A Theory of Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing

A Theory of Heuristic and

Systematic Information

Processing

Shelly Chaiken and Alison Ledgerwood

ABSTRACT

The heuristic-systematic model proposes two

distinct modes of thinking about information.

Systematic processing involves attempts to thor-

oughly understand any available information

through careful attention, deep thinking, and

intensive reasoning, whereas heuristic processing

involves focusing on salient and easily compre-

hended cues that activate well-learned judgmental

shortcuts. Heuristic processing is a more efficient

and relatively automatic mode of processing,

but more often than not confers less judgmental

confidence. Systematic processing confers more

confidence but is relatively effortful and time-

consuming. Thus, individuals tend to engage in

heuristic processing unless they are both motivated

and able to think carefully about information, in

which case the two modes of processing can have

additive, attenuating, or interactive effects.

Furthermore, both modes of processing can be

relatively open-minded, driven by accuracy con-

cerns, or relatively biased, driven by defense or

impression concerns. This chapter situates the heu-

ristic-systematic model within its intellectual and

personal history, and highlights key empirical find-

ings that support the model’s central tenets.

INTRODUCTION

Attitudes have been a primary focus of

theory and research in social psychology

since the 1920s. Nine decades of research

have produced a sizeable and complex body

of literature that speak to questions of how

people’s attitudes are formed, maintained,

and changed, and provide an ever-growing

foundation upon which new questions arise

and new answers unfold. In 1980, a founda-

tion of process-oriented models that explained

attitude change based on how people under-

stand and evaluate persuasive argumentation

set the stage for one question in particular:

Was careful argument scrutiny the only

kind of process by which attitude change

could occur? Or might we sometimes

change our minds in more efficient, but less

effortful, ways?

The heuristic-systematic model of persua-

sion (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken et al.,

1989, 1996; Chen and Chaiken, 1999)

Uncorrected proofs. Chapter to appear in P. A. M. van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of

theories of social psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

247

answers this question by proposing two

distinct modes of information processing.

The first mode, systematic processing,

involves attempts to thoroughly understand

any and all available information through

careful attention, deep thinking, and inten-

sive reasoning (e.g., thinking carefully about

the arguments presented, the person arguing,

and the causes of the person’s behavior). This

information is combined and used to guide

subsequent attitudes, judgments, and behav-

iors. For instance, a systematic approach to

thinking about a proposed economic policy

might involve reading as many magazine and

newspaper reports as possible to learn and

develop an opinion about the “best” course

of action for the economy. The heuristic-

systematic model suggests that such system-

atic thinking entails a relatively high degree

of mental effort, and thus requires that a

person (1) can devote a certain amount of

attention to thinking about the issue, and

(2) wants to devote this attention. Thus,

systematic processing is unlikely to occur

unless a person is both able and motivated

to do so.

Heuristic processing is much less demand-

ing in terms of the mental work required and

much less dependent on having the ability

(e.g., enough knowledge and enough time) to

think carefully about information. In fact,

heuristic processing can be viewed as rela-

tively automatic because it can occur even

when people are not motivated and able to

deliberately think about a topic. Heuristic

processing involves focusing on easily

noticed and easily understood cues, such as a

communicator’s credentials (e.g., expert

versus nonexpert), the group membership of

the communicator (e.g., Democrat or

Republican), the number of arguments pre-

sented (many or few), or audience reactions

(positive or negative). These cues are linked

to well-learned, everyday decision rules

known as heuristics. Like other knowledge

structures (e.g., stereotypes), heuristics can

vary in their availability and accessibility, as

well as in their perceived reliability (i.e., the

extent to which a particular person perceives

a heuristic to be a valid guide for judgment in

a given situation; see Chen and Chaiken,

1999; Darke et al., 1998). Moreover, they can

be used self-consciously or non-self-

consciously: People may consciously decide

to invoke a heuristic in order to inform a

subsequent judgment, but heuristics can also

influence judgments without intention or

self-awareness.

Examples of heuristics include “experts

know best,” “my own group can be trusted,”

“argument length equals argument strength,”

and “consensus implies correctness.” These

simple, intuitive rules allow people to form

judgments, attitudes, and intentions quickly

and efficiently, simply on the basis of the

easily noticed cues, and with little critical

thinking. A heuristic approach to a proposed

economic plan might involve simply adopt-

ing the opinion of a noted economist. In

other words, heuristic thinking is what we do

when we do not have much ability or time to

think about something and want to make a

reasonable decision as quickly as possible.

The theory further proposed that two prin-

ciples act in conjunction to determine the

mode and extent of information processing

that occurs in any given context (Chaiken,

1980, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). The mod-

el’s least effort principle reflects the assump-

tion that individuals try to arrive at attitudinal

decisions as efficiently as possible (see also

Allport, 1954). Thus, all else equal, people

should tend to prefer a less effortful mode of

processing (i.e., heuristic processing) to one

that requires more time and cognitive

resources (i.e., systematic processing).

Meanwhile, however, the sufficiency

principle asserts that individuals are some-

times motivated to exert additional cognitive

effort in order to reach a certain level of

judgmental confidence. They must therefore

balance their preference for maximizing cog-

nitive efficiency with the desire to satisfy

their motivational concerns, such as the goal

to reach an accurate conclusion (Chaiken

et al., 1989; see also Simon, 1976). The

heuristic-systematic model suggests that this

balance point is determined by a sufficiency

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

248

threshold, defined as the degree of confi-

dence to which an individual aspires in a

given judgmental situation (Chaiken et al.,

1989; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). The suffi-

ciency threshold can be conceptualized as a

point located on a continuum of judgmental

confidence. The extent of information

processing is determined by the size of the

discrepancy that exists between an individu-

al’s actual level of confidence in their judg-

ment and the sufficiency threshold (i.e., their

desired confidence). Thus, effortful informa-

tion processing should only occur when

actual confidence falls below the sufficiency

threshold, and should continue (when capac-

ity allows) until this confidence gap is closed.

Extent of information processing will there-

fore depend both on a particular person’s

actual level of judgmental confidence in a

given persuasion setting, as well as their

desired level of confidence in that setting

(see Figure 12.1).

Together, the least effort and sufficiency

principles suggest that – assuming adequate

cognitive capacity – individuals will engage

in systematic processing insofar as the less

Figure 12.1 A person with a small gap between actual and desired confidence might

be able to reach their desired level of confidence (the sufficiency threshold) using only

heuristic processing (Panel A). If the confidence gap is larger, either due to a low level of

actual confidence (Panel B) or a high level of desired confidence (Panel C), it is less likely

that people can reach their desired level of judgmental confidence using only heuristic

processing. When people cannot attain their desired level of confidence using only

heuristic processing, they will engage in systematic processing in an effort to finish

closing the confidence gap, assuming they have the ability to do so

Actual

confidence

Actual

confidence

Actual

confidence

Desired

confidence

Desired

confidence

Desired

confidence

Confidence

gap

Confidence

gap

Confidence

gap

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

249

effortful heuristic mode does not yield suffi-

cient judgmental confidence (either because

heuristic processing cannot occur, as in situ-

ations that do not offer easily processed

heuristic cues, or because it is insufficient to

close the confidence gap). Systematic

processing will therefore be increased by

factors that either decrease actual confidence,

increase desired confidence, or both.

THE MULTIPLE-MOTIVE

HEURISTIC-SYSTEMATIC MODEL

Although the heuristic-systematic model was

initially developed to apply to individuals

motivated by accuracy concerns to seek valid

judgments, later work expanded the model to

incorporate two other broad motivations that

can lead to selective information processing,

geared toward arriving at a particular attitudi-

nal position (Chaiken et al., 1989, 1996;

Chen and Chaiken, 1999). The first of these,

defense motivation, was intended to reflect

the impact of such self-focused variables as

ego-involvement and personal commitment

(see, e.g., Kiesler, 1971; Sherif and Cantril,

1947). According to the multiple-motive

model of heuristic-systematic processing,

these factors arouse a desire to confirm and

defend the validity of preferred attitudinal

positions (like one’s pre-existing opinion),

while challenging the validity of nonpre-

ferred positions. Impression motivation, on

the other hand, reflects the impact of other-

focused variables such as impression-relevant

involvement, communication goals, and affil-

iative concerns (e.g., Higgins and McCann,

1984; Johnson and Eagly, 1989; Smith et al.,

1956), which arouse a desire to express atti-

tudes that are socially acceptable.

Like accuracy motivation, defense and

impression motivations can engender heuris-

tic and/or systematic processing. However,

unlike accuracy motivation, these directional

motives tend to lead people to process

information selectively, rather than open-

mindedly. The biases engendered by these

directional motives largely occur outside of

awareness; people usually operate under the

illusion that they are thinking in an open-

minded fashion. In the case of defense-

motivated processing, for instance, individuals

may selectively choose heuristics that help

to confirm a preferred position. A defense-

motivated person might therefore invoke the

heuristic “experts know best” if the position

of an expert source reinforces her cherished

values and social identity, but might choose a

different heuristic (e.g., “outgroup sources

can’t be trusted”) if the position threatens

her social identity. Likewise, impression-

motivated heuristic processing entails selec-

tive application of heuristics that ensure a

smooth interaction with specific others. For

example, when interacting with a person or

group whose views on an issue are unknown

or vague, a perceiver might invoke the heu-

ristic “moderate judgment minimizes disa-

greement.” On the other hand, when others’

views are known, a “go along to get along”

heuristic might better serve the same goal.

With sufficient cognitive capacity and

higher levels of motivation, defense-

or impression-motivated people will also

process systematically, but they will again do

so selectively. Thus, a defense-motivated

perceiver will attend to, elaborate on, and

recall information that serves to bolster his

preferred, self-protective position, while an

impression-motivated perceiver will system-

atically process information in such a way as

to convey a desired impression to (real or

imagined) others.

The multiple-motive model thus proposed

three general categories of motives that give

rise to three distinct processing goals, any of

which can engender heuristic and/or system-

atic processing. Expanding the theory in this

way broadened its applicability to a much

wider range of persuasion and social

influence situations. In essence, the multiple-

motive heuristic-systematic model allowed a

rapidly increasing laundry list of persuasion-

relevant variables to be understood in

terms of their effects on a few key factors –

processing goal, cognitive capacity, actual

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

250

confidence, and desired confidence – which

could in turn suggest a reliable prediction

about the extent of attitude change that

should occur in a given setting. The strength

of this basic dual-process model to organize

and generate predictions in the persuasion

literature led to its application across a wide

range of settings (Chen and Chaiken, 1999;

Ledgerwood et al., in press; Mackie, 1987;

Stroebe and Diehl, 1988; see Eagly and

Chaiken, 1993; Ledgerwood et al., 2006, for

reviews). More broadly, it was one of several

theories that helped to precipitate a flowering

of dual-process models across multiple areas

of social psychology, as researchers began to

see similar basic principles at work in a

number of different domains including stere-

otyping, impression formation, and decision

making (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999).

PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE

THEORY: AN AUTHOR BY

LITERATURE INTERACTION

In 1972, the first author entered graduate

school at the University of Massachusetts

Amherst armed with a math major, a psy-

chology minor, and a vague interest in social

influence. I began working with Alice Eagly,

who was at the time examining the impor-

tance of message comprehensibility within

the context of Bill McGuire’s information

processing paradigm. In fact, my masters

research project involved testing an idea

about comprehensibility that McGuire had

tucked away in the depths of a handbook

chapter; namely, that the importance of com-

prehensibility in determining the effective-

ness of persuasive appeals would depend on

the modality of the communication (Chaiken

and Eagly, 1976). Looking back, I can trace

part of the development of the heuristic-

systematic model to this project. The idea

was that message comprehensibility should

matter more when the message is in written

form rather than audio or video, partly

because there is more flexibility to carefully

scrutinize a message when reading it than

when hearing it spoken. Later, we returned to

this idea to examine whether a different type

of persuasion variable – source cues – might

become increasingly influential as one moved

from written to audio and visual modalities

(Chaiken and Eagly, 1983). This research

suggested that different persuasion variables

might be more or less influential depending

on how a message was presented.

Here then was one seed for the heuristic-

systematic model: different types of persua-

sion variables had more or less impact

depending on a recipient’s ability to carefully

scrutinize a message. Other seeds were in

the recent and current literature at that

time: articles on correspondent inference

theory, Kelley’s covariation theory, and self-

perception theory populated the reading lists

for my coursework, and I was intrigued both

by attribution models and by the simplicity

of self-perception (Bem, 1972; Jones and

Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972, 1973). With Alice,

I helped develop an attribution model of

source characteristics based on Kelley’s

(1973) cube model, particularly his notions

of discounting and augmentation. Yet com-

pared to self-perception theory, analyzing the

covariances of even a somewhat superficial

persuasion variable like source characteris-

tics seemed effortful and deliberative. Could

people really be so careful, so thoughtful, all

the time?

The simple if–then’s of self-perception

theory appealed to me – why engage in some

arduous analysis of your own thoughts and

behaviors when you could simply reason: if

I’m yelling, I must be angry? Years before,

when Kennedy and Nixon had been running

for president, I remember listening to my

parents consider the intricacies of the various

political issues at stake. Meanwhile I (with a

young child’s preference for the simple that

I still haven’t seemed to grow out of com-

pletely) knew that Kennedy was the man to

vote for; after all, he looked better. And it

wasn’t just me; in graduate school, I read

about data showing that although those who

heard the first Kennedy–Nixon debate on the

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

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radio believed Nixon had won, those who

watched it on television were convinced that

Kennedy had in fact prevailed. If the average

person was really what McGuire (1969) had

dubbed “the lazy organism,” might a simple

if–then suffice for most of us, much of

the time?

Then, in 1975, I came across Shelley

Taylor’s recently published dissertation,

which shed some additional light on self-

perception processes. Female participants

were shown pictures of three different

men who varied in attractiveness. Some

participants were given false physiological

feedback suggesting that they showed a

strong preference for one of the men pic-

tured. Participants were then led to believe

that they would have the opportunity to meet

one of these men in a few weeks (high con-

sequences condition), or were not led to

expect a future meeting (no consequences).

They then rated each of the three men on

attractiveness. The results suggested that par-

ticipants in the no consequences condition

engaged in self-perception: they based their

ratings of attractiveness on the physiological

feedback provided. Most interestingly to me,

however, participants in the high conse-

quences condition were not affected by the

feedback manipulation. Instead, there was

some evidence to suggest they were thinking

more carefully and critically about the three

candidates: they spent more time looking at

the pictures, and content analyses suggested

that they made more critical comments.

I remember thinking to myself that surely

this could apply to persuasion. High and low

consequences provided a variable that could

perhaps predict when a lazy organism would

opt for a simple “if-then” versus a more

complicated analysis of available informa-

tion. I built my main dissertation experiment

around this idea, testing whether high versus

low consequences would moderate the per-

suasive impact of source cues (the most

frequently studied noncontent variable at the

time) and content (extent of strong persua-

sive argumentation). I reasoned that source

cues such as likeability can be processed

quite easily and efficiently by a lazy organ-

ism unmotivated by future consequences.

When future consequences were present,

however, participants should be motivated to

process information more carefully, and

extent of strong argumentation should play a

greater role in persuasion.

And (amazingly, to me at the time), the

study worked. I started calling the more

deliberative mode of thinking systematic, but

didn’t really know what to call the other one

until Icek Ajzen, another important mentor

for me in graduate school, suggested the

name “heuristic.” As I continued the line of

research, the notion of consequences became

abstracted into motivation to process infor-

mation. Like many other theories at that

time, the default motivation was implicitly

assumed to be accuracy; I began to explicitly

label the motivation “accuracy motivation”

only later in order to emphasize that both

modes of thinking served the same motive

(rather than one being rational and the other

irrational). Drawing on my earlier modality

research, I also added capacity as a second

variable that seemed necessary for delibera-

tive processing to occur.

Over the years, I tried to expand the model

to other kinds of cues, and to test its assump-

tions in various ways. Perhaps inevitably,

given that my intellectual genes were steeped

in classic functional theories of attitudes

(Alice Eagly had worked with Herb Kelman),

it occurred to me that accuracy was not the

only motive in town, and I began to try to

group the major attitudinal functions I had

learned about in graduate school into a few

broad categories of motives. Over time, we

developed and tested predictions deriving

from a multiple-motive heuristic-systematic

model that included not just accuracy

motivation, but also impression and defense

motives (see Chaiken et al., 1996; Chen and

Chaiken, 1999, for reviews).

Very gradually, then, the theory

expanded – first under the influence of func-

tional theories, and then following new devel-

opments in social cognition. I had always

thought of heuristics as simple decision rules

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

252

that were likely represented in memory, and

such a conceptualization lent itself to new

theorizing about availability and accessibility

in social cognition. By now I was at New

York University, where hallway conversa-

tions with Tory Higgins and John Bargh

inevitably turned toward basic principles of

social cognition. I began to think that heuris-

tics ought to vary in their availability, acces-

sibility, and reliability, and that this would

have important consequences for when a

given heuristic would be applied. Furthermore,

heuristics seemed to me to be relatively auto-

matic, in at least some senses of the term (see

Bargh, 1994). I always thought of them as a

kind of shortcut; thus, at the very least they

were automatic in the sense of being effi-

cient. It also seemed likely that they often

(but not always) operated outside of aware-

ness. Over time, the results of accumulating

studies provided support for this social-cog-

nitive side of the model as well (see Chen

and Chaiken, 1999, for a review).

Conceptualizing heuristics as a form of

automatic social cognition highlights one

way in which the basic processes underlying

the heuristic-systematic model extend beyond

the persuasion context to other domains. It

became apparent early on that a dual-process

perspective was not restricted to a persuasion

context; that it would be fruitful to look

across different domains to understand the

common mechanisms at work in all of them.

And indeed, the heuristic-systematic model

was just one of a growing family of dual-

process models that began to populate social

psychology in the 1980s and 1990s, as

researchers across different domains con-

verged on a similar set of mechanisms to

explain information processing in a variety

of settings (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999).

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

OF THE THEORY

Like many of the models in this family, the

heuristic-systematic model suggests that

individuals can think about information not

only via a bottom-up, data-driven process

but also via a more top-down process

that depends on the pre-existing knowledge

structures they bring to a particular context.

Although this represented a radical reorienta-

tion in the field of persuasion at the time,

the notion that we can rely on learned asso-

ciations to structure understanding emerged

as early as 1930 in Kohler’s discussion of

sensation and perception, in which he

suggested that our perceptions are shaped as

much by a top-down application of knowl-

edge derived from past experiences as by

bottom-up, sensory experience (see also

Moskowitz et al., 1999; Yates, 1985). For

instance, upon sensing a pattern of colors and

lines with our eyes, we can draw on our

past experiences and associations with this

pattern to label it a “chair” and infer its

form and function. Subsequently, Bruner’s

“new look” emphasized the notion that our

perceptions are substantially shaped by

expectation and motivation (Bruner, 1957).

Research on mental schemas developed this

idea to suggest that we can quickly organize

and “fill in the blanks” about our world

using generalized mental structures built

from our past experiences (e.g., Anderson

and Pichert, 1978; Brewer and Treyens,

1981; see Fiske and Linville, 1980; Taylor

and Crocker, 1981; and Fiske and Taylor,

2008, for reviews). Together, these literatures

highlight a relatively quick, efficient,

top-down method of understanding the world

that capitalizes on past experience to struc-

ture current understanding, and suggests that

these mental shortcuts may be applied to a

range of different domains (see also Tversky

and Kahneman, 1974).

Within this historical context, the heuris-

tic-systematic model proposed that individu-

als might sometimes rely on quick, efficient,

cognitive shortcuts to make judgments about

the validity of information they encounter.

Thus, rather than carefully scrutinizing any

and all available information, people might

instead draw on simple if–then associations

learned through repeated experience to

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

253

inform their attitude judgments. For instance,

given that experts tend to be correct, indi-

viduals might develop a learned association

between experts and correctness that allows

them to easily and efficiently infer that a

subsequently encountered expert is likely to

be right (“if expert, then correct”).

As noted earlier, because the model

assumed that heuristics are like other knowl-

edge structures, it invited connections to

social-cognitive research on the principles

governing the activation and use of stored

knowledge (Chaiken et al., 1989, Chen and

Chaiken, 1999). In other words, heuristics

should be subject to the same principles of

availability, accessibility, and applicability

that underlie the use of stored knowledge in

other domains (e.g., Higgins, 1989; Higgins

et al., 1982). Considerable research supports

this claim (see Chen and Chaiken, 1999, for

a review). For instance, in order to be used to

inform attitudes in a given setting, a heuristic

must be (1) accessible (e.g., because it has

been situationally primed), and (2) applica-

ble (e.g., because an individual believes it to

be a reliable, or usable, guide for judgment;

Chaiken et al., 1992).

Heuristic processing thus represented a

very different mode of thinking from the

more systematic, comprehensive mode that

had occupied the center stage of persuasion

theory and research for some time.

Furthermore, the heuristic-systematic model

suggested that these modes of processing

involved a tradeoff between optimal

judgments (maximized by systematic

processing) and efficient judgments (maxi-

mized by heuristic processing). The model’s

original formulation proposed that heuristic

or systematic processing would predominate

depending on the relative importance of

accuracy or economic concerns for a given

person in a given context (Chaiken, 1980).

Subsequently, this notion was refined

to emphasize a continuum of judgmental

confidence, along which two critical points

can be located: a person’s actual confidence,

and their desired confidence or sufficiency

threshold (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). As lazy

organisms (McGuire, 1969), people first

attempt to close this gap in confidence via

heuristic processing. Only when this easier

strategy fails to confer sufficient judgmental

confidence will people exert the cognitive

effort required by systematic processing,

assuming they are able to do so.

Considerable research supports this

central claim that individuals will process

information heuristically unless they are both

motivated and able to engage in more effort-

ful systematic processing. Heuristic cues

alone tend to guide judgments when ability is

low (such as when participants possess little

knowledge about the topic, when they

are under time pressure, or when situational

constraints diminish cognitive capacity) and

when motivation is low (such as under condi-

tions of low task importance or personal

relevance; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Petty

et al., 1976; Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991;

Wood et al., 1985). As ability and motivation

increase, systematic processing plays an

increasing role in influencing attitudes (e.g.,

Chaiken, 1980; Martin et al., 2007; Petty and

Cacioppo, 1984; see Eagly and Chaiken,

1993, for a review). Importantly, the process-

ing modes are by no means mutually

exclusive: given adequate levels of ability

and motivation, heuristic and systematic

processing often co-occur (Chaiken, 1980,

1987; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). We return

to this assumption of concurrent processing

later in the section.

Bridging beyond the persuasion

context

Although the heuristic-systematic model was

initially developed within the context of the

paradigmatic persuasion experiment, in

which a source conveys a message to a target

with some effect, it quickly became clear

that the fundamental processes at work

within this context were mirrored in other

domains. At its heart, the persuasion para-

digm involves individuals making judgments

in light of information, as they do in many

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

254

other domains. Because it focuses on the

basic processes underlying persuasion effects,

the heuristic-systematic model provided a

natural bridge from persuasion to many

other, conceptually similar, areas. Across

various domains, individuals can make

judgments based on quick shortcuts or

more effortful, extensive processing, and

motivation and ability play a key role in

guiding the extent to which effortful process-

ing occurs.

Indeed, as noted earlier, the heuristic-

systematic model was among several early

dual-process models in social psychology.

Together, these paved the way for a rapid

proliferation of information-processing

theories in a variety of domains that distin-

guished between a relatively automatic, fast,

reflexive mode of thinking based on well-

learned associations, and a more controlled,

analytic, effortful mode based on systematic

reasoning (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989;

Fazio and Towles-Schwen, 1999; Fiske et al.,

1999; Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006;

Gilbert, 1989; see Chaiken and Trope, 1999;

Smith and DeCoster, 2000, for reviews). In

their 1999 volume, Chaiken and Trope

featured a variety of dual-process models

from diverse fields that converged in their

basic distinction between these two types

of processes, illustrating that these perspec-

tives are really a family of theories with a

common core.

Empirical findings

The first experiment designed to test the

heuristic-systematic model examined whether

involvement would moderate the extent

to which a heuristic cue (communicator

likeability) versus message content (extent of

supportive argumentation) influenced

people’s attitudes (Chaiken, 1980: Study 1).

Undergraduate participants read a transcript

of an interview with a university administra-

tor who in the course of the interview either

praised undergraduates (likeable source

condition) or disparaged them (unlikeable

source condition). Later, the administrator

stated his opinion on an issue (e.g., changing

from a semester to a trimester system) and

provided either a weak message (containing

only two arguments) or a strong message

(containing six different arguments) in

support of his opinion.

To test whether participants’ level of

motivation would determine the extent to

which they relied on the heuristic cue or

engaged in more effortful processing of

message content, the experiment also manip-

ulated participants’ involvement by leading

them to expect that they would discuss either

the same issue or a different issue at a subse-

quent experimental session. Participants who

expected to discuss the same issue should

be more motivated to reach an accurate con-

clusion about whether the administrator’s

position was valid, compared to those who

expected to discuss a different issue, and

should therefore engage in more systematic

processing. Consistent with the study’s

hypotheses, high involvement participants

showed greater attitude change in response to

a strong (versus weak) message, but were

unaffected by communicator likeability. In

contrast, low involvement participants

showed greater attitude change in response to

the likeable (versus unlikeable) communica-

tor, but were unaffected by message content.

Furthermore, substantiating the notion that

attitude change was mediated via systematic

processing in the high involvement condi-

tion, these participants showed greater recall

of arguments and reported more issue-

relevant thoughts, compared with those low

in involvement. Thus, which factors pro-

duced persuasion – and how they produced

persuasion – depended critically on partici-

pants’ level of motivation.

Importantly, by delineating a dual process

underlying people’s thinking about persua-

sive appeals, the heuristic-systematic model

was able to shed light on the role played

by motivational variables, as well as source

cues and message content, in influencing

attitudes. For instance, previous research had

reported conflicting findings regarding the

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

255

impact of involvement on persuasion (e.g.,

Pallak et al., 1972; Sherif and Hovland,

1961). Our results (Chaiken, 1980) suggested

that involvement could either increase or

decrease attitude change in response to a

persuasive message, depending on the valence

of available heuristic cues and the strength of

the message content. Similarly, Axsom et al.

(1987) showed that whereas involvement

increased the impact of argument quality on

persuasion, it decreased the impact of the

heuristic cue of audience response (i.e.,

whether an overheard message audience

sounded enthusiastic or unenthusiastic). The

heuristic-systematic model thus provided a

theoretical framework within which to organ-

ize a large number of persuasion-related

factors in a literature that had often produced

contradictory results.

The concurrent processing

assumption

It was in large part the prevalence of such

contradictory results that motivated the devel-

opment of the heuristic-systematic model.

Looking back, the historical assumptions

discussed earlier, combined with the current

climate in the persuasion literature, created a

unique context within which the logic of

a dual-process perspective was perhaps

more likely to be discovered. And, in fact,

two dual-process models of persuasion inde-

pendently emerged from this context: the

heuristic-systematic model and the elabora-

tion-likelihood model (ELM; Petty and

Wegener, 1999). Both provided an organiz-

ing framework for understanding the impact

of various persuasion variables by suggesting

two routes to persuasion: the heuristic or

“peripheral” route, and the systematic or

“central” route. However, they differed in

some important ways. For instance, whereas

the ELM assumed that the peripheral and

central routes to persuasion were mutually

exclusive, the heuristic-systematic model

suggested that they could co-occur and even

interact.

Thus, although many of the initial dual-

process studies of persuasion suggested that

heuristic cues do not impact attitudes when

people are motivated and able to process

systematically (e.g., Axsom et al., 1987;

Chaiken, 1980; Petty et al., 1981; Wood

et al., 1985), the heuristic-systematic model

suggested that this pattern was only one

possible outcome of the two modes of infor-

mation processing. Specifically, these results

seemed to represent cases in which system-

atic processing attenuated the judgmental

impact of heuristic processing because it

took into account information that contra-

dicted the valence of the available heuristic

cues. If systematic processing instead yielded

information that was congruent with heuris-

tic processing, the heuristic-systematic model

suggested an additivity hypothesis whereby

heuristic processing could exert a direct

effect on judgment over and above the impact

of systematic processing. Supporting this

hypothesis, Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991;

see also Maheswaran et al., 1992) found

that when heuristic cues and message

content were congruent, attitude change was

mediated by both heuristic and systematic

processing.

Importantly, however, the heuristic-

systematic model proposed that the two

processes could not only co-occur, but could

also interact to exert interdependent effects

on judgment. Specifically, heuristic process-

ing could bias systematic processing by

influencing people’s expectations about the

validity of arguments presented in a persua-

sive appeal (Chaiken et al., 1989). To test this

notion, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994)

presented participants with a novel attitude

object (a new telephone answering machine

called the “XT–100”) and assigned them to

one cell of a 2 (accuracy motivation: low

versus high) by 2 (heuristic cue: valid versus

invalid) by 2 (argument quality: strong versus

ambiguous versus weak) design. This study

manipulated accuracy motivation by varying

the importance and personal relevance of

participants’ decisions regarding this new

product. Whereas participants in the high

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

256

importance condition learned that they were

part of a small list of respondents, that their

input would be heavily weighted, and that

the product would be distributed in their

geographical area, participants in the low

importance condition learned that they were

part of a large group of respondents, that

individual opinions were unimportant, and

that the product would be distributed in a

different geographical area.

Participants next received a positive

message about the product that contained a

heuristic cue conveying either high or low

validity. Specifically, they learned that the

product description in the message was taken

from Consumer Reports, a credible source,

or from a promotional Kmart pamphlet, a

noncredible source. The product description

contained either strong arguments, weak

arguments, or an ambiguous mixture of the

two. Participants then reported their attitudes

toward the XT–100 and listed their thoughts

about the product description.

As in previous studies (e.g., Chaiken,

1980), the relatively unmotivated participants

in the low importance condition expressed

attitudes that reflected the source credibility

cues, but not the quality of the arguments

presented in the product description. Thus,

participants were more favorable toward the

XT–100 when they had read a positive mes-

sage from a credible (versus noncredible)

source, regardless of actual message content.

Moreover, this effect of source cue on

attitudes was direct, rather than mediated by

cognitive elaboration, consistent with the

notion that participants were directly infer-

ring the validity of the message from the

source’s credibility (i.e., processing heuris-

tically by using a well-learned association

between credibility and correctness).

Meanwhile, the results for participants in

the high importance condition who read an

unambiguous message also replicated past

research: highly motivated participants who

read a strong (versus weak) persuasive mes-

sage expressed more positive attitudes toward

the XT–100, and this effect was mediated by

participants’ cognitive elaborations about the

product. Additional analyses revealed that

when source cue and message content were

contradictory in their implications for

message validity (i.e., a credible source

paired with weak arguments, or a noncredible

source and strong arguments), systematic

processing alone determined attitudes. This

is consistent with the attenuation hypothesis

suggesting that systematic processing can

override the effects of heuristic processing.

However, when source credibility and

message content were congruent (i.e., a

credible source and strong arguments, or a

noncredible source and weak arguments),

there was both a direct effect of the heuristic

source cue on attitudes and an effect of

message content mediated by systematic

processing. Thus, when the information

provided by heuristic and systematic process-

ing were congruent, the results supported the

additivity hypothesis suggesting that both

modes of processing can independently influ-

ence attitudes.

Finally, highly motivated participants who

read an ambiguous message were influenced

both by the source cue and by systematic

processing of the high (versus low) quality

arguments. Supporting the bias hypothesis,

these participants’ cognitive elaborations

about the attitude object were influenced by

the validity information provided by the

source cue, such that the high credibility

source biased systematic processing in a

positive direction, whereas the low credibil-

ity source biased systematic processing in a

negative direction. In addition, attitudes in

this condition were also directly influenced

by the heuristic cue.

In other research examining the bias

hypothesis, Darke et al. (1998) studied the

impact of consensus information presented

in the absence of persuasive argumentation

on college students’ support for comprehen-

sive exams. Accuracy motivation was manip-

ulated via personal relevance. Participants in

the high relevance condition were led to

believe that the exam policy would have

direct personal consequences (i.e., it would

take effect the following academic year, and

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

257

would thus apply to current students),

whereas those in the low relevance condition

were led to believe that there would be no

personal consequences (i.e., the policy would

take effect in ten years, and therefore have

no impact on current students). Participants

then learned that 80 percent of students either

supported or opposed instituting comprehen-

sive exams, based on either a small poll

(a sample size of ten students) or a large poll

(a sample size of 1,000 students). Consistent

with the bias hypothesis, participants in the

high personal relevance condition generated

thoughts that were biased in the direction of

the available consensus cue, and these

thoughts then influenced their attitudes. In

contrast, the consensus information exerted a

direct, heuristic influence on participants’

attitudes in the low personal relevance

condition. Interestingly, highly motivated

participants also discriminated between the

more and less reliable heuristic cues: partici-

pants in the high relevance condition were

more persuaded by the consensus informa-

tion when the poll was based on a large

versus small sample of students, whereas

participants in the low relevance condition

were persuaded by consensus information

regardless of the poll’s size.

Together, then, these studies highlight the

complex interplay between heuristic and

systematic processing (see also Chen et al.,

1996; Erb et al., 1998; Ziegler et al., 2005).

Importantly, they demonstrate that the two

modes of processing can influence attitudes

both independently and interactively,

suggesting that they may best be conceptual-

ized as two interdependent and potentially

co-occurring ways of thinking (see Eagly

and Chaiken, 1993: Chapter 7, for further

discussion).

Multiple motives

Another unique feature of the heuristic-

systematic model is that it jointly considers

the influence of multiple modes of process-

ing on the one hand and multiple motives on

the other. The tripartite analysis of motives in

the heuristic-systematic model has its histori-

cal roots in the literature on attitude function,

although it should be noted that similar

classes of motives that center on understand-

ing, protecting the self, and affiliating with

others are echoed across multiple domains

(e.g., Allport, 1954; Baumeister and Leary,

1995; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Fiske,

2002; Heider, 1958; Lerner and Tetlock,

1999; Tesser and Campbell, 1983). The

notion that individuals are often motivated to

form and hold attitudes that square with

relevant facts built on Katz’s (1960) “knowl-

edge” function and Smith et al.’s (1956)

“object appraisal” function of attitudes,

which emphasized the role often played

by attitudes in organizing experience and

guiding action with respect to an individual’s

ongoing concerns. The heuristic-systematic

model was thus initially designed to apply to

persuasion contexts in which the message

recipient is concerned with assessing the

validity of a persuasive appeal (Chaiken,

1980, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1996). We subse-

quently extended the model beyond

validity-seeking persuasion contexts, adding

impression and defense motives to encapsu-

late two other broad classes of attitude

functions in the literature (Chaiken et al.,

1989). The concept of impression motivation

was designed to capture other-oriented,

affiliative functions such as Smith et al.’s

(1956) social adjustment function, which

emphasized the role that attitudes can play in

helping people establish and maintain

relationships with other individuals or groups

(see also McGuire, 1969). Meanwhile,

defense motivation encapsulated self-

oriented defensive functions such as Katz’s

(1960) ego-defensive function and Smith

et al.’s (1956) externalization function, which

suggested that some attitudes serve to protect

individuals’ self-image against internal or

external threats.

Considerable evidence supports the notion

that impression motivation can guide heuris-

tic and systematic processing (see Chaiken

et al., 1996, for a review). For example, Chen

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

258

et al. (1996: Study 2) led participants to

anticipate a discussion about a social issue

with a partner who ostensibly held either a

favorable or an unfavorable opinion on the

issue. Before this discussion, participants

read a series of fictitious scenarios designed

to prime either the accuracy goal of deter-

mining a valid opinion, or the impression

goal of getting along with other people. After

this task, participants familiarized them-

selves with the discussion issue by reading

an evaluatively balanced essay concerning

the issue (in this case, whether election

returns should be broadcast while polls are

still open). Participants then listed the

thoughts that had occurred to them as they

read the essay and indicated their own atti-

tudes toward the issue.

Impression-motivated participants expres-

sed attitudes that were much more congruent

with their alleged partners’ attitudes than did

accuracy-motivated participants: when the

partner favored one side of the issue, they

favored the same side, whereas when the

partner opposed it, they opposed it. Inter-

estingly, accuracy-motivated and impression-

motivated participants exhibited the same

amount of systematic processing (as meas-

ured by the number of issue-relevant thoughts

that were listed). However, whereas accu-

racy-motivated participants’ systematic

processing was open-minded and unbiased

by their partners’ attitudes, impression-

motivated participants exhibited systematic

processing that was biased toward their

partners’ attitudes. For example, when the

partner favored allowing broadcasts of elec-

tion returns while the polls were still open,

impression-motivated participants listed

thoughts that revealed much more favorable

thinking about arguments supporting the

broadcasting of returns and more unfavora-

ble thinking about arguments opposing it.

Like impression motivation, defense

motivation can also guide heuristic and sys-

tematic processing in a directional fashion,

as individuals attempt to close the gap

between actual and desired confidence that a

judgment will protect their cherished beliefs

and self-views (e.g., Ditto and Lopez, 1992;

Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1997; Liberman

and Chaiken, 1992; Lord et al., 1979). For

instance, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1997)

found that participants’ vested interest in

a campus issue biased their judgments of a

consensus cue’s reliability, when additional

information that would permit systematic

processing was unavailable. Specifically,

participants rated the consensus information

(an opinion poll of their fellow students) as

more reliable, and criticized it less, when the

poll results supported rather than opposed

their vested interests. When additional

information was available, participants also

displayed a defensive bias in their systematic

processing, cognitively elaborating the argu-

ments presented in a selective manner that

reflected their vested interests. Interestingly,

when both types of information were availa-

ble, exposure to a hostile consensus cue

appeared to undermine judgmental confi-

dence and increase systematic processing of

the arguments presented: In these conditions,

the influence of vested interests on partici-

pants’ subsequent attitudes was mediated by

their cognitive elaborations about the issue.

In contrast, exposure to a congenial cue

appeared to close the confidence gap, such

that participants simply used their vested

interests to directly inform their subsequent

attitudes, rather than engaging in additional

heuristic or systematic processing. Thus, as

with accuracy and impression motives, both

heuristic and systematic processing can be

used to serve self-protective processing

goals.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ISSUES

Because it focuses on the basic mechanisms

by which persuasion can occur, the heuristic-

systematic model can predict how a wide

range of variables will influence attitudes

and judgments in various situations. It is

therefore a particularly powerful tool for

understanding and influencing information

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

259

processing in ways that can help effect posi-

tive social change, and has been applied to

diverse issues such as increasing individuals’

acceptance of potentially threatening health

information, improving the design of product

warning labels, identifying and decreasing

bias in jury decision-making, increasing

recycling behavior, and developing more

effective programs for preventing substance

abuse among teens (e.g., Brewer and Hupfeld,

2004; ForsterLee et al., 2006; Harris and

Napper, 2005; Howard et al., 2006; Jepson

and Chaiken, 1990; Liberman and Chaiken,

1992; Scott, 1996; Werner et al., 2002;

Zuckerman and Chaiken, 1998). Here, we

discuss the implications of the heuristic-

systematic model for two areas that we find

particularly interesting: negotiation and

political decision-making.

Negotiation and conflict

resolution

Recent research exploring heuristic and sys-

tematic processing in simulated negotiations

has confirmed the utility of a dual-process

perspective for understanding information

processing in conflict settings (see

Ledgerwood et al., 2006, for a review).

Specifically, when negotiators have modest

levels of motivation (or low cognitive capac-

ity), they often rely on heuristics such as

fixed-pie assumptions (the perception that a

negotiation is a zero-sum game), initial

anchor values (e.g., first offers, or informa-

tion about the typical outcome of similar

negotiations), and stereotypes about an

opponent’s group membership (De Dreu

et al., 1999; Thompson and Hastie, 1990; see

De Dreu, 2004, for a review). In contrast,

when motivation and capacity are relatively

high, sole reliance on these heuristics tends

to decrease as systematic processing

increases.

Researchers have identified several factors

that influence the extent to which people

process information in negotiations (see De

Dreu, 2004). These factors include both

stable individual differences and temporary

elements of a given situation that influence

motivation and/or capacity. For instance,

negotiators who are high in the dispositional

need for cognitive closure – that is, the desire

to reach a judgment quickly and avoid ambi-

guity (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994) – are

more likely to rely solely on heuristics than

are those who have a low need for closure

(De Dreu et al., 1999).

Temporary, situation-specific factors such

as the presence of a highly involving task or

process accountability (the need to justify the

way in which a decision is made) tend to

increase the extent of systematic processing,

whereas time pressure and capacity-degrad-

ing conditions (e.g., noise) tend to decrease

such processing (e.g., De Dreu, 2003; Tetlock

et al., 1989; see Ledgerwood et al., 2006, for

a review). For example, De Dreu (2003)

examined the effect of time pressure on

fixed-pie perceptions. Business students were

placed into pairs and asked to play the role of

a buyer or seller in a negotiation over the

purchase of a car. The negotiation task was

designed to hold integrative potential: the

different issues varied in importance to

the two negotiators, so that an integrative

solution that capitalized on this variation in

priorities would be more beneficial to both

negotiators than a 50:50 split based on a

fixed-pie assumption. Participants were led

to believe that they had either plenty of time

in which to complete the negotiation (low

time pressure condition), or relatively little

time (high time pressure condition).

Participants were more likely to revise their

fixed-pie assumptions, which led to higher

joint outcomes, under low rather than high

time pressure. These results suggest that

time pressure reduces systematic processing,

heightening reliance on heuristic cues

such as fixed-pie perceptions and preventing

negotiators from capitalizing on integrative

potential.

In contrast, when an individual expects

to discuss an issue with, justify a decision to,

or be evaluated by an unknown audience,

he or she tends to engage in pre-emptive

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

260

self-criticism, displaying a heightened moti-

vation to arrive at an accurate conclusion

(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock et al.,

1989). In terms of the heuristic-systematic

model, holding a person accountable to an

audience whose views are unknown can

increase desired confidence for a correct

judgment and thereby stimulate accuracy-

motivated systematic processing. Confirming

this idea, De Dreu et al. (2000) randomly

assigned business student participants to

high-accountability and low-accountability

conditions before asking them to engage in a

mock negotiation over the purchase of a car.

In the high-accountability condition, partici-

pants expected that their negotiation strate-

gies and decisions would be reviewed and

evaluated several days later by an experi-

enced negotiator and a psychologist. In the

low-accountability condition, participants

did not receive this information. The results

showed that under high accountability,

participants were more likely to revise their

fixed-pie assumptions and tended to obtain

higher joint outcomes. Together, these

studies suggest that negotiation outcomes

can be improved by reducing the impact of

variables that decrease accuracy motivation

and capacity (like time pressure), as well as

by facilitating factors that increase accuracy

motivation (like accountability to an impar-

tial expert).

Political attitudes

The heuristic-systematic model can also be

used to shed light on political decision-

making and voting behavior (e.g., Forehand

et al., 2004; Marcus et al., 2000; Mondak,

1993; Newman and Perloff, 2004), and

suggests that the impact of various factors on

political judgments and intentions will

depend on a voter’s ability and motivation to

think about available information. When

people are motivated and able to process

political information, they will tend to

weigh the quality of the arguments put forth

regarding an issue or candidate. In contrast,

when people are low in motivation to process

information about political issues or candi-

dates (e.g., involvement and personal

relevance are low), or lack the ability to proc-

ess systematically (e.g., they are stressed or

under time pressure), they may tend to rely

on heuristics such as party labels, expert or

celebrity endorsements, and source cues such

as attractiveness or group membership. For

example, a low-motivation or low-capacity

voter might oppose a state ballot initiative

because Oprah opposes it, support a senator

because the letter (“D” or “R”) next to the

name matches the voter’s typical political

preferences, or vote for a presidential candi-

date because their facial features convey an

air of competence (see Hall et al., 2009;

Todorov et al., 2005).

Political psychologists have identified

five broad categories of heuristics that can

influence voting behavior: party affiliation,

ideological affiliation, endorsements, polls

(i.e., consensus information), and candidate

appearance (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).

Although in an ideal world, citizens partici-

pating in a democratic process would usually

think carefully and critically about political

information before arriving at conclusion,

heuristic processing is thought to guide a

substantial portion of political decision-

making. For instance, echoing Converse’s

(1964) observation that the majority of

Americans display relatively low levels of

political sophistication and knowledge,

Mondak (1993) suggested that most voters

face a range of pressing everyday concerns

that tend to take precedence over political

matters, increasing the likelihood that voters

will rely on heuristics when processing

political information (see also Ledgerwood

and Chaiken, 2007). Consistent with this

notion, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) found a

high rate of heuristic use among individuals

participating in a mock presidential election.

Using a process-tracing methodology, these

researchers were able to track the extent to

which participants accessed different kinds

of information about the candidates on a

computer: They provided participants with a

A THEORY OF HEURISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION PROCESSING

261

list of available types of information (e.g.,

“Issue Stance,” “Past Experience,” “Endorse-

ments”), each of which could be opened with

a mouse click to display the relevant infor-

mation, and then recorded which kinds

of information participants chose to access.

Information from each of Lau and Redlawsk’s

five political heuristic categories was accessed

by over 90 percent of participants.

Interestingly, different participants also

appeared to prefer different types of heuris-

tics: those higher in political expertise were

more likely to use ideology and endorsement

heuristics, whereas those lower in expertise

were more likely to use candidate appearance

heuristics. As the heuristic-systematic model

would predict, participants were more likely

to use heuristics when their ability to engage

in more effortful processing was limited (i.e.,

when the information environment was made

more complex by having the information

labels actively scroll past participants on the

computer screen rather than remain static).

Lau and Redlawsk’s (2001) study suggests

that all five categories of heuristics are likely

to play a role in a given election; however,

some types have been studied more

frequently than others. For example, given

the prolific use of endorsements for a wide

variety of political attitude objects (including

everything from local ballot initiatives to

presidential candidates), and from a wide

variety of endorsers (ranging from political

organizations to celebrities), political scien-

tists have been particularly interested in how

endorsement heuristics influence political

opinions and voting behavior. Using data

from a California poll regarding an upcom-

ing election for members of the State Supreme

Court, Mondak (1993) showed that endorse-

ments increased voters’ willingness to express

an opinion and the direction of that opinion

when they had relatively little information

about the issue. Specifically, respondents

were more likely to say a Supreme Court

justice should be retained or recalled (rather

than choosing “not sure”) when told which

governor had appointed the justice, and they

used their evaluation of the governor to guide

their evaluation of the justice in question.

In other words, they used the governor’s

endorsement as a heuristic in forming an

attitude toward the associated Supreme

Court justice. Consistent with the heuristic-

systematic model, this was more likely to

occur when respondents had been previously

exposed to relatively little media information

regarding the justice (thereby limiting their

ability to engage in systematic processing)

and for respondents scoring higher on a need

for cognitive efficiency measure (designed to

tap both motivation and ability to carefully

process information).

In Mondak’s (1993) study, the heuristic

implication of an endorsement from a politi-

cian depended on a voter’s attitude toward

that politician. However, the impact of

an endorsement could also depend on the

perceived reliability of the heuristic for a

particular judgmental task; that is, the extent

to which a perceiver deems a heuristic to be

a valid guide for judgment in a given situa-

tion (see Chen and Chaiken, 1999). For

example, when considering an environmental

issue, a voter might feel that an endorsement

from Greenpeace affords a sizeable increase

in judgmental confidence, whereas an

endorsement from the National Basketball

Association does not, despite equivalent

evaluations of the two organizations. Indeed,

Forehand et al. (2004) found that participants

expressed more favorable attitudes toward a

hypothetical initiative when it was endorsed

by a well-known and issue-relevant source

rather than a fictional or issue-irrelevant

source. Supporting the heuristic-systematic

model’s sufficiency principle, this difference

emerged in a low motivation context (in

which participants expected to justify their

preferences about an unimportant and unre-

lated issue, ballot formatting) but not a high

motivation context (in which participants

expected to be held accountable for their

position on the initiative itself).

Group endorsements can also act to bias

systematic information processing about an

issue or a candidate. Individuals may be

motivated by defense or impression concerns

HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

262

to agree with an ingroup and disagree with an

outgroup, and may therefore process infor-

mation selectively to arrive at these preferred

judgments (Fleming and Petty, 2000). For

example, Cohen (2003: Study 4) asked lib-

eral undergraduate students to evaluate a

(stereotypically liberal) proposal for a gener-

ous federally funded job-training program.

Half the participants learned that Democrats

opposed and Republicans supported the

program, while half received no information

about group endorsement. On average,

participants in the latter condition supported

the program, in keeping with their ideologi-

cal beliefs. However, when participants were

told that their ingroup opposed the program,

they showed biased processing of the infor-

mation presented in the proposal, selectively

interpreting ambiguous information and

selectively attending to unambiguous infor-

mation to support the ingroup position. As a

result, participants in the ingroup-opposed

condition were more likely to oppose the

program themselves, compared to partici-

pants in the no-information condition.

Moreover, the Democratic participants

believed that group endorsement influenced

the attitudes of other Democrats and (even

more strongly) Republicans, but perceived

themselves to be relatively unaffected by this

information. Thus, consistent with the notion

that heuristic processing need not involve

intentionality and self-awareness (see

Chaiken et al., 1989; Chen and Chaiken,

1999), it seems likely that people are

unaware of the extent to which group endorse-

ments bias their thinking about an issue. This

may tend to exacerbate political conflicts:

whereas Democrats and Republicans might

agree on a policy in the absence of endorse-

ment information, merely attaching a party

label to a proposal can distort information

processing and lead partisans to adopt diver-

gent positions. Bipartisan proposals may

therefore be particularly likely to gain

public support not only because their actual

content may better address the political goals

of both groups, but also because the absence

of a link to a particular party may help to

promote more open-minded information

processing.

CONCLUSION

Looking back, we see the heuristic-system-

atic model as very much a product of its

historical context, building on theories both

within the attitudes domain and outside of it,

and developing beyond the study of basic

social psychological processes to shed light

on important and relevant social issues. To

us, this illustrates the benefit of working in

an area with such a long and cumulative his-

tory that both influences and draws from

other psychological and related social-

science disciplines. In coming years, we

hope that the field continues to develop the

heuristic-systematic model in concert with

other dual-process theories, drawing from

the research that has already been done to

influence that which is yet to come.

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