Equitable Distribution of Marital Property in Connecticut

Connecticut Judicial Branch

Law Libraries

Equitable Distribution of

Marital Property in Connecticut

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

Table of Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 3

Section 1: Connecticut's All Property Equitable Distribution Scheme ........................ 4

Table 1: Modification ..................................................................................... 11

Section 2: Classification of Property .................................................................... 13

Table 2: ALR Annotations on Classification of Marital Property ............................ 24

Section 3: Valuation of Assets ............................................................................ 26

Section 4: Specific Issues in Property Valuation ................................................... 34

Table 3: Valuing and Distributing Pensions and Retirement Benefits .................... 41

Table 4: QDROs - Sample & Model Forms ........................................................ 43

Table 5: ALR Annotations on Property Valuation ............................................... 44

Section 5: Distribution of Property ...................................................................... 45

Section 6: Factors in Equitable Distribution of Property ........................................ 56

Table 6: Treatment of various types of property in each stage of determination.... 65

Section 7: Wedding Presents Between Spouses .................................................... 69

Table 7: Should Connecticut Adopt the New York Rule or the English Rule? .......... 73

Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations,

Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit

lawlibrarians@jud.ct.gov

2024 Edition

Equitable Distribution of Property- 2

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References to online legal research databases refer to in-library use of these

databases. Remote access is not available.

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https://www.jud.ct.gov/policies.htm

Equitable Distribution of Property- 3

Introduction

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

• “We must, however, consider, the paramount purpose of a property division

pursuant to a dissolution proceeding [which] is to unscramble existing marital

property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of

dissolution.” Greenan v. Greenan, 150 Conn. App. 289, 311, 91 A. 3d 909 (2014).

• “At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal

separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may

assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse. The court

may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the

sale of such real property, without any act by either spouse, when in the judgment

of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.” Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 46b-81(a) (2023).

• “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court,

after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the

length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage

or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of

income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate,

liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future

acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the

contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in

value of their respective estates.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81(c) (2023).

• “As a general framework, [t]here are three stages of analysis regarding the

equitable distribution of each resource: first, whether the resource is property

within [General Statutes] § 46b-81 to be equitably distributed (classification);

second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property

(valuation); and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property

between the parties (distribution).” Brady-Kinsella v. Kinsella, 154 Conn. App. 413,

423, 106 A.3d 956 (2014).

• Connecticut’s all property equitable distribution scheme: “It does not limit,

either by timing or method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property

subject to a trial court’s broad allocative power.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783,

792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

• “Importantly, ‘[a] fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court

may exercise broad discretion in...dividing property as long as it considers all

relevant statutory criteria.’” Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App. 613, 617, 95

A.3d 569 (2014).

• “[W]e conclude in part I A of this opinion that a trial court possesses inherent

authority to make a party whole for harm caused by a violation of a court order,

even when the trial court does not find the offending party in contempt. In part I B

of this opinion, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised that authority in

the present case.” O'Brien v. O'Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 96, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017).

Equitable Distribution of Property- 4

Section 1: Connecticut's All Property

Equitable Distribution Scheme

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to Connecticut’s all property

equitable distribution scheme in distributing property as part

of an action for dissolution, legal separation or annulment of

marriage.

DEFINITIONS:

• “It is black letter law that Connecticut is an equitable

distribution property state . . . .” Wendt v. Wendt, 59

Conn. App. 656, 663, 757 A.2d 1225 (2000) (Emphasis

added).

• “At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a

marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint

under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to

either spouse all or any part of the estate of the

other spouse.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81(a) (2023).

(Emphasis added.)

• " This approach to property division is commonly referred

to as an 'all-property' equitable distribution scheme."

Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365

(1995). (Emphasis added.)

CHECKLISTS:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part II. Introducing the basic concepts of property

division

§ 6.03. Checklist

CASES:

• Fronsaglia v Fronsaglia, 202 Conn. App. 769, 246 A.3d

1083 (2021). “‘We review financial awards in dissolution

actions under an abuse of discretion standard. ... In order

to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we

must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law

or could not reasonably conclude as it did.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App.

108, 111, 786 A.2d 525 (2001).” (pp. 775-776)

“‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court's division of

marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks, or gives a

wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration

which it was [its] duty to regard.’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 355, 880

A.2d 872 (2005).” (pp. 776-777)

• Kammili v. Kammili, 197 Conn. App. 656, 232 A.3d 102

(2020). “In fashioning orders that distribute marital

property, ‘General Statutes § 46b-81(c) directs the court

to consider numerous separately listed criteria.... [Section]

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 5

46b-81(a) permits the farthest reaches from an equal

division as is possible, allowing the court to assign to either

the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the

other. On the basis of the plain language of § 46b-81,

there is no presumption in Connecticut that marital

property should be divided equally prior to applying the

statutory criteria." (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn. App. 224, 238,

987 A.2d 362 (2010).” (p. 664)

“The plaintiff also asserts that the overall award of

property was improper because the trial court did not

consider the plaintiff's financial contribution in obtaining

assets prior to the marriage. In essence, the plaintiff

argues that the court's distribution was improper because

the court was required to, but ultimately did not, ‘consider

the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,

preservation or appreciation in value of their respective

estates,’ as required by § 46b-81(c).

Section 46b-81(c) enumerates several factors that a trial

court must consider when fashioning an order distributing

marital property. The contribution of each party to the

purchase of property is but one factor. See General

Statutes § 46b-81(c). ‘There is no ... requirement that the

court specifically state how it weighed these factors or

explain in detail the importance it assigned to these

factors.’ Desai v. Desai, supra, 119 Conn. App. at 238.

Moreover, when a trial court states in its memorandum of

decision that it has considered the factors listed in § 46b-

81(c) in fashioning an order distributing marital property,

the ‘judge is presumed to have performed [his or her] duty

unless the contrary appears [from the record].’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn. App.

143, 152, 958 A.2d 763 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn.

905, 962 A.2d 794 (2009).” (pp. 671-672)

• Al-Fikey v. Obaiah, 196 Conn App. 13, 21, 228 A.3d 668

(2020). “In the court’s decision, it recognized that the Cos

Cob home was foreclosed on account of the defendant’s

misconduct. In lieu of the marital home, the court instead

awarded the plaintiff a single property…. At the same time,

the court awarded the defendant his current residence at

the Washington Terrace property along with seven

additional properties. We conclude that the trial court

acted within its broad discretion in dividing the properties

as it did. The trial court was confronted with a complicated

record regarding the defendant’s property ownership. Its

decision to award separate residences to each party and to

allow the defendant to retain whatever interest he

possessed in the seven other Bridgeport properties was

reasonable.”

• Moyher v. Moyher, 198 Conn. App. 334, 339, 232 A.3d

1212 (2020). “Although the trial court ‘need not give every

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 6

factor equal weight ... or recite the statutory criteria that it

considered in making its decision or make express findings

as to each statutory factor, it must take each into

account.’ . . . Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. at 355,

880 A.2d 872.”

• Ferri, et al. v. Powell-Ferri, et al., 317 Conn. 223, 224-

225, 116 A.3d 297 (2015). “This appeal arises from a

dissolution action, dissolving the marriage of the named

defendant, Nancy Powell-Ferri, and the defendant, Paul

John Ferri, Jr. (Ferri). The dispositive issue in this appeal is

whether the trial court properly rendered summary

judgment in favor of Ferri on the cross complaint filed by

Powell-Ferri on the ground that it failed to plead a legally

sufficient cause of action. Specifically, Powell-Ferri’s cross

complaint alleged that Ferri had breached his duty to

preserve marital assets during the pendency of their

marital dissolution action by failing to take any affirmative

steps to contest the decanting of certain assets from a

trust by the plaintiffs, Michael Ferri and Anthony Medaglia,

who were then serving as trustees. We conclude that this

state does not require a party to a dissolution action to

take affirmative steps to recover marital assets taken by a

third party and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the

trial court.”

• Radcliffe v. Radcliffe, 109 Conn. App. 21, 26 Fn.6, 951

A.2d 575 (2008). “In O'Neill, we observed that ‘an

equitable distribution of property should take into

consideration the plaintiff's contributions to the marriage,

including homemaking activities and primary care taking

responsibilities’; O'Neill v. O'Neill, supra, 13 Conn. App.

311; and that ‘a determination of each spouses'

contribution within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b-

81 includes nonmonetary as well as monetary

contributions.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Neill

v. O'Neill, supra, 312.”

• Ricciuti v. Ricciuti, 74 Conn. App. 120, 124, 810 A.2d 818

(2002). “Here, the defendant began receiving a pension

from the Department of Defense after his retirement in

1996. The pension accrued over twenty-two years, during

nineteen of which the parties were married. The court,

therefore, correctly determined that the defendant's

pension was subject to distribution under § 46b-81.”

• Mongillo v. Mongillo, 69 Conn. App. 472, 481-482, 794

A.2d 1054 (2002). “In fashioning its orders for the

disposition of property, the court is obligated to consider

the statutory factors relating to the disposition of property

in marital dissolution. See General Statutes § 46b-81. The

statutory scheme setting forth the criteria for the court's

exercise of discretion in making property awards provides

no support for the plaintiff's argument that it was error for

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 7

the court not to award the plaintiff a portion of the

defendant's retirement benefits.”

• Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 673, 757 A.2d 1225,

cert. den. 255 Conn. 918. (2000). “The court made

extraordinary efforts to ensure that the valuation and the

division of the marital property was within the bounds of

our statutes, case law and constitution. We will not disturb

the court's thoughtful analysis and conclusion, which falls

well within the bounds of its broad discretion.”

• Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 365, 752 A.2d 1000

(1998). “Recent decisions from this court have indeed

empowered trial courts to deal broadly with property and

its equitable division incident to dissolution proceedings.”

• Watson v. Watson, 221 Conn. 698, 712, 607 A 2d. 383

(1992). “. . . [W]e recognize that the trial court must be

accorded discretion in fashioning an equitable assignment

of property. The power to act equitably is the keystone to

the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of

circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a

marriage.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

• Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 235, 449 A.2d 151

(1982). “The division of property was structured in such a

manner as to return to the defendant her contribution and

that of her family. Payments for the defendant's counsel

fees, medical bills, her outstanding debts and any capital

gains tax on the property were to be made from the

proceeds resulting from the sale of the real estate. The

defendant, in addition, is to receive significant sums of

money and one-half the remainder of the net proceeds

from the sale of the real estate.

The alimony awarded the defendant was not

substantial in amount nor was it for a long period of time.

When considered, in the context of other orders which

required the plaintiff to pay for the full support, college

education, and medical expenses of the five children of the

marriage and to maintain insurance on his life for the

benefit of the defendant, we cannot say the award is

clearly erroneous.”

• Lane v. Lane, 187 Conn. 144, 147, 444 A.2d 1377 (1982).

“Differences inherent in particular family situations require

that the court’s discretion be broad enough to make

suitable orders upon dissolution of marriage to fit the

circumstances.”

• Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 740-741, 453

A.2d 1151 (1982). 'While the trial court must consider the

delineated statutory criteria, no single criterion is preferred

over the others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 8

varying the weight placed upon each item under the

peculiar circumstances of each case."

• Tsopanides v. Tsopanides, 181 Conn. 248, 435 A.2d 34

(1980). “The principal issue raised by this appeal is

whether in a dissolution action the court may properly

render a judgment ordering the conveyance of property to

a party who has not filed a claim for such relief.”

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

# 650-895 Allocation of property and liabilities;

Equitable distribution

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

Disposition of Property

§§ 896-907 In general

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 465-549. Equitable Distribution

§§ 465-470. In general

§ 465. Generally

§ 466. Limitations on court's discretion

§ 467. Disposition of community property

§ 468. Alimony or maintenance distinguished

§ 469. Extent of court’s jurisdiction

§ 470. Procedural matters

• 193 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 101, Proof of Equitable

Distribution of Marital Debt, by Anne E. Melley, Thomson

West, 2021 (Also available on Westlaw).

I. Legal Background – In general

II. Elements of Proof

III. Model Pleadings and Discovery

IV. Proof of Equitable Distribution of Marital Debt

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part I. Scope and overview

Part II. Introducing the basic concepts of property

division

§ 6.04. Understanding the Basic Legal Principles,

Jurisdiction and Concepts of Property division

[1] Obtaining Jurisdiction over Property

[2] Dividing Property Under Equitable

Distribution

[3] Defining the Estate for Equitable

Distribution

[4] Considering the Statutory Factors

[5] Analyzing What Constitutes Property

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

You can contact us

or visit our catalog

to determine which

of our law libraries

own the treatises

cited.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 9

Chapter 37. Principles of property division

§ 37.01 Theories and Principles

[b] Equitable distribution: an overview

[i] Equitable distribution defined

[ii] Goals of equitable distribution

[iii] Validity of equitable distribution statutes

[v] "All property" regimes

• Understanding Family Law 4th ed., by John DeWitt

Gregory et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable distribution of property

§10.03. Characterizing property for the purpose of

equitable distribution

[B]. All property equitable distribution

jurisdictions

• 2 Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 42. Equitable distribution doctrine

§ 42:1. General aspects of equitable distribution

§ 42:3. Meaning of "Equitable," "Just," or "Fair"

• 1 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 1. Introduction to equitable distribution

§ 1.1. The equitable distribution concept

§ 1.2. Equitable distribution: background and

overview

§ 1.3. –History

§ 1.4. –Policy

§ 1.5. –Current trends

§ 1.6. Constitutionality

§ 1.7. Retroactive application

§ 1.8. Equitable distribution practice

Chapter 2. Property Division Systems

§ 2.1. Introduction

§ 2.2. Goals of Property Division

§ 2.7. Equitable distribution

§ 2.8. All property model

§ 2.9. Dual classification model

§ 2.10. All property versus dual classification: a

comparison

• Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, The American

Law Institute, Thomson West, 2002 with 2023 supplement

(also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 4. Division of Property Upon Dissolution

§ 1. Introductory Provisions

§ 2. Definition and Characterization of Property

§ 3. Allocation of Property on Dissolution of

Marriage

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 10

LAW REVIEWS:

• Jennifer F. Dalenta, Mickey v. Mickey: The Long-awaited

Clarification in the Landscape of Equitable Distribution of

Marital Assets, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 949 (February 2011).

• Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of

the Law of Family Dissolution on Property Division, 2001

B.Y.U.L. Rev. 891 (February 2001)

• Ann Laquer Estin, International Divorce: Litigating Marital

Property and Support Rights, 45 Family Law Quarterly

293 (Fall 2001)

WEBSITES

• Divorce and Money Matters, a booklet by the Connecticut

Women’s Education and Legal Fund

Public access to law

review databases is

available on-site at

each of our law

libraries.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 11

Table 1: Modification

Case Decisions on Modification

Walzer v. Walzer,

209 Conn. App.

604, 615, 268

A.3d 1187

(2022).

• “Although the court does not have the authority to modify a

property assignment, a court, after distributing property,

which includes assigning the debts and liabilities of the

parties, does have the authority to issue postjudgment

orders effectuating its judgment. ... [I]t is ... within the

equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders

[are] required to protect the integrity of [its original]

judgment. ... This court has explained the difference between

postjudgment orders that modify a judgment rather than

effectuate it. A modification is [a] change; an alteration or

amendment which introduces new elements into the details,

or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and

effect of the subject-matter intact. ... In contrast, an order

effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to protect

the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring the parties’

timely compliance therewith. ...

If a party's motion can fairly be construed as seeking an

effectuation of the judgment rather than a modification of

the terms of the property settlement, this court must favor

that interpretation. ... Similarly, when determining whether

the new order is a modification, we examine the practical

effect of the ruling on the original order.” (Internal citations

omitted)

Silver v. Silver,

200 Conn. App.

505, 519, 238

A3d 823 (2021).

• “‘The Superior Court has jurisdiction to assign property in

connection with a dissolution of marriage action, in

accordance with § 46b-81, but unlike periodic alimony or

child support, which usually are modifiable, the assignment

of property is nonmodifiable.’ Taylor v. Taylor, 57 Conn. App.

528, 533, 752 A.2d 1113 (2000). That is not to say that a

property assignment is never subject to modification.

Pursuant to § 52-212a, a court may open and modify a

property assignment in acting on a motion seeking such

relief filed within four months of the judgment. See

Passamano v. Passamano, 228 Conn. 85, 89 n.4, 634 A.2d

891 (1993) (‘a property division order generally cannot be

modified by the trial court after the dissolution decree is

entered, subject only to being opened within four months

from the date the judgment is rendered under ... § 52-212a’

(emphasis added)); Fitzsimons v Fitzsimons, 116 Conn. App.

449, 454–55, 975 A.2d 729 (2009) (concluding that,

pursuant to § 52-212a, trial court was vested with discretion

to modify property assignment in granting motion seeking

modification filed within six days of dissolution judgment).”

Equitable Distribution of Property- 12

Lawrence v.

Cords, 165 Conn.

App. 473, 483-

484, 139 A.3d

778 (2016).

• “‘Although the court does not have the authority to modify a

property assignment, a court, after distributing property,

which includes assigning the debts and liabilities of the

parties, does have the authority to issue postjudgment

orders effectuating its judgment.’ . . . Roos v. Roos, 84

Conn. App. 415, 421-22, 853 A.2d. 642, cert. denied, 271

Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004). ‘[I]t is …within the

equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever

orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original]

judgment.’ Santoro v. Santoro, 70 Conn. App. 212, 217, 797

A.2d 592 (2002).”

Sousa v. Sousa,

322 Conn. 757,

777-780, 143

A.3d 578 (2016).

• “… as the Appellate Court has recently recognized,

Connecticut's case law is in conflict ‘regarding whether the

modification of a property distribution postdissolution

implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction or merely

its statutory authority.’ Lawrence v. Cords, 165 Conn. App.

473, 483 n. 8, 139 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 907,

140 A.3d 221 (2016) … The mere existence of this conflict,

along with the Superior Court's general jurisdiction over

family matters under § 46b-1, demonstrates that, even if we

assume, without deciding, that the restriction of

postjudgment modification of property distributions in § 46b-

86 (a) is in fact jurisdictional in nature, it is far from ‘entirely

obvious’ that Judge Resha was without subject matter

jurisdiction in this case when he modified the pension

distribution. See Broaca v. Broaca, supra, 181 Conn. at 472

(Peters, J., dissenting); Wells v. Wells, 698 N.W.2d 504, 510

(S.D. 2005). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate

Court improperly determined that it was ‘entirely obvious’

that Judge Resha lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

modify the underlying judgment of dissolution in 2007.”

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them.

Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your local law

librarian to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 13

Section 2: Classification of Property

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to what types of property are

classified as property in Connecticut as part of an action for

dissolution, legal separation or annulment of marriage.

DEFINITION:

• Classification of marital property: “whether the

resource is property within § 46b-81 to be equitably

distributed....” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792-793,

663 A.2d 365 (1995).

• Marital property: “At the time of entering a decree

annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation

pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior

Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the

estate of the other spouse. The court may pass title to real

property to either party or to a third person or may order

the sale of such real property, without any act by either

spouse, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper

mode to carry the decree into effect.” Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 46b-81 (2023).

• Types of property interests and expectancy: “Our

Supreme Court in Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 618-

19, 974 A.2d 641 (2009), further explained: ‘The

legislature has not seen fit to define [the] critical term

[property within the meaning of § 46b-81], leaving it to the

courts to determine its meaning through application on a

case-by-case basis…As we noted previously, this court has

generally taken a rather broad and comprehensive view of

the meaning of the term property for purposes of equitable

distribution…We have not erased altogether, however, the

limitations inherent in the term. We continue to recognize

that the marital estate divisible pursuant to § 46b-81 refers

to interests already acquired, not to expected or unvested

interests, or to interests that the court has not

quantified…’” Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837,

849, 88 A.3d 559 (2014).

STATUTES:

• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)

§ 46b-81(a). “At the time of entering a decree annulling or

dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a

complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may

assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of

the other spouse. The court may pass title to real

property to either party or to a third person or may order

the sale of such real property, without any act by either

spouse, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper

mode to carry the decree into effect.” [Emphasis added.]

CHECKLISTS:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

You can visit your

local law library or

search the most

recent statutes and

public acts on the

Connecticut General

Assembly website to

confirm that you are

using the most up-

to-date statutes.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 14

Part IV. Assessing pendente lite property

considerations

§ 6.20. Checklist

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

§ 6.24. Checklist

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

§ 6.30. Checklist

CASES:

• Powers v. Hiranandani, 197 Conn. App. 384, 399-400, 232

A.3d 116 (2020). “Although he testified at trial that he

inherited Monesh's 1 percent interest in Lantern Circle, on

appeal the defendant in this court argues that because

Monesh's estate had not been settled at the time of

dissolution, his inheritance had not yet been valued[…]The

question we must answer is whether, at the time it

dissolved the parties' marriage, the court properly ordered

the defendant to transfer his rights, title and interest in

Lantern Circle to the plaintiff. We conclude that the court's

order was proper.”

• Dinunzio v. Dinunzio, 180 Conn. App. 64, 75, 182 A.3d 706

(2018). “The court did not mention the plaintiff's pension in

its property distribution orders, omitting it completely from

the category entitled: ‘Pension, IRA and Retirement Assets.’

It thus did not assign the pension a value, or order that it

be distributed to either party. Nowhere in its decision,

moreover, did the court state that it was considering the

pension as an offset or a balance against any of its other

financial orders. It is therefore clear that the trial court

improperly classified the plaintiff's pension only as a source

of income, not as property subject to equitable distribution.

‘[T]he issues involving financial orders are entirely

interwoven, [and] [t]he rendering of a judgment in a

complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic,

each element of which may be dependent on the other.’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Grant, 171

Conn. App. 851, 869, 158 A.3d 419 (2017). Because the

trial court's failure to classify the plaintiff's pension as

property for equitable distribution is not severable from its

other financial orders, this case must be remanded for a

new trial on all financial orders.”

• Thomasi v. Thomasi, 181 Conn. App. 822, 836-837, 188

A.3d 743 (2018). “On the basis of our review of the

dissolution agreement, we conclude that the trial court

incorrectly determined that the language in paragraph 9B is

clear and unambiguous. The term ‘marital portion’ of the

defendant's pension contains a latent ambiguity because

the determination of that amount is not self-defining and

can be deduced by using more than one methodology, each

of which yields a significantly different outcome. Also, the

term ‘marital portion’ is not elsewhere defined in the

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 15

dissolution agreement. As noted, although Attorney

McMahon expressed a preference for utilizing the coverture

method for determining the marital portion of a pension,

she, with equal clarity, also acknowledged the legitimacy of

the use of the subtraction option for making such a

determination. Because the term ‘marital portion’ can be

reasonably susceptible to more than one method of

calculation not specified in the parties' agreement, a latent

ambiguity exists in the parties' agreement.

In its decision to rely on extrinsic evidence to resolve

the parties' disagreement as to the import of the term

‘marital portion,’ the court's focus on Attorney McMahon's

usual practice was misplaced. Rather, the task of the court

in resolving the ambiguity was to discern the intent of the

parties in employing the language at issue.”

• Hornung v. Hornung, 323 Conn. 144, 152, 146 A.3d 912

(2016). “We conclude that the trial court properly awarded

lump sum alimony, and not a property distribution in

violation of the agreement, for two reasons: (1) the trial

court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as

alimony and, as such, its incidental consideration of two

factors in § 46b-81, the property distribution statute, does

not demonstrate that the award is a functional property

distribution; and (2) the fact that the combined alimony

and child support awards apparently exceed the plaintiff's

claimed expenses does not demonstrate that the award is

actually a property distribution, in light of the standard of

living of the marriage and the equitable and statutory

factors considered by the trial court.”

• May v. May, Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex at

Middletown, No. FA05-4003715-S (Dec. 29, 2016) (63

Conn. L. Rptr. 610) (2016 LEXIS 3446). “…[T]he parties

entered into an Agreement for an entirely new judgment

dissolving a new marriage occurring after the First

Dissolution. In making that Agreement, they each had the

right and power to dispose of the assets they owned at the

time, including assets acquired under the First Dissolution.

If the defendant's claim to the payment of $90,000 by the

plaintiff survived their remarriage and the other equitable

defenses raised by the plaintiff, then the claim constituted

an asset or property of the defendant at the time of the

Second Dissolution. If it was not an issue that was actually

raised during the course of the negotiation of the

Agreement, it was an issue which could have been raised.

This court concludes that any remedial orders it might enter

at this time requiring the plaintiff to pay said sum to the

defendant would conflict with the release and integration

language in the Second Dissolution. If the defendant

believes that the Second Dissolution does not properly

address the issue of the $90,000 payment in accordance

with the intent of the parties, or that there was a mistake

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 16

in the Second Dissolution as to the debt, then her recourse

is to seek the correction of that judgment.”

• Curtis Wood v. Deborah Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 717,

125 A.3d 1040 (2015). “The plaintiff’s interest in the LLC

was previously acquired during the term of the marriage

and was presently existing at the time of the trial. He

possessed a contractual, enforceable right to the funds

owed to him by the LLC under the terms of the

agreement…We recognize that his receipt of the funds was

contingent upon future events, i.e., the sale of the

Dearfield Lane property at such a price that there would be

enough proceeds from the sale for the LLC to pay off the

liens, mortgages, and costs and then to pay the plaintiff the

funds owed to him. It is well settled, however, that ‘[t]he

fact that a contractual right is contingent on future events

does not degrade that right to an expectancy.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) [Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn.

783, 797, 663 A.2d 365 (1995)]. We conclude, therefore,

that the court properly characterized the plaintiff’s interest

in the LLC as distributable property for the purposes of §

46b-81.”

• Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App. 201, 226, 118 A. 3d

657 (2015). “Individual financial orders in a dissolution

action are part of the carefully crafted mosaic that

comprises the entire asset relocation plan … Under the

mosaic doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a

collection of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as

a seamless collection of interdependent elements.

Consistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the

mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows reviewing

courts to remand cases for reconsideration of all financial

orders even though the review process might reveal a flaw

only in the alimony, property distribution or child support

awards.” Internal quotation marks omitted.

• Reville v. Reville, 312 Conn. 428, 470-71, 93 A.3d 1076

(2014). “To summarize, the trial court improperly

concluded that the defendant's unvested pension, in May,

2001, definitively was not distributable marital property

pursuant to § 46b–81. Because the court employed an

incorrect legal analysis to conclude that the pension was

not property, it improperly refused to admit and/or

consider evidence of the pension's value, evidence which

was relevant to the issues of whether it had been disclosed

and whether it would have affected the outcome of the

dissolution action. Consequently, the trial court's denial of

the plaintiff's motion to open was an abuse of discretion.

The trial court applied the correct burden of proof to the

plaintiff's claim, and accordingly, did not commit plain error

in that regard. The judgment is reversed and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.”

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 17

• Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837, 88 A.3d 559

(2014). “The cause of action in Perricone v. Rousseau,

supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6027402-S, is

‘property’ for the purpose of § 46b-81. ‘There is no doubt

that a right in action, [when] it comes into existence under

common-law principles, and is not given by statute as a

mere penalty or without equitable basis, is as much

property as any tangible possession…’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Silver v. Silver, 112 Conn. 145, 150, 151

A. 524 (1930).” p. 849

“The value of the chose in action, on the other hand,

determined at least in part by the party’s chances of

prevailing, may be unknown, and, indeed, the action may

turn out to be worthless. Nevertheless, that fact is

irrelevant to its classification as a property interest. See . .

. Bender v. Bender, [258 Conn. 733, 749-50, 785 A.2d 197

(2001)].” p. 850

• Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 974 A.2d 641 (2009).

“…it is clear that, whatever interest the defendant had in

potential disability payments under § 5-192p, that interest

was not, at the time of dissolution, a presently existing

enforceable right to a future benefit.” p. 628

“…analyzing an interest that does not become a ‘right,’

much less actual, possessory property, prior to the

occurrence of some future event or events involves a

second step. We must look at the nature of the contingency

to determine whether it is so speculative as to be deemed a

mere expectancy or, conversely, whether it is ‘sufficiently

concrete, reasonable and justifiable as to constitute a

presently existing property interest for equitable

distribution purposes.’ Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn.

749…” p. 629

“Furthermore, such an interest, even if it was sufficiently

concrete to constitute distributable property, could not be

classified as distributable under the facts of this case. A

benefit derived from an injury occurring years after

dissolution, meant solely to compensate for the loss of

future wages, simply does not represent the ‘fruits’ of the

marital partnership that §46b-81 is designed to equitably

parse.” p. 631

• Ranfone v. Ranfone, 103 Conn. App. 243, 928 A.2d 575

(2007). “In Bender v. Bender . . . 258 Conn. 745-46, the

Supreme Court explained that ‘the theme running through’

our case law interpreting what property may be considered

marital property pursuant to § 46b-81 ‘pays mindful

consideration to the equitable purpose of our statutory

distribution scheme, rather than to mechanically applied

rules of property law. In order to achieve justice, equity

looks to substance, and not to mere form.’ The court

further explained that ‘retirement benefits, whether vested

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

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available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 18

or unvested, are significant marital assets, and may be…the

only significant marital asset. To consider…pension benefits

a nondivisible marital asset would be to blink [the court’s]

eyes at reality.’” p. 251

“The Supreme Court explained: ‘The fact that a portion of

the pension benefits, once vested, will represent the

defendant’s service to the fire department after the

dissolution does not preclude us from classifying the entire

unvested pension as marital property.’” p. 252

• Greenan v. Greenan, 150 Conn. App. 289, 309-311, 91 A.

3d 909 (2014). “The plaintiff argues that the court’s orders

regarding the 529 accounts violated General Statutes §

46b-56c(f) because the amount in the 529 accounts far

exceeds tuition at the University of Connecticut for both

children. He argues that the court improperly disguised the

assignment of his property (the 529 accounts) as an

educational order. He further argues that the court, in

fashioning this order, failed to take into account the first

factor of § 46b-56c (c), the parents’ income.

Although 529 accounts pertain to education expenses; see

26 U.S.C. § 529; the court’s orders regarding the plaintiff’s

529 accounts were not educational support orders pursuant

to § 46b-56c. . . The court’s orders with respect to the 529

accounts did not require the plaintiff to provide support in

the future for the children to attend college. Rather, the

court ordered that the plaintiff continue to maintain the

accounts, which he had previously established and in which

he had elected to place more thatn $280,000. The court

further ordered that the defendant, to whom the court had

granted sole custody of the minor children, be the

custodian of the 529 accounts. The court ordered, pursuant

to § 46b-56c, that the defendant, not the plaintiff, ‘be

responsible for the educational expenses of the minor

children . . . . ‘ The accounts, per the court’s order and 26

U.S.C. § 529 were for the benefit of the minor children. The

courts’ order simply changed the person who was the

custodian of the accounts, which were previously existing

property, from the plaintiff to the defendant.

The 529 accounts were marital property pursuant to

General Statutes § 46b-81, under the broad definition given

to that term by our legislature. . .

The court did not err in its distribution of the 529 accounts.

It is afforded broad discretion in its award of property.”

• Kiniry v. Kiniry, 71 Conn. App. 614, 624, 803 A.2d 352

(2002). “On the one hand, stock options that are awarded

prior to the date of dissolution and awarded solely for past

services are considered to be earned during the marriage

and are, therefore, considered marital property subject to

equitable distribution under § 46b-81 . . . . On the other

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

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them. Updating case

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are still good law.

You can contact your

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update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 19

hand, stock options that are earned prior to the date of

dissolution, but that constitute compensation for future

services, are not considered to be earned during the

marriage and, therefore, are not subject to distribution as

marital property under § 46b-81.”

• Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 748, 785 A.2d 197

(2001). “[I]n determining whether a certain interest is

property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81,

we look to whether a party's expectation of a benefit

attached to that interest was too speculative to constitute

divisible marital property . . . . In cases in which an interest

was so speculative as to constitute a mere expectancy, we

concluded that it was not property subject to equitable

distribution . . . whereas, in cases in which an interest was

not so speculative as to constitute a mere expectancy, but

rather a presently existing interest in property, we treated

it as property subject to equitable distribution.”

• Borneman v. Borneman, 245 Conn. 508, 517-518, 752

A.2d 978 (1998). “Despite the fact that the stock options at

issue in this case had not yet ‘matured’ or ‘vested’ at the

time of dissolution, the options created an enforceable right

in the defendant.”

• Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 168, 708 A.2d 949

(1998). “By contrast, the benefits attendant on a newly

acquired professional degree have not vested at the time of

dissolution, and any benefits derived will accrue only after

the dissolution of the marriage. These benefits may never

accrue for any number of reasons because the holder has

no enforceable right to earn any particular income in his or

her chosen profession. Consequently, we conclude that an

advanced degree is properly classified as an expectancy

rather than a presently existing property interest. It is not,

therefore, subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution

pursuant to § 46b-81.”

• Cooley v. Cooley, 32 Conn. App. 152, 162-163, 628

A.2d 608, cert. denied 228 Conn. 901, 634 A.2d 295

(1993). “The plaintiff had no vested right at any time to the

trust corpus that would permit its inclusion in the marital

estate.”

• Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 232, 527 A.2d 1184

(1987). “That the plaintiff must pay the defendant a one

third share of the assets he may acquire under his mother’s

will and on termination of her inter vivos trust only if and

when this acquisition materializes does not transmute such

expected assets into ‘property’ of the plaintiff. . . The

present order, while contingent, is definite; yet the date

upon which it may take effect, as well as the situation of

the parties upon that date, is necessarily uncertain. Until

our legislature amends § 46b-81 to authorize contingent

transfers of expected property, we shall not read such an

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 20

intent into the statute. We have concluded that the award

to the defendant of a share of the plaintiff's expectancy

cannot be sustained as a permissible transfer of property

under 46b-81.”

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable

distribution

# 671-718 Property subject to distribution or division

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 475-489. Property subject to division

§§ 490-512. Specific types of property

§§ 490-493. In general

§§ 494-496. Marital residence

§§ 497-500. Professional degrees, license, and

practice

§§ 501-503. Pension rights; other benefit payments

and awards

§§ 504-506. Government pensions

§§ 507-512. Other benefit payments and awards

• 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

Disposition of Property

§§ 908-924. Divisibility of assets owned by the spouses

• 27C C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

§§ 957-983. Specific kinds of property or interests

§§ 957-962. Homestead or marital residence

§§ 963-970. Retirement, pension, and other

employment-related benefits

§§ 971-983. Other kinds of property or interests

• 193 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 101, Proof of Equitable

Distribution of Marital Debt, by Anne E. Melley, Thomson

West, 2021 (Also available on Westlaw).

I. Legal Background – In general

II. Elements of Proof

III. Model Pleadings and Discovery

IV. Proof of Equitable Distribution of Marital Debt

• See Table 1 for ALR annotations

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with

Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West,

2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 26. Assets subject to distribution

§ 26.1. In general

§ 26.2. Definition of property

§ 26.3. Identification of particular assets for

distribution

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 21

§ 26.4. Real estate

§ 26.5. Marital home

§ 26.6. Entirety property or joint tenancy holdings

§ 26.7. Personal property and rights

§ 26.8. Financial interests

§ 26.9. Insurance annuities and other policy benefits

§ 26.10. Receivables

§ 26.11. Pension and retirement benefits and

interests

§ 26.12. Military retirement benefits and interests

§ 26.13. Social security benefits

§ 26.14. Other employment related benefits and

assets

§ 26.15. Professional licenses and degrees

§ 26.16. Business interests and professional

practices

§ 26.17. Gifts

§ 26.18. Inheritances, trusts and other estate

interests

§ 26.19. Property acquired before the marriage

§ 26.20. Property acquired after dissolution action

commenced

§ 26.21. Fraudulent transfers and property

transferred while action is pending

§ 26.22. Debts and liabilities

§ 26.23. Tort and worker's compensation claims and

other pending actions

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part IV. Assessing pendente lite property

considerations

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

• Understanding Family Law, 4th ed., by John DeWitt Gregory

et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable Distribution of Property

§10.09. Professional goodwill

[A] Goodwill: definition and basic concepts

[B] Classification of professional goodwill

[2] Classification of goodwill for equitable

distribution

[a] Professional goodwill as divisible

property

[b] Professional goodwill not divisible

§10.10. Pensions and retirement benefits

[A] Overview

[B] Basic terms and concepts

[C] Characterization of pension benefits

[H] Military retirement benefits

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 22

• A Practical Guide to Divorce in Connecticut, Hon. Barry F.

Armata and Campbell D. Barrett, editors, Massachusetts

Continuing Legal Education, 2013, with 2018 supplement.

Chapter 5. The definition of property

• Value of Pensions in Divorce, 4th ed., by Marvin Snyder,

Wolters Kluwer, 2010, with 2013 supplement.

Chapter 1. Pension assets in divorce

Chapter 2. Defined benefit pension plans

Chapter 3. Defined contribution plans

Chapter 5. Federal retirement systems

• 1 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 5. Classification

§ 5.1. General principles

§ 5.2. The classification process

§ 5.3. Burden of proof - Identification

§ 5.4. Burden of proof - Classification

§§ 5.8—5.12. Property

§ 5.13-- 5.19. Acquired by the parties

§ 5.20-- 5.63. Property acquired: unitary vs. mixed

property

• 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 6. Specific Types of Property

§ 6.1. Introduction

§ 6.2. Retirement plans: background and

terminology

§ 6.4. Military retirement pay: federal law

§§ 6.5—6.12. Other military service benefits: federal

law

§§ 6.13—6.17. Other federal government benefits:

federal law

§§ 6.18—6.20. Private retirement plans: federal law-

-—qualified domestic relations orders

§§ 6.21—6.27. Private retirement benefits: state law

in general

§§ 6.47—6.51. Stock options and other restricted

employment benefits

§ 6.59. Workers' compensation proceeds

§§ 6.60—6.63. Degrees and licenses

§§ 6.71—6.75. Businesses and professional practices

§§ 6.76—6.81. Intellectual property

§ 6.82. Prizes and awards

§§ 6.83—6.86. Marital home

§§ 6.87—6.90. Insurance proceeds and policies

§ 6.91. Future inheritances and gifts

§§ 6.92—6.94. Interests in trusts

§§ 6.95—6.101. Debts

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 36. Valuation of marital property

Each of our law

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Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

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our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

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References to online

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Remote access is not

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 23

§ 36.03. Defining property

[1]. Professional degrees and licenses

[2]. Professional goodwill

[3]. Retirement benefits

Chapter 37. Principles of property distribution

§ 37.04. Classification of property

§ 37.07. The marital home

§ 37.08. Business interests

§ 37.09. Professional goodwill

§ 37.10. Increased earning capacity resulting from a

professional license, graduate degree, or education

§ 37.11. Retirement benefits

§ 37.12. Federal government benefits

[1] Social security

[2] Military retirement

§ 37.13. Personal injury, workers' compensation,

and other awards and claims

§ 37.14. Debts

Chapter 38. Guide to equitable distribution

§ 38.02. Step Number One: Property Subject to

Distribution

• Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 3. Ownership of personality by husband and wife

Chapter 9. Pensions and reserve or retired pay

§ 9:1. Generally

§ 9:2. Spousal rights in retirement and

pension benefits—Generally

§ 9:6. —Military retirement pay

Chapter 37. Services by wife in husband’s business

Chapter 47. Spouse’s professional degree license as

marital property

Chapter 48. Pension or retirement benefits as subject to

award or division

Chapter 49. Accrued vacation, holiday time, and sick

leave as marital or separate property

Chapter 50. Workers’ compensation benefits as marital

property

Chapter 53. Appreciation in value of separate property

during marriage without contribution by either spouse

as separate or marital property

Chapter 54. Treatment of stock options for purposes of

dividing marital property

Each of our law

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Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

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the other treatises

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References to online

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 24

Table 2: ALR Annotations on Classification of Marital Property

Accounting

Practice

77 ALR4th 645, Divorce And Separation: Goodwill In Accounting

Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of

Marriage, by Martin J. McMahon, Thomson West, 1989.

Attorney's

Unliquidated

Contingent Fee

Contracts

44 ALR5th 671, Divorce And Separation: Attorney's Contingent

Fee Contracts As Marital Property Subject To Distribution, by

Charles W. Davis, Thomson West, 1996.

Degree or

License

3 ALR6th 447, Spouse’s Professional Degree Or License As

Marital Property For Purposes Of Alimony, Support, Or Property

Settlement, by William M. Howard, Thomson West, 2005.

Dental Practice

76 ALR4th 1025, Divorce And Separation: Medical Or Dental

Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of

Marriage, by Martin J. McMahon, Thomson West, 1989.

Inherited

Property

38 ALR6th 313, Inherited Property as Marital or Separate

Property in Divorce Action, by George L. Blum, Thomson West,

2008.

Intellectual

Property

80 ALR5th 487, Copyright, Patent, Of Other Intellectual

Property As Marital Property For Purposes Of Alimony, Support,

Or Divorce Settlement, by Frank J. Wozniak, Thomson West,

2000.

Law Practice

79 ALR4th 171, Divorce And Separation: Goodwill In Law

Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of

Marriage, by Martin J. McMahon, Thomson West, 1990.

Lottery

Winnings

124 ALR5th 537, Division of Lottery Proceeds in Divorce

Proceedings, by Amy P. Bunk, Thomson West, 2004.

Medical Practice

76 ALR4th 1025, Divorce And Separation: Goodwill in Medical

Or Dental Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On

Dissolution Of Marriage, by Martin J. McMahon, Thomson West,

1989.

Military Services

59 ALR6th 433, Construction and Application of Federal

Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act in State Court

Divorce Proceedings, by Ann K. Wooster, Thomson West, 2010.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 25

Table 2: ALR Annotations on Classification of Marital Property (cont'd)

Pension

94 ALR3d 176, Pension Or Retirement Benefits As Subject To

Award Or Division By Court In Settlement Of Property Rights

Between Spouses, by Charles C. Marvel, Thomson West, 1979.

Personal Injury

Settlement or

Recovery

109 ALR5th 1, Divorce and Separation: Determination of

Whether Proceeds from Personal Injury Settlement or Recovery

Constitute Marital Property, by Kurtis A. Kemper, Thomson

West, 2003.

Personal Injury

Action

80 ALR5th 533, Spouse’s Cause Of Action For Negligent

Personal Injury, Or Proceeds Therefrom, As Separate Or

Community Property, by Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Thomson West,

2000.

Retirement

benefits

94 ALR3d 176, Pension Or Retirement Benefits As Subject To

Award Or Division By Court In Settlement Of Property Rights

Between Spouses, by Charles C. Marvel, Thomson West, 1979.

Separate

Property,

Appreciation in

value

39 ALR6th 205, Divorce and Separation: Appreciation in Value

of Separate Property During Marriage with Contribution by

Either Spouse as Separate or Community Property (Doctrine of

"Active Appreciation"), by George L. Blum, Thomson West,

2008.

24 ALR4th 453, Divorce And Separation: Appreciation In Value

Of Separate Property During Marriage Without Contribution By

Either Spouse As Separate Or Community Property, by Michael

A. Rosenhouse, Thomson West, 1983.

Sick leave

78 ALR4th 1107, Accrued Vacation, Holiday Time, And Sick

Leave As Marital Or Separate Property, by Gavin L. Phillips,

Thomson West, 1990.

Stock options

46 ALR4th 640, Divorce And Separation: Treatment Of Stock

Options For Purposes Of Dividing Marital Property, by Eric

Hollowell, Thomson West, 1986.

Vacation

(accrued)

78 ALR4th 1107, Accrued Vacation, Holiday Time, And Sick

Leave As Marital Or Separate Property, by Gavin L. Phillips,

Thomson West, 1990.

Workmen’s

compensation

30 ALR5th 139, Divorce And Separation: Worker’s

Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject To

Distribution,” Thomson West, 1995.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 26

Section 3: Valuation of Assets

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to valuation of property

determined to be property assets relating to marriage.

SEE ALSO:

Section 4. Specific issues in property valuation

DEFINITIONS:

• Fair market value: “the price that would probably result

from fair negotiations between a willing seller and a willing

buyer, taking into account all of the factors….” Brooks v.

Brooks, 121 Conn. App. 659, 668, 997 A.2d 504 (2010).

• Determination of Value: “We begin our analysis by noting

that a trial court has broad discretion in determining the

value of property. In assessing the value of …property…the

trier arrives at his own conclusions by weighing the opinions

of the appraisers, the claims of the parties, and his own

general knowledge of the elements going to establish value,

and then employs the most appropriate method of

determining valuation…The trial court has the right to accept

so much of the testimony of the experts and the recognized

appraisal methods which they employed as he finds

applicable; his determination is reviewable only if he

misapplies, overlooks, or gives a wrong or improper effect to

any test or consideration which it was his duty to regard.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Porter v. Porter, 61

Conn. App. 791, 799-800, 769 A.2d 725 (2001).” Wood v.

Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 718, 125 A.3d 1040 (2015).

• Date of valuation: “The plaintiff contends that determining

loss by looking to the stock value at the time of the trial on

remand entails the use of an arbitrary date in time to fix the

value because that value fluctuates daily. We disagree that

assessing the value of the stocks and options at the time of

the remand trial was arbitrary or irrational. At the time of

that trial, the court could determine with certainty the

precise value of the loss to the marital estate caused by the

plaintiff's transactions. The defendant rightfully expected

that the plaintiff would obey the automatic orders and that

the stocks and options would remain in the marital estate

until distributed to the parties by the court following a trial

on remand. If the plaintiff had not sold the stock or

exercised the options, and the trial court divided the marital

assets between the parties, including the stocks and options,

the defendant would have enjoyed the benefit of any

increase in their value. The plaintiff, however, unilaterally

removed the stocks and options from the marital estate,

preventing the court from distributing them in the form of

stocks and options, and thus depriving the defendant of the

opportunity to benefit from the increase in their value.

Lacking the stocks and options to distribute, the court

essentially awarded the defendant the value that her

putative share of the stocks and options would have had at

Equitable Distribution of Property- 27

the time of the remand trial, putting the plaintiff in precisely

the position she would have occupied at that time if the

plaintiff had not violated the automatic orders.” O'Brien v.

O'Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 110-111, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017).

CHECKLISTS:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

§ 6.24. Checklist

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

§ 6.30. Checklist

• 2 Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 42. Equitable distribution doctrine

§ 42.85. Checklist: older client

CASES:

• Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua, 201 Conn. App. 261, 275-276, 242

A.3d 542 (2020). “With respect to valuation, the value

assigned to property in a dissolution proceeding should

generally be calculated at the time of dissolution. . . In the

present case, however, the defendant did not provide the

trial court with a financial affidavit. In a dissolution

proceeding, both parties ‘are required to itemize all of their

assets in a financial affidavit and to provide the court with

the approximate value of each asset.’ . . .

In Powers, the defendant did not provide the court with the

value of certain real property on his financial affidavit. As a

result, the trial court relied on testimony and other financial

affidavits to determine the value of the property in dispute. .

. On appeal to this court, the Powers defendant argued that

the trial court abused its discretion by ‘equitably distributing

property between parties without properly determining the

value of the real property.’ . . . This court rejected that

argument and held that if parties fail to provide the

approximate value of each asset on their financial affidavits

in a dissolution proceeding, then ‘the equitable nature of the

proceedings precludes them from later seeking to have the

financial orders overturned on the basis that the court had

before it too little information as to the value of the assets

distributed.’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) . . . Accordingly, this court concluded that, without

evidence of the value of the disputed property, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion. . . The same is true in the

present case.”

• Merk-Gould v. Gould, 184 Conn. App. 512, 523, 195 A.3d

458 (2018). “…[W]e conclude that the court abused its

discretion in valuing the defendant's interests in private

equity companies on the basis of the cost of the assets at

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 28

the time of their purchase, rather than the value of the

assets as of the date of the dissolution.”

• Cimino v. Cimino, 174 Conn. App. 1, 12, 164 A.3d 787, cert.

denied at 327 Conn. 929, 171 A.3d 455 (2017). “Aside from

speculation and conjecture, there is no evidence that the

defendant had knowledge of either the total value of the

pension or the details in the pension booklet that would

allow for a calculation of said value. Additionally, the plaintiff

failed to demonstrate that the defendant should have known

that the information contained in the pension booklet was

something that he should have disclosed. Furthermore, we

disagree with the plaintiff's supposition that the defendant

engaged in ‘gamesmanship’ to deceive both the trial court

and the plaintiff with respect to this financial information. On

the basis of its subordinate factual findings regarding the

conduct of the defendant, the court properly determined that

there was no probable cause to justify opening the judgment

for the limited purpose of discovery. See, e.g., Sousa v.

Sousa, 173 Conn. App. 755, --- A.3d --- (2017). We cannot

conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the

plaintiff's motion to open with respect to the issue of the

defendant's pension.”

• Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341, 352, 125 A.3d

606 (2015). “At the outset, we note that, as a general

proposition, ‘the trial court need not necessarily specify a

valuation method used. Nor is the court required to set forth

specific factors that were considered in arriving at that

determination.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks

v. Brooks, 121 Conn. App. 659, 667, 997 A.2d 504 (2010).

In this case, neither party provided the court with expert

testimony regarding the value of the property in Jamaica. As

a result, the court was left to rely upon the testimony of the

parties and its general knowledge to establish the value of

the property.”

• Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn. App. 106, 121, 920 A.2d 340

(2007). “[t]he principle that requires the court to value

assets as of the date of dissolution does not absolutely

preclude the court from considering the significance of the

date of separation...[T]he date of separation may be of

significance in determining what is equitable at the time of

distribution. In distributing property… the court is instructed

to consider the contribution of each spouse in the

acquisition, preservation and appreciation of the marital

estate.”

• Sowinski v. Sowinski, 72 Conn. App. 25, 27, 804 A.2d 872

(2002). “On appeal, the defendant specifically challenges the

court's finding with regard to the fair market value of the

Copake property and requests that we reverse the court's

financial orders. He points out that the parties disputed the

value of the Copake property at trial despite the fact that

they had stipulated to the value of the Salisbury property.

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 29

The defendant argues that the court improperly admitted

hearsay as to that issue and that the court relied on such

hearsay, in the absence of any other competent evidence in

support of its finding, when arriving at its valuation of the

Copake property. We agree.”

• Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn. App. 791, 800, 769 A.2d 725

(2001). “Here, neither party provided the court with expert

testimony as to the value of the home. As a result, the court

was left with the claims of the parties and its general

knowledge to establish the value of the home. According to

the defendant, the value of the home was $285,000. The

court, however, determined the value to be $270,000, a

figure slightly less than the value proposed by the plaintiff,

$271,750, which she derived from the mid range of a

market analysis. Given the circumstances the court faced in

determining the value of the marital home, we cannot

conclude that its valuation of $270,000 was clearly

erroneous.”

• Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 760, 785 A.2d 197

(2001). “We conclude that it is within the trial court's

discretion, as it is in the context of vested pension benefits .

. . to choose, on a case-by-case basis, among the present

value method, the present division method of deferred

distribution, and any other valuation method that it deems

appropriate in accordance with Connecticut law . . . .”

• Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 531, 752 A.2d

978 (1998). “The court need not, however, assign specific

values to the parties' assets.”

• Carlos v. Carlos, 19 Conn. App. 416, 419, 562 A.2d 580

(1989). “More important than any speculation about how the

trial court might have arrived at the amount of the

encumbrances is the fact that the parties had never agreed

on these figures. We read the memorandum of decision as

stating that the parties stipulated to facts including the total

amount of the encumbrances. For that reason, we are

constrained to find that the underpinning of the decision is

not sound even though the award may be fair.”

• Cuneo v. Cuneo, 12 Conn. App. 702, 709, 533 A.2d 1226

(1987). “That requirement is simply part of the broader

principle that the financial awards in a marital dissolution

case should be based on the parties' current financial

circumstances to the extent reasonably possible.”

• Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 274-275, 460 A.2d

1260 (1983). “We have approved the capitalization of actual

income as an appropriate method of valuation . . . . In the

present case the defendant's company was, at the time of its

valuation in 1980, a going concern. There was no evidence

that it was in the process of liquidation. Although the trier

was not obliged to accept the income approach he was not

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 30

precluded from doing so merely because the company is a

closely held, ‘one-man’ business.”

• Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 529-530, 429 A.2d 964

(1980). “The defendant first contends that the court could

not properly decide the questions of periodic alimony and

the assignment of property because it lacked sufficient

information respecting the value of the plaintiff's interest in

a closely held corporation, in his life insurance policies and in

his pension rights. This position is curious. In addition to

having access to the plaintiff's financial affidavit, the

defendant was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the

plaintiff at length regarding his financial circumstances.

Further, the defendant had the opportunity to explore the

plaintiff's financial circumstances through a variety of

discovery procedures. Optimal use of the resources might

well have generated additional pertinent facts for the court's

consideration. From the defendant's failure to elicit such

information, however, it in no way follows that the court

acted on insufficient evidence. Reviewing the record in this

regard, we find that there was sufficient financial information

before the court for it to fashion the appropriate orders on

the financial aspects of the case.”

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable distribution

# 760-774 Valuation of property or interest in general

# 850-864 Marital residence or homestead

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 537-549 Valuation

§§ 537-542. In general

§ 538. Time of valuation

§ 539. Change in value after time of valuation

§ 540. Effect of dissipation of marital assets

§ 541. Power to prevent dissipation of marital

assets

§ 542. Expert evidence with respect to valuation

§§ 543-549. Specific types of property

• 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

Disposition of Property—Valuation of assets

§ 925. Generally

§ 926. Measures of value

§ 927. Time of valuation

§ 928. Evidence pertaining to valuation of assets;

experts

• 51 ALR 4th 11, Necessity That Divorce Court Value Property

Before Distributing It, by Sonja A. Soehnel, Thomson West

(1987).

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 31

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with

Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West,

2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 27. Valuation of assets

§ 27.1. In general

§ 27.2. Date of valuation

§ 27.3. Valuation methods and criteria

§ 27.4. Book value

§ 27.5. Assessed value

§ 27.6. Sale price or purchase offer

§ 27.7. Appraisal

§ 27.8. Business type and history

§ 27.9. General economic conditions

§ 27.10. Earning capacity

§ 27.11. Size of holding

§ 27.12. Goodwill and intangible values

§ 27.13. Buy-sell agreements

§ 27.14. Other factors

§ 27.15. Valuation of particular assets

§ 27.16. Real estate

§ 27.18. Professional practices and other closely held

businesses

§ 27.19. Marketable securities

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

• Understanding Family Law, 4th ed., by John DeWitt Gregory

et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable Distribution of Property

§10.09. Professional goodwill

[C] Valuation

[1] Book value

[2] Capitalization of excess earnings

[3] Buy-sell agreements

§10.11. Valuation of assets: general principles

• 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 32

Chapter 6. Specific Types of Property

§ 6.58. Valuation and division of personal injury

awards

§ 6.59. Workers compensation proceeds

§ 6.50. Valuation and distribution of stock options

§ 6.76. Valuation and distribution of intellectual

property

§ 6.82. Prizes and awards

§ 6.83. Division of the marital home

§§ 6.87—6.90. Insurance proceeds and policies

§§ 6.92—6.94. Interests in trusts

§ 6.98. Valuation of marital debts

Chapter 7. Valuation of Assets

§ 7.1. Need to value

§§ 7.2—7.6. Date of valuation

§§ 7.7—7.11. Defining value

§ 7.12. Determining value: rules for the court

§§ 7.13—7.18. Determining value: advice for the

parties

§ 7.19. Valuation of businesses: general rules

§§ 7.20—7.24 Valuation of businesses: total value

approach

§§ 7.25—7.28. Valuation of businesses: going concern

approach

§ 7.29 Valuation of businesses: choosing a method

• Valuing Specific Assets in Divorce, by Robert D. Feder et al.,

Wolters Kluwer, 2000 with 2021-2 supplement (also

available on VitalLaw).

Part I. Closely held businesses

Part II. Professional practices

Part III. Real estate

Part V. Personal property

Part VI. Machinery and equipment

Part VII. Individual Intangible Assets

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 36. Valuation of Marital Property

§ 36.02. The valuation process—an overview

§ 36.06. The date of valuation

§ 36.07. Discovery

§ 36.09. Valuation experts

§ 36.10. The closely held corporation- background

§ 36.11. Valuation methods and the closely held

corporation

§ 36.12. A special look at the professional practice

• 2 Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 43. Necessity that divorce court value property

before distributing it

Chapter 44. Proper date for valuation

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 33

Chapter 51. Method of valuation of life insurance policies

in connection with trial courts division of property

Chapter 55. Valuation of stock options for purposes of

divorce court’s property distribution

• Valuation of Divorce Assets, by Barth H. Goldberg, revised

edition, 2005, with 2023-2024 supplement, Thomson West

(also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 1. Valuation process—Generally

Chapter 2. Experts and the use of them

Chapter 6. Valuation of closely held corporations

Chapter 7. Dealing with corporate stock issues

Chapter 8. Valuation of professional entities, goodwill, and

license interests

Chapter 10. Valuation of wife’s services

Chapter 12. Particular valuations

Chapter 14. Valuation of collectibles

• Valuing Professional Practices and Licenses, A Guide for the

Matrimonial Practitioner, 3rd ed., Ronald L. Brown, ed.,

1998, with 2023-1 supplement, Wolters Kluwer (also

available on VitalLaw).

Part A: Basic concepts in valuing professional practices

Part B: Valuing law practices

Part C: Valuing medical and dental practices

Part D:Valuing accounting practices

Part E: Valuing architectural and engineering practices

Part G: Merger and double counting

Part H: Handling celebrity cases

Part I: Miscellaneous topics

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 34

Section 4: Specific Issues in Property Valuation

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to the valuation of specific

types of assets including pensions, professional licenses,

degrees, and Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs).

DEFINITIONS:

• Goodwill: “It can hardly be doubted that the increment of

value, loosely termed goodwill, that arises from the

established reputation of a business for the quality of its

goods or services may often be found to enhance the value

of professional as well as other enterprises by increasing

their ability to attract patrons.” Eslami v. Eslami, 218

Conn. 801, 813, 591 A.2d 411 (1991).

STATUTES:

• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)

§ 46b-81. Assignment of property and transfer of title

• 42 USC § 407 (2024)

Chapter 7. Social Security

Assignment of benefits

(a) In general

(b) Amendment of section

CHECKLISTS:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

§ 6.24. Checklist

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

§ 6.30. Checklist

CASES:

• Cunningham v. Cunningham, 204 Conn. App. 366, 254

A.3d 330 (2021). “It is well established that pension

benefits are a form of property.” (p. 373)

“The plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial

court granting the motion of the defendant . . . for a

domestic relations order relating to distributions from his

pension plan. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

improperly modified the property division set forth in the

parties' 2011 dissolution judgment by (1) requiring the

plaintiff, at the defendant's direction, to assign a portion of

her 50 percent joint survivor annuity from the defendant's

pension benefit to a third party, (2) requiring the plaintiff

to share in the cost of the 50 percent joint survivor

annuity election under the pension plan, and (3) adopting

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

You can visit your

local law library,

search the most

recent U.S. Code on

the U.S. Code

website or search

the most recent

statutes and public

acts on the

Connecticut General

Assembly website to

confirm that you are

accessing the most

up-to-date laws.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 35

a formula that could result in an unjustified reduction to

the plaintiff's marital portion of the retirement benefit that

she receives under the pension plan. We disagree and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.” (p. 368)

• Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 200 Conn. App. 63, 79-80, 239 A.3d

1216 (2020). “The cross complaint did not allege that Ferri

failed to act prior to the decanting. The cross complaint

alleged that Ferri failed to act after becoming aware of the

trustees' decanting of the 1983 trust. The court, therefore,

properly rejected Ferri's contention that the Parrino

defendants lacked probable cause because they knew that

Ferri only learned about the decanting after the fact.”

• Bilbao v. Goodwin, 333 Conn. 599, 616, 217 A.3d 977,

(2019). “Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of

formal legislative guidance on the question, the

contractual approach is the appropriate first step in

determining the disposition of pre-embryos upon divorce.

As set forth in part IV of this opinion, we do not decide

how a court should determine the disposition of pre-

embryos in the absence of an enforceable agreement.”

• Grant v. Grant, 171 Conn. App. 851, 863, 158 A.3d 419,

427 (2017). "‘As is often stated, we do not reverse the

factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly

erroneous and find no support in the evidence.’ (Emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Szynkowicz

v. Szynkowicz, supra, 140 Conn. App. at 542. Under the

circumstances of this case, the court's finding the

defendant in contempt for violating the automatic orders

was clearly erroneous because the evidence at trial

suggested that the defendant spent money from his

retirement account for customary and usual household

expenses. The court failed to identify any expenditures

that violated the automatic orders in its articulation. See

Practice Book § 25-5 (b). The court, therefore, abused its

discretion with respect to this claim.”

• Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn. 457, 165 A.3d 1124, 1133

(2017). “Furthermore, imposing an obligation on parties in

divorce proceedings to bring separate actions against third

parties, particularly when that party feels that filing such

an action is against their best interest, is poor public policy

and could lead to untenable results. … The automatic

orders do not require Ferri to take all conceivable actions

to recover assets not under his control.” (p. 472)

“Because Ferri was unaware of the decanting, he could not

have taken any affirmative acts or in any way assisted in

the dissipation of marital assets. Ferri did not affirmatively

engage in the type of intentional waste or selfish

impropriety necessary to constitute dissipation. See

Gershman v. Gershman, supra, 286 Conn. 350-51; see

also Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 225, 116 A.3d

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 36

297 (2015).” (p. 473)

• Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341, 343, 125 A.3d

606 (2015). “The court ordered that the defendant would

retain her pension, with no claim to it by the plaintiff. The

court lastly ordered the plaintiff to transfer to the

defendant, by way of a qualified domestic relations order,

$43,158.65, ‘due to an outstanding loan of $20,000 in

order to equalize the parties’ retirement accounts.’”

• Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn. App. 325, 332-333, 983 A.2d

293 (2009). “A QDRO is merely an administrative tool

used to effectuate the transfer of marital property, in this

case pension benefits, from an employee to a

nonemployee spouse….we do not read the parties’

agreement in the case before us to make the vesting of

the plaintiff’s property interest in a portion of the

defendant’s pension benefits to be in some way contingent

on the successful processing of the QDROs. To put it

simply, we conclude that the plaintiff’s property interest in

portions of the defendant’s pension benefits was not

predicated on the processing of paperwork; the plaintiff

cannot be deprived of this important asset on the basis of

a mere administrative error.”

• Hannon v. Redler, 117 Conn. App. 403, 409-410, 979 A.2d

558 (2009). “… the lack of evidence from the defendant

did not preclude the court from determining the value of

his interest in the medical practice and providing an

equitable distribution of this asset. It was not improper for

the court to value the asset, by way of the testimony

before it, on the basis of the buyout agreement’s value of

the defendant’s interest in the medical practice…

…Our Supreme Court, in Bornemann v. Bornemann,

supra, 245 Conn. 508, noted that ‘when neither party in a

dissolution proceeding chooses to introduce detailed

information as to the value of a given asset, neither party

may later complain that it is not satisfied with the court’s

valuation of that asset.’”

• Kiniry v. Kiniry, 71 Conn. App. 614, 624, 803 A.2d 352

(2002). “On the one hand, stock options that are awarded

prior to the date of dissolution and awarded solely for past

services are considered to be earned during the marriage

and are, therefore, considered marital property subject to

equitable distribution under § 46b-81 . . . . On the other

hand, stock options that are earned prior to the date of

dissolution, but that constitute compensation for future

services, are not considered to be earned during the

marriage and, therefore, are not subject to distribution as

marital property under § 46b-81.”

• Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 814, 591 A.2d 411

(1991). “We reject the notion that professional goodwill

may be evaluated without consideration of the saleability

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 37

of the practice and the existence of a market for its

purchase.”

• Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 799, 663 A.2d 365

(1995). “We next must determine how vested pension

benefits should be valued and distributed. The task of

properly valuing pension benefits is complex because such

benefits may be defeasible by the death of the employee

spouse before retirement and the amount of benefits

ultimately received depends upon a number of factors that

remain uncertain until actual retirement. Therefore, a trial

court, in valuing the parties' assets upon dissolution, has

considerable discretion in selecting and applying an

appropriate valuation method.”

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 537-549 Valuation

§§ 543-549. Specific types of property

§ 543. Generally; professional education and license

§ 544. Professional practice

§ 545. —Goodwill

§ 546. Stock or interest in close corporation

§ 547. Pension rights

§ 548. –Time of valuation

§ 549. –Alternative methods of valuing and

distributing pension rights

• 27C C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available

on Westlaw).

§§ 957-983. Specific kinds of property or interests

§§ 957-962. Homestead or marital residence

§ 960. - Valuation

§ 963, 964. Retirement and other employment-

related benefits

§ 965. - Valuation

§ 966. Pensions

§ 967. Military retirement pay or pensions

§ 969. –Valuation and allocation

§ 972. Professional practice

§ 973. — Valuation

§ 974. Gifts

§ 975. Inheritances

§ 976. Insurance

§ 977. Interests in, and assets of, corporation,

partnership, or business

§ 978. –Valuation

§ 979. Real property

§ 980. Securities

§ 981. — Valuation

§ 982. Tort claims and settlements

§ 983. Miscellaneous property or interests

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 38

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable

distribution

# 760-774 Valuation of property or interest in

general

# 780-810 Valuation, division, or distribution of

particular property or interests

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with

Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West,

2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 27. Valuation of assets

§ 27.17. Advanced education or professional license

§ 27.20. Pension, retirement and profit-sharing

plans

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

§ 6.34. Pension and retirement benefits

§ 6.44. Excluding professional degrees

• Understanding Family Law, 4th ed., by John DeWitt

Gregory et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable Distribution of Property

§ 10.10. Pensions and retirement benefits

[D] Valuation and distribution of pensions

F] Federal pensions

[G] Qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs)

• Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, by Monika

D. Young, Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis

Advance).

Chapter 27. Valuation of real property

Chapter 47. Qualified domestic relations orders

• Value of Pensions in Divorce, 4th ed., by Marvin Snyder,

Wolters Kluwer, 2010, with 2013 supplement.

Chapter 12. Time value of money

Chapter 13. Valuation of a defined benefit pension plan

Chapter 14. Valuation of a defined contribution plan

Chapter 17. Pension court orders (QDROs)

Chapter 23. Military pensions in divorce

Chapter 24. Railroad retirement benefits

• Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 9. Pensions and reserve or retired pay

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 39

§ 9.9. Evaluating a retirement or pension plan-

generally

§ 9.10. Evaluating a retirement or pension benefit-

recent developments- present value

§ 9.11. Evaluating a retirement or pension benefit-

recent developments- proportionate share

§ 9.12. Evaluating a retirement or pension benefit-

recent developments- immediate or deferred

award

Chapter 43. Necessity that divorce court value property

before distributing it

§ 43.7. Goodwill

§ 43.8. Pension benefits and interests in business

§ 43.10. Professional or advanced degree

§ 43.13 Illustrations of valuation

Chapter 48. Pension or retirement benefits as subject to

award or division

§ 48.9. Military retirement benefits

§ 48.13. Valuation

§ 48.14. Valuation illustrations

• 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 6. Specific types of property

§§ 6.18—6.20. Private retirement plans—Qualified

domestic relations orders

§§ 6.38—6.41. Valuation of retirement benefits

§ 6.42. Military service benefits under state law

§§ 6.43—6.46. Survivor benefits

§ 6.52. Disability benefits

§§ 6.60—6.63. Degrees and licenses

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 36. Valuation of Marital Property

§ 36.13. Valuation of retirement benefits

§ 36.14. Degrees and licenses

§ 36.15. Valuation of non-economic contributions

• Valuing Specific Assets in Divorce, by Robert D. Feder et

al., Wolters Kluwer, 2000 with 2021-2 supplement (also

available on VitalLaw).

Part IV. Pensions

• Valuation of Divorce Assets, by Barth H. Goldberg, revised

edition, 2005, with 2023-2024 supplement, Thomson West

(also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 8. Valuation of professional entities, goodwill,

and license interests

§ 8.5. Property Rights in Licenses and Degrees –

generally

Chapter 9. Valuing retirement plans

Chapter 15. A compendium of valuation cases covering

specific assets

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

You can contact us

or visit our catalog

to determine which

of our law libraries

own the treatises

cited.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 40

• Valuing Professional Practices and Licenses, A Guide for

the Matrimonial Practitioner, 3rd ed., Ronald L. Brown,

ed., 1998, with 2023-1 supplement, Wolters Kluwer (also

available on VitalLaw).

Part F: Valuing professional degrees and licenses

• The Military Divorce Handbook: A Practical Guide to

Representing Military Personnel and Their Families, 3rd

ed., by Mark E. Sullivan, 2019, American Bar Association.

• Military Retirement Benefits in Divorce: A Lawyer’s Guide

to Valuation and Distribution, by Marshal S. Willick, 1998,

American Bar Association.

Law Reviews:

• Edward Bryan, Cryptocurrency Considerations in Divorce,

FamilyLawyerMagazine.com (November 11, 2021).

• John E. Kirchner, Division of Military Retired Pay, 43

Family Law Quarterly 367 (Fall 2009).

• Difficult Valuation Issues Symposium, 35 Family Law

Quarterly, No. 2 (Summer 2001).

- Challenges in Valuing Pension Plans, p. 235

- The Challenges of Stock Options, p. 251

- Exploring the Use of the Time Rule in the

Distribution of Stock Options on Divorce, p. 263

- Valuation Basics and Beyond: Tackling Areas of

Controversy, p. 305

- The Effect of Goodwill in Determining the Value of a

Business in a Divorce, p. 351

Public access to law

review databases is

available on-site at

each of our law

libraries.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 41

Table 3: Valuing and Distributing Pensions and Retirement Benefits

Valuing and Distributing

Pension and Retirement Benefits

"There are three widely approved methods of valuing and distributing pension

benefits." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 800, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

1. Present value (or offset) method

“The first method involves placing a present value on the retirement plan, as of the

date of dissolution, by using actuarial tables to determine the life expectancy of the

employee-spouse, by considering all the circumstances of the case, and by

evaluating the probability that the employee-spouse will eventually exercise his or

her rights under the retirement plan.” In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P.2d 661, 666

(Colo. 1987).

“Calculating a pension's present value depends on several factors, including the

employee spouse's life expectancy, the proper interest rate for discount and the

date of retirement.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 800, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

“Once the court has determined the present value of the benefits at issue, it may, in

light of relevant equitable considerations, award those benefits to the employee

spouse and/or may offset the nonemployee's equitable share in the pension benefits

with an award of other assets.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 801, 663 A.2d

365 (1995).

Advantage: The offset method has the advantage of effecting a ‘clean break’

between the parties.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 802, 663 A.2d 365

(1995).

Disadvantage: “The drawback to the offset method is that it places the entire risk

of forfeiture before maturity on the employee spouse. Further, this method is not

feasible when there are insufficient other assets by which to offset the value of

the pension . . . .” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 802, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

2. Present Division Method

“. . . involve[s] delaying distribution until the pension matures.” Krafick v. Krafick,

234 Conn. 783, 803, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

“Under the ‘present division’ method, the trial court determines at the time of trial,

the percentage share of the pension benefits to which the nonemployee spouse is

entitled. The court may then, through a QDRO for pensions covered by ERISA or

some equivalent if the non-ERISA plan permits, presently divide or assign the

pension benefits between the spouses.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 803, 663

A.2d 365 (1995).

Advantage and disadvantage: “the advantage of imposing on the parties equally

the risk of forfeiture, but have the cost of prolonging the parties' entanglement with

each other.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 803-804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

Equitable Distribution of Property- 42

“. . . favored when there are insufficient assets to offset the award of the pension to

the employee spouse alone or when the evidence is inadequate to establish present

value.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

3. Reserved Jurisdiction Method

“. . . involve[s] delaying distribution until the pension matures.” Krafick v. Krafick,

234 Conn. 783, 803, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

“Alternatively, under the ‘reserved jurisdiction’ method, the trial court reserves

jurisdiction to distribute the pension until benefits have matured. Once matured, the

trial court will determine the proper share to which each party is entitled and divide

the benefits accordingly.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 803, 663 A.2d 365

(1995).

Advantage and disadvantage: “the advantage of imposing on the parties equally

the risk of forfeiture, but have the cost of prolonging the parties' entanglement with

each other.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 803-804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

“ . . . favored when there are insufficient assets to offset the award of the pension to

the employee spouse alone or when the evidence is inadequate to establish present

value.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

“These methods are not exclusive.

A trial court retains discretion to select any other method to take account of the

value of a pension asset ‘that might better address the needs and interests of the

parties.’ In re Marriage of Grubb, supra, 745 P.2d 666. The touchstone of valuation,

as well as the ultimate distribution of pension benefits, is the court's 'power to act

equitably.' Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 585, 362 A.2d 835 (1975).”

Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them.

Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your local law

librarian to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 43

Table 4: QDROs - Sample & Model Forms

Qualified Domestic Relations Orders: Samples and Model Forms

• 8A Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms, 3d ed., by

Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West, 2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also

available on Westlaw).

§ 50.58. Sample Qualified Domestic-Relations Order (QDRO)

• Library of Connecticut Family Law Forms, 2nd ed., Amy Cavalo MacNamara et

al., eds., Connecticut Law Tribune, 2014.

Chapter 14. Judgment

§ 14-003. Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)

• 1 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, by Monika D. Young, Matthew

Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

§ 47A.01. Sample QDRO - division of defined benefit plan

§ 47A.02. Sample QDRO – division of defined contribution plan

§ 47A.03. IRS Sample language for qualified domestic relations order

§ 47A.04. IRS Model IRC §402(f) notice

• Dividing Pensions in Divorce: Negotiating and Drafting Safe Settlements with

QDROS and Present Values, 3rd ed, by Gary A. Shulman et al., Wolters Kluwer,

2010, with 2024 supplement (also available on VitalLaw).

Chapter 17. Drafting a “proper” QDRO for pensions and 401(k)s

§ 17.05. Model QDROs for a “defined benefit” pension plan

§ 17.10. Model QDROs for a “defined contribution” plans

§ 17.11. Model QDRO for employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., Matthew Bender, 2023

(also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 46. The Role of Retirement Benefits in Property Distribution

§ 46.08. Forms

[1]. MODEL FORMS: Order for assignment of interest in retirement plan

[2]. MODEL FORM: Qualified Domestic Relations Order

[3]. FORM: Determination as to qualification of domestic relations

order, notice of participant and alternate payee, agreement to comply

with order and other relief

[4]. FORM: Letter to plan administer

• 7 West's Legal Forms, 3rd ed. 2006, with 2022 supplement, Thomson West,

(also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 18. Property Distribution

§ 18:105. Percentage distribution of pension—use of qualified domestic

relations order

§ 18:106. Disposition of pension plan—qualified domestic relations order

§ 18:107. Disposition of profit-sharing plan—qualified domestic relations

order

Each of our law libraries own the Connecticut treatises cited. You can contact us or visit our catalog to

determine which of our law libraries own the other treatises cited or to search for more treatises.

References to online databases refer to in-library use of these databases. Remote access is not available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 44

Table 5: ALR Annotations on Property Valuation

Accounting

Practice

77 ALR4th 609, Valuation Of Goodwill In Accounting Practice For

Purposes Of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, by Martin J.

McMahon, Thomson West, 1989.

Dental

Practice

78 ALR4th 853, Valuation Of Goodwill In Medical Or Dental

Practice For Purposes Of Divorce Court’s Property Division, by

Michael J. McMahon, Thomson West, 1990.

Law Firm

74 ALR3d 621, Evaluation Of Interest In Law Firm Or Medical

Partnership For Purposes Of Division Of Property In Divorce

Proceedings, by Dag E. Ytreberg, Thomson West, 1976.

Law Practice

77 ALR4th 683, Valuation Of Goodwill In Law Practice For Purpose

Of Divorce Court’s Property Settlement, by Martin J. McMahon,

Thomson West, 1989.

Medical

Partnership

74 ALR3d 621, Evaluation Of Interest In Law Firm Or Medical

Partnership For Purposes Of Division Of Property In Divorce

Proceedings, by Dag E. Ytreberg, Thomson West, 1976.

Medical

Practice

78 ALR4th 853, Valuation Of Goodwill In Medical Or Dental

Practice For Purposes Of Divorce Court’s Property Division, by

Martin J. McMahon, Thomson West, 1990.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 45

Section 5: Distribution of Property

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to methods and formulas for

division of assets relating to marriage.

DEFINITIONS:

• Coverture: “is defined as ‘[t]he status and rights of the wife

arising from the marriage relationship’; Ballentine's Law

Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969); and has a long history of use

regarding marital assets.” Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App.

656, 666, 757 A.2d 1225 (2000).

• Coverture fraction: “established by the court for the

unvested stock options consisted of a fraction, ‘the

denominator of which shall be the number of months from

the date of grant to the date of vesting [when the options no

longer will be] subject to divestment, and the numerator [of

which shall] be the number of months from the date of grant

to December 1, 1995 [the date of the parties' separation].’

Specifically, the plaintiff challenges the coverture

numerator, contending that the court should have used the

date that the defendant's employment commenced instead

of the date that the unvested assets were granted and the

date of dissolution instead of the date of separation. We

disagree.” Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 666, 757

A.2d 1225 (2000).

STATUTES:

• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81 (2023)

“(c). In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any,

to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence

presented by each party, shall consider the length of the

marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the

marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station,

occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate,

liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the

opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets

and income. The court shall also consider the contribution

of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or

appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

CHECKLISTS:

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 38. A practical guide to equitable distribution

§ 38.04[2]. The Check: an asset-by-asset guide

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

§ 6.24. Checklist

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

You can visit your

local law library or

search the most

recent statutes and

public acts on the

Connecticut General

Assembly website to

confirm that you are

using the most up-

to-date statutes.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 46

§ 6.30. Checklist

CASES:

• Fronsaglia v Fronsaglia, 202 Conn. App. 769, 777, 246 A.3d

1083 (2021). “Moreover, ‘[w]e have iterated that there is no

set formula the court is obligated to apply when dividing the

parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested with broad

discretion in fashioning financial orders.’ . . . As a panel of

this court once expressed, the court has ‘vast discretion’ in

fashioning its orders. Damon v. Damon, 23 Conn. App. 111,

114, 579 A.2d 124 (1990).”

• Silver v. Silver, 200 Conn. App. 505, 507, 238 A3d 823

(2021). “In the plaintiff's proposed orders, with respect to

Exusia, the plaintiff requested in relevant part that the court

(1) find that, notwithstanding the plaintiff's ownership of 10

percent of Exusia's corporate stock, the plaintiff possessed a

50 percent equitable interest in Exusia, and (2) order the

defendant to buy out the plaintiff's 50 percent interest in

Exusia.”

• Wilson v. Di Iulio, 192 Conn. App. 101, 217 A.3d 3 (2019).

“The defendant next argues that the court erred in its

property division by making a property award enforceable

by a modifiable alimony award. We disagree.” (p. 112)

“The court entered orders designating the defendant as the

alternate payee pursuant to a domestic relations order. See

footnote 5 of this opinion. Recognizing that a decision by the

plaintiff to remarry could divest the defendant of this award,

because the new spouse would have to consent to the

designation of the defendant as the survivor beneficiary, the

court ordered $1 per year in alimony to the defendant

‘modifiable only to enforce the rights called for in this

provision.’ According to the defendant, this solution

conflates the nonmodifiable nature of a property division

with the modifiable nature of an alimony award. The plaintiff

agrees that a property award pursuant to § 46b-81 cannot

be modified after judgment. She argues, however, that

there is nothing in the court's decision that seeks, orders, or

retains jurisdiction to modify a property settlement in the

future. The plaintiff argues, rather, that the court was within

its discretion to award alimony of $1 per year as security in

favor of the defendant given the terms of the plaintiff's

retirement plan. We agree with the plaintiff.” (p.113)

“As in Utz, we conclude that the court in the present case

acted within its discretion in fashioning the award as it did.

The court considered the restrictions in the plaintiff's

retirement plan, which require that a future spouse of the

plaintiff consent to the designation of the defendant as a

survivor beneficiary. To account for this scenario, the court

ordered nominal alimony of $1 per year to the defendant as

security for the award. The court did not retain jurisdiction

to modify the property award in the future but, rather,

issued an award of nominal alimony for the protection of the

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 47

defendant. On the basis of our review of the record, we

cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in

entering this order.” (p. 114)

• Lavy v. Lavy, 190 Conn. App. 186, 197-198, 210 A.3d 98,

(2019). “We begin with the plaintiff's claim that the court

improperly found that he made material omissions on his

financial affidavit in violation of the separation agreement by

failing to disclose the Niagara account and Jerusalem

property. The plaintiff essentially raises three arguments in

support of this claim. First, he argues that, because the

defendant knew about the Niagara account and the

Jerusalem property at the time of the dissolution judgment,

their nondisclosure on his financial affidavit would not have

affected her decision-making process and, therefore, his

failure to disclose those assets could not have constituted

material omissions. Second, he argues that his

nondisclosure of the Niagara account and the Jerusalem

property had no ‘real importance or cause[d] great

consequences to the overall separation agreement of the

parties’ and that the court overvalued those assets in

determining whether their nondisclosure constituted

material omissions. Third, the plaintiff argues that the court

should not have found that his failure to disclose the Niagara

account was a material omission because there was no

evidence that the plaintiff knew the Niagara account existed

at the time of the divorce. We are not persuaded by these

arguments and conclude that the court properly determined

on the basis of the record presented that the plaintiff's

failure to disclose the assets in question constituted material

omissions.”

• Zaniewski v. Zaniewski, 190 Conn. App. 386, 397-398, 210

A.3d 620 (2019). “In this case, the defendant took all

reasonable actions necessary to remedy the lack of

adequate factual findings necessary for our review. He filed

a motion for articulation. When that motion was denied on

faulty jurisdictional grounds, he timely filed a motion for

review of that decision with this court. Furthermore, the

plaintiff never filed any opposition at any stage of the

proceedings contending that the requests for articulation

were not necessary for a proper review of the claims on

appeal . . . Having considered all the competing interests

involved, which includes the plaintiff's interest in not having

to relitigate issues that she would contend properly were

decided in her favor, we conclude that the appropriate

action in this case is to remand the matter for a new trial on

all financial orders.”

• Oudheusden v. Oudheusden, 190 Conn. App. 169, 178, 209

A.3d 1282 (2019), reversed in part at 338 Conn. 761

(2021). “…the defendant argues that the court improperly

awarded the plaintiff alimony from income that was

generated by the defendant's two businesses and awarded

her 50 percent of the value of those businesses. The plaintiff

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 48

counters that ‘an impermissible double dip would have

occurred here only if the trial court had given 100 [percent]

ownership of the businesses to [the] [p]laintiff and then

ordered [the] [d]efendant to pay alimony based on income

from an asset he no longer had as a result of the transfer,

making compliance infeasible.’ (Emphasis omitted.) We

agree with the defendant that, under the circumstances of

this case, the court effectively deprived the defendant of his

ability to pay the $18,000 monthly alimony award to the

plaintiff by also distributing to the plaintiff 50 percent of the

value of his businesses from which he derives his income.

The general principle is that a court may not take an income

producing asset into account in its property division and also

award alimony based on that same income.”

• Oudheusden v. Oudheusden, 338 Conn. 761, 791-792, 259

A.3d 598, 616, 2021 Conn. LEXIS 111 (2021). “. . . the

judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with respect to

its determination that the trial court improperly double

counted the value of the defendant's businesses for

purposes of the property division and alimony awards, and

the case is remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to

remand the case to the trial court for a new hearing on all

financial issues.”)

• Forgione v. Forgione, 186 Conn. App. 525, 533-534, 200

A.3d 190 (2018). “In the November 6, 2013 memorandum

of decision, the court recognized that the plaintiff previously

had paid the $60,000 advance to the defendant and, thus,

ordered the defendant to transfer his title to the marital

residence to the plaintiff. The defendant acknowledges this

fact, yet, still claims on appeal that the court's division was

unequal. In support of his claim, the defendant proffers

several calculations that merge the court's division of the

parties' remaining financial assets with the court's division of

the marital home.

…the defendant's argument is based on pure conjecture as

to the source of the advance payment to the defendant.

Thus, the premise of the defendant's argument—that the

plaintiff received a $60,000 net gain as a result of the

transfer of assets related to the marital home—finds no

support in the record, and is, in fact, contradicted by it.

Therefore, we are unpersuaded by the defendant's claim.”

• Reinke v. Sing, 186 Conn. App. 665, 696, 201 A.3d 404

(2018). “The plaintiff attempted to persuade the court that

the defendant had concealed assets, misled the plaintiff, or

knowingly provided false information to defraud the plaintiff.

The court, however, did not find that such conduct had

occurred. Instead, the court found that the defendant ‘had

originally failed to fully disclose some of his assets and [had]

understated his income’ and the court ‘made neither an

express finding that his failure to do so amounted to fraud,

nor, for that matter, that his behavior did not amount to

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 49

fraud.’ In part I of this opinion, we rejected the plaintiff’s

claim that the court’s finding that fraud had not been proven

was clearly erroneous.”

• Krahel v. Czoch, 186 Conn. App. 22, 43, 198 A.3d 103

(2018). “Unlike orders for the periodic payment of alimony,

the court does not retain continuing jurisdiction over orders

of property distribution nor can it expressly reserve

jurisdiction with respect to matters involving lump sum

alimony or the distribution of property. As our Supreme

Court explained in Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 273, 752

A.2d 1023 (1999), ‘[o]n its face, the statutory scheme

regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution

proceedings prohibits the retention of jurisdiction over

orders regarding lump sum alimony or the division of the

marital estate…General Statutes § 46b-82…provides that the

court may order alimony [a]t the time of entering the

[divorce] decree…General Statutes § 46b-86, however,

explicitly permits only modifications of any final order[s] for

the periodic payment of permanent alimony…Consequently,

the statute confers authority on the trial courts to retain

continuing jurisdiction over orders of periodic alimony, but

not over lump sum alimony or property distributions

pursuant to § 46b-81.’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, in Bender v. Bender,

258 Conn. 733, 761, 785 A.2d 197 (2001), our Supreme

Court, albeit in dicta, expressly rejected the practice of

reserving jurisdiction over personal property. Cf.

Cunningham v. Cunningham, 140 Conn. App. 676, 686, 59

A.3d 874 (2013) (having determined formula for division of

assets received by the defendant pursuant to nonqualified

plan, court had discretion to retain jurisdiction to effectuate

its judgment).”

• Tarnowsky v. Iorfino, Superior Court, Judicial District of

Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FA-175017411-S (Sept.

27, 2018) (2018 LEXIS 3183). “Therefore, the court orders

that the Richmond Drive property shall be listed for sale

within thirty days of the date of the dissolution judgment

with a real estate agent having at least ten years of

experience in the greater Darien area. The defendant shall

select the real estate agent who shall be the listing broker

for the Richmond Drive property. The Richmond Drive

property shall be listed for sale at the listing price

recommended by the listing broker. The defendant shall

accept any offer containing no unusual contingencies within

5 percent of the listing price. Every sixty days, the

defendant shall review the listing price with the listing

broker, and the listing price will be reduced to the greater of

the revised listing price recommended by the listing broker

or 95 percent of the prior listing price. The plaintiff shall

cooperate fully in the sale of the Richmond Drive property.

The defendant shall have exclusive possession of the

Richmond Drive property until it is sold. The plaintiff shall

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 50

vacate the Richmond Drive property within twenty days of

the date of entry of the dissolution judgment.”

• Varoglu v. Sciarrino, 185 Conn. App. 84, 90-91, 196 A.3d

856 (2018). “We do not agree with the plaintiff's assertions

that the court made improper findings pertaining to the

plaintiff using proceeds from a loan secured by the marital

home to purchase property in Crested Butte. This finding

was supported by the evidence because the defendant

testified that the plaintiff did so and, upon review of the

record, we are not left with a firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. Furthermore, despite the plaintiff's use of a

portion of the loan proceeds in a manner that the defendant

claims he did not intend, the court awarded her the

Colorado property free and clear of any claims by the

defendant.”

• O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 85-86, 161 A.3d 1236

(2017). “‘Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that

the trial court abused its discretion when it considered the

plaintiff's purported violations of the automatic orders in its

decision dividing marital assets [even though the court did

not hold the plaintiff in contempt of court for those

violations]?’ O'Brien v. O'Brien, 320 Conn. 916, 131 A.3d

751 (2016). We agree with the defendant that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion in considering the plaintiff's

violations of the automatic orders in its division of the

marital assets, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of

the Appellate Court.”

• Richman v. Wallman, 172 Conn. App. 616, 621-622, 161

A.3d 666 (2017). “The terms of the separation agreement

contemplate the drafting of more than one QDRO because it

specifically states that ‘[t]he parties agree that Attorney

Elizabeth McMahon shall prepare the QDROs.’ (Emphasis

added.) Had the agreement been drafted to refer to only

one QDRO, the use of the plural "QDROs" would not have

been included. In addition, Voya, the administrator of the

IBM pension plan, specifically required a separate QDRO to

split the pension, and the court found the contemplated

divisions could not be done with a single QDRO. Moreover,

‘courts have continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy

appropriate to the vindication of a prior . . . judgment . . .

pursuant to [their] inherent powers…" (Internal quotation

marks omitted). Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 604, 974

A.2d 641 (2009). Accordingly, the court acted within the

scope of its subject matter jurisdiction by ordering the

plaintiff to agree to the terms of the two QDROs…”

• Nadel v. Luttinger, 168 Conn. App. 689, 701, 147 A.3d 1075

(2016). “We recognize, finally, the defendant's argument

that the court violated the rules of contract interpretation by

examining extrinsic sources, such as footnotes on financial

affidavits and a Fidelity report, to support its interpretation

without first finding the separation agreement to be

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 51

ambiguous. The court did reference such sources, but

nothing prevents a court from considering evidence that

tends to explain into what category a payment belongs.

Although the agreement itself was properly determined to

be clear and unambiguous, it was nonetheless incumbent on

the court to determine the nature of the award in issue.”

• Schneider v. Schneider, 161 Conn. App. 1, 127 A.3d 298

(2015). “The plaintiff . . . appeals from the judgment of the

trial court denying his motion for an order that the

defendant . . . reimburse him for mortgage payments he

made after she failed to make payment as required by the

original judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage . . . We

agree and conclude that the court’s denial constituted an

improper modification of the property distribution order.”

pp. 2-3

“In contrast, an order effectuating an existing judgment

allows the court to protect the integrity of its original ruling

by ensuring the parties’ timely compliance therewith.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, 156

Conn. App. 587, 595, 113 A.3d 132 (2015).” p. 6

• McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 157 Conn. App. 568, 581, 118

A.3d 64 (2015). “…pursuant to the parties’ separation

agreement, the division of the parties’ personal property

was left to the parties to accomplish, and, if they were

unable to do so, they agreed to binding mediation. There

was no language in the dissolution judgment retaining the

court’s authority to effectuate a distribution order or to aid

the parties in the event a dispute later arose…the parties in

the present case were unable to complete the division of

their personal property, leaving the parties in legal limbo.

Nevertheless, the trial court was without any statutory

authority to issue an order resolving the parties’ dispute

over the distribution of their personal property, as that

authority existed only at the time the marriage was

dissolved. The division of personal property was clearly

contemplated by the parties and the court at the time of

dissolution, and was left to the parties, so no oversight or

omission can be claimed.”

• Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App. 613, 618-619, 95

A.3d 569 (2014). “As noted, the plaintiff urges this court to

conclude that when one spouse inherits from his or her

family, the amount of that inheritance should be separated

from other assets acquired during the course of the

marriage and the court, in treating an inherited asset,

should place particular weight on the failure of the

noninheriting spouse to contribute at all to the acquisition of

the inheritance. It is noteworthy that in making this

argument, the plaintiff would have this court ignore his own

lack of participation in the acquisition of this inherited

asset.”

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 52

• De Repentigny v. De Repentigny, 121 Conn. App. 451, 461-

462, 995 A.2d 117 (2010). “In regard to its decision to

grant ownership of de Assembly to the defendant, the court

found that ‘[t]hroughout the marriage, although both parties

made contributions to the acquisition, maintenance and

reservation of this asset, the evidence clearly supports a

finding that the defendant’s contribution was significantly

greater.’ Given the court’s findings regarding the level of the

respective parties’ involvement with and management of de

Assembly, and the inherent difficulty one could expect were

a divorced couple required to operate a business together,

we will not second-guess the court’s decision to grant

ownership of de Assembly to the defendant.”

• Sapper v. Sapper, 109 Conn.App. 99, 110-111, 951 A.2d 5

(2008). “The court properly considered the liquidation of the

college funds in ordering their replenishment as part of the

distribution of the marital property. The plaintiff also claims

that the court improperly considered the issue of fault in

awarding the defendant 80 percent of the remaining

proceeds of the marital estate. He is mistaken.”

• Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 666, 757 A.2d 1225,

cert. denied 255 Conn. 918, 763 A.2d 1044 (2000). “In

modern times, a coverture factor has reemerged as a

mechanism for apportioning between spouses the benefit or

value of unvested stock options, retirement plans or other

benefits that were earned partially during and partially after

the marriage.”

• Damon v. Damon, 23 Conn. App. 111, 114, 579 A.2d 124

(1990). “The plaintiff complains that the judgment,

providing that the contents of the home ‘shall become the

sole property of the defendant unless within one month of

the date of the Judgment the parties agree on a division of

said contents between themselves,’ is an improper

delegation of the court's power to make the distribution. The

essential meaning of these words is that the defendant

would be the owner of the personalty unless she chose to

give the plaintiff some of it. The court did not, therefore,

delegate its authority to distribute assets.”

• Vincent v. Vincent, 178 Conn. 212, 212, 423 A.2d 879

(1979). “In this action, both parties alleged that the

marriage was broken down irretrievably. The court dissolved

the marriage and ordered that the real estate in the name of

the plaintiff husband be transferred to the defendant wife

and then be sold by the defendant without delay. Upon

completion of the sale, deducting all necessary expenses,

the net proceeds were to be divided equally between the

parties. The plaintiff husband has appealed from this

judgment.”

• Murphy v. Murphy, 180 Conn. 376, 378, 429 A.2d 897

(1980). “Rather than determine what each party had

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 53

contributed to every category of property in dispute, that is,

real property, personal property, bank accounts, and other

assets, the court considered their property as a whole.”

• Croke v. Croke, 4 Conn. App. 663, 663-664, 496 A.2d 235

(1985). “The judgment of December 11, 1980, provides that

the plaintiff has the right to occupy jointly owned real

property located at 276 Park Street in New Canaan, with the

parties' minor child until the minor child attains age

eighteen, or residential custody of the minor child is

transferred to the defendant, or the death or remarriage of

the plaintiff or her cohabitation with another person under

circumstances which would warrant the modification of

periodic alimony pursuant to the provisions of General

Statutes § 46b-86, or the plaintiff elects to vacate the

premises.”

• Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 493, 439 A.2d 425 (1981).

“The decree rendered in the present case was of the second

type, i.e., it ordered the plaintiff to transfer her interest in

the Florida property to the defendant. The order did not

purport to transfer title to out-of-state realty by its own

terms. The plaintiff's argument that the court below was

bound to apply Florida law, when it made its order relating

to the Florida land, lacks merit. Inasmuch as the decree did

not directly affect title to the Florida lands, this dissolution

action did not differ materially from any other dissolution.”

WEST KEY

NUMBER:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable distribution

# 780-810 Valuation, division, or distribution of

particular property or interests

#820-827 Methods of Distribution

#850-864 Marital residence or homestead

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 528-536. Manner of division

§ 528. Generally

§ 529. Presumption of equal division

§ 530. Award of money or distribution in kind

§ 531. Partition

§ 532. Use of mathematical formulas; weighting of

pertinent factors

§ 533. Joint ownership after dissolution

§ 534. Division of debts

§ 535. Authority to divide nonmarital property

§ 536. –Effect of statute

• 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

§§ 948-956. Methods of distribution

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Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

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available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 54

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with

Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West,

2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 29. Distribution of Assets

§ 29.1. Methods of distribution

§ 29.2. Sale or buy-out

§ 29.3. Distribution in kind

§ 29.4. Offsetting assets and credits

§ 29.5. Deferred sale or distribution

§ 29.6. Time rule for division

§ 29.7. Distribution of particular types of assets

§ 29.8. Marital home

§ 29.9. Allocation of expenses and/or appreciation

§ 29.10. Allocation of equity

§ 29.11. Outright transfer and allocation of liabilities

§ 29.12. Present or future buy-out

§ 29.13. Family business

§ 29.14. Pension, retirement and deferred

compensation interests

§ 29.15. Insurance interests

§ 29.16. Effect of transfers prior to trial

§ 29.17. Distribution to children or other third parties

§ 29.18. Effect of distribution on rights of creditors

§ 29.19. Finality of distribution; effect of after

discovered property

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part V. Defining, valuing, and allocating property for

purposes of the asset division—Overview

Part VI. Defining, valuing, and allocating specific

assets

• Understanding Family Law, 4th ed., by John DeWitt Gregory

et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable Distribution of Property

§10.12. Fair and equitable distribution

[A] Introduction

[C] Equal division and starting points

[E] Marital debts and liabilities

[F] The marital home

• Dividing Pensions in Divorce: Negotiating and Drafting Safe

Settlements with QDROS and Present Values, 3rd ed., by

Gary A. Shulman et al., Wolters Kluwer, 2010, with 2024

supplement (also available on VitalLaw).

• Value of Pensions in Divorce, 4th ed., by Marvin Snyder,

Wolters Kluwer, 2010, with 2013 supplement.

Chapter 17. Pension court orders

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 55

• 2 Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 42. Equitable distribution doctrine

Chapter 48. Pension or retirement benefits as subject to

award or division

Chapter 54. Treatment of stock options for purpose of

dividing marital property

Chapter 56. Award of interest on deferred installment

payments of marital asset distribution

Chapter 58. Proprietary of using contempt proceeding to

enforce property settlement award or order

• 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 6. Specific Types of Property

§§ 6.28—6.37. Methods for distributing retirement

benefits

§ 6.46. Mechanics of dividing survivors benefits

§ 6.50. Valuation and distribution of stock options

§ 6.58. Valuation and division of personal injury

awards

§ 6.81. Valuation and distribution of intellectual

property

§ 6.85. Division of marital home

§ 6.99. Division of marital debts

• 3 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 9. Mechanics of Division

§ 9.1. Introduction

§§ 9.2—9.7. Transfer of title

§§ 9.8—9.10. Monetary award

§§ 9.12—9.15. Sale

§§ 9.16—9.22. Enforcement

§§ 9.23—9.32. Modification and other post-judgment

actions

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 37. Principles of property distribution

§ 37.06. Division of property by the court

[1]. Determining an “equitable” distribution

[2]. Ordering distribution

§ 37.07. The marital home

§ 37.08. Business interests

§ 37.09. Professional goodwill

§ 37.10. Increased earning capacity resulting from a

professional license, graduate degree, or education

§ 37.11. Retirement benefits

§ 37.12. Federal government benefits

§ 37.13. Personal injury, worker’s compensation, et al

§ 37.14. Debts

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 56

Section 6: Factors in Equitable Distribution

of Property

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to non-financial factors to be

considered in the equitable distribution of property including

dissipation of assets.

STATUTES:

• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81 (2023)

“(c). In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any,

to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence

presented by each party, shall consider the length of the

marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the

marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station,

occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate,

liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the

opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets

and income. The court shall also consider the contribution

of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or

appreciation in value of their respective estates.

CHECKLISTS:

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part III. Assessing the statutory criteria

§ 6.07. Checklist: Assessing the statutory criteria

CASES:

• Mitchell v Bogonos, 218 Conn. App. 59, 73, 290 A.3d 825

(2023). “Applying the factors set forth in § 46b-81, the

court concluded that the parties' marriage was of a short

duration and the defendant did not contribute to the

acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of any of

the plaintiff's assets. The court's decision to permit the

plaintiff to retain the comic book collection was not related

to the court's assessment of its value and, thus, the

defendant is unable to establish that the absence of an

appraisal somehow affected the court's ultimate disposition

concerning the parties' assets.”

• Fronsaglia v Fronsaglia, 202 Conn. App. 769, 777, 246 A.3d

1083 (2021). “At the outset, we note that the defendant's

claim of disproportionality is factually untenable. The court

found that the defendant received approximately $550,000

in lump sum payments over the course of a few months

after selling his 12.5 percent interest in emuamericas, LLC,

during the pendente lite period. The court determined that

the payments for the defendant's interest in emuamericas,

LLC, were marital assets subject to division by the court

because they were earned entirely during the marriage.

Notably, the court found that the defendant had

misappropriated the $550,000, only later revealing that he

had spent the entire sum. The court also found that the

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public acts on the

Connecticut General

Assembly website to

confirm that you are

using the most up-

to-date statutes.

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 57

defendant spent all of this money on his own needs and

wants and did not use any of this sum to pay down any of

the family's debts or outstanding obligations. Specifically,

the court found that the defendant failed to ‘pay down and

secure releases for any of the over $200,000 worth of liens

on the family home.’ In essence, the defendant dissipated a

marital asset. “[D]issipation in the marital dissolution

context requires financial misconduct involving marital

assets, such as intentional waste or a selfish financial

impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the

marriage.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gong v.

Huang, 129 Conn. App. 141, 153, 21 A.3d 474, cert.

denied, 302 Conn. 907, 23 A.3d 1247 (2011). As correctly

noted by the court, the payments should have been ‘held

secure or subject to the automatic orders,’ which the

defendant failed to do; instead, he spent the entire sum in

violation of the automatic orders. The defendant asserts

that the court abused its discretion when it included the

$550,000 payment in dividing the marital assets because

the funds were no longer part of the marital estate.” (pp.

777-778)

“As noted previously herein, the court found that the

defendant was not a credible witness and, thus, gave no

credence to his claims that he believed that the $550,000

belonged to him and that he could spend it without

restrictions. We will not disturb credibility determinations

made by the court. See Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn.

at 359, 880 A.2d 872 (on appeal, ‘[w]e cannot retry the

facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)).” (p. 779)

“Consequently, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion as the distribution was not grossly

disproportionate where the court found that the defendant

misappropriated and dissipated $550,000 of marital assets

in violation of the automatic orders, and the court merely

reattributed those assets to the defendant, as the law

permits.” (p. 780)

• Riccio v. Riccio, 183 Conn. App. 823, 827-828, 194 A.3d

337 (2018). “The court's distribution of the parties' assets,

although not equal in monetary terms, is not inequitable

solely on the basis of that disparity. See, e.g., O'Brien v.

O'Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 122, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017) (‘[A]

distribution ratio of 78 percent to 22 percent is not, on its

face, excessive, as the plaintiff contends. Indeed, we have

upheld distributions awarding as much as 90 percent of the

marital estate to one party.’). Our thorough review of the

record leads us to conclude that the court properly

considered the appropriate statutory factors, and that its

orders were both supported by its findings and within its

broad discretion.”

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Equitable Distribution of Property- 58

• Shirley P. v. Norman P., 329 Conn. 648, 664, 189 A.3d 89

(2018). “In sum, we conclude that the reversal of the

defendant’s criminal conviction deprives that judgment of

any preclusive effect that it may have had in the present

dissolution action. The trial court’s property division award,

which was premised exclusively on the fact of the

defendant’s conviction, must therefore be reversed. The

judgment is reversed with respect to the property division

award and the case is remanded for a new trial with respect

to that issue; the judgment is affirmed in all other

respects.”

• Varoglu v. Sciarrino, 185 Conn. App. 84, 92-93, 196 A.3d

856 (2018). “Our review of the record leads us to conclude

that the court properly considered the appropriate statutory

factors and that the award made by the court concerning

the distribution of the equity in the marital home was both

supported by the evidence and within the parameters of the

court's discretion. As previously stated, the court found that

the plaintiff's majority ownership in 2 Ledgemoor Lane,

LLC, prevented the defendant's creditors from levying on

the marital home and stated that the plaintiff's ‘contribution

to the preservation of…the real estate, was substantial.’

There is no indication that the court failed to take into

account her contribution to the preservation of the marital

home when making its distribution of the equity in the

marital home. Moreover, we note that, despite the

plaintiff's protests, the court's property distribution can be

considered favorable to her. Despite the plaintiff's having

contributed 22 percent toward the purchase of the marital

home and only being responsible for one third of the

expenses to maintain the property when the parties lived

together in the home, the court awarded the plaintiff 40

percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the home. For

these reasons, we will not disturb the court's orders.”

• Kent v. DiPaola, 178 Conn. App. 424, 431-432, 175 A.3d

601, 606-607 (2017). “In dividing up property, the court

must take many factors into account…A trial court,

however, need not give each factor equal weight…or recite

the statutory criteria that it considered in making its

decision or make express findings as to each statutory

factor." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wood v. Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 720-21, 125

A.3d 1040 (2015); see also O'Brien v. O'Brien, 326 Conn.

81, 121-22, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017); Emerick v. Emerick,

170 Conn. App. 368, 378, 154 A.3d 1069, cert. denied, 327

Conn. 922, 171 A.3d 60 (2017).”

• Amelia Wood v. David Wood, 170 Conn. App. 724, 731-

732, 155 A.3d 816, 821-822 (2017). "When deciding to

whom to assign property to, the court ‘shall consider the

length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of

the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation,

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 59

amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational

skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs

of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future

acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall

also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the

acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their

respective estates.’ General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).

‘Whether the parties made a contribution in the acquisition

and preservation of property is a question of fact. . . .

Accordingly, this court can reverse the trial court's finding

that the parties contributed equally to the accumulation

and growth of the assets held by the parties as of the date

of the dissolution only if it is found to be without any

reasonable basis in the evidence. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Kiniry v. Kiniry, 71 Conn. App. 614, 628, 803

A.2d 352 (2002).”

• Valentine v. Valentine, 164 Conn. App. 354, 367, 141 A.3d

884, 892-893 (2016). “The court’s orders with respect to

the marital home do not offend the basic elements of

fairness in light of the plaintiff’s age, education, talents,

good health, sources of unsalaried income, and ability to

seek gainful employment . . . In view of financial orders

and a property division where she obtained a greater share

of the marital assets, we conclude that the court’s division

of the parties’ sole significant asset was not

disproportionately unfavorable to the plaintiff.”

• Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341, 345, 125 A.3d

606 (2015). “General Statutes § 46b-81 (c) provides…’The

court shall also consider the contribution of each of the

parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in

value of their respective estates.’ Furthermore, ‘[o]ur

jurisprudence requires the trial court to consider all the

statutory criteria set forth in …§ 46b-81 in determining how

to distribute parties’ assets in a dissolution action…We do

not, however, require that courts ritualistically recite the

criteria they considered, nor are they bound to any specific

formula respecting the weight to be accorded each factor.’

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Casey v. Casey, 82

Conn. App. 378, 384, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).”

• Brady-Kinsella v. Kinsella, 154 Conn. App. 413, 423-424,

106 A.3d 956 (2014). “As our prior cases have held,

‘[p]ension benefits are widely recognized as among the

most valuable assets that parties have when a marriage

ends. . . . Nevertheless, there is no set formula that a court

must follow when dividing the parties’ assets, including

pension benefits.’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn. App. 106, 111,

920 A.2d 340 (2007). It is also clear that a court can

exercise a wide range of discretion in dissolution matters . .

. governed by General Statutes § 46b-81 . . . that a trial

court ‘may assign to either spouse all or any part of the

estate of the other spouse. In fixing the nature and value of

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 60

the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after

considering all the evidence presented by each party shall

consider the length of the marriage, the causes for

the…dissolution of the marriage…the age, health, station,

occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate,

liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the

opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets

and income.’ (Emphasis added.)”

• Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn App. 224, 238, 987 A2d. 362

(2010). “…The court found the plaintiff to be responsible for

the breakdown of the marriage. It also stated that

‘[d]espite the brevity of the marriage, the court cannot

disregard the physical violence.’ The court clearly

considered the statutory criteria set forth in § 46b-

81.…There is no additional requirement that the court

specifically state how it weighed these factors or explain in

detail the importance it assigned to these factors.”

• Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn. App. 449, 975 A2d 729

(2009). “…In light of the court’s finding, upon

reconsideration, that the defendant’s conduct in causing the

irretrievable breakdown of the parties’ marriage should be

taken into consideration in the division of the equity of the

marital home, we cannot say that awarding the plaintiff an

additional 10 percent of that equity was an abuse of the

court’s discretion.” (p. 456)

“There was no need for the plaintiff, having timely proposed

an order giving her more than a simple 50 percent interest

in the house, to set forth in her proposed orders every

possible disparate division of the equity in the marital

residence for the court to have discretion to grant a

postjudgment motion to reargue…” (p. 459)

• Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341, 351, 943 A.2d

1091 (2008). “…the trial court considered the defendant’s

‘dissipation of family assets’ in ordering the overall asset

division between the parties. The trial court specifically

referred to two acts of dissipation. The first was the

defendant’s ‘bad investment’ in the various Alkon

partnerships. The second was the $200,000 loss on the sale

of the excessively expensive marital home. The trial court,

however, did not find either financial misconduct, e.g.,

intentional waste or a selfish financial transaction, or that

the defendant had used marital assets for a nonmarital

purpose with regard to either of these transactions. In the

absence of such findings, we must reverse the judgment of

the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.”

• Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 493, 949 A2d 468 (2008).

“We conclude…that a trial court should consider

preseparation dissipation of marital assets, so long as the

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 61

actions constituting dissipation occur either: (1) in

contemplation of divorce or separation; or (2) while the

marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an

irretrievable breakdown.”

• Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn App. 143, 152-153, 958 A.2d

763 (2008). “The plaintiff focuses on § 46b-81(c) and its

requirement that the court consider the contribution of the

parties to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in

value of the Cape Cod property and argues that the court

abused its discretion by failing to take proper consideration

of these factors. These factors, however, are only a few of

the many factors specifically mentioned in § 46b-81(c)….

…Certainly the court would not be abusing its discretion in

considering the defendant’s substantial nonmonetary

contributions that enabled the plaintiff to spend weekends

away from his primary residence and his children so that he

could upgrade the Cape Cod property.”

• Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632, 647, 910 A.2d 963

(2006). “We note that, because the parties were first

married in 1981, divorced in 1992, cohabited from 1993

until their second marriage in 1998, and were divorced for

the second time in 2004, the difference between the length

of their entire relationship, approximately twenty-two

years, and the length of their second marriage, six years, is

not insubstantial. We conclude that the trial court did

consider the entirety of the relationship and thus based its

financial awards in part on impermissible considerations.”

• Greco v. Greco, 70 Conn. App. 735, 740, 799 A.2d 331

(2002). “Despite the defendant's contentions to the

contrary and his own review of the criteria set forth in §

46b-81, we cannot construe the court's award as an abuse

of discretion in light of the court's finding that the

defendant's infidelity was the cause of the breakdown of

the marriage. That is a factor that the court was required to

consider pursuant to § 46b-81.”

• Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn. App. 305, 309-310, 650 A.2d

608 (1994). “The defendants also argue that the trial court

incorrectly found by clear and convincing evidence that the

three properties had been fraudulently conveyed. ‘A party

who seeks to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent bears

the burden of proving that the conveyance was made

without substantial consideration and that, as a result, the

transferor was unable to meet his obligations (constructive

fraud) or that the conveyance was made with fraudulent

intent in which the transferee participated (actual fraud).’

Tessitore v. Tessitore, 31 Conn. App. 40, 42, 623 A.2d 496

(1993). ‘A fraudulent conveyance must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence.’ Id., 43. Whether a conveyance is

fraudulent is purely a question of fact. Tyers v. Coma, 214

Conn. 8, 11, 570 A.2d 186 (1990). For the reasons stated

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 62

above, we cannot conclude that the trial court's factual

findings that the properties had been fraudulently conveyed

were clearly erroneous.”

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable

distribution

# 725-750 Proportion or share given on division

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018

(Also available on Westlaw).

§§ 513-527. Factors considered in division

§ 513. Generally

§ 514. Duration of Marriage

§ 515. Age and health of parties

§ 516. Earning capacity and employability

§ 517. Value of separate property

§ 518. Origin of property

§ 519. Loss of inheritance

§ 520. Custody and child support

§ 521. Homemaker’s services

§ 522. Alimony and maintenance

§ 523. Tax consequences

§ 524. Dissipation of marital assets

• 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on

Westlaw).

§§ 936-947. Factors considered

• 193 AmJur Proof of Facts 3d 101, Proof of Equitable

Distribution of Marital Debt, by Anne E. Melley, Thomson

West, 2021 (Also available on Westlaw).

I. Legal Background – In general

II. Elements of Proof

III. Model Pleadings and Discovery

IV. Proof of Equitable Distribution of Marital Debt

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with

Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson West,

2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 28. Factors to be considered for Division of

Property

§ 28.1. In general

§ 28.2. Length of the marriage

§ 28.3. Causes for the dissolution

§ 28.4. Age of the parties

§ 28.5. Health of the parties

§ 28.6. Station of the parties

§ 28.7. Occupation

§ 28.8. Amount and sources of income

§ 28.9. Vocational skills and employability of the

parties

§ 28.10. Estates of the parties

§ 28.11. Liabilities and needs of the parties

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 63

§ 28.12. Opportunity for future acquisition of assets

and income

§ 28.13. The contribution of each party to the

acquisition, preservation or appreciation of assets

§ 28.14. Dissipation of assets

§ 28.15. Tax implications

§ 28.16. Other factors considered

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

Part III. Assessing the statutory criteria

• Understanding Family Law, 4th ed., by John DeWitt

Gregory et al., Lexis, 2013.

Chapter 10 Equitable Distribution of Property

§ 10.12. Fair and equitable distribution

[B] Factors in equitable distribution

[D] Dissipation of assets and marital misconduct

• 1 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, by Monika

D. Young, Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis

Advance).

Chapter 19. Determining factors in equitable distribution

of marital property

• 2 Marital Property Law, rev. 2d ed., by John Tingley and

Nicholas Svalina, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on

Westlaw).

Chapter 41. Consideration of Tax Consequences in Marital

Property Distribution

Part 1. Tax consequences arising directly from court’s

property distribution order

Chapter 42. Equitable distribution doctrine

§§ 42:19-42:29. Factors considered

• 3 Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al.,

Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 37. Principles of property distribution

§ 37.06. Division of property by the Court

[1]. Determining an “equitable” distribution

[a-j]. Requirement to consider specific factors

Chapter 38. A practical guide to equitable distribution

• 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th ed., by Brett R.

Turner, Thomson West, 2023 (also available on Westlaw).

Chapter 8. Division of Assets

§ 8.1. General principles

§ 8.2. Burden of proof: presumptions and starting

points

§ 8.3. Establishing the factors

§ 8.4. Balancing the factors

§§ 8.5—8.9. Contributions to specific assets

§§ 8.10—8.13. General contributions to the marital

partnership

Each of our law

libraries own the

Connecticut treatises

cited. You can

our catalog to

determine which of

our law libraries own

the other treatises

cited or to search for

more treatises.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 64

§ 8.14. Duration of the marriage

§§ 8.15—8.22. Future financial needs

§§ 8.23—8.26. Conduct of the parties

§§ 8.27—8.31. Tax consequences

§ 8.32. Other considerations: the catch-all factor

• Dividing Pensions in Divorce: Negotiating and Drafting Safe

Settlements with QDROS and Present Values, 3rd ed., by

Gary A. Shulman et al., Wolters Kluwer, 2010, with 2024

supplement (also available on VitalLaw).

LAW REVIEWS:

• Sanford L. Braver and Ira Mark Ellman, Citizens’ Views

About Fault in Property Division, 47 Family Law Quarterly

419 (Fall 2013).

• Brett R. Turner, Theories and Methods of Valuing Marital

Assets, 25 Journal of American Academy of Matrimonial

Lawyers 1 (2012).

Public access to law

review databases is

available on-site at

each of our law

libraries.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 65

Table 6: Treatment of various types of property in each stage of

determination

* Resources are

more fully

described in Key

at end of table

Classification

Valuation

Distribution

Closely held

businesses and

corporations

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.16

• Rutkin

§ 37.08[1]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation § 491

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 977

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.18

• Rutkin

§§ 36.10-36.11

§ 37.08[2]

§ 38.04[2][d]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation § 546

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 978

• Rutkin et al.

§ 29.13

(family

business)

§ 50.35

• Rutkin

§ 37.08[3]

§38.05[1][d]

Collectibles

such as baseball

cards, books,

furniture, etc.

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.7

§ 27.7

• Rutkin

§ 36.09

§ 27.7

• Rutkin et al.

§ 29.7

§ 50.39

• Rutkin

§ 38.04[2][b]

§ 38.05[1][b]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§ 493

Debts and

liabilities

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.22

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§ 464

• 27B C.J.S.

Divorce §§ 933-

934

• Rutkin et al.

§ 50.32

• Rutkin

§ 37.06[1][i]

§ 37.14

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation §

534

Gifts (including

engagement

rings, wedding

presents and

interspousal

gifts)

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.17

• Rutkin

§ 37.04

[3][b][iii]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 487-489

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 974

• Rutkin

§ 37.04

[3][b][iii]

Inheritances

and trusts

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.18

• Rutkin

§ 37.04

[3][b][ii]

Equitable Distribution of Property- 66

* Resources are

more fully

described in Key

at end of table

Classification

Valuation

Distribution

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 975

Insurance

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.9

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 509-510

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 976

• Rutkin et al.

§ 29.15

§ 50.31

Marital home

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.5

• Rutkin

§ 37.07[1]

§ 38.04[2][a]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 494-496

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §§ 957-

960

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.16

• Rutkin

§ 37.07[2]

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §960

• Rutkin et al.

§§ 29.8-

29.12

§§ 50.3-

50.11

• Rutkin

§ 37.07[3]

§ 38.05[1][a]

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce

§§ 961-962

Pensions and

retirement

plans

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.11

• Rutkin

§ 37.11[1]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 501-508

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 963,

964

§ 966-968

§ 970

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.20

• Rutkin

§ 36.13

§ 37.11[2]

§ 38.04[2][f]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 547-549

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce

§ 965

§ 966, 969

• Rutkin et al.

§ 29.14

§ 50.37

§ 50.58

• Rutkin

§ 37.11[2]

§ 38.05[f]

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce

§ 965

§ 966, 969

Personal

injury,

worker’s

compensation

and other

awards (Tort)

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.23

• Rutkin

§ 37.13

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 511-512

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 982

• Rutkin

§ 37.13

Equitable Distribution of Property- 67

* Resources are

more fully

described in Key

at end of table

Classification

Valuation

Distribution

Personal

property

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.7

• Rutkin et al.

§ 50.13

• Rutkin

§ 38.04[2][b]

§ 38.05[1][b]

Prizes and

awards

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce § 983

• Rutkin

§ 37.13[5]

Professional

degrees and

licenses

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.15

• Rutkin

§ 36.14

§ 38.04[2][e]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§ 497-499

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce

§ 971

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.17

• Rutkin

§ 37.10

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§ 543

• Rutkin

§ 37.10

§ 38.05[1][e]

Professional

practices

including

goodwill

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.16

• Rutkin

§ 36.12

§ 37.09

§ 38.04[2][e]

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§ 500

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §972

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.12

§ 27.18

• Rutkin

§ 36.12

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation

§§ 544-545

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §973

• Rutkin

§ 38.05[1][e]

Real estate

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.4

• Rutkin

§ 38.04[2][a]

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §979

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.16

• Rutkin et al.

§ 50.12

• Rutkin

§ 38.05[1][a]

Stocks and

securities

• Rutkin et al.

§ 26.8

• 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and

Separation § 492

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §980

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.19

• Rutkin

§ 38.04[2][c]

• 27C C.J.S.

Divorce §981

• Rutkin et al.

§ 27.19

§ 50.36

• Rutkin

§ 38.05[1][c]

Equitable Distribution of Property- 68

Key to Resources Referenced:

24 Am Jur = 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West, 2018 (Also available

on Westlaw).

27B CJS = 27B C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on Westlaw).

27C CJS = 27C C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available on Westlaw).

Rutkin = Family Law and Practice, by Arnold H. Rutkin et al., Matthew Bender, 2023

(also available on Lexis Advance).

Rutkin et al. = Arnold H. Rutkin et al., 7, 8 & 8A Connecticut Practice Series, Family

Law and Practice with Forms, 2010, with 2022-2023 supplement, Thomson West, (also

available on Westlaw).

Equitable Distribution of Property- 69

Section 7: Wedding Presents Between Spouses

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

• Bibliographic resources relating to the question of how

wedding gifts are treated in a contested dissolution trial.

TREATED

ELSEWHERE:

• Breach of promise to marry and return of engagement

ring and courtship gifts

DEFINITIONS:

• “Despite the fact that there are thousands of dissolution

opinions issued by Connecticut judges, this question has

not been decided by any Connecticut trial court or

appellate court. It is an issue of first impression.”

Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 12, 910 A.2d 1011

(2006).

• “Connecticut is an all property state. Krafick v. Krafick,

234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).” Coppola v.

Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 13, 910 A.2d 1011 (2006).

[Emphasis added.]

• “‘The distribution of assets in a dissolution action is

governed by [General Statutes] § 46b-81. . . . This

approach to property division is commonly referred to as

an “all-property” equitable distribution scheme.’

(Citations omitted.)” Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp.

11, 13, 910 A.2d 1011 (2006).

• “Connecticut has no statutory definition of ‘marital

property.’” Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 13,

910 A.2d 1011 (2006). [Emphasis added.]

• Gift: “A gift is the transfer of property without

consideration. It requires two things: a delivery of the

possession of the property to the donee, and an intent

that the title thereto shall pass immediately to him.”

Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 13, 910 A.2d 1011

(2006).

• “Treatises have stated that if the donors' intent is not

clear, there are two basic approaches for classifying

wedding gifts. Annot., Rights in Wedding Presents as

Between Spouses, 75 A.L.R.2d 1365, 1366 (1961). Those

two approaches are referred to as the New York rule

and the English rule.” Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn.

Supp. 11, 17, 910 A.2d 1011 (2006). [Emphasis added.]

• “The New York rule presumes that a wedding gift is

intended as a joint gift unless the gift is appropriate for

the use of only one spouse or is peculiarly earmarked for

one particular spouse. This rule assumes that there is

inadequate or insufficient evidence of the donor's intent.

See Avnet v. Avnet, 204 Misc. 760, 768, 124 N.Y.S.2d

Equitable Distribution of Property- 70

517 (1953).” Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 17,

910 A.2d 1011 (2006).

STATUTES:

• Conn. Gen. Stat. (2023)

§ 46b-81(c). Assignment of property and transfer of

title. “(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property,

if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the

evidence presented by each party, shall consider the

length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment,

dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age,

health, station, occupation, amount and sources of

income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,

employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the

parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition

of capital assets and income. The court shall also

consider the contribution of each of the parties in

the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in

value of their respective estates.” [Emphasis added].

CASES:

• Coppola v. Farina, 50 Conn. Supp. 11, 17, 910 A.2d 1011

(2006). “Treatises have stated that if the donors' intent

is not clear, there are two basic approaches for

classifying wedding gifts. Annot., Rights in Wedding

Presents as Between Spouses, 75 A.L.R.2d 1365, 1366

(1961). Those two approaches are referred to as the New

York rule and the English rule.”

• Avnet v. Avnet, 204 Misc. 760, 768, 124 N.Y.S.2d 517

(1953). “In passing I might say that more so than in any

other period in the long history of mankind, this is the

age of ‘50-50’ marriages. The time has come to say

clearly that all wedding gifts whether from the bride's

‘side’ or from the groom's, excepting such items which

are peculiarly adaptable to the personal use of either

spouse, and those gifts which are specifically and

unequivocally ‘earmarked’ as intended exclusively for the

one or the other of the spouses, commonly intended for

general use in the household, are the joint property of

both parties to the marriage. This reasoning should apply

as well to the things of like use purchased with cash

wedding gifts not otherwise ‘earmarked’.”

WEST KEY

NUMBERS:

• Divorce

Allocation of property and liabilities; Equitable

distribution

# 718. Gifts and Inheritance

• Gifts, Inter vivos

# 43. Operation and effect as to parties

• Marriage & Cohabitation

# 606. Gifts and trusts

# 661. Gifts

# 681(2). Gifts

AMERICAN LAW

REPORTS:

• 75 ALR 2d 1365, Rights in Wedding Presents as Between

Spouses, by R.P. Davis, Thomson West, 1961.

You can visit your

local law library or

search the most

recent statutes and

public acts on the

Connecticut General

Assembly website to

confirm that you are

using the most up-

to-date statutes.

Once you have

identified useful

cases, it is important

to update the cases

before you rely on

them. Updating case

law means checking

to see if the cases

are still good law.

You can contact your

local law librarian to

learn about the tools

available to you to

update cases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 71

§1. Introduction, scope, and related matters, p.

1365.

§ 2. General observations and conclusions;

presumptions, p. 1366.

§ 3. Gifts to one of the spouses by relatives or

friends, p. 1366.

§ 4. Gifts appropriate only for use by, or adornment

of, one of the spouses, p. 1367.

§ 5. Bank accounts created from gifts to the

spouses, p. 1368.

§ 6. Gifts from one spouse to the other, p. 1368.

§ 7. Household furniture and furnishings given in

kind, or purchased with money given; generally,

1368.

§ 8. — As affected by statute

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

• 38 Am Jur 2d Gifts, Thomson West, 2019 (Also available

on Westlaw).

§ 15. Intention of donor

§ 16. — Evidence of donative intent

§ 66. Ownership of wedding presents as between

spouses

• 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation, Thomson West,

2018 (Also available on Westlaw).

§ 489. Wedding Gifts

• 38A C.J.S. Gifts, Thomson West, 2017 (Also available on

Westlaw).

§ 1. Generally, definitions and nature

§ 2. Classification

§ 16. Intent

§ 18. Delivery

§ 20. Sufficiency

§ 21. Surrender of control

§ 23. Constructive or symbolic delivery

§ 30. Redelivery to donor

§ 65. Revocation, generally

§ 71. Generally; presumptions-Burden of proof

§ 91. Questions of law and fact

• 27C C.J.S. Divorce, Thomson West, 2016 (Also available

on Westlaw).

§ 974. Gifts

§ 1274. Effect of decree on vested or unvested

Interest

TEXTS &

TREATISES:

• 7 Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice

with Forms, 3d ed., by Arnold H. Rutkin, et al., Thomson

West, 2010, with 2022-2023 supplement (also available

on Westlaw).

Chapter 26. Assets Subject to Distribution

§ 26:17. Gifts

Encyclopedias and

ALRs are available in

print at some law

library locations and

accessible online at

all law library

locations.

Online databases are

available for

in-library use.

Remote access is not

available.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 72

• LexisNexis Practice Guide: Connecticut Family Law, Louise

Truax, editor, 2023 ed., LexisNexis.

Chapter 6. Division of Property

§ 6.38. Including Gifts, Inheritances, and Trusts

• 1 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, by

Monika D. Young, Matthew Bender, 2023 (also available

on Lexis Advance).

Chapter 18. Property Subject to Equitable Distribution

§ 18.05(3)(a). Wedding Gifts

You can contact us

or visit our catalog

to determine which

of our law libraries

own the treatises

cited.

References to online

databases refer to

in-library use of

these databases.

Equitable Distribution of Property- 73

Table 7: Should Connecticut Adopt the New York Rule or the English

Rule?

“Should Connecticut Adopt the New

York Rule or the English Rule?”

Coppola v. Farina

50 Conn. Supp. 11 (2006)

Page 21

“Both the English rule and the New York rule indicate that the donor's

intent controls. This is consistent with Connecticut law.”

Page 21

“In the underlying case, the parties stated that they would offer no

evidence from the donors themselves as to the intent for the cash or

checks given at the wedding reception. This court finds that the self-

interested testimony of the parties themselves cannot be relied on to

decide the issue of donor's intent. There was no other evidence of the

donor's intent. Because cash is fungible, there was nothing specific in

the nature of the cash that could be used by only one spouse.”

Page 22

“Connecticut is an all property state and, therefore, all real and personal

property owned by parties regardless of when acquired or how acquired

through employment, gifts, inheritance, before the marriage or jointly

acquired or separately acquired during the marriage are all considered

property for the purpose of marital distribution in Connecticut. The

English rule has no foundation in Connecticut. This court chooses to

adopt the New York rule.”

Page 22

Page 23

“There is no evidence from the donors as to the donor's intent for the

cash wedding gifts given at the wedding reception. The parties do not

intend to call any of the donors as witnesses. No wedding gift cards will

be offered. All of the disputed wedding gifts were cash or checks. Cash is

fungible. There will be no evidence offered of a large cash gift or a cash

gift allocated to a certain purpose, such as paying off of the wife's

student loans or the improvement of real property owned by the

husband for years prior to the marriage. Each of the gifts was made in

cash or in a check, a cash equivalent. All gifts were made at the wedding

reception. The wedding guests had attended the marriage ceremony in

which the parties were declared husband and wife. Each of the wedding

guests had attended the reception where the wedding singer introduced

the parties as Mr. and Mrs. Gino Farina. Thereafter, the cash wedding

gifts were given. The court therefore rules that it is irrelevant to how

many of the 172 guests were from the ‘bride's side,’ how many of the

172 were her family and friends, how many of the 172 guests were from

the ‘groom's side’ and how many of the 172 were his family and friends.

The defendant's objection is sustained. The donor of the cash and

check gifts made at the wedding reception is irrelevant.”