Interagency
Security
Committee
Best Practices for Mail
Screening and Handling
Processes: A Guide for the
Public and Private Sectors
September 27, 2012
1
st
Edition
THE FINDINGS IN THIS REPORT ARE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS AN OFFICIAL
U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION UNLESS SO DESIGNATED BY OTHER
AUTHORIZING DOCUMENTS.
Distribution is authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals or enterprises.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
Preface
This document has been produced by the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
(CTTSO) Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). The CTTSO operates as a Program
Office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC).
The CTTSO is charged with providing a forum for interagency users to discuss mission
requirements to combat terrorism, prioritize those requirements, fund and manage solutions, and
deliver capabilities. The CTTSO accomplishes these objectives through rapid prototyping of
novel solutions and field testing before the traditional acquisition systems are fully engaged.
This low-risk approach encourages interdepartmental and interagency collaboration, thereby
reducing duplication and eliminating capability gaps.
This document is intended to provide best practices for the screening and handling of all
incoming packages and letters, whether delivered via the United States Postal Service (USPS),
commercial common couriers, or special messengers. In the majority of government agencies,
the “mailroom” is the central receiving and distribution function for all incoming and outgoing
mail and packages. For the purpose of this document, the authors use terms such as “mail,”
“mail handling,” and “mail center” in a manner reflecting the common vernacular. These terms
are used in a broad sense to describe the processing and distribution of not only USPS mail and
packages, but also other forms of written correspondence and packages—such as those provided
by commercial common couriers and special messengers. From a mail screening and handling
perspective, this expanded definition of “mail” and “mailroom” will help ensure that all
incoming “mail” items are considered when evaluating the application of the recommended best
practices. The authors in no way intend for the reader to interpret use of these or any such
similar terms as being representative of the technical definition of “mail” that properly identifies
the materials, products, processes, functions, authorities, brands, and facilities associated with
the USPS.
The original version of this document was produced with restricted dissemination and is only
available to Federal Government agencies (see Publications at www.tswg.gov). The Interagency
Security Committee has modified the document to be fully releasable to private individuals and
organizations. Multiple Federal agencies, the Interagency Security Committee, and two private
sector organizations contributed to the creation of this releasable version of the Best Practices
Guide. They are acknowledged at the conclusion of this document.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 2
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1. Purpose .................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2. Approach................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.3. The Art and Science of Screening Mail and Packages ........................................................................ 5
1.4. Additional Resources ............................................................................................................................. 6
2. POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE MAIL STREAM .................................................................................... 7
2.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive Threats ................................................... 7
2.2.1. Chemical ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2.2.2. Biological ...................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.3. Radiological/Nuclear ..................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.4. Explosives ..................................................................................................................................... 8
2.3. Dangerous Items and Contraband ........................................................................................................ 9
2.4. Hoaxes ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.5. Threatening Content .............................................................................................................................. 9
3. ANALYZING RISK IN MAIL STREAMS .................................................................................................. 11
3.1. Types of Mail and Package Deliveries ................................................................................................ 11
3.1.1. U.S. Postal Service ...................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.2. U.S. Postal Service Accountable Mail ......................................................................................... 11
3.1.3. Express Couriers .......................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.4. Other Couriers ............................................................................................................................. 12
3.1.5. Other Deliveries .......................................................................................................................... 12
3.1.6. Interoffice Mail ............................................................................................................................ 12
3.2. Risk Profile ........................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.1. Threat .......................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2.2. Vu
lnerability ................................................................................................................................ 13
3.2.3. Consequence ................................................................................................................................ 13
3.2.4. General Risk Factors ................................................................................................................... 14
4. MAIL SCREENING FACILITIES ............................................................................................................... 17
4.1. Primary Categories of Mail Screening and Sorting Facilities .......................................................... 17
4.1.1. Offsite Screening Facilities/Remote Delivery Sites .................................................................... 17
4.1.2. Isolated On-Campus Facilities..................................................................................................... 17
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
4.1.3. Primary Office Locations ............................................................................................................ 17
4.1.4. Single Room Mail Center Operations.......................................................................................... 17
4.2. Mail Screening Facility Core Requirements ...................................................................................... 18
5. MAIL SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES ..................................................................................................... 20
5.1. Ov
erview ............................................................................................................................................... 20
5.1.1. Mail Center Screening Challenges .............................................................................................. 20
5.1.2. Alternative Approaches ............................................................................................................... 20
5.2. Integrating Technologies Into Mail Screening Operations ............................................................... 21
5.2.1. Mail Screening and Sorting Facilities.......................................................................................... 21
5.2.2. Personal Protective Equipment .................................................................................................... 22
5.2.3. Radiation/Nuclear ........................................................................................................................ 23
5.2.4. Chemical Screening ..................................................................................................................... 23
5.2.5. Suspicious Items .......................................................................................................................... 23
5.2.6. Explosives ................................................................................................................................... 23
5.2.7. Biohazards ................................................................................................................................... 24
5.2.8. Dangerous and Contraband Items ................................................................................................ 25
5.2.9. Containment Systems .................................................................................................................. 25
5.2.10. Decontamination of Mail, Personnel, and Facilities .................................................................... 26
6. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING MAIL SCREENING PROCESSES ............................................ 27
6.1. Pr
ocess Mapping .................................................................................................................................. 27
6.2. Integrating Screening Procedures ...................................................................................................... 27
6.2.1. U.S. Postal Service ...................................................................................................................... 27
6.2.2. Express Couriers and Other Delivery Services............................................................................ 27
6.3. Screening Processes .............................................................................................................................. 28
6.3.1. Radiation/Nuclear ........................................................................................................................ 28
6.3.2. Chemical ...................................................................................................................................... 28
6.3.3. Explosive ..................................................................................................................................... 28
6.3.4. Dan
gerous Items and Contraband ................................................................................................ 28
6.3.5. Biohazard..................................................................................................................................... 28
6.4. Sorting and Delivery Processes ........................................................................................................... 28
6.4.1. Mail Sorting and Package Sorting ............................................................................................... 28
6.4.2. Inbound Courier Services ............................................................................................................ 29
6.4.3. Inbound Delivery ......................................................................................................................... 29
6.5. Interoffice Mail ..................................................................................................................................... 29
6.5.1. Interoffice Mail Pickup ................................................................................................................ 29
6.5.2. Interoffice Mail Screening ........................................................................................................... 29
6.5.3. Interoffice Mail Sorting and Delivery ......................................................................................... 29
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
6.6. Outbound Mail Processes .................................................................................................................... 29
6.6.
1. Pickup of Outbound Mail ............................................................................................................ 29
6.6.2. Processing Outbound Mail .......................................................................................................... 29
6.6.3. Transferring Outbound Mail to U.S. Postal Service or Couriers ................................................. 29
7. SUSPICIOUS MAIL INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES................................................................ 31
7.1. Initial Alert Procedures ....................................................................................................................... 31
7.2. Specific Substance Initial Response Procedures ................................................................................ 31
7.3. Evacuation Procedures ........................................................................................................................ 32
7.4. Internal Communication ..................................................................................................................... 32
7.5. External Communication .................................................................................................................... 32
7.6. Post-Event Follow-Up .......................................................................................................................... 33
7.7. Other Resources ................................................................................................................................... 33
8. TRAINING MAIL SCREENING PERSONNEL ........................................................................................ 34
8.1. Su
spicious Mail Characteristics .......................................................................................................... 34
8.2. Use of Screening Technology ............................................................................................................... 34
8.3. Incident Response Procedures ............................................................................................................ 34
9. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 35
9.1. The Team Approach ............................................................................................................................ 35
9.2. Implementing Appropriate Technology and Procedures ................................................................. 35
9.3. Adjusting Approaches as the Threat Changes .................................................................................. 35
APPENDIX 1 – GOVERNMENT MAIL CENTER REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS ........ 36
APPENDIX 2 – SUSPICIOUS MAIL OR PACKAGES POSTER ....................................................................... 37
APPENDIX 3 – MAIL CENTER CLASSIFICATION .......................................................................................... 38
APPENDIX 4 – MAIL CENTER ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ....................................................................... 40
APPENDIX 5 – MAIL SCREENING REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... 48
APPENDIX 6 – MAIL SCREENING BEST PRACTICES CHECKLIST .......................................................... 50
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 57
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
2
Executive Summary
The Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling guide is designed to provide mail center
managers, their supervisors, and an organization’s security personnel a framework for
understanding and mitigating risks posed to the organization by the mail and packages it receives
and delivers on a daily basis. A wide range of potential threats can be introduced into an
organization by way of the mail center. Threats that involve chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or explosive substances (CBRNE) are both dangerous and disruptive. Some threats,
such as white powder hoaxes and threatening letters, are merely designed to disrupt the activities
of an organization or to express dissatisfaction with a particular individual or policy. The mail
center screening and handling processes must be able to identify threats and hoaxes and
eliminate or mitigate the risk they pose to the organization, its employees, and daily operations.
This guide provides an introduction to and understanding of the most efficient and effective
processes and procedures to handle and screen mail entering an organization’s mail processing
facilities.
There is no single set of “best practices” that is applicable to all mail centers. However, there are
a number of factors that help determine both the type of mail screening facility that is required
and the range of screening procedures that should be implemented by the mail center manager.
The purpose of this guide is to help mail center managers understand these factors and evaluate
them in terms of their specific operational requirements. The Best Practices for Mail Screening
and Handling guide is structured with a “building block” approach.
Section 1, Introduction, provides an introduction to mail screening and outlines the analytical
approach necessary to develop appropriate and effective screening processes. Most importantly,
it highlights the fact that mail screening is both an “art and science.” The clear message for all
users of the guide is that there are no guarantees that even the best screening technology and
procedures will identify all potential threats before a letter or package arrives at the desk of the
intended recipient. The guide is intended to provide an overview of best practices for mail
screening and sorting activities. It is not intended to replace Federal Government mail handling
or U.S. Postal Service regulations, policies, or directives. To ensure that users are fully aware of
these regulations and policies, Appendix 1, Government Mail Center Regulations and Related
Documents, has been added as supplement to this guide.
Section 2, Potential Threats in the Mail Stream, provides a review of the potential threats that
could appear in the mail stream. Specifically, CBRNE threats are discussed and defined. In
addition, this section of the guide provides a basic introduction to hoaxes and their impact on the
mail stream. Having discussed the potential threats in the mail stream, the guide then proceeds
to provide the user with a structured approach to countering these threats. First, mail center
managers should perform a risk assessment associated with their specific mail center operations.
Consideration of certain factors (e.g., the type(s) of mail received, organizational profile,
location, facility security) is examples of the elements that should go into such an assessment.
Section 3, Analyzing the Risk in Mail Streams, focuses on defining and explaining the elements
of this assessment. To be both efficient and effective, screening processes should be well-
designed and properly integrated into the overall process of receiving, sorting, and delivering
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
3
mail and packages. Proper screening requires consideration and evaluation of both the facilities
within which the screening will be performed and the technologies and processes that will be
used for screening within these facilities. Proper screening technology selection requires a solid
understanding of mail and package volumes, accountability procedures, transfer requirements,
and courier routes. This is particularly important in small mail centers where a few individuals
must perform multiple tasks sequentially. The mail center manager must ensure that the
screening workflow itself does not create any unexpected security violations or unnecessary
contamination.
Section 4, Mail Screening Facilities, provides mail center managers with an understanding of
the foundation for mail screening through a description and definition of the primary categories
of mail screening and sorting facilities. For example, the best practice for organizations that
have determined they are at a high level of risk is to create an off-site mail and package
screening facility. Organizations that have a lower level of risk associated with their mail and
package processing operations, or perhaps have more limited resources, may create an isolated
on-campus facility that leverages the security features of the larger campus. In instances where
the facility risk level, mail volume, and budgetary constraints make separate facilities infeasible,
mail screening facilities can be located within the building that serves as the primary office
facility. Finally, small mail centers that operate from a single room may choose to integrate a
separate stand-alone negative pressure mail room (NPMR) within their existing space for mail
screening purposes.
Mail screening technologies and processes can have a significant impact on the ability of a mail
center to receive, sort, and deliver mail and packages in a timely fashion. Some screening
processes, such as those for radiation, can be done relatively quickly with little delay or
disruption in the normal mail handling procedures. Others, such as the procedures for biological
agents, can delay mail for many hours or even days, depending on the technology being used and
the degree of certainty desired for the results. Mail security personnel must understand
technology and process requirements that reflect the degree of risk in their mail operations and
seek to achieve acceptable levels of both security and speed.
Section 5, Mail Screening Technologies, provides an overview of the challenges associated with
mail screening technologies. In addition, it provides an in-depth look at the types of
technologies that can be used to counter each of the known threats. This section provides an
initial understanding of what should be considered when selecting screening technologies, as
well as what should be considered when integrating these technologies into specific mail
screening processes from an operational and a staff safety perspective.
Section 6, Designing and Implementing Mail Screening Processes, provides the user of this
best practices guide with a logical framework for understanding and tailoring an organization’s
specific mail screening and handling process. Beginning with a process-mapping approach, the
guide provides a basic understanding of how to approach establishing the processes for CBRNE
screening. Most importantly, this section provides a clear understanding of how the screening
processes can be integrated into the basic operations of accepting, screening, clearing, and
processing mail and packages to ensure that sorting and delivery, interoffice mail, and outbound
mail processing all benefit from and are not hindered by the screening overlay.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
4
Key factors to be considered in mail screening are not only what mail should be screened and
how it should be screened, but also what specifically should be done when a suspicious mail item
or threat is identified. Simply put, response procedures are as important as the screening process
itself.
Section 7, Suspicious Mail Incident Response Procedures, provides a primary description and
checklist of actions required when an incident occurs. Topics such as alert procedures,
evacuation, and post-event follow-up are discussed in this section. Communication is a key
component of incident response, and this portion of the guide addresses both internal and
external communication requirements.
The success of mail screening and handling technologies in any mailroom environment, while
dependent on facilities and equipment, ultimately will succeed or fail based upon the staff
assigned to the operation and how well they understand their mail screening responsibilities.
Section 8, Training of Mail Screening Personnel, is specifically directed at defining the
primary categories of training that should be conducted and the recurring training that may be
needed, as well as the frequency of “testing the system.”
Section 9, Conclusions, expands this basic training theme by defining the need for a team
approach to the many aspects of mail screening that take place inside a mailroom/center. In
addition, this section highlights a sometimes overlooked requirement: the need to continually
evaluate the organization’s mail screening approaches and adjust processes, procedures, and
equipment as the threat changes.
Summary
Well-designed and implemented mail and package screening procedures can identify suspicious
items on a regular basis. Mail centers must have clearly documented incident response
procedures in order to mitigate the risk posed by these items and avoid unnecessary disruption of
their operations. Response procedures for handing suspicious mail will vary from organization
to organization and will be based upon a combination of factors such as the type of item
discovered, the location of the mail screening facility, internal facility configuration, the number
of personnel in the facility, and specific organizational protocols. All procedures must address
initial response procedures, evacuation procedures, internal and external communications,
evidence-handling procedures, and post-incident requirements. The United States Postal
Inspection Service (USPIS) has highly trained personnel who are familiar with the most current
guidelines for responding to incidents involving suspicious mail or packages and who can help
design appropriate procedures for specific mail centers. Incident response procedures should
also be coordinated with local first-responder personnel, if possible.
The movement of mail and packages is an important part of an organization’s daily operations.
A successful mail and package screening program requires the integrated efforts of senior
organization officials, mail center management, security officials, technology providers, public
health officials, and local first responders. Working together, this diverse team can ensure mail
is properly screened and delivered in an affordable and efficient manner. This Best Practices for
Mail Screening and Handling guide provides a primary tool to be used in achieving this goal.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
5
1. Introduction
1.1.
Purpose
This Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling guide is designed to provide mail
center managers, their supervisors, and an organization’s security personnel with a
framework for understanding and mitigating risks posed to an organization by the mail and
packages it receives and delivers on a daily basis. The best practices guide outlines the most
efficient and effective processes and procedures to handle and screen mail entering facilities
for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats. It includes a
discussion of alternative technologies that can be employed and a recommendation for the
proper location and construction of a mail screening facility.
1.2. Approach
This guide is designed to help administrative services directors, mail center managers, and an
organization’s security personnel achieve the following objectives:
• Define and analyze the risks associated with various types of mail streams;
• Understand the most likely types of CBRNE threats that may appear in the mail;
• Analyze and compare the efficacy, efficiency, and economics of alternative mail
screening technologies, facilities, and processes;
• Select the appropriate screening technologies, facilities, and protocols;
• Design an efficient workflow for mail screening and sorting processes;
• Understand and implement identification tools for suspicious mail and packages;
• Understand and implement contamination reduction strategies;
• Develop and implement appropriate training for mail center personnel;
• Develop suspicious substance-specific incident response procedures; and
• Define internal and external communications procedures.
1.3. The Art and Science of Screening Mail and Packages
Mail screening is both an art and a science. It requires a properly built facility, clearly
defined and consistently executed processes, well-trained and educated screening
personnel, engaged security managers, and the support of all employees throughout an
organization.
Threats in the mail stream are continually changing. New explosives, new electronic
trigger devices, and new biological and chemical substances are appearing at more
frequent intervals. Nuclear proliferation is making radioactive materials potentially more
available than ever before. Terrorists are hiding explosives in common office supply
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
6
items and electronic devices, making them increasingly difficult to detect. Loading docks
and delivery vehicles often provide easy access to buildings that have high levels of
security screening at their lobby entrances. Mail screening processes must therefore be
both appropriate for today’s threats and flexible enough to deal with the sudden
appearance of currently unknown suspicious substances or delivery mechanisms.
There are no guarantees that even the best mail screening technologies and procedures
will identify all potential threats before a letter or package arrives at the desk of the
intended recipient. Therefore, all employees, not just mail center personnel, should be
trained to recognize suspicious mail and packages and know how to respond when such
items appear. What happens to a piece of suspicious mail after it is identified can be just
as important in reducing its potential impact on the organization as stopping it from
appearing in the first place. This can be especially true in the case of “white powder
letters” that contain no material that is actually harmful, but can be massively disruptive
nonetheless. Although it is often difficult to initially identify whether the white powder
is a nonthreatening substance, knowing how to respond to such letters appropriately can
significantly limit the disruptive effect.
1.4. Additional Resources
This guide provides an overview of best practices for mail screening and sorting activities. It
is not intended to replace Federal Government mail or U.S. Postal Service (USPS) postal
regulations or internal organizational policies and directives. Appendix 1, Government Mail
Center Regulations and Related Documents, contains a list of related government mail
center regulations and security-related documents that can be used to supplement the
information in this guide.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
7
2. Potential Threats in the Mail Stream
2.1.
Overview
There is a wide range of potential threats that can be introduced into a facility by way of the
mail center. Threats that involve CBRNE substances are both dangerous and disruptive.
Some, like white powder hoaxes and threatening letters, are merely designed to disrupt the
activities of an organization or to express dissatisfaction with a particular individual or
policy. The mail center screening process must be able to identify all of these threats and
eliminate or reduce the risk they pose to an organization’s employees, facilities, and daily
operations. Appendix 2, Suspicious Mail or Packages Poster, provides a poster than can be
used to help mail center employees visually identify suspicious mail and packages.
2.2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive Threats
2.2.1. Chemical
Categories of chemical threats include nerve agents, blood agents, pulmonary (choking)
agents, blister agents, industrial chemicals, and irritants. Chemical threats can be
presented in solid, liquid or gaseous/vapor form. They are difficult to detect until already
deployed and their impact is almost always nearly instantaneous. Chemical weapons
present unique challenges for both those who are seeking to use them as weapons and for
those who are trying to detect their presence in mail and packages. If the goal is to target
a particular facility or individual, both liquids and gases must be contained while the mail
or package is being processed and then released when the item is opened by the recipient,
by a timer, or by a remote electronic device. These requirements make use of chemical
agents as mail-borne weapons somewhat difficult. However, chemical weapons can be
packaged and deployed using almost any of the courier or local delivery services.
Because of their light weight, some gases can also be compressed into small containers
that can be mailed using USPS drop boxes. Mail and package screening systems must
therefore be capable of identifying the release of chemical agents and, to the extent
possible, containing the exposure to limited areas within the mail center or mail screening
facility.
2.2.2. Biological
Biological agents are now a well-known and recognized category of mail-borne threat as
a result of the anthrax letters that were discovered in October 2001. In addition, the
biological agents that cause anthrax, plague, smallpox, and tularemia are most widely
recognized as potential mail-borne biological weapons. As was demonstrated with the
anthrax letters, large quantities of weaponized spores can be distributed using a common
envelope. They can also be distributed through an aerosol method, although this would
require a more sophisticated “bomb” enclosed in a flat or parcel. Due to their small size,
and the high volumes of dust and paper residue common in most mail centers, biological
agents can often go undetected by traditional visual inspections. Further complicating
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
8
screening requirements is the fact the incubation period for biological agents can be days
or even weeks in some cases. Although this means an individual can be treated
successfully once exposed, it also means that exposed individuals who are not aware of
their contact with the biohazard can go for extended periods without receiving treatment,
thereby hindering their probability of recovery.
One additional substance frequently included in any discussion of biological threats is
ricin. Ricin is a poison found naturally in castor beans. Ricin can be made from the
waste material left over from processing castor beans, and therefore can be considered
readily available to anyone who would want to use it for terrorist purposes. A toxin, ricin
cannot be easily absorbed through the skin, but is usually fatal when it enters the
bloodstream through a cut or other form of open wound. Small particles of ricin can also
be inhaled into the lungs, leading to death in two to three days. All of these factors make
ricin a potentially dangerous substance when deliberately introduced into a mail center
environment.
2.2.3. Radiological/Nuclear
Radiation threats include those produced by a nuclear detonation of some kind and those
that are the result of unprotected exposure to radioactive material. Radiation can also be
dispersed by combining a radiation source with a conventional explosive to create a
“dirty bomb” that can be introduced into the mail stream as a package. Individuals
exposed to radiation can suffer both immediate and long-term effects. Radiation
detection systems that can be used in mail screening operations are capable of detecting
and identifying various types of radiation particles (alpha, beta, and gamma). However,
due to the difficulty in identifying alpha and beta particles from sources inside packages,
most pagers and portals incorporated into mail center systems primarily target gamma
radiation.
2.2.4. Explosives
Letter mail and packages are both susceptible to being used as mail bombs. New
explosives and the miniaturization of the components necessary to initiate an explosion
have made letter bombs more destructive and more difficult to detect. The similarity
between the components of letter bombs and many common electronic devices has
further exacerbated this trend. Fortunately, there is a wide range of detection
technologies and approaches that can be used in even very small mail centers to identify
explosive substances.
There is a wide range of explosives that have been used in letter and parcel bombs.
Military explosives such as C-4 and “det cord,” ammonium nitrate, and most recently
pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN)-based explosives are all readily available and
commonly used. Fortunately, explosives have a variety of characteristics that can be
used to help detect them. In addition to their appearance and density, explosive
substances emit a vapor trace that can be collected from letters and packages by using
explosive detection canine teams or modern electronic sensors.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
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2.3. Dangerous Items and Contraband
2.3.1. Dangerous Items
In addition to items that are intentionally dangerous to the recipient, such as those
discussed in the CBRNE section 2.2, mail can contain items that can cut or shock an
individual when a letter is opened. Although unlikely to cause permanent harm, they do
temporarily disrupt the activities of an individual or organization.
2.3.2. Illegal or Contraband Items
Illegal or contraband items, such as drugs, guns, knives, swords, and similar items, are
also frequently shipped through the mail. Mail center screening processes must be
prepared to identify and segregate these items in accordance with an organization’s
policies. In some organizations, such as security and law enforcement agencies, these
items are allowed to be received through the normal mail center process.
2.4. Hoaxes
2.4.1. Definition
Hoaxes consist of suspicious mail items that are designed to present the appearance of a
dangerous substance or other threat, but do not contain the actual substance necessary to
cause harm. Hoaxes can be as disruptive to a mail center or an organizational facility as
an actual threat.
2.4.2. White Powder Envelopes
The most common type of hoax is the “white powder envelope.” Since the original
anthrax letters, any white powdery substance can now be used to create the impression of
anthrax. Sugar substitutes, baby powder, corn starch, and a myriad of other similar
substances have successfully been used to simulate anthrax, leading to the evacuation of
mail centers and office buildings. In addition, these hoaxes have also led to the writing of
thousands of prescriptions for medications as a preventative measure for the employees
of the mail operations. Frequently, white powder letters also contain threatening
markings such as “anthrax inside” to create further suspicion and fear in the minds of the
recipients. The goal for screening processes is to be able to identify these letters
whenever possible and, in all cases, rule out the possibility that the white powder is a
dangerous biological substance or toxin.
2.5. Threatening Content
2.5.1. Types of Threats
Suspicious mail may contain threatening language on the envelope itself or in the
contents of the envelope. This can range from the aforementioned “anthrax inside” to
language such as “Death to the President.” Some letters will contain detailed descriptions
of potential murders or terrorist attacks.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
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2.5.2. Proper Handling of Threat Letters
These letters must be identified and segregated as early as possible in the mail stream to
both maintain their integrity as evidence and to limit any potential emotional harm to the
intended recipient.
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
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3. Analyzing Risk in Mail Streams
3.1.
Types of Mail and Package Deliveries
Organizations receive mail and packages from a wide variety of sources every day. Some of
these sources, such as USPS and major express couriers, have extensive security, screening,
and control processes embedded in their day-to-day operations. Many others deliver items
that can be considered to be from “trusted vendors” or other sources that limit the potential
risk they pose to the intended recipient or other individuals within an organization.
Unfortunately, even the best procedures and control measures do not completely eliminate
risk; therefore, it is important to implement mail center procedures that provide both a second
line of screening and the ability to track mail and packages from receipt to delivery. This
section will briefly introduce the delivery services provided by various carriers and identify
associated risks.
3.1.1. U.S. Postal Service
The USPS delivers a full range of items including letter mail, flats, and parcels.
Although there is a variety of different categories of mail services (First Class, Priority,
Express, etc.), all mail is routinely delivered by a USPS mail carrier or authorized agent.
The USPS has a number of security measures in place that help reduce the risk posed by
the mail and packages it delivers on a daily basis. These include personnel screening,
suspicious mail training for their carriers, limits on the size and weight of packages that
can be left in blue USPS mailboxes, and limited biohazard screening for B. Anthracis (the
biological agent that causes anthrax) at its large processing centers. Despite these
measures, mail and packages can be introduced into the USPS system by virtually
anyone, without any requirement for mailer identification or a return address.
3.1.2. U.S. Postal Service Accountable Mail
The USPS offers extra services through the use of its Certified and Registered mail
products that may also contribute to enhanced security. With Certified Mail, the mailer
receives a receipt stamped with the date of mailing. Each item has a unique article
number that allows delivery to be verified online. As an additional security feature, the
recipient’s signature is obtained at the time of delivery and a record is maintained by the
USPS. Registered Mail provides an even higher level of security by incorporating a
system of receipts to monitor the movement of the mail through the USPS sorting and
delivery system. Both of these systems are designed to make sure the items being mailed
are not lost or stolen. They do not, however, do anything to reduce the risk contents the
mail piece may pose to the intended recipient.
3.1.3. Express Couriers
National express couriers (FedEx, UPS, etc.) provide pickup and delivery of express mail
and packages. The security features associated with these services include end-to-end
tracking and limited screening for potentially dangerous substances throughout the
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sorting process. Like USPS items, there are few restrictions on who can introduce an
item into the system and no mailer or shipper identification is required. Individuals can
simply present their item to the clerk at a retail shipping facility and pay for the
transaction in cash. In most cases, recipients are required to sign for items in order for
them to be released by the express courier. This system provides security of the items
being mailed, but again, does little to reduce the threat posed by the contents of the flat or
parcel being received. Terrorists have recently begun to use global express couriers as
channels for explosive packages. Packages that are transported by air pose a threat to
both the air carrier and the intended recipient, evidenced by the October 2010
interception of improvised explosive devices in the form of computer printer cartridges
originating from Yemen and destined for the United States. This practice of using air
carriers has led to couriers instituting additional screening procedures and placing
restrictions on outbound shipments from selected high-risk countries.
3.1.4. Other Couriers
In addition to well-known national couriers, there is a full range of regional and local
couriers that provide more limited delivery services. These couriers range from well-
established enterprises with processes, sorting facilities, and vehicles comparable to the
national carriers, to small businesses that provide bicycle or motorcycle couriers within a
single metropolitan area. Background screening, training, and security procedures vary
widely among this group; therefore, they must be considered as some of the potentially
higher risk sources of suspicious items from the mail center perspective.
3.1.5. Other Deliveries
Though the primary focus of this guide is on mail center operations, there are numerous
other individuals that deliver items to an organization on a daily basis. These include
newspaper and magazine services, fast food vendors, gift shops, florists, office supply
vendors with their own or contracted delivery vehicles, and large third-party logistics
trucking firms that are hired to deliver products from the original manufacturer or retailer.
Each of these sources of deliveries has an associated risk and must be considered on an
individual basis. Wherever possible, it is best to incorporate them into the mail center
screening and delivery system to the fullest extent. Deliveries of this type will often
include items that are too large for traditional screening systems, so additional procedures
to identify and verify vendors, delivery vehicle drivers, and recipients will be necessary.
These procedures may be performed by the facility physical security personnel rather
than mail center personnel.
3.1.6. Interoffice Mail
One source of mail and packages that often does not get an adequate review during an
assessment of mail and package screening operations is interoffice mail. Created and
delivered entirely within an office building or campus environment, interoffice mail is
considered to be “safe” and from one “trusted source” to another. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case, and interoffice mail must be considered another potential source of
suspicious mail. Outgoing interoffice mail receptacles are often little more than open
containers placed in or around mail box distribution points. Disgruntled employees,
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visitors, maintenance personnel, and others can introduce suspicious mail directly into the
internal mail sorting and delivery process, bypassing the screening technology and
procedures that have been established for USPS and express courier deliveries.
3.2. Risk Profile
A risk profile should be completed on any existing mail center; prior to the design,
installation, and implementation of any new mail center screening facility; and when
modifying the screening capabilities of an existing facility. Although the mail center is
the focal point of the assessment and profile, it should be completed with the assistance
of the organization’s security personnel and facilities manager, whenever possible.
The level of risk associated with an individual organization may vary widely from a
similar facility in a different organization located across the street. In addition, although
properly prepared risk assessments are sufficiently broad as to incorporate a variety of
profiles, the mail center manager or person responsible for the mailroom function must
recognize that risk levels can change rapidly.
In general, the risk associated with the operation of an organization’s mail center can be
viewed through three basic factors. The following “formula” can be used as the basis for
determining an organization’s mail center risk level:
RISK = THREAT + VULNERABILITY + CONSEQUENCE
3.2.1. Threat
The threat has been defined in terms of the CBRNE substances (plus hoaxes) described in
Section 2. Any organization analyzing their potential risk status should consider all of
these threats as potentially applicable to their organization.
3.2.2. Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the organization’s assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their
operations and the physical characteristics of their mail center with respect to the known
and projected threats. For example, could a biological or radiological threat be
introduced into their organization through the mail stream; or could an explosive device
be introduced in an undetected manner?
3.2.3. Consequence
In evaluating an organization’s risk profile, a key driving factor to be considered is the
consequence of an incident involving the mail center. For example, if the mail center
were shut down, would the entire facility have to shut down as well? If a mail center
incident requires evacuation of the building, what effect will that have on the daily
operations of the organization? Will critical functions be disrupted? Will clients be
affected?
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One of the most significant aspects to be considered by any organization in evaluating the
consequences of either a real or suspect incident is the potential financial impact.
If production is delayed for a day–what will that mean in terms of lost revenue? If
employees are forced to leave their facility and cannot work for one, two, or more days,
what is the cost of their salaries? One case study, involving a large international
organization, demonstrates the severity of this impact. Immediately after the original
anthrax attacks in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area, the organization received a
letter containing white powder. This caused the entire organization to shut down for a
period of 2 to 3 days while the substance was analyzed and ultimately determined to be a
hoax. In a post-event analysis, the organization estimated that the cost of paying
employee salaries for the period of the shut down exceeded five million dollars.
Ultimately the organization determined that the cost of an offsite mail screening facility
would cost only a fraction of the lost wages on an annual basis–thus it is critical that an
organization include financial impact in their risk profile assessment.
3.2.4. General Risk Factors
A wide number of factors can be included in any risk profile, and they will vary from
organization to organization. Although all potential risk factors cannot be listed here, the
following provides some general guidelines to the type of factors that should be
considered.
3.2.4.1. Public Posture
Is the organization a logical target for terrorist attacks? In evaluating this factor, an
organization should look at its position with respect to where and how it is considered
part of the industrial base. The following industrial areas may be considered as higher
risk areas:
• Banking
• Energy
• Power
• Defense
• Legal
• Pharmaceutical
• Chemical
• Nuclear Facilities
• Transportation
– Air
– Land
– Sea
• Health and Medical
• Telecommunications
• Construction
• Bio-Medical Research
• Any organization considered part of the “Military Industrial Complex”
3.2.4.2. Symbolism
A key factor to consider when evaluating the posture of an organization is the symbolism
that can be attached to targeting that organization. Key factors to consider include:
• A well known or well publicized entity–Is the organization the type that if
attacked would have continuous and widespread “down line” impacts? The
anthrax attacks caused widespread concern and worries because virtually
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everyone was concerned about their mail, regardless of whether or not they were
individually considered a good target.
• Negative psychological impact–If an organization is targeted or the recipient of a
threat, there can, and most likely will be, a perception that all entities associated
with that organization are at risk, as well a potential risk for any organizations that
deal with the targeted entity. The negative psychological impact can drive a lack
of confidence in the organization, its position in the industrial sector, and a
corresponding loss of confidence in government entities. For example, threats
made against one or two prime entities in the banking industry have resulted in
the entire industry being considered a target with potentially wide spread
consequences.
3.2.4.3. Location
Organizations located in large, multitenant facilities (high rise office buildings,
standalone office parks, etc.) are more at risk to be affected if any of the organizations in
their facility are recipients of a mail-borne threat.
Likewise, organizations located in large urban centers are more likely to be affected by
any threat presented in their city. A biological attack in New York City, as an example,
would have all the organizations in NYC immediately concerned; whereas an attack on
an organization that is relatively isolated may not be considered to have as wide a
“footprint” with respect to collateral concerns.
3.2.4.4. Population
Terrorist threats attempt to instill fear in the largest number of individuals possible;
therefore, organizations with large employee populations are at higher risk than smaller
entities.
As with the Location factor, organizations located in areas with a high density population
can also be at risk regardless of the number of their individual employees.
3.2.4.5. Intangibles
A wide range of additional factors must be considered when evaluating an organization’s
and facility’s risk profile, some of which are organization or industry specific. For
example, has the organization/tenants, or the area within the industrial sector, been the
target of any previous terrorist attacks? Has the organization/tenants been the subject of
any highly publicized negative press? Has the organization/tenants been the target of
organized demonstrations, boycotts, labor disputes, etc.? Has the organization/tenants
been the subject of attacks by disgruntled employees? A positive answer to any questions
such as these should be considered in the risk assessment.
Other aspects that should be considered include, but are not limited to, such factors as:
• Facility layout–single building, multiple buildings, or campus;
• Single tenant or multiple tenants;
• Controlled access, public access, or a combination;
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• Loading dock configuration;
• Visibility of the organization’s facility that contains the mail center (e.g., signage,
lighting, advertising); and
• Number and frequency of visitors and/or tourists to the facility and the area in
which it is located.
All of these and similar factors will have a direct impact on an organization’s overall risk
profile.
3.2.4.6. Size and Volume of the Mail Stream
The risk associated with a mail center is also driven by its size and the mail volumes it
supports. Appendix 3, Mail Center Classification, provides an approach for
appropriately classifying a mail center based on the organization it supports and its mail
and package volume levels. Finally, Appendix 4, Mail Center Security Assessment
Worksheet, can help mail center and security managers take a snapshot of their existing
facilities and processes. Completion of this worksheet can significantly enhance
understanding of where significant risks may be present in existing mail center
operations. It will also serve as the basis for the design of an appropriately scoped mail
center screening facility and process.
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4. Mail Screening Facilities
4.1.
Primary Categories of Mail Screening and Sorting Facilities
4.1.1. Offsite Screening Facilities/Remote Delivery Sites
The best practice for organizations that have determined they are at a high level of risk is
to create an off-site mail and package screening facility. Many organizations or
subordinate components will incorporate this facility into a remote delivery facility where
all deliveries, including supplies, furniture, and food for in-house cafeteria vendors, must
be processed. Mail and packages will be received, screened, sorted, and prepared for
delivery at this facility. Secure courier vehicles then transport the items to office
locations for internal distribution. Security can be enhanced for these facilities by
implementing scheduled, permission-based delivery procedures and tracking.
4.1.2. Isolated On-Campus Facilities
Organizations that have a lower level of risk associated with their mail and package
processing operations, or more limited resources, may create an isolated on-campus
facility that would operate much in the same way as an offsite facility. The only
difference is the facility would be located within the security perimeter of the office
complex maintained by the organization. Although these facilities lack some of the
stand-off capability that a true offsite facility provides, they significantly reduce the
ability of a suspicious mail piece or package to disrupt organization operations for
extended periods of time. Separate mail screening facilities isolate any potential threat
and enable first responders to address the issue without typically requiring a complete
evacuation of the office space occupied by an organization’s employees. Whenever
possible, these on-campus screening facilities should not be co-located with other
operations. They should also have separate security and heat, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems.
4.1.3. Primary Office Locations
In instances where the security level, mail volume, and budgetary constraints make
separate facilities infeasible or excessively impractical, mail center screening activities
can be located within the building that serves as the primary office location for the
organization. The mail center should be placed in a secure area with direct access to the
outside of the building in order to limit movement of mail and packages within the
building prior to screening activities taking place. If direct outside access is not feasible,
mail and packages should be transported in a secure, negative pressure mail cart to
minimize the spread of any potential biological contaminants.
4.1.4. Single Room Mail Center Operations
Due to their very limited mail volumes or severe space restrictions, many mail center
operations are required to operate from a single room. Frequently, these mail centers
must share a loading dock with other organizations or tenants in the building. These mail
centers should seek to employ as many of the security capabilities resident in larger
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facilities as possible. There are scalable, configurable, stand-alone negative pressure mail
rooms (NPMRs) and small blast containment systems that can provide many of the
benefits of systems designed for large footprint, multi-room mail centers.
4.2. Mail Screening Facility Core Requirements
Table 4-1, “Mail Screening Facility Design,” outlines the core facility requirements and
where they will be met for the various types of mail screening facilities discussed above. In
instances where an organization is able to establish and construct a true offsite mail screening
facility, the requirements may all be satisfied by capabilities that are resident in the facility
itself.
Table 4-1. Mail Screening Facility Design
Core Facility Capabilities
Off-site
Screening
Facility
Isolated On-
Campus
Facility
Primary
Office
Location
Single Room
Mail Center
Facility
Campus
Building
Building
Facility
Campus
Building
Building
Facility
Campus
Building
Building
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Mail Center
Facility
Campus and Mail
Center
Building and
Mail Center
Building and
Mail Center
Facility
Campus
Building
Building
Facility
Campus and Mail
Center
Building and
Mail Center
Building and
Mail Center
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
N/A
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Loading Dock
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Mail Center
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
N/A
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
NPMR
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
NPMR
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Restricted Area
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Designated
Area
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Designated
Area
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Mail Center
Facility
Mail Center
Mail Center
Mail Center
Facility
Mail Center
Building
Building
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For isolated on-campus mail screening facilities, the overall campus security system will
provide some security protection for the mail center. For mail centers that are located in a
primary office location, the office building security system will serve a similar function as a
campus security system. Finally, for mail centers that consist of little more than a single
large room, there may be a need to supplement the building and mail center security with a
containment system such as an NPMR.
Tables in Appendix 5, Mail Screening Requirements, provide both an example of one way
to integrate and evaluate factors such as core requirements, the overall level of risk, the mail
center classification, the current mail processes assessment, and any additional factors that
security and management personnel deem significant as well as a starting point from which
mail center managers and organization security personnel can begin to build out their own
mail screening operation.
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5. Mail Screening Technologies
5.1.
Overview
5.1.1. Mail Center Screening Challenges
Mail screening technologies and processes can have a significant impact on the ability of
a mail center to receive, sort, and deliver mail and packages in a timely fashion. Some
screening processes, like those for radiation, can be done relatively quickly with little
delay or disruption in the normal mail handling procedures. Others, such as the
procedures for biohazards, can delay mail for many hours or even days, depending on the
technology being used and the degree of certainty desired for the results. Mail security
personnel must develop technology and process requirements that reflect the degree of
risk in their mail operations and seek to achieve acceptable standards of both security and
speed.
5.1.2. Alternative Approaches
There is no single set of “best practices” that is applicable to all mail centers. For some
specific areas, there are clear best practices. All mail center personnel should have a
background or security check prior to starting work. There must be a way to secure a
mail center when it is not being used. Mail centers must have redundant capabilities
consistent with their organization’s continuity of operations plan (Backup/Fallback
and/or Disaster Recovery Plans). Offsite mail centers provide better protection than a
mail center located on the main floor of an organization’s primary office building. Still,
if available budgetary resources do not support the construction or leasing of an offsite
facility and the courier vehicles required to transport mail back and forth, then the
organization should seek to employ the best practices that apply to screening procedures
for onsite mail centers. This document highlights the practices that are most suitable for
mail centers located in everything from minimum to very high-risk facilities. Best
practices for mail screening for medium to very high-risk mail centers include a full
range of CBRNE screening processes. For minimum and low risk facilities, aggressive
visual screening and X-ray scanning may be adequate.
Facilities judged to be at medium risk should provide separate, isolated HVAC systems in
lobbies, loading docks, mailrooms, and other locations susceptible to mailborne threats
that are isolated from other building areas. In addition to those measures undertaken for
facilities at medium risk, high-risk facilities should ensure the envelope of isolated
loading docks and mailrooms are full-height construction and are sealed to the floor, roof,
or ceiling above. Finally, in addition to those measures undertaken for facilities at high-
risk, facilities judged to be at very high risk should provide instrumentation to monitor
the pressure relationship established by the isolated system.
Table 5-1, “Common Screening Technology Applications,” provides an overview of what
technologies and approaches are available to detect each of the potential threats that have
been discussed in Section 2, Potential Threats in the Mail Stream.
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Table 5-1. Common Screening Technology Applications
SUBSTANCE
V
ISUAL
IN
SPECTION
AUTOMATIC
SENSORS
HANDHELD
SENSORS
CANINE
TEAMS
X-RAY
SCANNERS
AIR
S
AMPLING
SYSTEMS
CD
C
LRN* Tests
AUT
OMAT
IC BIO ID
SYSTEMS
Chemical X X X X
Biolog
ical X X
**
X X X
Radiological
X X
Nuclear X X
Explosives X X X X X
Danger
ous
Items
X
X
Contra
band X
X X X
Suspic
ious
powders
X
X
Threat
ening
Content
X
*Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
** Current American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) guidance states that suspicious powders should be sent to
the LRN for analysis of biological agents.
5.2. Integrating Technologies Into Mail Screening Operations
5.2.1. Mail Screening and Sorting Facilities
Mail screening should take place in a dedicated facility, hardened to protect against
explosive devices, with a separate HVAC system and negative pressure mail screening
facilities.
Mail centers that are within shared facilities or buildings housing an organization’s
offices should contain an NPMR that provides protection against the spread of biohazards
during the initial screening process. At a minimum, the mail center should operate on a
separate HVAC system that can be shut down in the event of a biohazard incident.
The facility dock area should have a minimum of two loading docks so that inbound and
outbound materials do not pass through the same door. For the highest-level of
protection, the negative pressure environment should begin at the inbound loading dock
door(s). The doors should be separated from one another by an interior wall within the
negative pressure environment.
Mail centers that do not have negative pressure environments should take special
precautions to limit exposing the mail to the rest of the office building or facility. If the
mail cannot be brought directly into the mail center through a loading dock, it should be
transported through the building in a negative pressure mail cart or other sealed container.
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Physical security requirements for the mail screening and sorting facility should be based
on a thorough risk assessment. In instances where mail centers contain one or more
rooms inside a larger building, the mail center should have a separate access control
system. The mail center access control system should be connected to the overall
building security system and monitored by personnel in the security operations center.
5.2.2. Personal Protective Equipment
Personal protective equipment (PPE) should be used by all personnel directly involved in
the mail screening process and those whose duties require them to enter a room or area
where deliberate biohazard screening is taking place.
Based upon guidance provided by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the minimum
level of acceptable PPE for medium and higher risk environments includes a Tyvek suit,
a National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved, disposable
Filtering Facepiece Respirator (FFR), Nitrile gloves, and foot coverings. Individuals
must receive appropriate annual medical screening to ensure they are physically able to
wear a respirator. The environmental health and safety representative within an
organization can help coordinate, document, and monitor the required PPE
implementations.
PPE should be donned prior to entering the mail screening portion of the negative
pressure environment and removed prior to completely leaving any negative pressure
environment. A properly constructed facility will include entry and exit chambers or
ante-rooms where this process can be completed without contaminating adjacent
warehouse space or offices.
The PPE itself should be considered potentially contaminated until any tests for
hazardous substances have been completed with negative results. Reusable PPE should
remain in the negative pressure environment, once it has been used for screening
purposes. Disposable PPE should be sealed in a disposable container and removed once
any tests for biohazards have been completed without incident.
For additional protection, mail screening personnel may also wear reusable NIOSH
approved canister type protective masks with replaceable filters. The masks should be
worn prior to entering the mail screening facility and removed only upon leaving the
negative pressure facility.
For mail screening and sorting operations where the risk analysis has demonstrated that
there is a low level of potential exposure to biological hazards, it is still recommended
that mail center personnel wear a smock or similar covering, a NIOSH approved FFR,
and Nitrile gloves. These items help protect the individuals from the high concentrations
of paper dust and other similar substances routinely found in mail centers. The gloves
also help protect the hands of mail center personnel during high volume mail sorting
operations. In addition, mail screening personnel may also be offered thin cotton gloves
to be worn under Nitrile gloves to minimize any irritation resulting from direct contact
with Nitrile.
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5.2.3. Radiation/Nuclear
Pedestal or wall-mounted radiation detection equipment should be placed along the
vehicle route to the loading dock area at the first place a vehicle enters the secure
perimeter.
Additional radiation detection devices should be mounted in the loading dock area and
monitored by personnel within the organization’s security command center.
Screening personnel working on the loading dock should be required to wear personal
radiation detection pagers while they are unloading vehicles.
5.2.4. Chemical Screening
The mail screening facility should have chemical detection sensors located in the loading
dock area and the mail and package screening rooms. Chemical sensors should be
capable of detecting and identifying a wide range of chemical weapons and industrial
chemicals.
Sensors should provide an audible and visual alarm that can be detected in the immediate
area. Chemical sensors should also be linked to the organization’s security command
center and be monitored on a continuous basis.
5.2.5. Suspicious Items
Mail screening, sorting, and delivery personnel must be observant for suspicious mail and
packages at every stage in the process. Many suspicious items such as hoax letters and
packages containing hazardous materials can be detected early in the sorting process by
properly trained mail handlers. For individual item screening, mail should be perforated,
cut, and tumbled or opened prior to a sample being taken. These processes will enhance
the likelihood that an adequate volume of material will be collected for proper
identification to take place. They will also help identify suspicious powders that are not
detected by systems focused on actual biological agents. Sample collection should be
conducted according to American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) guidance.
Mail trays, tubs, and individual items must be inspected for obvious signs of white
powder, liquids, or suspicious markings as they are unloaded from the courier or mail
vehicle at the loading dock. If detected, suspicious items (and the associated tray or tub
within which they were transported) should be immediately segregated.
Where possible, mail centers should implement a barcode, radio-frequency identification,
or other tracking system that enables positive control over individual trays, tubs, and
other mail equipment throughout the entire screening, sorting, and delivery process. This
will enable easier “back tracking” and identification of potentially contaminated areas if a
dangerous item is discovered downstream from the mail center.
5.2.6. Explosives
Explosives in mail and packages can be detected using a variety of technologies and
approaches. The specific technology or approach that is adopted will reflect the risk
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level, the volume of mail and packages received, and the speed with which the process
must be completed.
Explosive detection canines (EDCs) can be used to inspect courier vehicles as well as
mail trays or tubs before they are brought into the primary mail screening facility. EDC
teams can screen a high volume of mail and packages for explosives in a relatively short
period of time. Properly trained canines can detect all of the common explosives being
used, including pentaerythritol tetranitrate, currently the explosive of choice for many
terrorists.
Hand-held and tabletop explosives trace detection equipment can be used to detect the
presence of explosives within items or explosive residue on the outside of mail and
packages. Most trace detection systems are of limited use in high-volume mail screening
operations because of the requirement to collect an air sample or a swipe from an
individual item for testing. They can be used effectively for second-level evaluations of
suspicious items and for testing courier vehicles and personnel.
X-ray scanning systems have long been the most widely used technology to detect bombs
and other dangerous items in mail and packages. Mail and flats can be screened while in
trays or tubs. Packages should be screened individually. Most modern X-ray systems
have software designed to help the screener identify explosives, based on the density of
the substance. The effectiveness of X-ray screening is highly dependent on the training
and attentiveness of the equipment operator. Mail centers that process a large volume of
electronics will find X-ray scanning of packages to be especially challenging, due to the
similarity of many electronic devices to explosive devices. X-ray scanning systems
should be capable of producing and saving digital images from the scanning equipment
that can be viewed remotely for additional evaluation purposes.
5.2.7. Biohazards
Mail and packages should be screened for a full range of potential biohazards as indicated
by Federal, State, local, and/or organization-specific security guidelines.
Biohazard screening can be implemented on a piece basis or bulk (tray) basis. Piece-
level screening increases the likelihood that biological agents will be identified, but
decreases the mail processing throughput speed significantly.
For individual item screening, mail should be perforated, cut, and tumbled or opened
prior to a sample being taken. These processes will enhance the likelihood that an
adequate number of spores will be collected for proper identification to take place. They
will also help identify suspicious powders that are not detected by systems focused on
actual biological agents. Sample collection should be conducted using CDC-approved
devices and collection media and ASTM guidance.
Screeners should collect samples from the trays and tubs used to transport the mail as
well as from the mail itself. They should also collect samples from the mail screening
and processing equipment itself.
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It is strongly recommended that samples taken from the mail be processed by a CDC
LRN laboratory facility, even if onsite testing equipment is being employed. Mail and
packages should be kept in local quarantine until the results of the lab tests are released.
Onsite sampling and testing systems can be used in areas where CDC LRN laboratories
are not reasonably available. There are a growing number of systems that can collect air
samples and test for many biohazards likely to be used in suspicious mail and packages.
Test results from such systems may not be valid for forensic evidence purposes;
therefore, proper control of threat material is required from an evidentiary standpoint to
support post-event testing by CDC LRN laboratories.
5.2.8. Dangerous and Contraband Items
Dangerous items are best identified using a combination of visual inspection and X-ray
scanners. Visual inspection will also help identify the most common type of hoax letters.
Many trace detection systems that are used for identifying explosives also have the ability
to detect narcotics using the same approach.
5.2.9. Containment Systems
Negative pressure air rooms provide a significant level of containment of potential
biohazards. They reduce the threat to personnel and facilities and make cleanup of any
actual contamination easier to accomplish. These systems can either be built as integral
components of the mail screening facility or can be provided as separate, portable
configurations. In all cases, they will need access to, or must provide their own, heated
and cooled air for the comfort of the mail screening personnel. These systems should not
be connected to the facility’s centralized HVAC systems. Negative pressure air rooms
should be designed to achieve an appropriate number of Air Changes per Hour (ACH).
Generally, for illustrative purposes, the CDC recommends ≥12 ACH as a minimum for
infectious diseases. Mail room managers can use a number of references such as the
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers
(www.ashrae.org/) for detailed guidance in the creation of a negative pressure
environment.
Mail centers that do not have negative pressure systems should have sealable plastic bags
or other suitable containment systems available to enclose suspicious envelopes. The
bags should be clear so that first responders and other security personnel can view the
external information on the envelope. If an envelope has leaked white powder during
handling or when it has been opened, it should be covered and disturbed as little as
possible until first responders can complete a field check of the substance.
There are several different types of explosive containers that are sold for use in mail
centers. While they do provide protection from explosives when used properly, most first
responders now recommend that mail center personnel limit their handling of letters and
packages that may contain explosive devices. If a letter or package being X-rayed
reveals that it contains an explosive device, it should be left inside the X-ray scanner
itself. The scanner will provide a level of protection for mail center personnel while they
evacuate the local area pending further analysis by security personnel or first responders.
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5.2.10. Decontamination of Mail, Personnel, and Facilities
Specialized equipment exists to decontaminate mail; however, decontamination
requirements related to specific incidents should be managed by first responder personnel
and accomplished with equipment they provide. Contaminated facility cleanup should
only be conducted in conjunction with public health officials and in accordance with
CDC guidance, Environmental Protection Agency regulations, and other hazardous
material regulations.
Decontamination of an organization’s mailroom personnel or those affected in other areas
of a facility should generally be managed by first responders and accomplished with
equipment they provide. Emergency showers and eyewash stations should be available
to mail screeners who are exposed to suspicious powders or other irritants as part of the
organization’s mail screening infrastructure. These facilities should be located in areas
that are easily accessible to screeners and do not require individuals to leave the
immediate screening area.
The procedures for use of these emergency decontamination facilities should be reviewed
by local first responders to ensure that any steps taken by an organization will not impact
any further decontamination by first responders and/or in any way compromise the
overall personnel decontamination process.
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6. Designing and Implementing Mail Screening Processes
6.1. Process Mapping
To be both efficient and effective, mail screening processes should be well-designed and
properly integrated into the overall process of receiving, sorting, and delivering mail and
packages. This requires mail center managers to map out their current end-to-end mail
receiving and delivery processes before inserting screening technologies or processes. Many
aspects of screening technology selection will require a solid understanding of mail and
package volumes, accountability procedures, transfer requirements, and courier routes. This
is particularly important in small mail centers where a few individuals must perform multiple
tasks sequentially. Process mapping also enables the mail center manager to ensure that the
screening workflow does not create any unexpected security violations or unnecessary
contamination.
6.2. Integrating Screening Procedures
The following is a partial list of top-level processes that should be mapped and evaluated
with regard to mail screening requirements for mail and packages. Not all apply to every
mail center operation. Each item presents opportunities for suspicious mail to enter the mail
sorting system or be transferred from one employee to the next. Each also provides an
opportunity for suspicious mail to be identified, isolated, and contained before it can cause
harm to the intended recipient.
6.2.1. U.S. Postal Service
6.2.1.1. Mail and Package Pickup from Designated U.S. Postal Service Facility
Only authorized personnel specifically identified by the organization should be allowed
to sign for materials from U.S. Postal Service (USPS) facilities.
6.2.1.2. Transportation to the Mail Center or Mail Screening Facility
Courier vehicles provided by the organization should provide security for mail and
packages during transport. Vehicles should not be left unattended at any time.
6.2.1.3. Tracking and Accountability Processes
All accountable mail items and packages should be tracked from the moment they are
picked up or received until they are delivered to and signed for by the intended recipient.
6.2.1.4. Transfer of Mail and Packages to Mail Center Screening Personnel
Mail and packages should not be left unattended on the loading dock or in a publicly
accessible area.
6.2.2. Express Couriers and Other Delivery Services
6.2.2.1. Receipt of Mail and Packages from Courier
Courier personnel should be positively identified by mail center personnel before
accepting any items.
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6.2.2.2. Tracking and Accountability Processes
All express items and packages should be tracked from the moment they are received
until they are delivered and signed for by the intended recipient.
6.2.2.3. Large Volume/Bulk Shipments
Mail center personnel should not sign for items “in bulk” without validating they are
receiving the actual items on the manifest.
6.3. Screening Processes
Individual screening processes may vary based on the specific technology being employed.
6.3.1. Radiation/Nuclear
Trucks and delivery vehicles should be screened as they are approaching the mail
screening facility, and again at the loading dock.
6.3.2. Chemical
Continuous screening of the environment in and around the mail screening facility and/or
mail center should be conducted.
6.3.3. Explosive
Screening of vehicles, mail, and packages should be done using explosive detection
canine teams prior to bringing items into the mail screening facility. Screen mail tubs or
trays and individual packages using an X-ray scanner equipped with explosive detection
software.
6.3.4. Dangerous Items and Contraband
Screening for dangerous items should be done using aggressive, visual screening and the
X-ray scanner.
6.3.5. Biohazard
Samples should be collected from mail and packages and tested for common biological
hazards at a CDC LRN laboratory or using onsite Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
equipment. As a “best practice,” it is strongly recommended that any on-site testing that
is accomplished be verified and confirmed by the LRN. All mail items should be kept in
quarantine in a negative pressure environment until negative test results have been
obtained.
6.4. Sorting and Delivery Processes
6.4.1. Mail Sorting and Package Sorting
Mail and packages should be sorted in a secure facility that provides access only to mail
center personnel.
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6.4.2. Inbound Courier Services
Mail that is being transported from the screening facility to the locations where it will be
delivered should be secured at all times. An organization’s mail transport vehicles should
be locked and sealed from the time they leave the screening facility until they are opened
by an authorized individual at the delivery site.
6.4.3. Inbound Delivery
Items being delivered should not be left unattended. The intended recipient or an
authorized individual should sign for accountable mail and packages.
6.5. Interoffice Mail
6.5.1. Interoffice Mail Pickup
Interoffice mail should be picked up from a secure area or a designated individual.
Interoffice mail “drop sites” should not be accessible to the general public. Best practices
include use of special accountable interoffice envelopes that can be tracked from sender
to recipient using the mail center tracking system.
6.5.2. Interoffice Mail Screening
If the organization’s risk assessment suggests that interoffice mail may be accessible to
external personnel, mail center personnel should transport interoffice mail back to the
mail screening facility for screening processing. If this is not possible due to distance or
time limitations, mail center personnel should conduct an aggressive visual screening of
interoffice mail while it is being sorted for delivery.
6.5.3. Interoffice Mail Sorting and Delivery
Interoffice mail should be treated like all other mail and delivered only to the intended
recipient or an authorized individual.
6.6. Outbound Mail Processes
6.6.1. Pickup of Outbound Mail
Outbound mail should be picked up only from secure drop boxes or authorized
individuals. Outbound mail should be kept secure at all times until it arrives at the mail
center for further processing. Outbound “drop sites” should not be accessible to the
general public.
6.6.2. Processing Outbound Mail
Outbound mail should be inspected for signs that it is suspicious. Mail and packages
containing authorized, hazardous materials should be properly marked.
6.6.3. Transferring Outbound Mail to U.S. Postal Service or Couriers
Outbound mail should not be left unsecured on the loading dock or at other locations
while awaiting pickup by the USPS or express couriers. Mail being transported to USPS
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facilities should be secure at all times. Courier vehicles should not be left unattended or
unlocked.
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7. Suspicious Mail Incident Response Procedures
7.1.
Initial Alert Procedures
Suspicious mail response procedures will vary by organization and will be based upon a
combination of factors such as the type of item discovered, the location of the mail screening
facility, internal facility configuration, the number of personnel in the facility, and specific
organization emergency response protocols. There are, however, a number of common steps
that should be taken:
• Remain calm. Alert others in the immediate area that you have identified a
suspicious item. Ensure that the organization’s security command center or local law
enforcement and first responders are notified. If in a multi-tenant facility, building
management should also be contacted.
• Do not attempt to move the suspicious item. Put the envelope or package on a stable
surface if it is currently being carried or handled by mail center personnel.
• Do not sniff, touch, or taste any contents that may have spilled.
• Do not open the letter or package.
• Do not shake or empty the contents of a suspicious letter or package.
• Do not carry the letter or package or allow others to examine it.
7.2. Specific Substance Initial Response Procedures
7.2.1. Explosive Device
Immediately leave the mail screening area and initiate local evacuation procedures. If the
mail or package is inside an X-ray scanner, leave it there. Do not use cell phones or
radios within the immediate proximity of the suspicious package. Ensure that this
prohibition is part of all mail screening training.
7.2.2. Chemical Substance
Leave the mail screening area. Close any doors to prevent others from entering the area.
If possible, shut off any fans and the ventilation system of the local facility.
7.2.3. Biohazard Substance
Remain in the negative pressure mail screening environment until directed to leave by
first responders/HAZMAT personnel. If there is no negative pressure system, shut off
any fans and the ventilation system of the local facility and await arrival of first
responders/HAZMAT personnel. Follow guidance from emergency response personnel.
7.2.4. Radiation or Nuclear Substance
Leave the immediate area where the radiation source appears to be located. Do not touch
any source material or the packaging materials surrounding it.
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7.2.5. Dangerous and Contraband Items
Report suspicious items to the mail center manager and/or security command center for
further inspection. Notify local law enforcement as required.
7.2.6. Threatening Content
Report suspicious items with threatening content to the mail center manager.
7.3. Evacuation Procedures
Specific evacuation procedures will vary from site to site and must be coordinated in
advance with organization management (to include property or facility managers, as
appropriate), safety, and security personnel.
List all persons who were in the room or area when the suspicious letter or package was
recognized or who may have handled the letter or package. Be prepared to provide the
list to local public health authorities and law enforcement officials if requested.
When possible, write down the information regarding the appearance of the letter or
package and photograph the item with a digital camera.
All suspicious items should be maintained as evidence as part of a criminal investigation
until released by the appropriate law enforcement agency.
7.4. Internal Communication
All incidents involving suspicious mail and packages must be reported immediately to
mail center management personnel and/or security, or local law enforcement and first
responders. If the facility is a multi-tenant facility, building management should be
contacted as well.
Within the mail center, managers should provide employees an initial briefing and
regular updates during an ongoing incident. This is especially important when a
suspicious item has necessitated the evacuation of the mail center.
As soon as possible, mail center personnel should be briefed on any required or
recommended medical treatment in accordance with guidance provided by emergency
medical personnel, first responders, and/or public health officials.
7.5. External Communication
The mail center manager must work directly with organization management and security
personnel to outline procedures and protocols for initiating contact with external agencies
including public health agencies.
In emergency situations, the mail center manager must be able to place calls directly to
local first responder personnel. This matter must be addressed before a potential event
takes place.
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Designated security personnel within the organization or the mail center manager should
serve as the primary point of contact with local law enforcement and first responders at
the mail center during an ongoing incident.
Mail center personnel should never speak directly to the media about an ongoing
incident. All external communications about an incident should be controlled by the
organization’s office of public affairs or similar office, in conjunction with the
controlling Federal, State, or local authorities.
7.6. Post-Event Follow-Up
The mail center manager and the organization’s security personnel should conduct a joint
review of the incident and response actions with mail center employees and first
responders following the incident.
Employees should be given an opportunity to speak with medical personnel, human
resources representatives, environmental health and safety professionals, and other
organization personnel as desired.
The mail center manager should also document and share information about the incident
with other mail center managers as permitted by organization security protocols and
general policies and procedures.
Suspicious mail will often lead to an investigation by local police, the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service (USPIS), or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mail center
personnel should be taught not to destroy evidence by vacuuming up white powder,
shredding suspicious letters, disposing of dangerous packages, or similar activities.
7.7. Other Resources
Other resources and guidance on handling suspicious mail items can be found at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Web site:
• Anthrax: http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/faq/mail.asp
• Alert Health Network:
http://emergency.cdc.gov/documentsapp/anthrax/10312001/han51.asp
Appendix 1 provides additional sources and references.
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8. Training Mail Screening Personnel
8.1. Suspicious Mail Characteristics
All mail center personnel should receive at a minimum annual training on identifying and
handling suspicious mail and packages. It is important they understand the risks
associated with the various threats that can be introduced through the mail, the
characteristics of each, and the proper response to suspicious items.
Posters, videos, and online training packages are available to help mail center managers
conduct training. Organization security personnel, USPIS, and commercial security
contractors can provide suspicious mail training to mail center personnel.
8.2. Use of Screening Technology
In addition to suspicious mail identification and handling, all best practices mail
screening facilities incorporate the use of a range of different screening technologies.
Most technologies tend to be focused on identifying a specific type of potential hazard
(biological, chemical, etc.), but a few, such as X-ray scanners and vapor trace detectors,
have multi-substance capabilities.
In order for screening technologies to be effective, mail center screening personnel
should be trained on their proper use and maintenance. This training is best
accomplished by highly qualified trainers supplied by the equipment vendors themselves.
No individual should be allowed to operate the screening equipment unless properly
trained in its use. All screeners should also undergo refresher training on the equipment
they use on at least an annual basis.
Mail center personnel should also receive training on the proper use of PPE. This
includes fit testing, donning, removal, and disposal of the PPE.
8.3. Incident Response Procedures
All mail center personnel should receive training in suspicious mail response procedures.
This training includes handling suspicious mail and packages, communications with other
mail center personnel and the organization’s management and security personnel,
evacuation procedures, interacting with first responders and public health officials, and
when necessary, follow-up decontamination procedures.
When conducting incident response training, it is important to involve all the first
responder and public health organizations likely to be called to an incident at a mail
screening facility. In doing so, mail center personnel, first responders, and public health
officials become more comfortable working with one another. This training would also
reduce the likelihood of an overreaction and a major disruption when an incident does
occur. Mail center managers and the organization’s security personnel should conduct
regular rehearsals and evaluate the performance of the mail center during these
rehearsals.
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9. Conclusions
9.1. The Team Approach
A successful mail handling and screening program requires the integrated efforts of senior
organization officials, mail center management, security officials, technology providers, and
first responders. Working together, this team can ensure that an organization’s mail is
properly screened in an affordable and efficient manner. If an incident does occur, a well-
functioning team will significantly reduce the adverse effects suspicious mail and packages
have on the employees and operations of the organization. Appendix 6, Mail Screening
Best Practices Checklist, takes into consideration all the factors of a mail handling and
screening process and provides evaluators a checklist of both best practices and minimum
recommendations to help the team develop mail handling and screening processes
appropriate for their facility.
9.2. Implementing Appropriate Technology and Procedures
The specific technologies that are required for each mail center vary from one organization to
another based on the organization’s respective risk assessment, security countermeasures,
and characteristics of the mail center’s daily operations.
Well-designed and consistently-executed screening processes are essential for both
identifying suspicious items and limiting their impact once discovered. Any deviation from
approved procedures can easily lead to suspicious mail or packages being missed or the
inadvertent cross contamination of other items, equipment, facilities, or employees.
9.3. Adjusting Approaches as the Threat Changes
A certain level of threat is always present. Any piece of mail or a package may contain a
dangerous substance or threatening content. Well-trained personnel with the appropriate
tools can help mitigate that threat.
An organization’s security personnel should constantly advise mail center personnel of any
changes in the organization’s threat level or any particular threats to individuals so that mail
screeners can better perform their day-to-day screening activities and, if necessary, upgrade
processes or technologies.
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Appendix 1 – Government Mail Center Regulations and Related
Documents
Federal Emergency Management Agency Risk Management Series
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
• FEMA 430, Site and Urban Design for Security: Guidance Against Potential Terrorist
Attacks
• FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
Against Buildings
U.S. Postal Service Standards
• Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual
• Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, International Mail Manual
U.S. Postal Inspection Service Publications
• Publication 166, Guide to Mail Center Security, March 2008
• Poster 84, Suspicious Mail
• Notice 71, Bombs by Mail
• Publication 54, Notice of Bomb Threat
Regulations and Directives Utilized by Federal Agencies
• Federal Management Regulation 41 Code of Federal Regulations 102–192, Mail
Management
• 30 CFR 233.11 USPIS Screening Authority
• National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency,
2009
• Federal Continuity Directive 1, Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program
and Requirements, dated February 2008
• Federal Continuity Directive 2, Federal Executive Branch Mission Essential Function and
Primary Mission
• Federal Preparedness Circular 65, FEMA
Other Resources
• CDC Video: "Protecting Your Health" (for People Who Process, Sort, and Deliver the
Mail), accessed at
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/training/mailhandlingvideo.asp
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
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Appendix 2 – Suspicious Mail or Packages Poster
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Appendix 3 – Mail Center Classification
1. Mail Center Size
1.1. The classification of mail centers as small, medium, or large depends on several factors,
particularly when viewed from a mail screening and handling standpoint. The generally
accepted view is that incoming mail is screened, as opposed to outgoing mail. The rationale
for this approach is that outgoing mail poses a low probability of threat. The greatest threat,
as demonstrated by actual events, comes from external sources who are attempting to use the
mail stream as a vehicle for introduction of their particular threat to an area, organization,
group, office, or individual. Therefore, when focusing on best practices and procedures for
mail screening, it is incoming mail that is most important. The following factors should be
considered when sizing mail centers for mail screening.
1.1.1. Daily Mail Volume. When considering volume, it is necessary to include the
number of First Class letters and flats received, the number of packages, and the number
of parcels or letter envelopes received from third-party couriers (e.g., FedEx, UPS, DHL,
TNT, etc.). It should be noted in a wide range of operational areas there is general
acceptance that “standard mail” (e.g., magazines, newspapers, and other types of mail
that can be processed and delivered in “bulk” form) is exempt from the normal screening
processes. “Standard mail” is considered to be from a known originator; therefore it is
not considered a threat. Generally, this mail is not considered when establishing daily
mail volume for screening processes. The daily throughput of a given mail center will
have a significant impact on the design and operation of any proposed mail screening and
handling procedures.
1.1.2. Number of Customers. This factor considers the number of recipients of mail
being processed by a given mail center. The daily volume of mail per recipient often
varies significantly. For example, some mail centers have 500–700 mail recipients, each
receiving an average of 40–50 pieces of mail per day. Other mail centers have
comparable customer populations, but recipient mail per day is consistently in the single
digits. This is important, because it affects the level of effort required to meet established
delivery standards to the target population. If mail screening procedures are to be added
to the processing flow, their impact on level of effort and its timing also must be
determined. The ability and/or willingness of the customer base to accept delays will
have a direct impact on the type, amount, and nature of screening employed. In many
cases, the number of mail center customers has resulted in the use of automated mail
processing equipment to sort incoming mail. Automation should be considered when
defining mail screening best practices for a specific location.
1.1.3. Geographical Distribution. Is the mail center centralized, or do satellite mail
centers and/or distribution points exist? Satellite mail centers may require redundancy in
any proposed mail screening and handling procedures. Although the type of incoming
mail screening may be similar, such as X-ray scanning, the scale of the screening solution
could vary between primary mail centers and satellite locations that support the same
organization.
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1.1.4. Staffing Level. The staffing level of a given mail center will be a direct result of
the factors described above. The number of full-time and part-time personnel, their skill
sets and levels of training, and the ability to augment the staff factor into the design and
selection of mail screening and handling best practices.
2. Classifying Your Mail Center
2.1. Table A3-1 presents a basic strategy for the sizing of mail centers. The size
classification is derived by quantifying a range for the factors described above, driven
primarily by daily incoming mail volume. This approach provides a basic level of
classification which can then be integrated with other elements to arrive at the recommended
type of facility and screening technologies to be employed in a given situation.
TABLE A3-1
MAIL CENTER CLASSIFICATION
Daily Mail
Volume
Staff Number of Satellites
Class A – Small
< 1000 < 10 N/A
Class
B – Mediu
m
1000 -9,999 10 - 49 < 3
Class
C – Large
10,000+ 50+ 3 or more
2.2. When considering a standard set of best practices and mail screening and handling
procedures, one must recognize that no single solution will fit all mail centers. In addition,
when looking at the myriad of technological applications that could be brought to bear, the
number of potential solutions expands rapidly. Any solution presented will be impacted by
the factors mentioned above, as well as additional factors and subjective judgments. For
example, if CBRNE screening is required, the nature, type, and number of CBRNE
technologies may vary by organization. Today’s commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
technologies for biological detection range from simple manual test kits to fully automated
sensor and evaluation suites. Capabilities for explosives detection range from the use of
canines, to manually swabbed packages, to a host of fully automated solutions. In
developing a best practices approach, a range of technologies may be required to ensure that
the unique attributes of individual mail centers are fully accommodated.
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Appendix 4 – Mail Center Assessment Worksheet
ADMINISTRATIVE
INFORMATION
REQUIREMENT
STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Date Completed
Completed By
Organization
Head
quarters Address
Offi
ce Manager Name:
Phone:
E-Mail:
Mail Center Manager Name:
Phone:
E-mail:
Buildings Served Buil
di
ng Location # of Floors # of Mailstops
1.
2.
3.
4.
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LOCATION and
FUNCTION
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Facility Level of Risk
Has a risk assessment been completed on the facility? If so,
what level of risk does the facility have?
Offi
ce Location
Is the facility located in an urban area?
Is the facility located in a high-crime area?
Is the facility located in a shared office building?
Is th
is a high visibility government office location?
Are any o
ther high-visibility or high-risk organizations in the
building?
Func
tion
Is this a headquarters location?
Are th
ere regular visitors to this location?
Are th
ere senior executives who receive mail at this
locati
on?
Genera
l O
ffice Security
Does the office building have its own external security
system?
Does t
he office building have an access control system?
Is there a sign-in process for visitors to the office building?
Is there restricted access to the government office itself?
Genera
l Mail Security
Are mail and packages delivered to the office building?
Do the
major international carriers (FedEx, UPS, DHL, TNT,
etc.) deliver items directly to the building?
Do oth
er local couriers deliver packages directly to the
building?
Is th
ere a centralized mail distribution point for all tenants
of the building?
If it
is a multi-client
building, are any screening services (X-
ray, etc.) provided by the management of the office
building?
Does t
he
government organization have mail and packages
delivered directly to its office location?
Have t
here been previ
ous suspicious mail incidents at the
facility?
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MAIL CENTER
ASSESSMENT
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Mail Center Location
Is the mail center located in
an offsite facility?
Is the mail center located in
the main office building?
Does the mail center have
doors that restrict access to
non-mail center employees?
Mail Center Security
Are there CCTV cameras
overlooking the main access
points to the mail center
(employee entrance,
customer entrance, loading
dock)?
Does the mail center have an
access control system?
Are the access doors to the
mail center locked during the
day?
Are windows in the mail
center secured throughout
the day?
Is there a designated
customer service area
separate from the mail
processing area?
Are visitors to the mail center
allowed access to the facility?
Is there a sign-in list for
authorized visitors to the
mail center?
Other
Are there any other mail
center facility-specific
security issues?
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MAIL CENTER EMPLOYEES REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Pre-Screening
Are employees pre-screened
during the hiring process to
identify potential risks?
Temporary Employees
Does the mail center use any
temporary employees to
process or deliver mail?
Employee Identification
Do employees wear visible
picture ID badges at all
times?
Employee Training
Are employees trained on
proper mail center security
procedures?
Are employees trained on
proper suspicious mail
handling procedures?
Are employees trained on
proper mail center
evacuation procedures?
Other
Are there any other mail
center employee-specific
security issues?
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INBOUND MAIL/PKG
SCREENING
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Identification
Are suspicious mail identification wall
posters displayed
at all screening and mail sorting stations?
Are employees trained on the identification of
suspicious mail?
Handling
Does the mail center have well-documented suspicious
mail handling procedures?
Are the employees familiar with the suspicious mail
handling procedures?
Are screened items kept segregated from non-screened
items?
X-Ray Screening
Is the mail center conducting X-ray screening of
inc
oming mail and packages?
Are the employees conducting X-ray screening properly
traine
d and certified?
Has the X-ray equipment been inspected in accordance
wi
th the required schedule for the area?
Personal Protective
Equipment
Are gloves and masks available for individuals to use
during the screening process?
Containment Systems
Is the mail center facility protected by a negative
press
ure air room?
Are there temporary storage systems for suspicious mail
and pack
ages?
Is e
mergency contact information for security, police,
fire, and m
edical personnel displayed near mail
screening and sorting locations?
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
45
INBOUND
MAIL/PKG
RECEIVING
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
General
Are there documented mail and package handling
procedures?
A
re employees trained on proper mail and package
handling procedures?
Is t
here a list of approved couriers authorized to pick up
and deliver mail and packages to the mail center?
Mail
Is mail picked up or received only by employees specifically
authorized to do so?
Is
accountable mail requiring signature or other specialized
handling procedures properly processed by an employee
authorized to do so?
Is
mail stored in a secure area while waiting further
processing?
Pac
kages
Are packages left unsecured on the loading dock or in
other areas outside the mail center?
Are packages being delivered signed for by an authorized
employee of the mail center?
Do
es the mail center maintain a log (paper or electronic) of
the packages it receives?
Are p
ackages stored in a secure area while waiting further
processing?
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
46
MAIL/PKG
DELIVERY
OPERATIONS
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Sorting
Do mail center personnel maintain proper chain-of-
cu
stody control over mail and packages during the
sorting process?
A
re mail and packages properly signed out to courier
serv
ices?
Couriers
Does the mail center use third-party courier services to
transport mail from the sorting facility to delivery
locations?
Do
es the mail center use mail center employees to
transport mail from the sorting facility to delivery
locations?
D
o personnel wear proper identification when
performing courier services?
A
re courier vehicles kept locked when transporting mail
and packages?
D
o couriers maintain positive control over mail and
packages at all times?
Do cou
riers maintain proper chain-of-custody
documentation for accountable mail and packages?
Fin
al Delivery
Do mail center personnel perform final delivery of mail
and packages?
D
o mail center personnel deliver mail to centralized mail
box locations?
D
o mail center personnel deliver mail and packages to
individual recipients?
D
o final recipients properly sign for accountable mail and
packages?
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
47
OUTBOUND
MAIL/PKG
PROCESSING
REQUIREMENT STATUS
(Y, N, NA)
DETAILS
Interoffice Mail
Do mail center personnel pick up, sort, and deliver
interoffice mail?
Is
interoffice mail sorted at the central mail center
facility?
Outbound Mail and
Packages
Do mail center personnel pick up outbound mail and
packages from centralized locations within the office
building?
Is outbound mail transported to the post office by mail
center personnel?
Po
stage Meter
Security
Are adequate control measures in place to avoid misuse
of postage meters, stamps, and other payment systems?
MAIL VOLUME DAILY VOLUME OF PIECES
Inbound Mail
I
nbound Flats
Inbound Packages
O
utbound Mail
O
utbound Flats
O
utbound Packages
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
Appendix 5 – Mail Screening Requirements
MAIL CENTER SCREENING REQUIREMENTS RATING
1. Evaluation Criteria
1.1. Determining the proper mail screening approach requires a combined evaluation that
includes the overall level of risk, the mail center classification, the current mail processes
assessment, and any additional factors that security and management personnel deem
significant.
1.2. The table below provides one way to integrate and evaluate all of these factors. The
mail screening requirements rating provides an indication of the recommended Best Practices
and Minimum Recommended mail screening facility and technology approaches for a
particular organization and mail center location. Table A5-1, “Mail Screening Requirements
Rating,” and Table A5-2, “Mail Screening Recommendations Best Practices,” provide an
overview of each facility, technology, and process approach.
TABLE A5-1
MAIL SCREENING REQUIREMENTS RATING
Facility
Risk Rating
Mail Center
Class A
(Small)
Mail Center
Class B
(Medium)
Mail Center
Class C
(Large)
1
1A
1B
2
2A
2B
3
3A
3B
3C
2. Mail Screening Approaches. Table A5-2, “Mail Screening Best Practices,” provides a
starting point for mail center managers and organization security personnel to use to begin to
build out their own mail screening operation. It is a baseline set of screening processes
founded on best practices currently in use in government and commercial facilities around
the world. Specific or unique situations may require significant upgrades to the
recommended processes, or they may permit reductions in the level of screening
recommended for a site, based on its risk rating and its mail center classification.
48
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
TABLE A5-2
MAIL SCREENING BEST PRACTICES
FACILITY
TYPE
VISUAL
SCREENING
DANGEROUS
CONTRABAND
HOAX
SCREENING
EXPLOSIVE
SCREENING
CHEMICAL
SCREENING
BIOLOGICAL
SCREENING
RAD/NUKE
SCREENING
CONTENT
SCREENING
1A
X
X
X
1B
X
X
X
2A
X
X
X
X
2B
X
X
X
X
3A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
3B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
3C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
49
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
Appendix 6 – Mail Screening Best Practices Checklist
1.0 FACILITY
DESIGN
BEST PRACTICE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
1.1 Location
1. Mai
l center is located in an offsite
facility outside the main primary
office or campus location.
2. Offsite facility is not located in a
high-traffic or high-visibility area.
1. Mai
l center is located in a facility or
specific area controlled by the
organization.
2. Mai
l center is in a designated room
away from the primary office
activities.
1.2 Security
1. Mai
l center has a separate CCTV
security system that is monitored
24/7.
2. F
acility is enclosed by security
fence.
3. A
ccess to secure area is monitored
by a guard.
4. T
he visitor control system issues
temporary badges that include a
picture.
1. Mai
l center itself has a separate
access control system.
2. O
nly mail center personnel are
allowed access to the mail
screening and handling areas.
1.3 Loading Dock
1. A
ccess to loading dock is restricted
to mail center personnel and
approved delivery vehicles.
2. Loading dock has inbound and
outbound doors separated by a
sufficient distance to avoid cross
contamination.
1. A
ccess to loading dock is restricted
to individuals and vehicles inside
the campus or building security
perimeter.
2. A
ccess to loading dock can be
closed or restricted when not in use.
1.4 Biohazard
Containment
1. Mai
l center has a negative pressure
system that begins at the loading
dock and includes dedicated
screening and temporary
quarantine areas.
2. T
he negative pressure mail center
has a separate HVAC system.
1. Mai
l center personnel have the
ability to shut off flow to the HVAC
system that supports the mail
center.
2. A
ccess to mail center does not
require personnel to carry
unscreened items through core
office areas.
50
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
2.0 TRACKING &
ACCOUNTABILITY
BEST PRACTICE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
2.1 USPS Mail
1. Inbound mail is tracked throughout
the initial screening process at the
tub or tray level using internally-
generated barcodes.
1. Inbound mail is tracked, processed,
segregated, and delivered on a daily
basis.
2.2 USPS
Packages
1. All packages are barcoded and
tracked from receipt, throughout the
screening process, and until
delivered to the recipient or a
designated representative.
2. Undeliverable packages are
secured in the mail center in a
separate area until delivery can be
made.
1. All packages are barcoded and
tracked from receipt, throughout the
screening process, and until
delivered to the recipient or a
designated representative.
2. Undeliverable packages are
secured in the mail center in a
separate area until delivery can be
made.
2.3 Express
Couriers
1. All packages are tracked using the
dedicated courier tracking
number/barcode from receipt,
throughout the screening process,
and until delivered to the recipient or
a designated representative.
2. Undeliverable packages are
secured in the mail center in a
separate area until delivery can be
made.
3. All items are screened using an X-
ray scanner at an offsite facility.
1. All packages are tracked using the
dedicated courier tracking
number/barcode from receipt,
throughout the screening process,
and until delivered to the recipient or
a designated representative.
2. Undeliverable packages are
secured in the mail center in a
separate area until delivery can be
made.
2.4 Supplies and
Other Items
1. Mail center personnel must confirm
all items against the delivery
manifest.
2. Items must be entered into the
tracking and/or procurement
system.
3. All items must be screened and
stored in a secure facility until
delivered or consumed.
1. Mail center personnel must confirm
all items against the delivery
manifest.
2. Items must be entered into the
tracking and/or procurement
system.
3. All items must be screened and
stored in a secure facility until
delivered or consumed.
51
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
3.0 PERSONAL
PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT
BEST PRACTICE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
3.1 Clothing
1. PP
E includes a Tyvek outer
garment, hood, gloves, boots, and a
minimum N95 respirator (FFP
Mask).
2. A
smock may be substituted for a
Tyvek suit for individuals not
involved in biohazard screening.
1. P
PE includes wear of smock,
gloves, and N95 mask (FFP Mask).
2. PPE is made available to all
personnel.
3.2 Wear
1. Mai
l screeners dress in PPE prior to
entering the screening facility and
remove it before leaving the
negative pressure environment.
1. S
mocks are left in the mail center
when not in use.
2. I
f worn, gloves and masks are
donned prior to screening and
sorting mail.
3.3 Disposal
1. P
PE is enclosed in sealed bags and
remains in the negative pressure
environment until the daily mail has
tested clean.
2. PPE is disposed of on a daily basis.
1. S
mocks are left in the mail center
when not in use.
2. O
ther PPE items are disposed of on
a daily basis.
52
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
4.0 SCREENING
EQUIPMENT &
PROCESSES
BEST PRACTICE
MINIMUM
RECOMMENDED
4.1 Chemical
1. Mail center has an air sampling system with
automatic alert capability.
2. Sensors are located at the loading dock and inside
mail screening facilities.
3. Chemical sensor system is monitored by the mail
center security operations.
1. Mail center personnel
visibly inspect mail and
packages for the
presence of liquids.
2.
Mail and packages with
obvious contaminants
are set aside for further
inspection by security
or HAZMAT personnel.
4.2 Biological
1. Mail and packages are screened inside a negative
pressure environment.
2. Items are visually inspected for signs they may
contain a biological hazard.
3. Air samples are collected from the outside and
inside of all mail and packages.
4. Samples are collected from mail tubs and trays.
5. Collection device filters are tested for biological
hazards by a CDC-approved laboratory.
6. Mail and packages are quarantined until negative
test results are obtained.
1. Items are visually
inspected for signs they
may contain a
biological hazard.
2. Suspicious items are
segregated until
released by mail center
supervisors, security
personnel, or first
responders.
3. No mail is released for
delivery until suspicious
mail has been cleared.
4.3 Radiological/
Nuclear
1. Inbound delivery vehicles are screened for
radiation using pedestal or wall mounted sensors.
2. Radiation sensors are integrated into the central
security system and monitored 24/7.
3. Mail center personnel wear radiation pagers while
screening and processing mail.
4. If radiation is detected in an item, mail center
personnel leave the immediate area.
1.
Mail center personnel
visually screen items
for signs that a
radiation producing
device is enclosed.
2. Mail center personnel
wear radiation pagers
while screening and
processing mail.
4.4 Explosives
1. Vehicles and mail/packages are screened by
explosive detection canine teams before being
allowed inside the screening facility.
2. Items are visually inspected for signs they may
contain an explosive device.
3. Mail is screened at the batch level (tubs or trays)
using an X-ray scanner.
4. Packages are screened individually with an X-ray
scanner.
5. Mail center personnel conducting scanning
operations are networked with remote security
personnel for technical support as necessary.
6.
Suspicious items are segregated until released by
mail center supervisors, security personnel, or first
responders.
1. Mail center personnel
visually screen items
for signs that an
explosive device is
enclosed.
2. Suspicious items are
segregated until
released by mail center
supervisors, security
personnel, or first
responders.
53
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
4.0 SCREENING EQUIPMENT
& PROCESSES
BEST PRACTICE
MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
4.5 Contraband and
Dangerous Items
(continued)
1. I
tems are visually inspected
for signs they may contain
dangerous or contraband
items.
2. Mai
l is screened at the batch
level (tubs or trays) using an
X-ray scanner.
3. P
ackages are screened
individually with an X-ray
scanner.
4. Mai
l center personnel
conducting scanning
operations are networked
with remote security
personnel for technical
support as necessary.
5. Suspicious items are
segregated until released by
mail center supervisors,
security personnel, or first
responders.
1. Mail center personnel
visually screen items for
signs that they may contain
dangerous or contraband
items.
2. S
uspicious items are
segregated until released by
mail center supervisors,
security personnel, or first
responders.
54
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
5.0 SUSPICIOUS
MAIL INCIDENT
RESPONSE
BEST PRACTICE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
5.1 Incident
Response Plan
1. Mail center has a formal
emergency response plan.
2. Response plan is reviewed and
updated at least quarterly.
3. Copies of the response plan are
maintained by the mail center,
security personnel, local managers,
and when appropriate, first
responders and public health
officials.
1. Mail center has a formal
em
ergency response plan.
2. Response plan is reviewed and
updated at least quarterly.
3. Copies of the response plan are
maintained by the mail center,
security personnel, local managers,
and when appropriate, first
responders and public health
officials.
5.2 Training
1. Mail center personnel have
received, read, and been briefed on
the suspicious mail and emergency
response plan.
2. Mail center personnel and related
organizations have conducted a
tabletop exercise of the emergency
response plan.
3. Mail center personnel and related
internal organizations have
completed a live exercise of the
emergency response plan.
4.
Local first responders and, as
appropriate, public health officials
have conducted a site visit of the
mail center location and reviewed
emergency response procedures.
1. Mail center personnel have
received, read, and been briefed on
the suspicious mail and emergency
response plan.
2. Mail center personnel and related
organizations to include public
health officials have conducted a
tabletop exercise of the emergency
response plan.
55
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
6.0 TRAINING BEST PRACTICE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED
6.1 Suspicious
Mail and Package
Characteristics
1. A
ll mail center personnel have
received initial training on
identification and handling of
suspicious mail and packages prior
to beginning work at the mail
center.
2. All mail center personnel have
received annual training on
identifying suspicious items.
1. All mail center personnel have
received initial training on
identification and handling of
suspicious mail and packages prior
to beginning work at the mail
center.
2. A
ll mail center personnel have
received annual training on
identifying suspicious mail and
packages.
6.2 Screening
Technology and
Procedures
1. Mai
l center personnel have
received initial training on
specialized mail screening
equipment from the vendor.
2. Mai
l center personnel have
received annual training from the
vendor or local supervisors.
1. Mail center personnel have
received initial training on
specialized mail screening
equipment from the vendor.
2. Mai
l center personnel have
received annual training from the
vendor or local supervisors.
56
Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes:
A Guide for the Public and Private Sectors
57
Acknowledgements
The following organizations participated in, contributed to, and/or were instrumental in the
creation of this document:
• United States Department of State
• United States Department of Defense
• United States Department of Homeland Security
• Interagency Security Committee
• United States Postal Service
• United States Postal Inspection Service
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
• Pitney Bowes Government Solutions
• Serco