14
3. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
4. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Mary-
land, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, and Rhode Island.
5. The terms “child-custody determina-
tion,” “custody determination,” and
“order,” as used in this Bulletin, refer to
custody determinations and visitation
determinations.
6. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
7. Violence Against Women Act of 1994;
Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2265, 2266.
8. The complete text of the Hague Conven-
tion can be found at 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 et
seq. (1986) or online via the U.S. Depart-
ment of State’s Web site at www.travel.
state.gov, under “International Parental
Child Abduction.”
9. International Child Abduction Remedies
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.
10. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, Prefatory Note. The Full Faith and
Credit clause requires that full faith and
credit “be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other state” (U.S. Constitution,
article IV, § 1).
11. Id.
12. Girdner, L.K., and Hoff, P.M., eds. 1993.
Final Report: Obstacles to the Recovery and
Return of Parentally Abducted Children.
Washington, DC: American Bar Associ-
ation Center on Children and the Law
(hereinafter Obstacles Project Final Re-
port). The Obstacles Project Final Report
was considered by the UCCJEA drafting
committee, and numerous recommenda-
tions from the report are reflected in the
uniform act. In addition to suggesting
amendments to the UCCJA and the PKPA,
the Obstacles Project Final Report pro-
posed an original “Act To Expedite En-
forcement of Child Custody Determina-
tions.” The purpose of the statute was to
alleviate the shortcomings and lack of uni-
formity in then-existing procedures for
enforcing child-custody and visitation
orders that had frustrated many parents
trying to exercise their lawful court-
ordered rights. Article 3 of the UCCJEA
incorporates many ideas from the
proposed statute.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, “Full Faith and Credit
Given to Child Custody Determinations.”
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d). This section es-
tablishes the principle of “exclusive, con-
tinuing jurisdiction.”
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g). This section pro-
hibits simultaneous proceedings.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e).
17. Like the UCCJA, the PKPA defines
“home State” as the State in which a child
has lived with a parent or person acting
as a parent for at least 6 months preced-
ing the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding.
18. See endnote 12, supra.
19. See endnotes 6–9, supra.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2266. The VAWA’s definition
of “protection order” expressly excludes
child-custody orders issued pursuant to
State child-custody laws (except to the
extent that they are entitled to Full Faith
and Credit under Federal law).
21. As of July 2001, the Hague Convention
was in force between the United States
and 49 countries. For a complete list of
countries that are party to the Conven-
tion, see the U.S. Department of State’s
Web site (www.travel.state.gov) or the
Hague Conference on Private International
Law’s Web site (www.hcch.net).
22. The Hague Convention, ratified in
1986, took effect in the United States in
1988 following enactment of the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act.
23. UCCJA, section 1 (Purposes of Act;
Construction of Provisions). The UCCJEA
omitted a “purposes” clause for stylistic
reasons: NCCUSL no longer includes claus-
es of this type in its uniform acts. The offi-
cial comments note, however, that many
of the original purposes of the UCCJA
remain valid.
24. In re Michelle Lemond, 413 N.E.2d 228
(Ind. 1980). An extraordinary judicial
panel—consisting of the Supreme Court of
Indiana; the Court of Appeals of Indiana,
First District; and the Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals—held two judges, a pri-
vate attorney, and a county prosecutor in
indirect criminal contempt for willfully
and intentionally disobeying orders of the
State Supreme Court and the mandate of
the Court of Appeals in an interstate cus-
tody enforcement case brought pursuant
to the UCCJA. Each judge and lawyer was
fined $500 and charged with costs. The
contempt proceeding stemmed from a
custody dispute between a mother in
Hawaii and her ex-husband, who retained
custody of their daughter in Indiana.
Proceeding in accordance with the UCCJA,
the mother sought to enforce the Ha-
waiian court order in Indiana. The father
resisted at every level of the State’s
courts.
After 3 years of litigation, the mother final-
ly prevailed; the father had exhausted his
remedies in the State courts, and it was
expected that the orders of the State Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals
would be honored and the child returned
to her mother. However, the father’s coun-
sel staged an 11th hour attempt to shield
his client from the orders of Indiana’s high-
est courts by initiating the filing of a CHINS
(Child In Need of Services) petition by the
county prosecutor in juvenile court. The
juvenile court issued the CHINS petition
minutes before the Circuit Court’s issu-
ance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering
the return of the child to her mother.
However, the Circuit Judge assisted the
father’s efforts by ordering that the writ
not be executed for 4 hours and then dis-
qualifying himself from hearing the CHINS
petition. A new judge was named to hear
the CHINS petition, and it was this judge
who found the daughter in need of servi-
ces and ordered that she be detained for a
mental examination.
Characterizing the sole legal issue in the
contempt proceeding as whether the juve-
nile court’s jurisdiction was properly in-
voked, the courts in this case held that
they would “not tolerate the attempted
use of emergency jurisdiction to reopen a
fully litigated and decided custody battle”
(413 N.E.2d at 245). The courts “became
convinced that [the CHINS hearing] was
not a good faith effort to help a child in
need of services. Rather, it was a well-
orchestrated effort to thwart the orders
of these Courts by prostituting the emer-
gency authority of a juvenile court” (id. at
238). The juvenile court judge should have
recognized the CHINS petition for what it
was: “nothing more than a pretense for
the judge assuming jurisdiction,” a sham
designed to avoid the force and effect of
the writ (id. at 242).
25. 716 P.2d 991 (Cal. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S.
400, 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987).
26. UCCJEA, section 102(4) (definition of
“child-custody proceeding”).
27. UCCJEA, section 201 (Initial Child-
Custody Jurisdiction).
28. UCCJEA, section 202 (Exclusive, Con-
tinuing Jurisdiction). See also UCCJEA,