participation is highest in the Army. where about one

man in five in the career force is Negro.

Participation of Blncks in Future Forces

Estimating the participation of blacks in the all-volunteer

force or the future mixed volunteer and conscript force requires

14s

examination of (I) the projected pool of young white and

black men available for military service, (2) the ability of these

men to meet the mental and physical standards of the military

service, (3) the first term mihtary participation rates among

qualified men of both races and (4) the re-enlistment behavior

of men in the military. A range of estimates of the proportion

of blacks in the armed forces has been developed by varying

assumptions about qualifications rates, enlistment rates and

reenlistment rates.

Young men in the I7 to 20 age group are the primary

source of initial enlistments. During the 1970’s this pool will

grow by more than a million men. But, since the white pool will

grow at a slower rate than the black pool, the proportion of

blacks available for military service will increase, as shown in

table 12-V. This trend makes it likely that the proportion of

blacks in either the all-volunteer force or the mixed force will

increase during the 1970’s from today’s 10.6 percent. These

proportions of blacks in the military age population provide a

standard for evaluating minority group participation in the

alternative future forces.

TABLE l&V.--Trends

in the 17-20 male population [in thousands]

Black White Total

Percent

nonwhite

It is an unfortunate fact that not all these young men will

be qualified for military service. The qualifications for service

will be retained at today’s level in both the all-volunteer force

and the alternative mixed force. To be acceptable for military

service, young men must meet certain minimum physical,

moral, and mental standards. For example, men who score in

the lowest IO percent on the Armed Forces Qualification Test

are exempted from military service. The results of examinations

of draftees provide an found acceptable for military service in

young men for military service. (See table 12.VI). Clearly, the

TABLE 12-VI.-Preinduction

examination accepfance rafes

[percenf]

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

White ~...~~ ~~..

52.8

60.3 64.8 60.8 59.7

Black ._.... ~~..~~~~~~..~~..

21.7 29.2 42.5 49.9 45.0

proportion of young black men found acceptable for military

service in preinduction examinations is lower than the

proportion of young whites found acceptable. But just as

clearly, the acceptance rate for young blacks is rising rapidly.

Acceptance rates for enlistees are higher than for draftees,

running better than 90 percent overall. Combining the results

for draftees with the higher acceptance rates for similar

examinations for enlistees in all services gives an overall

acceptability rate of about 73 percent for whites and 53 percent

for blacks based on the recent past. Estimates of the qualified

black population have been made based on recent experience

(53 percent acceptability), and for improved black acceptance

rates (63 percent acceptability) and are shown in table l2-VII.

The acceptability of young whites has been held constant at 73

percent. Though the proportion of young blacks in the

population is growing, their numbers remain relatively small.

This limits the number of blacks who will serve in the armed

forces.

TABLE

12-VII.-Male population 17-20 qualified for military service

Qualified black population

based on

53-percent

63-percent

acceptability acceptability

1970 .~~.~~~~ ~~..~~ 528,490 628,740

1975 . .._.. ~~.~~~~~~.~~ 614,270

770,170

1980 ~..~~~~~~.. 684,410 817,110

1985 ..~..~~~~~~.~~..~~ 633,350

752,850

Qualified

white population

73-percent

acceptability

4,712,880

5.247,240

5,371,340

4,663,240

The next step in estimating the racial composition of

future forces is to determine the numbers of men of both races

who can be expected to participate in the first term force. The

all-volunteer force will attract men through higher pay and

improved conditions of service. The mixed force would include

draftees, draft induced volunteers and true volunteers. Recent

experience has been used to estimate the participation of true

volunteers in the armed forces and to show how the

participation rate is affected by military pay increases. Table

12-VI11 gives true volunteers in the first term of service during

1969 as a percent of the qualified male population, 17 to 20.

For example, some 51,200 blacks in the Army in their first

term of duty would have enlisted even if there had been no

draft. In 1969 the qualified black population was about

5 12,000, so 10 percent of the qualified men were serving as true

volunteers.

TABLE 1%VIII.-True volunteer participation rates at current

few/s Of pay

White

Black

(percent) (percent)

Army ~~~~~~~~~~~ 5.65

10.00

Navy ~~~~..~..~~~~~~~~~.~..~. 3.60 2.16

Marine Corps .~~~.~~~~~ 2.47

2.96

Air Force ~~~~~.~~...~~~~~ 3.46

4.01

DOD total .~~~~~ 15.38

19.15

The rates in table 12-VIII, and similar participation rates

for draft induced volunteers have been used to estimate

volunteer participation in the mixed volunteer and consript

forces. The proportion of blacks among draftees in recent years

has been higher than their proportions in the qualified

population. During the last five years, Negroes constituted only

9.2 percent of the qualified population but were 14.3 percent

of the men actually inducted. Estimates of the proportion of

blacks among draftees are based on recent experience and,

alternatively, on the assumption that blacks are drafted exactly

in proportion to their numbers in the qualified population.

Voluntary participation rates depend on the relationship

between the military compensation and civilian earnings. If

military pay is increased relative to civilian earnings,

participation rates should increase. The pay increases

recommended in chapter 5 will result in about a 40 percent

increase in first term military pay. But the effect of the increase

on black participation rates will be smaller than on white

participation rates. Because a larger proportion of the qualified

148

black population is willing to serve at today’s relative pay level.

the 40 percent increase will attract a smaller percentage of

additional black entrants. For example, studies of Air Force

re-enlistments indicate that a IO percent increase in relative pay

will increase white re-enlistments by 24 percent but black

re-enlistments by only I8 percent. Two assumptions were used

in estimating the effect of the recommended first term pay

increase on participation rates. In one case. the percentage

increase in the black participation rate was assumed to be

three-quarters of the percentage increase in the white

participation rate. In the other case, equal percentage increases

were assumed.

Experience during the 1960’s has also been used to

estimate the racial composition of the career force. For

example, blacks constituted 12.7 percent of the true volunteers

entering the Air Force between I963 and 1966. When men who

entered the Air Force in this cohort made first term

reenlistment decisions, 14.4 percent of the re-enlistees were

black. The ratio of these percentages. 1.134. is applied to the

estimated first term black proportion to estimate the

proportion of blacks in the career force. Thus. if 1 I, 1 percent

of the men in the first term service in the Air Force were black,

the percent of blacks in the career force is estimated to be 12.6.

The

same

procedure was used for all services.

These assumptions and estimates yield a variety of

estimates of the proportion of blacks in the two alternative 2.5

million man future forces. For the voluntary force. these

estimates range from 12.8 percent to 16.0 percent. For the

mixed force of conscripts and volunteers the lowest estimate is

12.1 percent and the highest is 15.1 percent. Tables 12-1X and

12-X give the best estimate of the proportion of blacks in the

TABLE

12-IX.-Esfimafed

racial composition of the enlisted male

al/-volunteer force in 1980

Percent

Black Total Negro

155,650 627,100 16.6

42,550 516,600 8.2

29,650

164,600

16.0

62,700 558,900

14.6

310.750 2.089.400 1G

149

TABLE

1%X.-Estimated reciel composition of the enlisted male

mixed torte in 1980

White

Black

723,400

144,300

483,750 42,850

154,250

31,950

481.200

84.200

Percent

Total Negro

867,700 16.6

526,600 8.1

186,200

17.1

565,400 14.9

-

DOD total 1,842,600 303,300 2.145.900 ct

two forces. For both forces, these estimates assume that the

proportion of black males qualified for military service rises to

63 percent. For the mixed force, blacks are assumed to be

drafted in proportion to their presence in the qualified

population. For the all-volunteer force, the effect of the first

term military pay increase is assumed to be smaller for blacks

than for whites. Given these assumptions, the proportion of

blacks in the two forces is nearly equal. The highest estimate for

the proportion of blacks in the all-volunteer force 16.0 percent,

occurs when the effect of the pay increase is assumed to be the

same for both races. For the mixed force, the highest estimate is

15.1 percent, when blacks are assumed to be drafted in a higher

proportion than their numbers in the qualified population, as

during the late 1960’s.

Even if higher estimates were realized, we would not

consider asking the government - including the military - to

cut back on hiring blacks, or to set quotas. Government service

has traditionally been a major source of employment for blacks.

This is as true for blacks with the highest skills and degrees as

well as for other levels of training and income. The participation

of blacks in municipal, state and national government reflects

the confidence blacks have in the government as a “hirer of last

resort.” Discrimination and segregation in other sectors of

society traditionally have persisted long after government policy

changed to include blacks. Citizens who are concerned with

racial imbalance in this or that sector must work to open

opportunities for blacks in all occupations. Then, and only

then, will the question of “proportionate representation” be

fair.

VETERANS IN SOCIETY

Many Americans are concerned that creation of an

all-volunteer force will adversely affect the size and composition

of the veteran population. They reason that a system of military

recruitment which uses conscription takes many .young men

from society, exposes them to an important experience, and

then rather quickly returns them to civilian life.

Veterans are today a substantial part of American society.

In 1968 veterans were 13 percent of the total population, 23

percent of the adult population, and 47 percent of the adult

male population. These more than 27 million veterans averaged

44 years in age, and 27 months of active duty. Both their

numbers and their ages make the influence of veterans on

American life highly significant.

A volunteer system will take fewer recruits, retain them

longer, and return fewer veterans to civilian society. If military

experience is beneficial, there would be some loss in the

qualities that veterans bring to society - qualities that are

attributed to military experience.

Military life is thought to have a discernible and beneficial

impact on an individual’s capabilities, attitudes, and behavior

patterns as they are carried over into the veteran’s civilian life.

The differences between veterans and non-veterans are

described in a variety of ways. Veterans are said to display

more

patriotism and to be readier to serve our nation. Some argue

that veterans are better informed and more concerned about a

wide variety of foreign and domestic affairs and, thus, are more

alert to threats to the nation. Veterans are alleged to behave

differently - to have more self-discipline and to pay greater

attention to neatness and hygiene. Veterans are said to do

better economically than non-veterans, to participate more in

community social and political activities, and, in general, to

make better and more productive citizens.

We have studied the effect of an all-volunteer force on the

size of the veteran population. In addition, we have examined

the effect of military service on men’s attitudes toward national

security and other contemporary issues to determine whether

veterans are different from non-veterans and whether the

differences are beneficial.

At any force level, the turnover of military personnel and

the consequent annual flow of new veterans will be smaller

151

under an all-volunteer system than under the mixed,

conscript-volunteer system. Using an estimate of 15 percent as

the enlisted turnover for the volunteer force and 20 percent for

the mixed force, about 130,000 fewer veterans would be added

annually to the veteran population with the all-volunteer force.

For the next 20 years World War 11, Korean War and

Vietnam veterans will dominate the veteran population and

therefore the short-run impact of ending the draft will be small.

Eventually, lower turnover will mean a smaller veteran

population. For example, by adding projected new veteran

accessions to the existing veteran population and adjusting for

mortality, the present system of conscription will generate a

veteran population of 26.3 million by the year 2000. For the

same effective force, an all-volunteer force adopted in 1971

would generate 3.2 million fewer veterans over the next 30

years. Veterans as a percentage of the total population would

decrease from 13 percent today to about 8 percent in the year

2000 under a mixed conscript-volunteer system and to about 7

percent for an all-volunteer force.

Whatever the exact quantitative effect of a return to an

all-volunteer force, If military service instills patriotism and

greater awareness of national interests, ending the draft would

eventually affect public attitudes about foreign policy and

national security matters. Alternatively, if military service does

not instill different attitudes then the change in method of

recruiting will have no effect. To study the influence of military

service on public attitudes we used national opinion surveys on

a wide variety of domestic, foreign policy and security issues

that also had information on the veteran status of respondents.

Military experience proved to be a minor factor

in

explaining

opinion differences. Other characteristics ~ notably occupation,

income, region, education, political party, age, race and other

sociological attributes ~ are far better predictors of attitudes

than veteran status. Indeed, there is a significant difference

between attitudes of veterans and non-veterans ~ holding other

characteristics constant - on only one matter of contemporary

debate -~ namely, attitudes toward veterans’ benefits.

Similarly, the effect of military training on earnings is

much more questionable than frequently supposed. Since 1960

over three-quarters of the active military personnel served in

jobs that had white-collar or blue-collar civilian counterparts.

Yet, only an estimated one-quarter of the men who left the

152

service accepted jobs which they judged to be related to their

military service. The figure for the Army. which experiences the

highest turnover rate, is 15 percent, the lowest among the

services.

As with attitudes, earnings depend on such factors as age,

ability, education and race. Gross comparisons of veterans’ and

non-veterans’ incomes are likely to be misleading because men

who enter the service are more intelligent, healthier, and have

more schooling than those who do not. A meaningful

comparison would allow for these factors. Recent studies which

have attempted to do this conclude that differences in the

earnings between veterans and non-veterans disappear when

factors other than military service are considered.

In summary, the belief that two or three years of military

service increases earnings or alters opinions is not supported by

the evidence. Other experience factors, such as region,

education, age, and the more fundamental family and

community history, are more significant in shaping a person’s

earning power and the way he thinks of himself and of his

environment. Most of these factors are determined long before

military service and are unaffected by it. Whatever qualities

veterans bring to their communities - informed judgment or

ignorance, patriotism or indifference, self-discipline or personal

disarray, community participation or apathy ~ are qualities that

these individuals would probably have displayed without prior

military experience.

EFFECTS ON FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

We have heard conflicting concerns about the effect on

foreign policy of a return to voluntary recruiting. One view

foresees a less militaristic foreign policy as a consequence of the

all-volunteer force; the other, more military adventurism.

Those who hold the first opinion believe that an

all-volunteer force necessarily will be smaller and less flexible

than a force raised by conscription. Therefore the return to

voluntary recruiting signals a weakening of the United States’

capability to meet its military commitments overseas. The

opposing belief is that the greater training and readiness of a

volunteer force will offer a tempting military solution to

problems which might be better resolved peacefully. Further,

those who hold this opinion think that an all-volunteer force

would have fewer and weaker links to civilian society,

153

imperiling democratic control of foreign policy decisions. We

have considered both of these concerns in the light of our

recommendations. Neither provides a valid basis for rejecting

the all-volunteer force.

Since World War II, the United States has benefited from

an extensive system of defense alliances. Similarly, the security

and freedom of our allies depend on United States’ military

power. Both the resolve and capability of the United States to

continue using its power in the defense of freedom help shape

the expectations and actions of friendly governments. Our

recommendations are designed to insure that an all-volunteer

armed force would be fully consistent with the strategic

concepts underlying national security policy.

This Commission has not tried to project the armed forces

required to carry out the nation’s foreign policy after the

transition to an all-volunteer force. The determination of these

peacetime force requirements is the responsibility of the

Department of Defense and the National Security Council. The

Commission has relied on a range of estimates of active duty

requirements and developed estimates of the all-volunteer force

required to yield the same effective force strength as these

equivalent mixed forces of conscripts and volunteers.

In addition to active duty forces, there will be 700,000 to

800,000 trained men in Reserve or National Guard units

(assuming a 2.5 million man active duty force). These units

furnish a force capable of rapid mobilization, which no draft

law can match. Deployment lead times vary from less than a

week for some naval units to 6 to I4 weeks for Army units.

Under an all-volunteer system, these units will continue to be an

important second line of defense. If a crisis situation requires

more men than are available in the active and reserve forces,

untrained manpower from the civilian pool can be recruited

voluntarily or by conscription.

As set forth elsewhere in this report, the Commission

recommends that permanent peacetime forces be put on a

voluntary basis and that a stand-by draft system be maintained

in readiness. We cannot foresee the shape of future threats to

the security of the United States, and prudence requires that

provision be made for mobilizing civilian manpower by

conscription if necessary.

The Commission’s recommendations, in summary, provide

1) active duty forces comparable in strength to those currently

154

projected, 2) reserve forces for quick reinforcement of the

active forces and 3) a stand-by draft system as a final measure

if large-scale mobilization of untrained men is needed. We

believe that these provisions constitute an effective and flexible

military manpower policy, and will enhance national security

during and after the transition to an all-volunteer force.

We have examined how the return to volunteer forces

might affect the decision to use U.S. military power. We

conclude that the recommended all-volunteer force will actually

increase democratic participation in decisions concerning the,

use of military force. We reject the fear of increased military

aggressiveness or reduced civilian concern following the return

to an all-volunteer force.

A decision to use the all-volunteer force will be made

according to the same criteria as the decision to use a mixed

force of conscripts and volunteers because the size and readiness

of the two forces will be quite similar. These military factors are

key determinants in any decision to commit forces. Beyond

initial commitment, the policy choice between expanding our

forces by conscription or by voluntary enlistment is the same

for both the all-volunteer force and a mixed force of conscripts

and volunteers. The important difference between the two

forces lies in the necessity for political debate before returning

to conscription. Voluntary enlistments in both alternative

forces can be increased by enhancing the attractiveness of

military service. If either force is expanded by making military

service more attractive, civilian participation obviously will be

increased in the process. Increased pay and added fringe

benefits will be borne by the general taxpayers, a far more

inclusive group than potential draftees and their families. If tax

increases are needed or military spending claims priority over

other public spending, a broad public debate is likely. Recent

history suggests that increased taxes generate far more public

discussion than increased draft calls.

With the all-volunteer force, the President can seek

authorization to activate the stand-by draft, but Congress must

give its consent. With the mixed system, draft calls can be

increased by the President. The difference between the two

alternatives is crucial. The former will generate public discussion

of the use of the draft to fight a war, the latter can be done

without such public discussion. If the need for conscription is

1.55

not clear, such discussion will clarify the issue, and the draft

will be used only if public support is widespread.

The claim is made that the ranks of the public attentive to

foreign policy are swelled significantly by those citizens

touched by the draft. It is a doubtful notion. The

corollary -- that public interest in foreign affairs will decrease

significantly if voluntarism is adopted - is also doubtful.

Volunteers have as many concerned relatives and friends as men

who are drafted. Higher educational levels, the diffusion of

modern mass communications, and the newsworthiness of

compelling national security events assure that foreign affairs

will hold the attention of a substantial and growing public.

regardless of the method used for procuring military manpower.

When a minority is selected to fight a long and unpopular

war,

the draft is inevitably a focal point for dissent.

Voluntarism would be expected to decrease dissent stemming

from the issue of conscription. However, popular dissent usually

arises from many issues and reaches the Government along

many channels. Ending conscription will close off one of the

channels, but it will not end dissent.

Because conscription is a tax in kind, part of the cost of

armed forces is hidden when there is a draft. The explicit costs

of using military forces are underestimated, with the result that

decisions to use the armed forces are made which perhaps

would not be made if the true costs were known. The

all-volunteer force, by making economic and political costs

explicit, should lead to more rational and democratic decisions

about the use of military force.

Finally, there is the allegation that political leaders will be

more inclined to military adventures if the armed forces are

composed entirely of volunteers. This argument is based on

three important inferences: (1) an all-volunteer force will be

more aggressive than a mixed force; (2) the nation’s civilian and

military leaders will risk the lives of volunteers with less concern

than those of conscripts

and (3) a doubtful foreign

commitment could be undertaken and sustained with less

popular dissent than if conscripts were used.

Decisions by a government to use force or to threaten the

use of force during crises are extremely difficult. Presidents

have arrived at such decisions only after consulting a broad

range of informed and responsible interests. The high cost of

military resources, the moral burden of risking human lives,

I56

political costs at home and overseas, and the overshadowing risk

of nuclear confrontation - these and other factors enter into

such decisions. It is absurd to argue that issues of such

importance would be ignored and the decision for war made on

the basis of whether our first-term forces were entirely

voluntary or mixed.

As discussed earlier in this report, an all-volunteer military

is not expected to differ significantly from the present mixed

force in its size, composition, and relations with civilian society.

Its subordination to the nation’s political leaders will change

not at all. The belief that volunteers will be more aggressive, will

have greater autonomy from the civilian leadership and will

exploit international tensions to their own advantage springs,

not from any rational evidence, but from an irrational fear of

relying on the neglected mechanism of freedom to preserve and

protect our nation.

157

CHAPTER13

CONSCRIPTION IN AMERICA

Throughout our nation’s history, state and federal

governments have compelled service to meet emergencies.

Nevertheless, a permanent and comprehensive peacetime draft,

such as we have known since 1948, is a

recent

departure.

During the colonial period, hundreds of conscription laws

dealt witli specific requirements for service, provided

exemptions and penalties, and laid down procedures. Induction

into the local militia generally entailed the obligations that are

imposed on a reservist today. A militiaman was ‘required to

attend drills and was available for call-up to repel Indian attacks

or invaders. The maximum term of active service was usually

three months, and in some instances the militia could not be

used beyond the borders of its colony. Despite the existence of

such draft laws, colonial militias were primarily made up of

volunteers.

The colonies were opposed to the idea of a common

defense establishment. Memories were still fresh of oppressive

acts by standing armies under Cromwell, Charles II, and James

II of England. The colonists’ fear that a large standing army

might result in loss of religious and political freedom denied

General Washington access to a centralized and compulsory

system of procuring men and supplies. Hence, the War of

Independence was fought almost entirely by volunteers who

were attracted by bounties either to the state militia or the

Continental Army. To the limited extent that state militias

resorted to the draft, its effect was mitigated by the exemptions

available to men who were married, who paid a commutation

fee, or who offered a substitute. The militia draft was more a

means of taxation than of compulsory procurement of

manpower.

Setting a pattern of rapid post-war demobilization which

has recurred throughout our history until World War II, the

Continental Congress reduced the standing army almost literally

to a corporal’s guard - some 80 men ~ soon after the War of

Independence. Such weakness left the Confederation unable to

suppress Shays’ Rebellion and protect against the continued

threat of foreign invasion and Indian attacks. To remedy the

defects of the Confederation, the Constitutional Convention

was called in 1787.

The new Constitution was ultimately a compromise

between two fears: (I) that the federal government would

remain too weak to maintain order or prevent invasion, and

(2) that the federal government might misuse its newly granted

power to curb the rights and relative independence of the

former colonies. In the field of military affairs, the compromise

took the form of balancing the independence of state militias

against the need for both a standing army and some centralized

control over the state militias. The Constitution gave the federal

government the powers to tax, to raise and maintain an army

and navy, and to declare war. The states retained the right to

raise the militia, to appoint its officers, and to supervise its

training in accordance with federal directives. The Constitution

explicitly provided that the militia could be placed under

federal control only to

“execute the Laws of the Union,

Suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” And the Second

Amendment identified the state militia as a bulwark of

freedom.

In 1790 Congress rejected Secretary of War Knox’s

proposal for a combination of universal militia service and a

federal draft. The question of conscription next arose during

the War of 18 12. After war was declared, President Madison and

Congress approved creation of a 166,000-man army composed

primarily of militiamen. However, three New England states

were opposed to the war and refused to conscript militia forces.

In addition, the regular army had difticultly recruiting. As a

result, the armed forces never reached the desired size and

sustained an almost unbroken series of defeats, culminating in

the burning of the nation’s capital in 18 14.

To reverse this tide of events, the President requested that

Congress conscript 40,000 men. The proposal was fiercely

debated. Finally, both the Senate and the House passed bills

that would have instituted a modified draft. Before the houses

of Congress could resolve their differences, however, the war

had ended.

The threat of conscription had created a real danger that

New England would secede from the Union. Interestingly, the

draft contemplated by both the Senate and the House was more

a

recruiting vehicle than a comprehensive system of

conscription. Both the House and Senate bills divided the

population either by state or nationwide into groups, each

representing a cross-section of socio-economic classes. Each

group would be compelled either to provide money or

“volunteers.” The volunteer would.be induced to serve by a

bounty raised among that group, or, if necessary, would be

selected from among its members. Thus both the House and the

Senate bills explicitly recognized that everyone should be taxed

according to his ability to pay in order to compensate the men

who actually did serve.

Once again, the end of the War. of 1812 saw a rapid

decrease in the size of the standing army. After 1815, a small

army was maintained ,until 1846 and the outbreak of the

Mexican War. Although it lasted more than two years, neither

conscripts nor the state militia were used to fight this war.

The Civil War, the greatest conflict ever waged on this

continent, was largely fought by volunteers on both sides. When

war was declared, the Union Army had fewer than 16,000

officers and men. Within the first two years, more than one

million men answered the call to arms. Nevertheless, President

Lincoln proposed a national draft in early 1863 to ensure that

the necessary troops would be forthcoming. When it was

enacted in March, the draft immediately aroused widespread

resistance, which reached a bloody climax in the New York

161

draft riots. The street fighting left more than 1,000 dead.

Like the draft proposed during the War of 18 12, the Civil

War draft was not a “pure” system of conscription. A draftee

could provide a substitute or initially purchase an exemption

for $300. Although conscription accounted for about 250,000

of the 3,667.OOO men who served in the Union Army, only

some 46.000 were actually drafted into personal service. Of the

balance of those subject to the draft, almost 87,000 purchased

an exemption and more than 116,000 provided substitutes.

True draftees accounted for only 2.3 prrccnt of the military

manpower raised by the North.

In theory, the South had universal conscription. Recause

of a wide range of exemptions, however, only 170,000 men

were conscripts out of the I.2 million who served in the

Confederate Army.

In the South and the North alike, therefore, the draft was

not a true system of conscription or a comprehensive system of

military manpower recruitment. Even so, the unpopularity of

the draft was apparent not only in the riots it touched off but

also in the widespread and disruptive draft resistance which

caused the suspension of habeas corpus in many areas.

Surprisingly, the constitutionality of the 1863 Conscription Act

was never tested in the federal courts. One fairly obvious reason

was the suspension of

huheus

corpus, which eliminated the

primary means of raising the constitutionality issue.

Still, there was an important state case - Knwdler V. Lane

‘~ in which

a divided Pennsylvania court upheld the

constitutionality of the 1863 Conscription Act. The court held

that the draft represented a valid recognition of, on the one

hand, the Government’s need to be able to wage a war and, on

the other, the individual citizen’s obligation to serve his

country.

Knee&r v. Lane was the first case upholding the

constitutionality of a wartime federal draft. The constitutional

question was not reconsidered until World War I. (In the

meantime, the United States used only volunteers to fight the

brief war against Spain in 1898.) In 1917, a comprehensive

draft law was passed immediately after the declaration of war

and precluded primary reliance on volunteers. Men were drafted

into federalized National Guard units and the constitutional

distinction between the army and the militia virtually

disappeared.

162

All enlistments were forbidden in 1918 so as not to upset

“the orderly process of selection” established by the preceding

year’s Act. Basically it evaluated the contribution of each

registrant to the war effort and made the least “valuable” the

most eligible. The effect of this procedure was certainly

inequitable. It meant that,

as in the Civil War, the poor

inevitably bore a disproportionate share of the burden of

service. For example, Negroes represented 13 percent of those

inducted although they accounted for only 9.6 percerit of total

registrants. Another unique aspect of the draft was its effect on

military pay. In the past, military pay had risen during a war

and had always exceeded comparable manufacturing earnings.

In World War I, almost total reliance on the draft relieved

Congress of the necessity for providing pay increases or

enlistment bonuses, even though the cost of living rose during

the war. For the first time, a soldier’s pay was less than that of

his civilian counterpart.

Opposition to the 1917 Act was less violent than the

response to the Civil War draft even though this was the first

measure that conscripted men for foreign service. Evasion

replaced open resistance, and more than 250,000 draftees failed

to appear for induction.

In contrast

to the Civil War experience, the

constitutionality of the 1917 Selective Draft Law was

immediately challenged in the federal courts. A number of cases

were consolidated by the Supreme Court and decided

unanimously in the Sekctiw Dru/‘t Law Cases. The significance

of this case has been magnified over time because the Supreme

Court has never again formally reconsidered the draft’s

constitutionality.

The Court upheld the law, citing as the only precedents

Knee&r v. Lune and several Confederate cases. The Court

noted that the Constitution granted Congress the power to

“raise and support armies

“; “to declare wars”; and “to make all

laws which shall be necessary and proper for

CarrYiW

into

execution the foregoing powers.” The Court argued that these

powers would be rendered ineffectual if any limit were imposed

upon their use. On that theory Congress had the power to

conscript men for war or any other legitimate purpose.

The Selec/ive Draft Law CUWS hold that the effective

exercise of the war power may require a wartime draft. After

World War I the draft expired and the nation again seemed

163

117.111, ” 70 IZ

content with a small standing army. Meanwhile, however, the

National Guard was brought into closer association with the

Regular Army through an amendment to the 1916 National

Defense Act. By that amendment, enacted in 1933, units which

met federal standards were paid by the Federal Government and

redesignated as units of the National Guard of the United

States. Thus, distinctions carefully drawn in the Constitution

were first blurred by Civil War conscription, then nearly

eradicated in World War I, and finally made to disappear

completely in 1933. Only those units not up to federal

standards would retain the status of a separate state militia.

In 1940, with war in progress in Europe, Congress passed a

draft law on September 14, 1940. The constitutionality of this

new law was at once challenged. Relying almost entirely on the

Selecfive Draft Luw Case.s, district courts in four major cases

rejected

the argument that a peacetime draft was

unconstitutional. Essentially, the courts reasoned that it was

unrealistic to construe the Constitution and the Selective Draft

Law Cuses to mean that an actual war must be declared before a

draft could be instituted. They pointed out that military

technology permitted the launching of massive surprise attacks

with devastating effect and concluded that it was essential for

the nation to be able to prepare adequately for war, as well as

to wage it, On the grounds that military necessity required a

broader

construction of Congress’ power under the

Constitution, the district courts decided that the power to raise

armies by conscription was no longer dependent upon the

power to declare war.

Legal challenges and general opposition to the draft

virtually ceased when Pearl Harbor plunged the United States

into war. As in World War I, the draft was the principal source

of military manpower, inducing many men to enlist and

providing directly more than IO million, or 61 percent, of the

16.5 million men who donned uniform.

The draft again enabled the Government to keep military

pay at levels significantly lower than comparable civilian pay.

The World War II Selective Service System established a

structure of deferments and exemptions which has remained

relatively unchanged down to the present day. The World War II

draft was the first genuinely popular system of conscription.

The draft law was allowed to expire on March 3 I, I947 as

part of the rapid demobilization typical of the nation’s behavior

164

in postwar periods. The military soon expressed concern that it

would not be able to obtain the necessary number of volunteers

which might. in part. have reflected a 23 percent decrease in the

A111ly’s recruiting budget. Simultaneously, President Truman

was vigorously promoting universal military training, which

Congress rejected in June, 1948. Instead, Congress passed a

draft act which was extended for short periods until the Korean

War. In January. 1949.

the Army ended the two-year

enlistment. raised standards higher, and refused to accept

volunteers with dependents. Nevertheless, young men continued

to enlist. Only 30,000 men were inducted during the period

from June, 1948, until the outbreak of the Korean War.

During the Korean War itself the draft provided 27 percent

of those in uniform. The Korean War caused Congress to extend

the I948 draft law; and in I95 I it continued the draft authority

for a four-year period. This four-year enactment completed the

evolution of the draft into a permanent part of the military

manpower procurement structure, even though the nation was

not fighting either a major or a declared war.

Until the United States’ commitment in Vietnam rose

sharply in 1965, the draft seemed to be generally accepted as a

necessary means of military manpower procurement. There was

virtually no debate or opposition to the extension of the

Universal Military Service and Training Act in 1955, 1959, and

1963. This was not too surprising. Following the Korean War,

military force levels decreased and the impact of the draft

declined while the number of draft age youth increased.

During the early 1960’s, 95 percent of those between the

ages of I8 and 35 were excluded from the I-A and I-A-O pool.

The Selective Service System found itself faced with the

problem of allocating an excess supply of eligible youth. Its

solution was to create new deferments OT expand the scope of

existing ones. In addition, induction standards were raised and

rejection rates increased during the early 1960’s. Meanwhile,

pay for first-term enlisted men remained below civilian levels.

Even so, young men continued to volunteer and the draft

call-ups remained relatively small. By 1964-65 only

5,000-10,000 men were being inducted each month, and the

average age of induction was almost 23.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 once again

focused attention on the draft. Monthly calls rose sharply to

20,000-30,000. Deferment criteria were tightened, and the

165

average age of inductees declined to 19. Of the 6 million men

who have served in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam war,

25 percent have been draftees. In the past few years numerous

articles and books have been written about the draft and both a

Congressional panel and a Presidential commission have been

created to study the Selective Service System. The Marshall

Commission, appointed by President Johnson in 1966,

published an extensive analysis of how the draft works and

concluded that the primary age of draft liability should be 19.

The Marshall Commission also urged a random system of

selection similar to the one that has since been adopted.

Both before and during the Korean War, there were cases

in which inductees questioned the draft’s legality. In general,

the federal courts either refused to reconsider the

constitutionality question or explicitly upheld peacetime

conscription as a legitimate and necessary measure to maintain

readiness for war. They usually took judicial notice of the

threatening international situation which has characterized the

cold war period and noted the need for a high degree of military

preparedness.

The Supreme Court has increasingly treated the

constitutional question as settled, Although the issue has not

been directly reconsidered, the Supreme Court has commented

in passing on the draft’s constitutionality. In a 1953 case the

Court said that the draft was a valid exercise of the war power

and must function in times of peril as well as during declared

wars. In 1968 the Supreme Court said in (I.S. v. O’Brien:

“The

Constitutional power of Congress to raise and support

armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is

broad and sweeping The power of Congress to classify and

conscript manpower for military service is beyond question.”

The only citation in support of this firm conclusion was the

Selective Draft Law

Cases which dealt with a

wartime

draft.

The Founding Fathers feared conscription by the central

government would lead to unnecessary abridgment of personal

freedoms. Until the Civil War there was no draft; the system of

compulsory service instituted in 1863 was born of necessity and

was, in any event, far short of being comprehensive. In both

19 17 and 1940 the draft emerged again as a wartime expedient.

In 1948 the Selective Service System was revived to maintain

preparedness for cold war crises. After the Korean War, it

166

remained in existence and was once again an important source

of manpower when the nation became deeply involved in

Vietnam in 1965. Given the nation’s legal and political

traditions, the relatively recent phenomenon of a continuing

peacetime draft should be reevaluated.

CHAPTER 14

RECENT FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

WITH VOLUNTARISM

Great Britain, Canada, and, until 1965, Australia have all

manned their armed forces on a completely voluntary basis in

the recent past. Because the United States shares with these

countries a common cultural heritage, we have examined their

experiences with all-volunteer forces to anticipate problems

which might arise once the draft was ended in the United

States. Of course, due allowance must be made for differences

as well as similarities in evaluating the impact of ending the

draft in other societies.

The British experience is most helpful because they

maintain relatively larger forces than the other two countries.

Also their comparatively recent decision to abandon

conscription sheds light on the transition process as well as the

steady state experience.

Britain’s decision in 1957 to end conscription coincided

with a new defense policy emphasizing nuclear deterrence,

withdrawal from positions east of Suez, and a cutback in force

169

levels to 400,000 from 700,000. By 1960 the transition was

virtually completed, and all inductions ceased.

The elimination of conscription increased the average

length of service per man by approximately 200 percent, from

less than three years under the draft to roughly eight. While this

increase reflects in part use of long initial terms of service (6 or

9 years) it also shows that true volunteers were more likely to

stay in the service than conscripts.

Another important effect of ending conscription was the

decline in the proportion of troops in training from 21 percent

to 14 percent despite an increase in the average length of

training per man. Thus, an all-volunteer force has enabled the

British to maintain a higher proportion of troops in an effective

status.

British officials have said that the fully volunteer force is

more productive than a mixed force because of lower turnover

and the superior performance of more experienced servicemen.

A precise measure of this improved productivity is not possible,

but the British are able to assess any changes in the quality of

their armed forces by such measures as educational attainment

and aptitude scores. These show that the Royal Navy and Air

Force have experienced no decline in quality since conscription

ended, and that the quality of Army recruits has slipped

slightly ~ the proportion of volunteers falling in the lowest 30

percent aptitude category increasing by perhaps 2 percent.

Some British Army officers assert that improved motivation and

morale in the enlisted ranks since the end of conscription far

outweigh the loss of a relatively small number of high quality

draftees.

During the past several years the British have experienced a

decline in enlistments which is beginning to threaten the

achievement of target force levels. There appear to be four

reasons for this shortfall. First, more young men are staying in

school. Second, new government policies expanding the

availability of both apprentice and advanced training have made

civilian employment relatively more attractive to youth. The

latter factor is especially important in Britain because 15-17

year olds enlist primarily to get training. Third, British youths

are less willing to undertake long initial minimum tours of duty

ranging from five to twelve years. Fourth, there has been a

decline in the number of youths aged 16 to 24 in the

population.

170

To increase enlistments, the British Army introduced in

April. 1969 a shorter minimum enlistment of three years. The

initial response has been good and this shorter option has not

significantly reduced the number enlisting for longer terms.

Thus. relatively short-term enlistments, perhaps supplemented

by pay increases, could provide an adequate number of British

recruits in the foreseeable future.

Conscription in Australia ceased after World War II. During

the Korean War a system of Universal Military Training was

introduced requiring every qualified male to complete three

months of training and then serve in the Australian reserves.

The active duty forces never used these conscripts and only

volunteers fought in Korea and Malaya. This system ceased in

1958 and the Australian forces were manned exclusively by

volunteers. But, in October of 1964, the Australian government

decided to raise force levels from 49,000 to 76,000 by

instituting a draft by lottery.

Some have cited the Australian decision to return to a

draft as evidence that an all-volunteer force is not feasible for

the United States. There are several reasons why this argument

by analogy is inappropriate. First, the Australians have not

made a concerted effort to attract additional recruits on a

voluntary basis. Once the decision was made to use conscription

to raise force levels, no serious effort was made to increase

voluntary enlistments either by raising pay or redoubling

recruiting efforts. Second, the Australian economy is heavily

unionized and apprenticeship programs requiring four or more

years deplete the pool of men available for military service.

Third, Australia has enjoyed a rapid growth in its economy (the

unemployment rate is about I percent) which makes civilian

jobs relatively more attractive than military service. Finally,

civilian earnings significantly exceed military pay rates. Civilians

receive over-time and other supplementary compensation in

excess of the common wage rates set by the government for

both the military and the civilian economy.

The Australians could have expanded the size of the

Armed Forces on a voluntary basis by raising pay and

reorganizing recruiting.Given the important differences between

the two countries, one cannot conclude that the Australian

experience shows that the United States would be unable to

attract enough recruits on a voluntary basis if energetic and

171

efficient recruiting were combined with competitive rates of

pay.

The Canadian Armed forces have always been entirely

voluntary except for the period from I940 to early 1945. The

Canadian forces presently number slightly less than 100,000

men, supported by an annual inflow of about 12,000 men. The

quality of the entrants is remarkably high; almost all fall within

the upper half of the population as measured by mental

aptitude. Military pay more nearly approximates civilian

earnings - the monthly pay for privates is $225. Attracting

recruits has posed no problem in Canada, and recruiting officers

suggest that the number of enlistments could be doubled or

tripled with no difficulty.

The Canadian armed force is relatively small; it is roughly

equivalent, on a population basis, to an American force of one

million men. However, budgetary constraints rather than

recruiting difficulties are responsible for the size of Canada’s

forces.

The recent experiences of the British, Australian, and

Canadian Armed Forces suggest that competitive wages will

attract an adequate quantity and quality of volunteers. There is

no evidence in any of these countries that all-volunteer forces

are alienated from the rest of society.

172

CHAPTER 15

ALTERNATIVES TO AN

All-VOLUNTEER FORCE

What are the alternatives both to the present system of

conscription and to an all-volunteer armed force? In this

chapter the Commission weighs various suggestions which have

been raised.

One proposed alternative is National Service. Many

National Service proposals involve purely voluntary service.

Such proposals are actually supplements, rather than

alternatives, to an all-volunteer armed force. Other proposals

would require service on the part of all those eligible. In our

analysis of alternatives to an all-volunteer force, we have

considered only the mandatory proposals. While these

mandatory National Service proposals differ in detail, they

would generally require service of all youth, though not

necessarily in the military. Most would permit individuals to

choose how they would serve from among a limited set of

alternatives.

Advocates of National Service have suggested a variety of

approaches. Some have urged that literally everyone, male and

173

female, be required to serve, even those who are physically or

mentally disabled or morally unfit. Because of the high cost of

formal and on-the-job training, National Service cm a one-year

basis would be prohibitively expensive. National Service for two

years would mean employing almost 8,000,OOO young people,

or 4,000,OOO if females are excluded. If longer terms of service.

were instituted for more attractive types of duty, these numbers

would be even larger. Assuming a very modest annual cost for

each participant of $4,000 to $5,000, the cost of such a

program would be a minimum of $16 billion, and perhaps as

much

as $40 billion - an amount equal to the entire current

manpower budget of the Department of Defense. In short, the

numbers

of men and cost of mandatory National Service are

staggering.

Advocates of other proposals argue that some individuals

should be excused from serving. If that were the case,

deferments and exemptions would proliferate just as they have

under the draft. A new Selective Service System would be

required to administer a non-universal National Service

program.

Regardless of the administrative procedure used, a

National Service program would not be able to prevent glaring

inequities among those who served. Not all National Service

would

be

equally desirable (or repugnant), and those with

higher qualifications would probably find their way into the

more desirable positions. If this inequity were minimized by

introducing a system of differential terms of service, the ranks

of those engaged in National Service and its cost would increase

further.

The appeal of mandatory National Service, in large

measure, arises from the manifest inequities in the present

system of conscription. It promises to eliminate these inequities

by forcing a larger proportion of the populace to serve in some

capacity ~ and hence to pay a tax-in-kind. In practice it not

only perpetuates such an inequitable tax, but extends it to a

larger segment of the population. The cure for inequity is not

its extension.

Above all, mandatory National Service is coercive and

involuntary. Such a system of universal conscription would

require all those eligible to serve within a specified period of

time. If insufficient numbers proved willing to enlist in the

military or volunteer for other onerous types of government

174

service, some would be compelled to serve in these less desirable

capacities. In essence, mandatory National Service requires

forced labor. Although motivated by a genuine interest in the

nation’s welfare, advocates of mandatory National Service are

suggesting a compulsory system which is more consistent with a

totalitarian than a democratic heritage. If the service that youth

would render is important and valuable enough to merit public

support, it can and should be financed through general taxation

like other government programs.

Universal Military Training resembles mandatory National

Service, for it contemplates conscription of all those eligible. It

is undesirable for generally the same reasons as mandatory

National Service. For one thing, it would impose on the military

more untrained personnel than can be productively employed.

A one-year tour of duty - the usual term proposed - is

prohibitively expensive in view of the very short period an

individual would serve after receiving costly training. Assuming

current eligibility standards, a two-year tour would force on the

services more than 2,000,OOO non-career persons at any given

time. Whether or not UMT is unconstitutional, it would

definitely represent a sharp break with the nation’s traditional

respect for individual freedom.

The lottery draft recently adopted is at best an expedient.

It is important to recognize that the tax inequity implicit in the

draft is not eliminated by substituting a lottery for present

methods of selection. In theory, the lottery makes it equally

probable that any individual might be selected from those

eligible to serve. It thus aims at equity in selection. But equity

in selection is not equity in service. Those few who are selected

to serve, whether at random or otherwise, still pay a large

tax-in-kind in order to reduce taxes for the majority. Moreover,

it is by no means clear that the lottery achieves greater equity

even in selection. No doubt one can find many instances of

inequitable treatment of draftees under Selective Service. Even

so, it does not logically follow that the system as a whole is

more unjust than a random system. Many local draft boards and

some of the general rules for deferments and exemptions

actually do more to achieve equity than the system of random

selection. Local boards can and do take into account an

individual’s particular circumstances.

The lottery reduces the number of draft induced

volunteers and thereby necessitates an increase in the number of

175

draftees. Because draftees serve two-year terms and volunteers

three, personnel turnover and the attendant costs are increased.

The lottery offers one advantage over Selective Service.

When it is combined with the proposal to expose potential

draftees to a one-time jeopardy at age 19, it reduces the

uncertainty confronting an individual about whether he will be

required to serve, and thereby mitigates the distortion in career

and personal planning endured under Selective Service.

176

APPENDIX A

BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES

This appendix describes the methods and assumptions

employed to derive estimated budgets for all-volunteer and

mixed forces of equal effective strengths. The mixed forces

examined employ a 19-year-old lottery as the means of selecting

draftees. Limitations of space preclude an exhaustive analysis of

estimation procedures. These detailed analyses will be reported

in a forthcoming volume containing background studies.

SUPPLY OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

In our analyses of mixed forces we have assumed that only

the Army will have to conscript men, and then only for its

enlisted ranks. Sufficient reservists, officers, and enlisted men

for the other services were presumed to be available on a

“voluntary” basis, even though some of them will be

draft-motivated. These assumptions are consistent with recent

experience.

177

Procedurally, monthly draft calls are determined as a

residual; they are the difference between requirements for

Army recruits and the number of Regular Army enlistments.

Given requirements, draft calls will be negatively related to

enlistments; the higher the enlistments, the smaller the draft

calls. If one looks at the data, however, he will find that draft

calls have been positively related to enlistments. Higher draft

calls have been accompanied by increased enlistments, because

many potential draftees prefer the advantages of enlisting to the

prospect of being an inductee. When requirements rise, the

probability of being drafted rises and induces an increase in

draft-motivated enlistments. Our projections for the mixed

forces incorporate this type of supply response. Army

enlistments rise by 235 men per year in response to an increase

in draft calls of 1,000 individuals. By shortening the period of

draft liability, the I9-year-old lottery now in effect will tend to

reduce the flow of draft-motivated volunteers relative to calls

(independently of the response to varying levels of draft calls).

In our projections the voluntary enlistment rates experienced

under Selective Service have been reduced by 12.5 percent to

provide for the effect of the l9-year-old lottery.

The average annual flow of voluntary enlistments under

the former Selective Service draft for the period FY 1963-65 is

shown at the top of table A-I. During this period, mental group

IV annual accessions (men with mental test scores between the

10th and 30th percentiles) were controlled by the services and

limited to a total of about 15 percent of enlistments and

inductions. Voluntary enlistments and Army inductions of men

in mental groups I-III are expressed as percentages of the 17-20

year-old male population on line 4 of table A-l. These are

enlistment and induction rates.

The “voluntary” enlistments in FY 1963 through I965

included many draft-motivated volunteers who indicated in the

1964 Department of Defense survey that if there had been no

draft they would not have volunteered for active military

service. Moreover, the inductees included some who said they

were also true volunteers, i.e., they would have enlisted in the

absence of a draft. The percentage of true volunteers (line 7 of

table A-I) represents the percentage of first-term enlisted men

who stated in the 1964 survey that they probably or definitely

would have volunteered in the absence of a draft. By

multiplying lines 4 and 7, we arrive at the estimated true

178

I PC-LIZ A-I.-voluntary enlistments and Army inductions by service

z

Regular

Army Army

Department

Marine F0r.X

of

enlistments

inductions Navy corps

Air Defense 1

Number of voluntary enlistments,

annual average FY 1963-65 fOOO1

Mental groips

I-III ~~..~~~:~~ . . . . .

Mental group

IV...-.--..~~--~

All mental groups...~.~----~~ ~~~

Voluntary enlistment rates under

Selective Service draft: FY 1963-&5 2

Mental groups I-III ~~~ ~~.~~.

2

Mental group

IV ~~.~~~ ~.~~

All mental groups ~~~ ~~~.~

Percentage of true volunteers (k)~ .._.......

True voluntary enlistment rates

in the absence of a draft

Mental groups I-III ~~~ ~~~~~~~.

All mental

groups~~~ ~~~~~~~

Number of true enlistments,

annual averages FY 1977-79 3

Mental groups

I-III ~~~~.~ ~~..~

Mental group IV.~~-.~~~..--~~ .._. ~~~~~~

95.3 73.3

76.3 29.1 01.5 262.2

7.3

35.9 6.7

1.0 5.9 23.6

102.6 109.2

65.0 30.9 87.4 305.9

1.56 1.20

1.25

0.46 1.33

4.62

0.12

0.59 0.14

0.03

0.10 0.39

- -

1.66

1.79 - 1.39 -

0.51 1.43

5.01

56.6 12.3 63.4

69.9 56.6

59.8

1.03

-

0.79 0.33 0.75 2.91

1.29 -

0.99

0.42 0.94

3.63

volunteer enlistment rate of men in mental groups 1 through 111

(line 81, assuming that the draft is abolished with no change in

the ratio of’ military to civilian pay.

For our projections we assumed that each service would

accept up to a

maximum

of 20 percent mental group IV

enlistments. The fraction of mental group IV enlistments was

allowed to fall below the 20 percent maximum whenever the

supply of true volunteers exceeded requirements.

The flow of true volunteers,in the absence of a draft and

with no pay changes in the period FY 1977-79, was estimated

by applying the true voluntary enlistment rates to the projected

17 to 20 year-old male population of 8,589,OOO men in this

period; this is presented in the bottom panel of table A-I.

Several statistical studies were made to estimate the

responsiveness of supplies of voluntary enlistments to changes

in the ratio of military to civilian pay. In two time series

studies, quarterly data on Army and Air Force enlistment rates

were related to the ratio of military to civilian pay, draft

pressure, and unemployment. In a third cross-sectional study,

regional differences in enlistment rates were related to

differences in civilian pay and unemployment. In these studies,

the unemployment variable was insignificant, and was thus

ignored in our projections. The elasticity of supply (defined as

the percentage change in voluntary enlistments resulting from a

given percentage change in military pay) i’, hich was estimated in

these studies, ranged from I to 2.2; i.e., a one percent increase-

in military pay can be expected to raise voluntary enlistments

by I to 2.2 percent.

The pay recommendations reported in chapter 5 of this

volume would produce the pay levels for first-term enlisted men

shown in the top panel of table A-II. An elasticity of +I.25

(which is on the low end of the range found in our studies) was

used to estimate the effect of this pay increase on the supply of

voluntary enlistments in the absence of a draft. The true

voluntary enlistment rates with no pay increase E0 and with the

higher recommended pay rates g are shown in the first two

lines of table A-III.

If the draft were ended in FY 1971 with no changes in

military pay (i.e. enlistment rates EO apply), the flow of true

volunteers would sustain the enlisted active duty force strengths

shown in lines 4 and 5 of table A-III. The larger flows of

TABLE A-Il.-Annual compensation of military personnel, by service 1

[in constant 1969 prices]

TABLE A-Ill.-Voluntary enlislmenf rafes and sustainable force sMengrh in the absence of a draft

[in thousands]

Army Navy

Marine Air Department

Corps FOKX of Defense

1.285 0.989

0.416 0.943

3.633

1.919 1.427 ,621 1.356 5.323

1.493 1.443 1.492 1.436 1.465

620.1 553.9 176.9 558.4 1.909.3

649.0

604.4

191.5 571.4 2,016.3

784.8 690.5 234.4 6839 2.393.6

677.9 798.2 268.3 753.5 2.697.9

624.3

691.9

827.1

439.0

487.2

518.6

148.0 471.2 1.682.5

178.6 528.6 1.886.3

184.8 558.9 2.089.4

volunteers that would be attracted by the higher recommended

pay levels could support the larger active duty forces shown in

lines 6 and 7. For comparative purposes, the four equilibrium

all-volunteer forces are presented in the bottom panel of table

A-III. Given the recommended pay increase, the sustainable

all-volunteer forces attain levels by FY 1980 that are above the

target levels for the 2.0, 2.25, and 2.5 million man forces,

Indeed, a 2.0 million man force could be raised with no pay

change provided true volunteers exhibit the projected higher

reenlistment rates of the model. It should be emphasized that

these conclusions pertain to the force in existence in 1980, and

not to the force strengths in the intervening years. In order to

maintain a force of 2.0 million men during the transition years

FY 1973 to 1976, some modest pay increases would be needed.

The number of accessions required to meet any given force

strength objective is a function of losses of active duty

personnel. Men are separated from the Armed Forces for

various reasons such as medical disability, unsuitable

performance, hardship, retirement, and most importantly,

failure to m-enlist after completing an obligated term. The vast

majority of enlisted and officer losses occur at the end of the

first term of service. The loss rates which would be experienced

by an all-volunteer force are expected to be considerably lower

than those in a mixed force. Two-year draftees would be

replaced by three-year regular enlistments. Moreover,

Department of Defense surveys of enlisted men support the

conclusion that draft-motivated volunteers exhibit lower

re-enlistment rates than true volunteers, Finally, the services’

experience with proficiency pay and regular and variable

re-enlistment bonuses has shown that pay increases for the

career enlisted force can raise re-enlistment rates. Reference to

table A-II reveals that the recommended pay increase needed to

move to an all-volunteer force would raise the pay of

second-term enlisted men by roughly 7 percent.

The responsiveness of supplies of first-term reenlistments

to military pay changes (referred to above as the elasticity of

supply) was estimated in three studies. All three studies

reported elasticity estimates which ranged from 2.0 to 4.5; i.e.,

a IO percent increase in the pay of second-term enlisted men

results in reenlistment rates that are 20 to 45 percent above

their previous levels. Again, the elasticity estimates used in our

183

projections were taken from the lower end of the intervals

reported in the three studies (line 2 of table A-IV).

Even if the draft were ended with no pay changes, our

studies indicate that reenlistment rates would rise when all

recruits voluntarily enter the service. The estimated percentage

increase in reenlistments when the mixed inputs of true and

draft-motivated volunteers are replaced by true volunteers is

shown in the third line of table A-IV.

TABLE A-IV.-Estimated first-term reenlistment rates

in mixed and all-volunteer forces

Marine Air

Army Navy corps Force

1. Relative increase in second

term (MI/M,,)

pay ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1.078 1.040 1.058 1.055

2. Elasticity of supply-B ~~~~~~~~ 2.43 2.14 2.00 2.38

3. Percentage increase due to

all-volunteer recruits

..~

39 25 20 47

Estimated first-term

reenlistment rates

4. Mixed force continued

draft (ro)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..~~~~~~~~~~~~

0.175 0.197 0.140 0.184

5. Transition period (r,)

~~~~~~~~~~~~

,210 .214 ,158 ,209

6. All-volunteer force Ire)

..~

,292 ,288 ,187 .307

The projections of draft calls and required accessions for

the mixed forces, assuming a continued lottery draft and no pay

changes,

were based on loss rates incorporating the

re-enlistment rates of line 4. In the move to an all-volunteer

force, it was recommended that military pay be increased at the

beginning of FY 1971. If the recommended pay raise is

implemented on July 1, 1970, the group which receives the

largest pay increase (first-term enlisted men) includes a

considerable number of draftees and draft-motivated volunteers.

It is unlikely, therefore, that first-term reenlistment rates will

immediately climb to their equilibrium levels. Some

improvement is anticipated, since the pay raise will make

military service more attractive in relation to competing civilian

jobs. Hence, for the transition period, we have used the

re-enlistment rates shown in line 5. The all-volunteer

reenlistment rates (line 6) reflect both the shift to all-volunteer

recruits and the higher pay for enlisted men.

184

The loss rates used in our projections generate the ilnnual

personnel turnover rates for the period FY 1977 through I97Y

shown in table A-V. With a draft and with 47 percent of Army

accessions projected to be draftees, we estimate that the annual

Army enlisted personnel turnover rate will be 27.5 percent. Due

to higher retention rates, an all-volunteer Army will have a

reduced turnover rate for enlisted men of only 17.9 percent per

year. Less striking reductions in turnover are expected to take

place in the other services and for officer personnel.

TABLE

A-V.-Projecfed annual turnover rates of mixed and

all-volunteer forces’

[for effective strength of 2.5 million men]

Comparing sustainable force strengths to target force levels

(table A-III), or comparing required accessions to the flow of

true volunteers, confirms the fact that the Army is likely to

suffer the largest manpower deficits if the draft is ended. The

recruitment problem which confronts an all-volunteer force is

an Army problem. This is not surprising since the Army is the

only service which has consistently relied on draft calls to meet

its manpower requirements.

In estimating the levels of military pay needed to attract

the requisite numbers of recruits, we have concentrated on

Army enlisted manpower deficits. This procedure involves a safe

assumption that if the Army’s manpower demands can be met,

the other services will certainly be able to staff their forces with

qualified men. This procedure also tends to overstate the

requisite increase in military

pay, since it tacitly assumes that

excess supplies of enlistment applicants to the other services

would

not

spill-over into the Army.

185

OFFICER SUPPLY

Under conscription, the number of applicants for most

officer procurement programs has exceeded requirements. It is

anticipated that this situation will prevail even in the absence of

a draft for the highly selective programs such as the. military

academies and ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps)

scholarships. Other programs such as the non-scholarship ROTC

and various college-graduate, officer-candidate schools may,

however, experience shortfalls. Because the flow of actual

entrants has been less than the number who would have

volunteered under a draft, data on actual officer accessions do

not provide a satisfactory basis for projecting future supplies.

The supplies of officers to an all-volunteer force depend

critically on three factors: (1) the intensity of the Vietnam War,

(2) the presence or absence of the draft, and (3) the ratio of

military to civilian pay. An econometric model using voluntary

ROTC enrollment data was developed to estimate the

quantitative effects of these three factors. The voluntary

enrollment rate of male freshmen at colleges where ROTC

participation is not compulsory provides us with a supply

variable free of the demand constraints which affect other

officer procurement programs. The Army has not limited

freshman ROTC enrollments, and hence, the enrollment rates

reflect the decisions of youths at these colleges.

The non-scholarship ROTC program has been the major

source of Army officers, and the Army will probably have the

severest officer recruitment problem in an all-volunteer force.

This assumption is plausible since the Army is the only service

which has offered a two-year obligated term (and at one time a

six-month term) for newly commissioned officers. The other

services have adopted three, four and five year obligated terms

even for ROTC officers. The estimated pay increase needed to

attract enough Army officers should be sufficient to attract an

adequate number of officers to the other services.

Army ROTC freshman enrollment rates exhibited a sharp

decline during the last half of the 1960’s so that by 1970, they

were about half of the rate in 1964. This decline closely

correlates with casualty rates in Vietnam. De-escalation should

reverse the trend in FY 1972 and lead to the projected

enrollment rates shown in table A-VI. This anticipated reversal

in the freshman enrollment rate will, however, have a delayed

186

TABLE A-W-Actual and projected proportion ot male freshmen

enrollments in Army ROTC programs in voluntary schools 1

196&90

impact since an increase in the supply of newly commissioned

officers will not occur until four years later.

Elimination of the draft will result in a loss of

draft-motivated volunteers in Army ROTC programs. Column 2

in table A-VI shows the projected trend in enrollment rates if

the draft is continued. The percentage of draft-motivated

first-term Army officers who entered through an ROTC

program was estimated to be 45 percent in the 1964

Department of Defense survey and 56 percent in the 1968

survey. The lower draft- motivation factor, 45 percent, was

employed in projections of Army ROTC officer supplies, on the

assumption that pre-Vietnam conditions would prevail during

the decade of the 1970’s.

The ratio of officer pay to civilian pay of college graduates

was found to be a significant variable explaining differences in

ROTC enrollment rates. The pay schedules recommended by

the Commission will raise the pay of first-term officers by

approximately 25 percent (table A-II). Our studies indicate that

187

this pay raise should increase the supply of Army ROTC

officers by 29 percent. The expected effect of the increased pay

on enrollment rates is shown in table A-VII. When the projected

voluntary enrollment rates of table A-VII with the pay increase,

are applied to the expanding pool of male college freshmen, the

Army meets its officer accession requirements. (The latter

statement assumes that the ROTC scholarship program will be

expanded as recommended from 5,500 scholarships per service

to 10,000 scholarships.)

ADDITIONAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR AN

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Comparisons of the average budgets required to sustain

mixed forces of 2.0, 2.25, 2.5 and 3.0 million men, and to

sustain all-volunteer forces with the same effective strengths for

FY 1977 through 1979 are. given in tables A-VIII, A-IX, A-X,

and A-XI. We have chosen the period FY 1977 through 1979 as

fairly representing the differences in budget requirements for

the mixed and all-volunteer forces. By then, accession

requirements will have stabilized, and most of the savings

accruing to an all-volunteer force will have taken effect. All of

the comparisons are made in constant 1970 dollars, that is,

there is no allowance for inflation. The pay profiles used to

188

TABLE A-VIII.-Estimated budget expenditures for mixed and

all-volunteer forces FY 1977-1979

[for force of 2.0 million men in billions of 1970 dollars]

All-

Mixed volunteer

force

force Increment

--

$13.20

4.21

17.41

.69

.29

.98

.a3

.25

1.08

.13

.08

.21

19.68

51.49

.09

1.58

-.15

- .Ol

-.16

.12

.Ol

.13

.08

.21

1.76

- .29

1.47

compute total pay and allowance are those set forth in chapter

5. For all of the mixed forces, we have used estimated pay for

FY 1971, which includes an across-the-board increase of 8

percent. For the 2.0, 2.25, and 2.5 million men all-volunteer

forces we have used the pay profile recommended by the

Commission. The 3.0 million man force requires a further pay

increase. In explaining tables A-VIII through A-XI, we have

focussed on the 2.5 million man force only as an example.

Estimates of the military pay and allowances of enlisted

men, officers, and uniformed women (including the imputed

value of income-in-kind) for a mixed force of 2.5 million men in

the period FY 1977 through 1979, are given at the top of table

189

TABLE A-IX.-Estimated budget expenditures for mixed and

all-volunteer forces FY 1977-79

(for force of 2.25 million men in billions of 1970 dollars]

Mixed

force

All-

volunteer

force Increment

$14.46 $1.76

4.64 .lO

19.10

1.86

.84 -.18

.35 - .Ol

1.19 -.19

.93 .14

.27 .03

1.20 .17

.16 .16

.08 .08

.24 .24

21.73 2.08

-24

15. Net bugetary increase ..~ 1.74

A-X.

Because

of lower personnel turnover, an all-volunteer force

can have 56.5 thousand less men than a mixed force of 2.5

million and still provide the same effective strength. In spite of

this reduction in size, which considered alone reduces budget

requirements by $678 million, the military pay and allowances

budget for an all-volunteer force is higher than that for the

equivalent mixed force for two reasons. First, annual pay rates

are higher - especially in the first four years of service.

Second, the greater retention of an all-volunteer force means

the force is more experienced; hence a larger fraction of the

men are receiving higher pay rates. Only 38.0 percent of the

mixed force is projected to have more than four years of service

as compared to 44.6 percent for the all-volunteer force. We

190

TABLE A-X.-Estimated budget expenditures for mixed and

all-volunteer forces FY 1977-1979

[tar

force ot

2.5 million men in billions of 1970 dollars]

Mixed

force

All-

VOlU&X?r

torte Increment

Military pay and allowances:

active-duty forces

1. Enlisted . ~~~ -...... $13.67

2. Officers ..~~ .._..._ .._... . . ~~. 5.02

3. Total compensation . . . . . 16.69

Training and turnover related

travel costs

‘4. Enlisted . . . .._ ~... 1.26

5. Officers .~~ .._.... .._.... . -~~ .._. ~~~ .41

6. Total training and travel costs 1.66

Reserve forces

7. Military pay/allowances ~.~~.. .66

6. Training and travel costs ..~ -.... .22

9. Total reserve forces ~~~ 1.06

Other budget increments

10. Proficiency pay

(first-term enlisted men) ....~~.~~~ -

11. Medical personnel ..~~~~~ ~.~

-

12. Miscellaneous - .~ ._...... . ~.~ .._...

13. Total other items . ~~~~...~ -

14. Total . . . . ~.~ .._..... ~~~ . . .

21.43

15. Less added Federal

income taxes ~~~ .._.. . . . . . . .._...

$15.78 $2.11

5.15 .I3

20.93 2.24

.95 - .30

.39 - .02

1.34 - .32

1.03 .17

.29 .07

1.32 .24

.I4 .I4

.16 .16

.06 .06

.36 .36

23.97 2.54

- .42

16. Net budgetary increase . . . . 2.12

estimate that the pay and allowances budget for an all-volunteer

force during FY 1977 through 1979 will on average be $2.2

billion higher than would be required for an equally effective

mixed force of 2.5 million men.

Although tne move to an all-volunteer force entails a

higher military pay and allowances budget, the training and

transient budgets, which are largely determined by the flow of

new accessions, will fall. Each enlisted recruit receives about

one-half of a year of basic military and technical training. The

size of the training command can be reduced with the move to a

191

TABLE A-XI.-Esfimated budget expenditures for mixed and

a//-vokmfeer forces FY 1977-1979

[for iorce of 3.0 million men in billions of 1970 dollars]

All-

volunteer

force Increment

520.41 54.62

6.04 .47

26.45 5.09

1.16 - .47

.46 -.03

1.62 - .50

1.19 .29

.28 .15

1.47

.44

.21 .21

.20

.08 .08

.49

30.03 5.52

-.97

4.55

voluntary force because fewer accessions are required to sustain

the all-volunteer force. The manpower savings and resulting

reduction in the military pay and allowances budget. have

already been incurporated into the analysis by the reduction of

56.500 men in the all-volunteer force of 2.5 million men. In

addition to manpower costs. substantial budget outlays are also

needed to finance the material and capital costs of the training

command. It was estimated in our study that the material and

variable costs over and above the personnel costs of enlisted

men are about $2,500 per recruit.

192

Approximately 25,000 postions in the 2.5 million man

mixed force must be set aside to accommodate the accession,

training. and separation moves of enlisted men. With its lower

personnel turnover, an all-volunteer force can economize on the

number of positions needed to accomplish these moves, in

addition to generating savings in direct travel costs. The direct

travel costs per recruit that were paid in 1968 are estimated to

be $268. The travel costs per officer accession are even

higher ~ $1 ,150 - because the typical officer is married and

must move dependents as well as household belongings. At a

force level of 2.5 million men, it is estimated that savings in

direct travel costs will average $70 million in FY 1977 through

1979.

The cost of training officers varies widely among different

officer procurement programs. It runs as high as $50,000 for an

officer trained at the military academies, and is approximately

$12,000 for officers commissioned through officer candidate

schools. Flight training is an even more expensive proposition,

and Department of Defense estimates range from around

$50,000 for helicopter pilots to $250,000 for jet fighter pilots.

In our projections, it was assumed that the number of officers

commissioned through the academies and ROTC scholarship

programs would be the same in both the mixed and

all-volunteer forces. The college and non-college graduate

officer candidate schools have historically been the sources

which equilibrated the supply and demand for officers. (Strictly

speaking, the involuntary recall of reserve officers has borne

much of the brunt of changing officer requirements, but this

would also be the case in an all-volunteer force.) The training

cost of $12,000 per officer for the officer candidate programs

was used to estimate the variable training costs for officers

shown in table A-X.

When the training and travel cost savings are subtracted

from the incremental budget expenditures for military pay and

allowances, the additional budget expenditures for the active

duty all-volunteer force (excluding medical doctors and

dentists) is estimated to be $1.92 billion per year in FY 1977

through 1979.

In order to sustain the reserve forces on an all-volunteer

basis, it will be necessary to raise the reserve forces budget by

$240 million. Other budget items (for the medical corps,

additional recruiting expenses, establishment of proficiency pay

193

for first-term enlisted men, etc.) add another $380 million. The

total increment is, therefore, estimated to be $2.54 billion per

year.

The implementation of the recommended basic pay rates

and other items of compensation will result in an increase in

federal income taxes paid by individuals in the active duty and

reserve forces. These added taxes should properly be .deducted

in calculating the incremental budget expense of an

all-volunteer force. For FY 1977 through 1979 they are

estimated to be $420 million.

Thus the net additional budget expense required to

maintain an all-volunteer force equivalent in strength to a 2.5

million man mixed force on a stable, continuing basis is about

$2.12 billion per year. For the 2.0 million man force the

comparable figure is $1.47 billion; for the 2.25 million man

force it is $1.74 billion; and for the 3.0 million man force,

$4.55 billion.

SMALLER FORCES

The military pay increases recommended by the

Commission (which were used to calculate the military pay and

allowances of the all-volunteer forces) would support active

duty forces that are larger than the force strength objectives for

forces of 2.25 and 2.0 million men even during the transition

years FY 1973 through 1976. Our projections imply that if the

recommended pay increases were put into effect, the services

could raise mental qualification standards, thereby reducing the

percentage of mental group IV enlistments below the 20

percent maximum assumed in the study. In fact, the projected

flows of true volunteers imply that nearly all recruits could be

drawn from the top three mental groups. On the other hand,if

the Army continued to accept up to 20 percent mental group

IV enlistments, our projections show that military pay levels

could be reduced while meeting the strength objectives during

the transition, for the 2.25 and 2.0 million man forces. The

estimated Army recruitment deficits together with an elasticity

of supply of 1.25 imply that the minimum increases in

first-term pay needed to maintain the 2.25 and 2.0 million men

forces during the transition years were 24.4 and 11.8 percent

respectively. If these lower pay levels had been adopted for

all-volunteer forces of 2.25 and 2.0 million men (and the

194

Commission does

not

recommend this), the military pay and

allowances budget for enlisted men could have been reduced by

$345 and $714 million below the figures shown in tables A-VIII

and A-IX, respectively.

MAINTAINING FORCE LEVELS AT THREE MILLION

MEN

It was noted earlier that the recommended pay scales

would

not

attract enough recruits to maintain an all-volunteer

force of equivalent strength to a 3.0 million man mixed force.

The data in table A-111 indicate that the overall deficit in

enlisted force strengths would be only 3.8 percent in FY 1975.

The deficits between target and sustainable force levels are,

however, unevenly distributed, being largest, 25.0 percent, for

the Army. To eliminate this deficit, first-term enlisted pay

would have to be approximately 17 percent higher than the

Commission has recommended in this report. The pay of career

enlisted men and officers would also have to be advanced to

prevent inversions in the pay profiles. When these higher rates

of pay are applied to the estimated length of service

distributions of enlisted men and officers, the military pay and

allowances budget for an all-volunteer force is $5.0 billion

higher than for the equivalent mixed force. The summary of

these budget estimates appears in table A-Xl.

RESERVE FORCES BUDGETS

The estimated average annual manpower budgets for each

of the four equally effective all-volunteer and mixed reserve

forces for FY 1977 to 1979 is given in table A-XII. The mixed

force estimates use 1970 compensation profiles, including the

assumed 8.0 percent pay increase. Compensation for the three

smaller all-volunteer reserve forces was computed using the

Commission’s recommended pay levels. Compensation for the

largest reserve force is based on the pay levels required for the

3.0 million man all-volunteer active force.

195

TABLE A-XII.-Reserve manpower expenditures ’

[millions]

Unmodified FY 1977-79

stable reserve force. _

Draft All-volunteer Difference

2.00 Force

Military pay and allowances $ 714.1

Personnel-related 2

~.~~~~~~ ~. 236.1

Total .~~~...~

952.2

2.25 Force

Military pay and allowances 792.4

Personnel-related = ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..

241.7

$ 634.2 $120.1

246.0 9.9

1,062.Z 130.0

927.7 135.3

267.9

26.2

Total ~~~.~~ ~.~... 1,034.l 1,195.6

161.5

2.50 Force

Military pay and allowances ~. 664.9 1,025.6

160.7

Personnel-related 2

.~~~.~~~..~.~~ 220.5 292.7 72.2

Total ~~~~.~~~.~~~ ~~~~...~..~ ~~~.. 1,065.4 1.316.3 232.9

3.00 Force

Military pay and allowances

698.7

1,193.5

294.8

Personnel-related 2 .~~...~~~~~~~~~~..

127.9 262.6 154.9

- __ -

Total .~~~...~ ~. 1,026.6 1,476.3

449.7

Modified FY 1977-79

stable reswve force

Draft

All-volunteer Difference

2.00 Force

Military pay and allowances ~. $ 633.0

$ 744.2 5111.2

Personnel-related 2 ~~~~ 167.1 210.0 22.9

Total .~~~..~~..~~...~..~~ ~~~~~ 620.1

954.2 134.1

2.25 Force

Military pay and allowances

701.6 626.3 124.7

Personnel-related 2

~~..~~.. 164.4 224.9 40.5

Total .~~~.~~~...~ 666.0 1,051.z

165.2

2.50 Force

Military pay and allowances

765.3 912.0 146.7

Personnel-related 2 ~~~~~~~~..~~...~~~ 156.6

244.2 87.4

Total ..~.~~~~.~~..~~~..~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ 922.1 1,156.Z

234.1

3.00 Force

Military pay and allowances

792.4 1,060.7 266.3

Personnel-related 2

59.6 231.5 171.7

- ~ ~

Total ~..~~.~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..

652.2 1,292.Z 440.0

1 Not onset ‘0, lwome taxes reCOvered.

‘Tra,“,“~ and travel: excludes military personnel CO(ID.

196

APPENDIX B

MILITARY AND

CIVILIAN CDMPENSATIDN

Compensation comparisons, like those in tables 5-11 and

5-111 in chapter 5, always raise two kinds of questions: (1) has

compensation been properly measured for the individuals being

compared and (2) are the particular comparisons drawn, valid

ones? These two questions are discussed below.

MEASUREMENTOFCOMPENSATION

The civilian earnings figures used in this study are those

generated by the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey

(CPS), and are based on individual earnings reported to census

interviewers. The value of employers’ contributions to fringe

benefits is derived from annual expenditure data for such

benefits submitted by private firms to the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce.

The military cash items of pay incorporated in the regular

and total compensation figures are based on a random sample of

pay records generated by each of the four services. Since these

197

pay records show the actual cash payments to individuals, the

estimates of military cash pay derived from them are probably

superior to those generated by the Census Bureau. The value of

items provided to military personnel in-kind has been derived

from Department of Defense estimates and from other sources.

In most instances, we have incorporated the lowest of the

available estimates.

For instance, food-in-kind provided was valued at $1.32

per day; the Defense Department’s estimate of the cost. That

figure excludes the costs of preparation, service buildings, and

equipment. Similarly, medical services have been valued at

about $92 per person per year. This estimate is based on the

costs of comprehensive medical insurance; costs which are

significantly below those actually incurred (about $400

annually per individual for active military men, their

dependents, and retired personnel). The current value of retired

pay has been estimated by discounting future benefits at 10

percent per year, a discount rate significantly above the 3%

percent used by the Government. The higher discount rate

greatly reduces the value of these benefits.

A conscious effort was made to use minimal estimates of

income-in-kind, recognizing that the value of such items to the

individual is likely on average to be lower than the costs of

providing them. If there is any bias in our measurement of

compensation, it is probably in the direction of underestimating

military compensation for those in the latter stages of their

careers.

With regard to the representative nature of the two

measures of compensation, the average level of military pay for

a given level of education and experience is probably more

representative than is the average level of civilian pay. Even

when age and education are held constant, the variability in pay

among civilians is significantly greater than the variability in

military pay.

VALIDITY OF THE COMPARISONS

The question of the validity of our comparisons breaks

down into three subquestions:

1. Are compensation comparisons by education and age

or years of experience superior to compensation

comparisons by occupation or by position? We have

used the former because education and age or years

of experience are objective characteristics that we can

measure with reasonable accuracy; whereas deciding

what civilian position is comparable to operating a

submarine sonar or to firing a mortar is a subjective

exercise fraught with difficulties.

Also, the “job approach” focuses on the nature

of the position rather than the qualifications of the

individuals holding that position. Admittedly,

education and experience are only two of the many

qualitative characteristics that determine pay. But

these two characteristics are among the most

important ones and their market value is easily

measured. Moreover, we have used them to compare

average compensation for two similar groups, each of

which includes individuals who are both more and

less successful than those receiving the average level

of compensation for the group as a whole. By

choosing two qualities (formal education and

on-the-job training or experience) which produce

significant differences in civilian earnings, we are best

able to relate military pay to civilian alternatives

which influence career decisions.

The final and probably most important reason

for choosing these two qualitative characteristics has

been our recognition that individuals are only partly

influenced by how well they are remunerated for

their performance of a particular task or in a

particular position. In choosing careers or employers,

they are also interested in advancement opportunities

or the speed of movement between jobs and levels of

responsibility. The education-experience classification

highlights one’s earnings opportunities throughout his

entire career. The compensation profiles derived from

this classification show the levels of pay at a point in

time as well as the changes in compensation over

time. As such, they emphasize the major dimensions

that influence the individual’s career decision - the

alternative levels of compensation over time in both

military and civilian careers.

199

2. Is the quality of military personnel higher (or lower)

than that of the civilians with whom their

compensation is being compared? More precisely, do

military selection procedures or self-selectivity result

in an average quality for military personnel exceeding

(or falling below) that of the civilian group to which

they are compared? This is a very hard question to

answer. It is difficult even to define “quality”, much

less determine whether it is higher or lower in the

military

than elsewhere. Fortunately, our

comparisons center on only those aspects of quality

which influence compensation. The fragmentary

evidence on these aspects suggests no significant

differences, if any, in the average level of quality

between the groups being compared. On the one

hand, the military services reject those with the

lowest mental (AFQT) scores and those with physical

handicaps at the initial entry point. On the other

hand, a large number of those with high AFQT scores

have been exempted from military service because

they had either college student or occupational

deferments. Also, upon completion of the initial term

of service, the separations from the military have in

the past tended to the proportionately greater among

those of higher skills and levels of education than

among those with lower skills and levels of education.

It has been argued that selectivity for promotion

makes the quality of military personnel relatively

superior. But, particular selective promotional steps

occur in the later stages of a military career and do

not become too critical until about the

20.years-of-service point.

The various factors mentioned above have

probably prevented the emergence of significant

differences in the average quality of the two groups.

This conclusion is substantiated by the observed

absence of any significant difference in civilian

earnings between veterans and non-veterans of the

same age and with the same educational levels.

Indeed, the civilian earnings of retired service

personnel are, on average, below those of civilians of

200

like age and educational background.

Finally, we have attempted to compensate for

any possible residual difference in quality favoring

the military by comparing military compensation

with the compensation for a group of civilians with

higher levels of education than those of the military

group.

For example, enlisted compensation was

compared with civilian compensation for only white,

male, high-school graduates. The enlisted ranks,

however, contain a significant proportion of

individuals (about 25 percent) who have not

completed high school. Similarly, officer

compensation was compared with the compensation

for white males with 16 or more years of education,

even though about 30 percent of the officer

population are not college graduates.

3. Should the levels of military compensation equal the

levels of compensation of equally qualified civilians?

This issue involves the respective heights of the two

compensation profiles - not their shapes or slopes.

While civilian high school or college graduates

work in a variety of activities and under extremely

divergent conditions, military personnel are likely to

experience greater hazards and hardships in the

service. For this reason, we are unable to claim that

equality between military and civilian compensation

represents true comparability. In fact, we suspect that

higher’ levels of remuneration for military than for

equally qualified civilian personnel will be necessary

to achieve comparability in both monetary and

non-monetary conditions of service. The excess of

military over civilian compensation required will

depend, among other things, on how many true

volunteers the military will require.

201

APPENDIX C

REVIEW OF THE

1966 DEPT. OF DEFENSE DRAFT STUDY

A number of published and unpublished studies have

developed estimates of the additional budget expenses that

would be needed to move to an all-volunteer system. The

estimates which have been most prominently reported in the

press and Congress are those contained in the 1966 Department

of Defense draft study! The I966 DOD study concluded that

an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men would add $4 billion

to $17 billion per year to the defense budget. If the extreme

estimates are excluded, the mid-range expenditure estimates are

from $5 billion to $8 billion per year. The Department of

Defense estimates are substantially higher than our’ estimate

that an additional $2.12 billion per year will be needed to

sustain an all-volunteer force of 2.5 million men on a stable

basis.

A careful review of the

1966 DOD draft study was

conducted to reconcile the differences in these estimates. The

DOD study concluded that the unemployment rate in the

civilian economy had a significant effect on both the demand

for and supply of military personnel. Two alternative

unemployment rates, 5.5 and 4.0 percent, were used in the

DOD projections. In addition, three alternative estimates of the

elasticity of supply (which describes the responsiveness of the

supply of volunteers to changes in military pay) were examined

for each assumed unemployment rate, thereby producing a total

of six estimated budget increments. As we have noted earlier in

appendix A, the unemployment variable was not statistically

significant in our studies of first-term enlistments. Hence, we

omitted unemployment as an explicit variable, and generated

only a single set of projections.

At the outset, it is instructive to examine the six budget

estimates which are reproduced in table C-l. The rows in table

C-I present the annual increments (or decrements) to the

defense manpower budget required to maintain an all-volunteer

force under different assumptions. Table C-I reveals that

between 92 and 95 percent of the added budget expense is due

TABLE C-L-Estimated increase in payroll costs necessary to obtain

an all-volunteer force of 2.7 million’

[billions]

5.5spercent 4.0-percent

unemployment rate unemployment rate

Low Best High LOW Best High

Enlisted:

Increase in

active-duty pay $3.57 $5.02 $ 6.96 $5.21 $7.64 $14.61

Increase in future re-

tirement benefits .16 .39 1.03 .42 .79 1.94

Savings from

reduced turnoverK -.35 - .41 -54 -.41 -.51 - .72

-- _-

Total ~~~~.~ 3.36 5.00 9.45 5.22 FG 15.63

Officers’ total ~~~ .29 .42 .63 .29 .42 33

--~--__

Grand total ...~~~.~

3.67

5.42 10.26 5.51 6.34 16.66

to the enlisted forces. Our review will be limited to the

estimated added budget expenses for the enlisted force.

The relative increase in pay, (Ml/MO) that is needed to

maintain an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men depends on

three factors: (1) the supply of true volunteers assuming the

draft is ended with no accompanying change in military pay; (2)

the number of accessions that are needed to meet the prescribed

force strength objectives; and (3) the elasticity of supply. The

budget estimates in the Commission study reported in appendix

A also involved assumptions about these three factors. In what

follows, we point out the major differences in assumptions

between the 1966 DOD draft study and the Commission study

and indicate how these differences account for the widely

divergent budget estimates.

SUPPLY OF TRUE VOLUNTEERS IN THE ABSENCE

OF A DRAFT

The 1966 DOD study dealt with projections for the period

FY 1970 through 197 1, while the Commission study related to

a steady state in the period FY 1977 to 1979. The estimated

annual flows of true volunteers for enlisted ranks taken from

the DOD study are presented in the top panel of table C-II. For

comparative purposes, our estimates of the supply of true

volunteers with no draft and no pay change are shown in the

last column. The male population in the 17-20 year-old range is

projected to be 7,5.5.5,000 for the FY 1970 through 1971

period as compared to 8,589,OOO for the FY 1977 through

1979 period. To adjust for this approximately 14 percent

increase in the pool of potential recruits, the voluntary

enlistments were converted to enlistment rates appearing in the

second panel of table C-11.

The true voluntary enlistment rates were not appreciably

different in the two studies. In fact, the Army enlistment rate

used in the Commission study lies mid-way between the two

Army enlistment rates reported in the 1966 DOD study. This

result is not surprising since both the DOD and Commission

studies estimated the incidence of draft-motivated volunteers by

analyzing the same survey of first-term enlisted men conducted

in the Fall of 1964.

205

TABLE

C-Il.-Supply of true volunteers in the absence of a draft

Commission

1966 DOD draft sludy study

percent unemployment

5.5

4.0

Number of true volunteers

per year

All Services,.~.~~~~~~~~

317 272 312

Army _..... ~~.~ ~~~~

106 91 110

Voluntary enlistment rates’

(percent)

All Services ~~~~~ _........ ~~~~~~.

4.20 3.60 3.63

Army . .._............... 1.40

1.20 1.29

Required accessions

All Services ~~~~~.~ ~~~.~~._ 500 512

342

Army ~~~~~~.. 220 232

148

Recruitment deficits’

All Services~.~ .._... ~~~~~~ . .._. 1.56

1.66 1.10

Army ~.~~~~~~~ ~~~ 2.06 2.55 1.34

Annual turnover rate’

(percent)

All Services ~~~~ _.... ~~~~~~~ . 21.3

21.8

16.4

Army . . . . 25.3

26.4

17.9

REQUIRED ACCESSIONS

In the Commission study, estimates of the accessions

required to maintain enlisted force strength objectives were

based on loss rates in the pre-Vietnam period. The

improvements in retention which result from having only true

volunteers and from higher levels of military pay were

incorporated into the Commission’s projection model. Hence,

the annual turnover rate of Army enlisted men was projected to

decline from 25 percent in the mixed force to 18 percent in the

all-volunteer forces.

206

The assumptions which were used in the 1966 DOD study

could not be found. However, the implications of their

procedures are summarized in the last panel of table C-II, which

shows the implied annual turnover rates. The required Army

accessions in the DOD study imply annual turnover rates of 25

and 26 percent respectively, which are approximately the rates

obtained for mixed forces of draftees and volunteers. We shall

comment later on the importance of this estimate.

ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY

The elasticity of supply, B, is defined as the relative

increase in voluntary enlistments resulting from a given relative

increase in the ratio of military to civilian pay. In the

Commission study, it was estimated that the elasticity of supply

of voluntary enlistments was approximately 1.25, and this value

was used in the projections. The 1966 DOD study assumed a

supply function in which the elasticity declines as larger

fractions of the available population are recruited into the

Armed Forces. Given the relative recruitment deficits appearing

in the fourth panel of table C-II, the elasticities implied by the

first-term pay increases proposed in the 1966 DOD study can be

calculated from the following equation:

log(EI/EBl = B Wx(M,/Mo)l,

where the Army recruitment deficits are used as the pertinent

shortfalls. The relative pay increase and relative Army

recruitment deficit for the six cases identified by the 1966 DOD

study are shown in table C-III. The implied elasticities, B, are

found to vary between 0.7 and 1.25. Thus, the elasticity

estimate used in the Commission study lies at the upper

extreme of the elasticities assumed in the DOD study. Finally,

the level of first-term pay Ml implied by the pay increases is

shown in the second column of table C-III. The first-term pay

of enlisted men, MB which prevailed in 1965 was reported in

the DOD study as follows: The low estimate of first-term pay

for enlisted men required to maintain a voluntary force is

$6,147 in 1965 prices. while the high estimate is $13,045.

207

TABLE

C-Ill.--implied first-term pay and elasticity

of

supply

for the DOD study

Relative Army

increase in

AnIWal recruitment Implied

first-$;; pay first-term pay deficit elasticity

I 0

Ml h/E,,

B

5.5-percent un-

employment

Low ~~~~~~~~~. 1.60 $ 6,147 2.06 1.26

Best ~~~~~~~~~. 2.11

7,206 2.06

.96

High ~~~~~~~. 2.61 9,596 2.08 .71

4.0-percent un-

employment

Low ~~~~~~ 2.14 7,306 2.55 1.23

Best ~~~~.. .~ 2.63

6,961 2.55 .97

High ~~.~ ~~ 3.62 13,045 2.55 .70

SENSITIVITY OF BUDGET ESTIMATES TO

ESTlMATES OF REQUIREMENTS

AND ELASTICITIES

The widely divergent estimates of the additional budget

expenditures for an all-volunteer force ($4 billion to $17 billion

in the 1966 DOD study and about $2 billion in the Commission

study) can be explained by the differences in the respective

estimates of requirements and elasticities. The 1966 DOD study

concluded that pay for first-term enlisted men would have to

rise by 80 to 282 percent to attract a sufficient flow of true

volunteers. (See table C-IV for 1965 pay rates.) The estimated

relative pay increases (M ,/MO) depends critically on the

estimated recruitment shortfall (E ,/Ed and the elasticity of

supply, B.

In order to show how these variables are related we

calculated the pay increases (Ml /&) necessury to achieve an

all-volunteer force for alternative values of (E,/Eo) and 8.

These are shown in the top panel of table C-V. The lower panel

of table C-V shows what the approximate 1966 DOD budget

increments would have been if the DOD study had used the

particular recruitment deficit shown in the column heading and

elasticity estimate shown for the row heading. For example, if

the DOD study had arrived at an estimated elasticity of I .O and

a recruitment deficit of 1.74, their procedures would have

208

generated an approximate budget increase of $3.33 billion. The

data of table C-V enable us to explain why the two studies

arrived at such widely different estimates.

TABLE C-IV.-Mlifary pay

of first-term enlisted men-1965 pay rates

Years Of

service

TtlX

equivalent

income Supplements

Total

military

income

TABLE C-V.-h/alive

increase in military pay (Ml/M,)

and DOD budget ex/xvws’

[for alternative elasticities and recruitment deficits]

Relative recruitment deficit (E./E,)”

Elasticity of

(percent turnover) - “’

SUPPlY

1.57 1.74

1.91 2.09 2.26

B

(16%) (20%)

(22%)

(24%) (26%)

Relative increase in first-term pay (M,/M,)

0.700 1.91 2.21

2.52 2.64

3.21

0.650 1.70 1.91 2.14 2.36 2.61

1.000 1.57

1.74

1.91

2.09 2.26

1.125 1.49

1.64 1.76

1.93

2.06

1.250 1.44 1.56( 1.66 1.60 1.92

1.375 1.36

1.50 1.60 1.71 1 .a1

Approximate budget expense of all-volunteer force (billions)

0.700 $4.29

$5.91 $7.71

510.47

$12.91

0.650 3.11 4.29 5.51 6.90 6.23

1 .ooo 2.37

3.33

4.29

5.31 6.20

1.125 1.92

2.77

3.56 4.40

5.14

1.250 1.64 2.31

2.99

3.67 4.35

1.375 1.30 1.98

2.54

3.16 3.73

The relative recruitment deficits (El/EO) is the ratio of

required accessions, E 1, to the supply of true volunteers in the

absence of a draft with no pay changes b. As indicated above,

there is little disagreement in the two studies on the true

voluntary enlistment rates. However, the projection period for

the Commission study, FY 1977 through 1979, is characterized

by a population pool that is some 14 percent larger than the

population pool for the FY 1970 through 1971 period of the

DOD projections. This fact alone operates to reduce the

recruitment deficit.

The estimated required accessions for the Army, E 1, were,

however, very different. The 1966 estimates imply that if all

rectiits were true volunteers who enlisted for three-year terms,

the Army would experience

an

annual turnover rate of 25 to 26

percent. In the period FY 1957 to 1965 when nearly half of all

Army accessions were two-year draftees, the annual turnover

rate of Army enlisted men was between 20 and 25 percent. It is

now nearly 34 percent because fully two-thirds of all Army

accessions are draftees. In the 1966 DOD study, it was assumed

that the draft would be continued to June 30, 1969. Hence, the

DOD projection period FY 1970 to 197 1 applied to a transition

period in which force strengths remained stable. No statement is

made in the DOD study to indicate when the pay of enlisted

men would be advanced. If it had been raised in 1966, the

greater retention of an all-volunteer force would have occurred

by 1970. On the other hand, if pay were advanced on July 1,

1969, some improvement in retention would still have taken

place especially when pay rates were more than doubled for

first-term enlisted men and increased by at least 50 percent for

second-term enlisted men. We believe that the DOD estimates of

required accessions are unreasonably high. If the 1966 DOD

study had used an annual turnover rate of 20 percent, the added

budget expenditure for an all-volunteer force would have varied

between $2.31 billion (for an elasticity of 1.25) and $5.91

billion (for an elasticity of 0.7). The implications of additional

budget expenditures of $2 billion to $6 billion a year are,

indeed, very different from estimates of $4 billion to $17

billion.

Finally, a considerable part of the added budget

expenditures arises because of pay increases to the career

enlisted force. If first-term pay must be doubled from $3,415 to

$6,830 per year, the pay of the career force must also be raised.

210

These career pay increases should lead to significantly higher

reenlistment rates which, in turn, would reduce personnel

turnover. The Commission study incorporated these effects in

generating estimates of personnel turnover rates. Moreover, the

recommended pay increase in the Commission study led to only

modest increases in the pay of career enlisted men. Although

the 1966 DOD study, provided higher career pay to prevent

inversions in the enlisted pay structure (enlisted men with 1 to

3 years of service earning more than men with 6 to 12 years of

service), they do not mention pay comparisons between enlisted

men and officers. The high budget estimate of $17 billion

implied that a new recruit would receive annual military pay of

$13,045 - considerably more than the pay of newly

commissioned officers.