Social Swarming: Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future

79MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2013

Major David Faggard is a U.S. Air Force

public affairs ofﬁcer and most recently

worked with the 82d Airborne Division

in Afghanistan. He currently serves as

the director of public affairs for U.S. Air

Forces, Central Command.

PHOTO: A man shouts after a missile

hits in a house in Aleppo, Syria, 3

January 2013. The ﬁghting is part of the

escalating violence in the Syrian civil

war that the United Nations estimates

has killed more than 60,000 people

since the revolt against President

Bashar Assad began in March 2011.

(AP Photo/Andoni Lubaki)

SOCIAL SWARMING

Major David Faggard, U.S. Air Force

Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse

in Future Conﬂict

WEETING DURING THE Arab Spring? That’s so 2010. A future

tactic in cyber-based-information warfare is built upon mobile-media

wielding e-citizen soldiers employing social swarming tactics to overwhelm

a system, a decision maker, or a critical node.

These mobile networks are vital to starting and maintaining cyber-based

insurgency, drawing physical and moral strength from super-empowered

individuals, while also using super-connected-individual networks to spread

information, move undetected, and muster support, constantly one step ahead

of authorities. It is possible for this swarm to move from the online world

into the real world where violence may ensue.

Understanding Swarming

To understand the nature of communication-based social swarming, one

must understand the concept of “battle swarm,” introduced by John Arquilla

and David Ronfeldt of the Rand Corporation in 2000.

Their essay, “Swarm-

ing and the Future of Conﬂict,” studied historical conﬂicts placing context

on smaller, less-equipped individual forces defeating larger, more equipped

forces by overwhelming the system and decision makers. Using swarming

tactics, by building off the past warfare approaches of melee, massing, and

maneuver, “social revolutions would, in coming decades, help bring about

the downfall of empires,” according to the Rand study.

Swarming as a mili-

tary tactic “implies a convergent attack by many units.”

The Rand report

80 March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW

argued that swarming must be able to be employed

from multiple directions, which clearly the hyper

connectedness of the Internet and digital devices

allow, and that the swarm must also perform sensory

operations on the selected target.

Imagine a mob of hyper-connected actors—

Howard Rheingold referred to it as a “smart mob”—

constantly one step ahead of authorities because it

employed real-time, GPS-enabled devices. With

these devices it could data-burst updates to its

swarm.

The only things in the swarm’s way attenuat-

ing communications among members are the seconds

it takes for servers to refresh. These conditions mean

the 24-hour news cycle would be obviated. This

smart mob, as we saw in the 2009 Iranian presiden-

tial elections, created melee, had mass, and through

exploitable off-the-shelf and widely available data

technology, was able to maneuver where government

forces were not.

Social swarming is more than using the Internet or

social media; it entails network envelopment of the

information aspect of modern command and control.

These complex networks are optimal when fully con-

nected and ﬂat with opportunity for direct “horizontal

communication” between network peers.

Swarming model. A working deﬁnition for this

essay would be that social swarming employs the

full computing power of mobile technology with

real-time network updates to strategically organize

e-citizen forces to overwhelm an opposing force

online achieving one’s own political ends.

The overall objective of this information-based

social swarm would not be the kinetic destruction

of a system or node, but the disruption of the node’s

ability to make a decision.

The implications of

this aspect of cyber- or net-centric warfare on a

decision maker’s ability to keep order are critical

in humanitarian or homeland operations. However,

dark-actors, either homegrown or transnational,

could potentially employ social swarming for

purely kinetic reasons, as was the case with the

2011 Mumbai attacks.

In addition, social swarms

might be used by insurgents of a “connected” state

in “phase four” operations.

Overlaying on recent communication-based

events, Mia Stockmans’ reﬁned MAO-Model of

Audience Development, as well as this author’s per-

sonal observations on advocacy-based communica-

tion, provides a working model for communication-

based social swarming (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Communication-based social swarm

Scream

Narrative Medium

Recruitment

Political

Rage

Political

Change

Target Selection

Potential for Violence

Super-Connected Individual

Major David Faggard

Super-Empowered Individual

Motivation

Ability

Opportunity

Resources: Time, Money,

Physical, Mental

Resources: Promotion, Price,

Place, Product

1 2

3 4

1. Preparation Phase

2. Ignition Phase

3. Protest Phase

4. International Buy-In

5. Climax

6. Follow on Information Warfare

Hussain and Howards

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ASYMMETRIC WAR

Additionally, incorporating Muzammil M. Hus-

sain and Philip N. Howard’s working “6-Stage

Framework for Political Change” offers an in-depth

study on the recent Arab Spring (March 2012),

which validates the working model of communica-

tion-based social swarming.

After explaining the

models of Stockmans and Hussain and Howard, this

author provides a working graphical representation

of the communication-based social swarm model.

Here, I interpret Stockmans’ model while over-

laying it with personal experience from years of

advocacy-based public-communication campaigns.

Stockmans’ reﬁned motivation, ability, opportunity

(MAO) model of audience development provides

a basic starting point for a dynamic model of

communication-based social swarming.

Motivation. Where Stockmans’ model ends

and the communication-based social-swarm

model begins is motivation. Stockmans’ model

explains that motivation for participation in an

event is largely cultural, based on desire and past

experience, not life-threatening necessity.

Being

compelled to overthrow an oppressive regime is a

signiﬁcant investment, a natural reaction to oppres-

sion, brutality, or another self-perceived injustice.

In other words, this catalyst event, which she

calls the “scream,” is a force within oneself that

literally “motivates” one to commit some form of

action you would otherwise not do under normal

circumstances.

Ability. The ability Stockmans describes focuses

on the resources of time, money, and physical and

mental capacity.

Time is relative online; quicker

is paramount, while monetary resources are

minimal. In the ability step of the communication-

based social swarm model, it is appropriate to list

additional factors required to start mobilizing a

swarm online: narrative and medium, as well as

target selection, all of which ﬁt within Stockmans’

descriptions of resources.

Narrative. Narrative drives action. Narrative

allows an audience to relate to the subject ratio-

nally.

Narrative is as much about the receiver as

it is about the message. Narratives explain societal

fabric, “beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions,”

and allow the receiver to connect with the sender

through stories.

Moreover, culture, socioeconomic

status, and personal beliefs create audience refer-

ence points for narrative. Narrative can create third-

party advocacy or kill it.

Defense Department

communicators build reputation-based narrative in

the world every day, according to Gallup conﬁdence

surveys, which indicate the U.S. military has the

highest con

ﬁdence amongst Americans.

Defense

Department Public Affairs’ efforts shape these

narratives for Americans. Moreover, the narratives

shape network-based power.

However, depending

on the receiver’s lens and narrative interpretation,

tremendous effects may result.

Medium. The medium for the communication-

based social swarm can be the regional, national,

or tribal online network based off the globally con-

nected information grid and its ability to employ

mobile media. Target selection can occur before

or after narrative development. However, if the

target is selected before narrative development,

the narrative may need to be reworked throughout

the process or the

ﬁnal online endstate may not be

achieved. The narrative is then translated by way

of a super-connected individual across the online

medium to the mass base.

Recruit, rage, change. The mass base is

recruited into this movement, typically through

the already-established online followership of the

super-connected individual driving towards some

form of political rage, otherwise known as the

advocacy issue. At this point, there is a potential

for violence, melee, or maneuver. Finally, after the

rage, there is a possibility for political change. If the

political change does not occur, a super-empowered

individual can reﬁne the narrative, or a super-

connected individual can increase the mass base,

change the medium, or continue “pulse-attacking”

the government communication apparatus while

striving to create confusion.

Opportunity. Opportunity described by Stock-

mans follows “promotion, product, place, and

price” (the “4Ps” of marketing, which is a 1960s’

marketing formula that still applies to online com-

munication today).

A recent marketing brochure

for this online technique says: “Where the voice of

one can quickly become the voice of one hundred

or one million.”

“Promotion” for a social swarm

is synonymous with recruitment based on narrative.

“Product” is the “purchasing” of a continuation of

the current corrupt governmental practices or an

attempt to mass together with like-minded actors

for the installment of a new government. “Place,”

82 March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW

referred to as “everyplace” in social swarms, will

ﬁrst take root globally online. It is the ﬁnal P,

“price,” which likely weighs on the social swarms’

potential recruits most. The “price” for this endeavor

may be a changed life, death, or imprisonment.

Stockmans adds that in opportunity, actors might

not be willing to act if there are signiﬁcant envi-

ronmental barriers.

With a social swarm, this is a

decision point where actors may decide it is too dan-

gerous to rebel, and maintain the status quo, or it is

too dangerous not to rebel, and suffer more potential

disruptive events. This is also the point at which there

is a potential for kinetic violence to begin.

Super Empowerment and Super

Connectedness

Thomas Friedman described super-empowered

individuals in his essay on globalization effects,

“Longitudes and Latitudes,” as those who could “act

much more directly and much more powerfully on

the world stage.”

Friedman explained how Osama

bin-Laden and the effects he could muster, through

the results of globalization, would bring about prob-

lems nations would have to deal with in the future.

The motivating catalyst event is a traumatic event

suffered by a victim, which may lead to a super-

empowered person providing spiritual, military, or

ideological guidance to the masses. This develop-

ment helps shape narrative.

In public relations,

this super-empowered individual might be seen as

the “inﬂuencer,” or the person who might develop

narrative in a third-party advocate situation.

However, online mega-inﬂuencers can be referred

to as super-connected individuals. These are the

actors who by their position, celebrity status, or

wealth are connected to tens of thousands of others

and can build and recruit the network to propagate

narrative. Often their followers may take information

and retransmit it to their networks, compounding the

effects of virally spreading information. The super-

connected individual’s reach is potentially unlimited

online, especially when the data relayed is of value

(potentially carrying life or death importance) to

the swarm.

A super-connected individual’s potential threats

to U.S. interests in remote hot spots are evident in

situations like that of Pakistani citizen journalist

Sohaib Athar, who unknowingly tweeted by way of

@ReallyVirtual (Figure 2). He conveyed real-time

details about America’s covert and secret mission

designed to get Osama bin-Laden.

Athar’s near-

instant accounts are not uncommon in today’s opera-

tional environment. Anyone, anywhere can inform a

global community regarding any matter in seconds,

no matter how classiﬁed and compartmentalized.

Although no physical social swarm occurred in

Athar’s case, one can only imagine the international

crisis that may have occurred if a smart mob of a

dozen followers of his subscribers (750 at the time)

showed up at Bin-Laden’s Abbottabad compound

and confronted the Americans. After live tweeting the

Bin-Laden mission, Athar, a Pakistani information

technology Twitter user, created one of the largest

Twitter followings in Pakistan with more than 70,000

followers.

Even though Athar was within the clos-

est proximity for his network to directly affect the

operation, the real super-connected individual in

the Osama bin-Laden example was Keith Urbahn

(Figure 3).

Urbahn is a former assistant of former Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

He spread word

online that America may have killed Bin-Laden.

When Athar tweeted, some of the world took notice;

when Urbahn tweeted, many in mainstream media,

Figure 3

Figure 2

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as well as prominent social media users in govern-

ment and society, took notice and perpetuated that

message. Based on Figure 4, it is easy to see what

nodes in the network offer the biggest reach with

the smallest bit of information.

David Singh Grewal provides an appropriate def-

inition for a network using a communication-based

social swarm model: “an interconnected group of

actors linked to one another in a way that makes

them capable of beneﬁcial cooperation.” Network

power, Grewal argues, results from societal coor-

dination and new global standards brought forth

through a revolution in technological advancements

via the elimination of distance and reach from the

concept of globalization.

Hyper-connected swarming. Social swarms

operate in an “all-channel” network; that is, the

swarm is capable of being hyper connected to every

other member of the swarm, and there is neither a

superior nor a follower, but all operate independently

and collectively to support the swarm.

Social

swarming is both nodal and nodeless.

My communication-based social swarming model

also builds off Hussain and Howard’s “6-Stage

Framework for Political Change.” However, there are

some differences based off marketing and public rela-

tions experience and the communication aspects of

the social swarm model.

My communication-based

social swarm model includes Hussain and Howard’s

stated phases with numbers one through six to repre-

sent their input. Step one is the “preparation phase,”

which they state includes recruitment and narrative

development, as well as medium identiﬁcation. This

is the phase where the mass base may start searching

for narrative. The “ignition phase” follows a catalyst

event. A “protest phase” follows, which organizes

networks ofﬂine to build larger numbers online and

in person. An “international buy-in phase” follows,

which, through online media, allows for the global

community to be aware. The “climax phase” fol-

lows, where real-world actors on both sides of the

issue can clash. Finally, a “follow-on information

warfare” phase happens where actors clash in the

social, cultural, political spheres online and in person,

vying to deﬁne the new makeup of the movement,

government, or the nation.

The communication-based social swarm model

in ﬁgure 1 is best understood with recent events in

2009 Iran, 2010 Haiti, and 2010 Tunisia, followed

by a future cast of Pakistan.

Iran. The June 2009 Iranian presidential elec-

tions appeared to be corrupt when President Mah-

moud Ahmadinejad defeated Mir-Hossein Mousavi,

causing nationwide protests that initially went

largely unnoticed in American mainstream media.

According to Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, “citizen

activists” took to the streets in Iran largely due to

access that Twitter provided the Iranian people.

Eventually the Internet’s global reach and inﬂuence

channelized mainstream media and prominent blog-

gers to report on the protests. Regional users even

altered their personal online settings like time-zone

stamps to reﬂect Tehran time. Many online personas

also changed their proﬁle photos to reﬂect a green

tint to go along with the narrative of a “green-color”

revolution.

As a medium, the advocacy-based social-media

effort, “Help Iran Election,” gathered 160,000

citizen activists to support the Iranian revolution

online from other countries.

This peacefully led

social swarm was further emboldened and assisted

Figure 4

Each node represents a twitter user that mentioned @KeithUrbahn

within 1 hour and 15 minutes of his infamous tweet. Read-

ers can ﬁnd this representation at <http://blog.socialﬂow.com/

post/5454638896/breaking-bin-laden-a-closer-look>

84 March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW

by hackers who attacked Iranian government cyber

networks.

One must ask why did the social swarm not

topple the repressive Iranian regime. According to

Burns and Eltham, it is likely because the Iranian

people were not willing to counter the brutal acts

of violence committed by the Basij military forces

on the streets targeting the cyber activists.

These

forces were likely the “environmental factors”

Stockmans identiﬁes as roadblocks to “opportu-

nity.”

Haiti. In 2010, the U.S. Air Force social-media

team found itself dealing directly with a commu-

nication-based social swarm while Airmen sup-

ported Haiti relief efforts following that nation’s

devastating earthquake. Haiti’s infrastructure, to

include its major ports and airport, were ravaged

by the earthquake.

On the ground in Haiti, a small

team of Air Force special operations airmen ﬁlled

in as air-traf

ﬁc controllers. Because the earthquake

severely damaged airport capabilities, these airmen

determined aircraft- landing priority for the severely

overcrowded runway based on aircraft cargo and

priority.

A Doctors Without Borders airplane circled

overhead because there was literally no more room

on the ﬂight line, so they took to the online world

and Twitter. When super-connected individual Ann

Curry became aware of the issue, she spread the

message via Twitter that the Air Force must let the

aircraft land. That tweet would go down as 2010’s

“most powerful tweet.”

Within minutes the Internet exploded, and the

swarm “pulse attacked” with direct messages, ques-

tions, and accusations ﬂooding Air Force Websites,

chat rooms, forums and blogs, eventually leading

to massive amounts of mainstream press coverage.

The Air Force social media team replied to the

fervor nearly instantaneously, but the social swarm

was mobilized and calling upon DOD decision

makers for action. A short time later, the Doctors

Without Borders aircraft was allowed to land.

Although the successful landing of the aircraft was

not directly related to the online attention, the atten-

tion the issue caused online made Pentagon senior

leadership aware, many who personally respond

and interact with followers on Twitter.

Arab Spring. The Arab Spring example was

of Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian who turned

himself into a super-empowered individual

through self-immolation in December 2010 to

protest increased prices of local goods and local

police brutality and corruption.

Bouazizi’s self-

immolation, recorded on video and used in many

online and mainstream media sources, instantly

turned Bouazizi into a super-empowered individual

by providing the region a narrative for the Arab

Spring.

Obviously digital and social media did

not cause the Tunisian people to overthrow the

Tunisian government, but Bouazizi’s suicide and his

funeral were captured on mobile-phone video and

later broadcasted by mainstream media and online,

creating a narrative for the movement that many in

the region could sympathize and empathize with.

With Bouazizi’s video so viral, it is impossible to

track down who created and distributed it initially,

but the narrative was created and exploited through

horizontal communication, which made advocacy

easier for a social swarm to form.

Pakistan. Potential threats to U.S. governmental

interests using social swarming could be affected

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

of Pakistan where a lack of U.S. narrative clouds a

nation struggling to assert sovereignty and regional

power in light of the recent American-led Bin-Laden

mission, alleged drone strikes, and transnational ter-

rorism. Placing the expanded MAO model against

the backdrop of current tensions in Pakistan and

Al-Qaeda front man Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s recent

comments calling for national revolution, one must

ask, “What is next for the nation of Pakistan?”

In the FATA region, U.S. narrative is nearly dead.

This is an area where American strategic interests

lay.

However, only 12 percent of Pakistanis view

the U.S. positively.

Furthermore, other nations

in the region believe America is a military threat

to them, according to Pew research.

Host-nation

and nonstate propaganda efforts likely frame this

Within minutes the Internet

exploded, and the swarm “pulse

attacked” with direct messages . . .

85MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2013

ASYMMETRIC WAR

narrative. Framing allows users to “understand an

experience.”

Pakistanis develop anti-U.S. narra-

tives at home, at places of worship, and even in the

government.

Furthermore, Americans fulﬁlled Pakistani nar-

ratives when the United States invaded Afghanistan

in 2001.

Years of negative U.S. framing likely

created a damaging U.S. image in the region.

The vacuum of a U.S. narrative along the Afghan-

Pakistan border contributed to regional, tribal, and

familial anti-U.S. narratives, making dynamics

favorable for terrorism recruitment.

From the

Pakistani lens of a nation under attack, allegedly by

drone aircraft, almost 70 percent of Pakistanis now

want U.S. forces out of Afghanistan.

Pakistani

perceptions of America will continue to decline as

long as these alleged drone strikes along the border

continue without explanation or transparency from

the governments involved. Is what happens next in

Pakistan based off the social swarm model?

One must ask why the Pakistani people have not

responded to the issues affecting them, in a way

similar to the Arab Spring. Some theories exist.

However, the answer to the question is largely

unknown. Still, a super-empowered individual,

now-Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri, recently

called on the people of Pakistan to revolt against

the Pakistan government and follow a similar path

as in the Arab Spring.

Using my communication-

based social swarm model, if Pakistanis in the FATA

region view their nation’s governmental policies

regarding Western operations as life threatening,

this may be a catalyst event for some of them.

Rounding out the items needed for a social swarm

to begin, consider this list:

● They have a super-empowered individual,

Zawahiri, who has developed narratives of cor-

ruption, anti-governmental feelings, and economic

decline, and he has engendered swaths of potential

recruits.

● Whether those affected by a catalyst event have

a super-connected individual is not clear.

● They need a ready and willing person to pro-

vide a medium and network.

● They also need someone willing to socially

swarm online or in person.

Mahmoud Salem, right, speaks to people before he suspends his campaign for parliament during the unrest in Heliopolis,

a suburb of Cairo, Egypt, 16 November 2011. Salem, one of Egypt’s most prominent activist bloggers, suspended his cam-

paign to join the protesters in Tahrir. Salem was part of a core group of online activists who used social media to spread

the word about police abuse and corruption under Mubarakt.

(AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

86 March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW

The social swarm’s Pakistan medium is present

with 68.2 percent of Pakistanis having access to

a mobile phone.

Pakistan’s understanding of the

widespread usage of mobile devices as a “terrorism

tool” is only beginning to take form, as evinced by

that nation’s recent legislation to ban the sale of

mobile SIM cards without biometric data.

Addi-

tionally, only 37 percent of Pakistanis support that

nation’s efforts against extremism in the FATA.

One solid aspect to the opinion polling of Pakistan

though is that approval rates of terror groups like

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are in decline.

Alleged drone strikes, reportedly surgical in

nature and only killing intended targets, may not

be enough of a catalyst for the mass base to rally

against the Pakistani government and the alleged

U.S. mission there. However, perception can

obscure reality, and if the FATA people believe in

their narrative, anything can happen.

According to civilian researchers, the accuracy

of the alleged drone strikes is not in question. The

aircraft and systemic processes are on target, and,

assuming these strikes could be a catalyst, their

accuracy could explain why they have not trig-

gered social swarming in Pakistan.

The lack of

a social swarm may not be because of insufﬁcient

narrative, lack of medium, or low recruitment. It

may be because the catalyst effect is not as large

and as widespread in the FATA region as it is

reported to be by news media. However, the global

narrative of perceived civilian casualties stemming

from drone strikes is signi

ﬁcant.

Cost and widespread usage. Finally, the con-

cept of a communication-based social swarm has

strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats

in the offense, as well as the defense. The largest

strength to the concept of a communication-based

social swarm is its cost and widespread usage.

Free mobile-media-enabled platforms like Twit-

ter, Facebook, and Google offer a wide range of

latitude to organizations operating within a con-

strained budgetary environment. For the United

States, these efforts can be relatively quick, in

a society that spent the past decade at war. The

biggest strength to this free tool is its size; nearly

a billion people are on Facebook alone; that is

tremendous reach within the network pool.

Additionally, large pools of employees are not

necessarily needed to use these tools because of the

distributed network of users already in the system.

History provides a window into the development

of communication; from pretelevised town-square

community gatherings, to the printing press, to

megaphone-like mainstream media, and now to

global town halls not constricted by borders or time

zones, the Internet is a game changer.

A weakness in my statements about communi-

cation-based social swarming may be the fact that

they are rooted in years of personal experience.

Additionally, many online strategists believe that

the “4Ps” of marketing may be out of sync with the

communicators and networks, which operate primar-

ily online.

It would be inappropriate not to mention

the collection of effort written against this topic as

well; some believe the capability is a utopian view.

Evgeny Morozov, in his book The Net Delusion,

offers his counterpoints to the concept that online

media can spur revolution. His arguments provide

debate on the growing power of Google, foreign

spy agencies collecting data on everyone, and the

consequences of an open and free Internet. However,

the book is all doom and gloom with little optimism.

In addition, while access is a strength to communi-

cation-based social swarming, it is also a weakness;

places like North Korea and many others around the

world labeled as “Internet black holes” will likely

have no ability to create meaningful social swarms.

If a super-connected individual built a network of

swarmers within one of these countries, he would

likely bear the brunt of national censorship and

repressive governmental practices.

The bread crumb trail. A big weakness when

employing social swarms is the digital bread crumb

trail the Internet user leaves behind. This trail pro-

vides an avenue for quick vengeance from proregime

forces to locate and neutralize online activists, as was

the case in Iran.

Additional weaknesses include

mobile-media’s ability to “Geo-Tag” photos and

video. These geo-tagged products inherently con-

tain the natural data needed by swarmers to com-

municate and plan with each other; however, the

ironic weakness is that the governmental decision-

making node would in theory be able to track the

GPS-enabled device either in real time, or through

the GPS-enabled photo or video. Furthermore, any

data broadcast over air waves would be vulnerable

to interception and jamming through a variety of

methods.

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ASYMMETRIC WAR

Opportunities for communication-based social

swarming include traditional functions of command

and control on the part of the swarming force, as well

as the governing decision-making node. In addition,

the concept goes further into the areas of foreign

intelligence gathering. Avenues like the American

Open-Source Center or U.S. Cyber Command may

be potential mechanisms to monitor communication-

based social swarms. However, transmitting and

interpreting that intelligence for real-time battleﬁeld

commanders or police ofﬁcers is another problem all

together. An additional opportunity may rest with the

U.S. government’s role in cloak-and-dagger mis-

sions of organizations that specialize in insurgencies.

Communication-based social swarming provides

another aspect in ﬁghting, monitoring, and recogniz-

ing, as well as defeating insurgency.

Threats to communication-based social swarm-

ing include the vertical communication structure

found throughout bureaucracies. Any response

agency would ultimately need a network-organized

structure capable of handling vast amounts of data

and directing it downward directly to company-level

or police-precinct leaders. Waiting weeks, days, or

even minutes is far too long for national response

agencies to maneuver within the decision space of

an online social swarm. Threats additionally might

come from dark-network elements attempting to

employ communication-based social swarming in

fragile or failing states, thus working with rebels to

ignite turmoil online instead of taking a target by

force—a cyber-social insurgency.

Future Threats

One potential future threat is with warfare itself.

A communication-based social swarm may have

both assisted and softened Georgian defenses during

the 2008 ﬁve-day war with Russia. During Rus-

sia’s “cyber-softening,” “cyber patriots” allegedly

attacked the Georgia infrastructure before kinetic

operations ever began.

It is widely rumored

that Russian-hired “hacktivists” enlisted e-cyber

soldiers (everyday citizens) from popular social

networks to conduct cyber attacks against the

Georgian government’s online infrastructure.

Imagine if, weeks before the cyber offensive,

efforts of social swarm recruitment may poten-

tially have affected the outcome of that conﬂict.

Communication-based social swarming is in no

way a panacea. It does offer methods for starting,

stopping, and coordinating online insurgencies,

while also creating governmental confusion in

a moderately connected society. Its methods are

furthered when repression and corruption are

rampant, when a narrative is easy to come by, and

when diplomatic access by other world powers is

not easily attainable, as was the case in 2009 Iran.

In situations like the Arab Spring in Libya, social

swarms employing online social media action

can assist with the revolution. In this case, it was

possibly because NATO military force limited

“barriers” from government forces.

Without this

military checkmate, pro-Qadafﬁ forces might have

fared much better.

With a nodeless organization, a fully integrated

and funded interagency effort within a joint task

force for global communication (operating under

a loosely deﬁned role with, but not subordinate

to, U.S. Cyber Command) would provide the best

possible way for America to identify, counter, or

adapt to an online social swarm. The process of

forming online groups capable of creating tension

to overwhelm decision makers or government

forces through a communication-based social

swarm is possible. Government decision makers

should take these swarms and their access to

democratized digital technologies into account in

future planning scenarios. MR

1. David Faggard, “Horizontal communication: Maneuvering a 21st Century Air

Force with Web 2.0,” Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, 2009.

2. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and The Future of Conﬂict,

Rand National Defense Institute (Santa Monica, CA, 2000), prepared for the Of

ﬁce

of the Secretary of Defense, 7.

3. Ibid.

4. Sean J.A. Edwards,

Swarming on the Battleﬁeld: Past, Present, and Future,

Rand National Defense Institute (Santa Monica, CA, 2000), prepared for the Ofﬁce

of the Secretary of Defense, 2.

5. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 22.

6. Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs, the Next social Revolution: Transforming

Cultures and Communities in the Age of Instant Access (Cambridge, MA: Basic

Books, 2002).

7. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 7. Mass, melee, and maneuver are forms of war-

fare, which historically build upon each other over time leading to the concept

of swarming.

8. David Schmidtchen, “Military Systems as Socio-Technical Networks,” in The

Rise of the Strategic Private, Technology, Control and Change in a Network-Enabled

Military

, The General Sir Brudenell White Series (Commonwealth of Australia:

National Library of Australia, 2006), 8.

NOTES

88 March-April 2013  MILITARY REVIEW

9. Arquilla and Ronefeldt, 23.

10. MSN.com News, “Mumbai attack plan used Google Earth, says US com-

mander,” 17 May 2012, online at <http://news.in.msn.com/international/mumbai-

attack-plan-used-google-earth-says-us-commander-1> (14 May 2012).

11. Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, “Democracy’s Fourth Wave?

Information Technologies and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring,” Working Paper

Series for the Social Science Research Network, 27 March 2012, online at <http://

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029711> (14 April 2012).

12. Mia Stockmans, “MAO-Model of Audience Development: Some Theoretical

Elaborations and Practical Consequences,” Tillburg University, no publication date,

online at <http://neumann.hec.ca/aimac2005/PDF_Text/Stockmans_Mia.pdf> (1

May 2012).

13. Ibid., 2.

14. Joss Hands, “@ is for Activism: Dissent, Resistance and Rebellion in a Digital

Culture” (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), 7.

15. Stockmans, “MAO-Model of Audience Development,” 4.

16. Stephen W. Littlejohn, Theories of Human Communication 5th edition (New

York: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996).

17. Joann Keyton,

Communication Research: Asking Questions, Finding Answers”

(New York: McGraw Hill Publishing Company, 2001).

18. John Rendon, Brieﬁng to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 September 2011.

19. Gallup. “Congress Ranks Last in Conﬁdence in Institutions,” Gallup Website,

22 July 2010, online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/141512/congress-ranks-last-

con

ﬁdence-institutions.aspx> (14 September 2011).

20. David Singh Grewal, “Globalization and Network Power,” Network-Power:

The Social Dynamics of Globalization (London: Yale University Press, 2008), 4 and 9.

21. Arquilla Ronfeldt, 69. “Pulse” is used throughout the Rand study and this author

believes the nature of constant online messaging for or against an issue that confuses

or degrades a decision making node is similar to a “pulse” attack.

22. Philip Kotler and Gary Armstrong, “Principles of Marketing” (14th Edition)

(Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011).

23. Chuck Brymer, president and CEO, DDB Worldwide, “swarm marketing,”

no publication date, online at <http://www.ddb.com/pdf/yellowpapers/DDB_YP_

swarm_210408.pdf> (15 April 2012).

24. Stockmans, “MAO-Model of Audience Development,” 5.

25. Thomas L. Friedman, “Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World after

September 11,” online at <http://www.thomaslfriedman.com/bookshelf/longitudes-

and-attitudes/prologue> (1 May 2012).

26. Ibid.

27. Friedman, “Longitudes and Attitudes,” 2002.

28. Rheingold, “Smart Mobs,” 2002, xv.

29. Doug Gross, “Tweeting Osama’s Death: The Accidental Citizen Journalist,”

CNN, online at <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-10/tech/tech_social-media_twitter-

osama-death_1_sohaib-athar-abbottabad-citizen-doctor?_s=PM:TECH>, March

2012 (2 April 2012).

30. Sohaib Athar Twitter Proﬁle, online at <http://twitter.com/#!/reallyvirtual> (2

May 2012).

31. Charles Cooper, Twitter’s bin Laden “coming of age moment”—really?” ABC

News, 2 May 2011, online at <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-20058851-

501465.html> (3 May 2012).

32. Keith Urbahn, “Osama-bin-laden-tweet-death,” Google Image of Urbahn,’s

Tweet, 2011, online at <http://utopianist.com/2011/05/osama-bin-laden-killed-the-

global-online-community-reacts/osama-bin-laden-tweet-death/> (4 May 2012).

33. Gilad Lotan, “Breaking Bin Laden: A Closer Look,” Social Flow, 13 May 2011,

online at <http://blog.socialﬂow.com/post/5454638896/breaking-bin-laden-a-closer-

look> (3 May 2012).

34. Grewal, Network-Power, 4.

35. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 58.

36. Ibid, 83.

37. Hussain and Howard, “Democracy’s Fourth Wave?” 27 March 2012.

38. Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, (2009) “Twitter Free Iran: An Evaluation of Twit-

ter’s Role in Public Diplomacy and Information Operations in Iran’s 2009 Election

Crisis,” in

Communications Policy & Research Forum 2009, 19th-20th November

2009, University of Technology, Sydney, 299.

39. Ibid., Twitter Free Iran, 303.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 304.

43. Ibid., 305.

44. Peter Spiegel and Yochi Dreazen, “U.S. Air Force Reopens Haitian Airport,”

Wall Street Journal, Americas News Section, 15 January 2010, online at: <http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703657604575004913901168380.html>

(4 May 2012).

45. Tyler Foster, “Dispatch from an Airman in Haiti—Team Efforts,” Air Force Blog,

2010, online at <http://airforcelive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2010/01/dispatch-from-an-

airman-in-haiti-team-efforts/> (12 April 2012).

46. MSNBC Newscast, “Ann Curry’s Haiti tweet ranked most powerful of 2010,” 14

December 2010, online at <http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/40645273/ns/today-today_

celebrates_2010/t/ann-currys-haiti-tweet-ranked-most-powerful/> (22 April 2012).

47. Eliza Villarino, “The Power of a Tweet: Doctors without Borders,” Devex,

12 October 2011, online at <http://www.devex.com/en/news/76230/print> (4 April

2012).

48. Ann Curry, television correspondent, NBC, interviewed by author, 20 April 2010.

49. Sudarsan Raghavan, “A lost generation of young people of Tunisia discuss

grievances that led to their revolution,”

Washington Post, World Section, 20 January 2011,

online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-lost-generation-of-young-people-

of-tunisia-discuss-grievances-that-led-to-their-revolution/2011/01/20/ABfCqOR_story.

html> (19 April 2012).

50. Ayman Mohyeldin, “Tunisia: Time of Change, Suicide that Sparked a Revo-

lution,” Al-Jazeera English, 19 January 2011, online at <http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=47d6fyaOjRM> (3 May 2012).

51. Ibid.

52. Asad Hashim, “Pakistan: A revolution against whom?” Al-Jazeera, 24 March 2011,

online at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/03/2011322132948393481.

html> (27 April 2012).

53. Barack Obama, “Text of Obama’s Speech to West Point 2010 Cadets,” CBSnews.

com, 22 May 2010, online at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/22/national/

main6509577.shtml> (4 May 2012).

54. Pew, “Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes,” Pew Global Attitudes

Project, 21 June 2011, online at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/21/u-s-image-in-

pakistan-falls-no-further-following-bin-laden-killing> (4 May 2012).

55. Pew, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power,”

Pew Global Attitudes Project, 7

September 2011, online at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-

declining-power/> (4 May 2012).

56. Littlejohn, “Theories of Human communication,” 1996.

57. Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,”

Rand National Security Research Division, no date given of publication; however,

language in the report indicates it is post-9/11, online at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/

reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf> (4 May 2012).

58. Pew, “Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes.”

59. Steven Kull, “Why Muslims are still mad at

America,” World Public Opinion.org,

6 September 2011, online at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmid-

dleeastnafricara/691.php> (4 May 2012).

60. Gerweher, “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment.”

61. Pew, “Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes,” 3.

62. Farhana Qazi, “Why is there no revolt in Pakistan?” Reuters, The Great Debate

Web page, 11 May 2011, online at <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2011/05/11/

why-is-there-no-revolt-in-pakistan> (4 May 2012).

63. CNN, “Al Qaeda leader calls for revolt like Arab Spring in Pakistan,” CNN

U.S. Webpage, 16 March 2012, online at <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-16/asia/

world_asia_pakistan-al-qaeda-video_1_al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahiri-united-states-and-

pakistan?_s=PM:ASIA> (2 May 2012).

64. Daily Times Website, “US should apologise for Salala cross-border attack:

Pakistan,” 21 May 2012, online at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2

012%5C05%5C21%5Cstory_21-5-2012_pg1_3> (21 May 2012).

65. Richard Leiby and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. drone strikes resume in Pakistan;

action may complicate vital negotiations,” Washington Post, World Section, 29 April

(no year given), online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_paci

ﬁc/us-

drone-strikes-resume-in-pakistan-action-may-complicate-vital-negotiations/2012/04/29/

gIQAIprqpT_story.htm> (20 May 2012).

66. Pew, “Support for Campaign against Extremists wane.”

67. Donald Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld’s war on terror memo,”

USA Today, World and

Politics Section, 20 May 2005, online at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/

executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm> (2 May 2012).

68. Pakistan Telecommunications’ Agency of

ﬁcial data, no publication date given,

online at <http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=269&

Itemid=658> (18 April 2012).

69. Pakistan cracks down on ‘terrorism tool’ mobile sim cards, 3 Dec 2012, online

at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9718441/Pakistan-cracks-

down-on-terrorism-tool-mobile-sim-cards.html> (10 Dec 2012).

70. Pew, “Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes.”

71. Ibid.

72. Brian Glyn Williams, Matthew Fricker, and Avery Plaw, “New Light on the

Accuracy of the CIA’s Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan,”

Terrorism Monitor, vol.

8, 11 November 2010, online at <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165%20> (3 May 2012).

73. Ibid.

74. PakistanSurvey.org, The New America Foundation, no publication date,

online at <http://pakistansurvey.org/question/drone-targets> (22 May 2012). Addi-

tional data concerning the alleged drone strikes is viewable in an online Google

Map mash-up from open source reporting at <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.

net/drones>.

75. Christina DesMarais, “Facebook vs. Google: Who Will Win?” PCWorld, 19

May 2012, online at <http://www.pcworld.com/article/255866/facebook_vs_google_

who_will_win.html> (20 May 2012).

76. David Meerman Scott, “Why the 4 Ps of marketing do not work on the Web,”

Webinknow.com, 20 July 2011, online at <http://www.webinknow.com/2011/07/why-

the-4-ps-of-marketing-do-not-work-on-the-web.html> (7 May 2012).

77. Reporters without Borders info-graphic, “The Internet’s Black Holes,” no

publication date, online at <http://emu.edu/now/peacebuilder/

ﬁles/2011/04/internet-

black-holes-rsf.jpg> (11 April 2012).

78. Burns and Eltham, Twitter Free Iran, 304.

79. Paul Rosenzweig, “From Worms to Cyber War,” The Deﬁning Ideas Website,

A Hoover Institutional Journal, 9 December 2011, online at <http://www.hoover.org/

publications/deﬁning-ideas/article/102401> (18 May 2012).

80. Jeanne Meserve, “Study warns of cyber warfare during military con

ﬂicts,”

CNN, 17 August 2009, online at <http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-17/us/cyber.

warfare_1_russian-georgian-attacks?_s=PM:US> (18 May 2012).

81. Megan O’Neill, “How YouTube is Aiding the Libyan Revolution,”

Social

Times

, 26 February 2011, online at <http://socialtimes.com/youtube-libyan-

revolution_b39678> (20 May 2012).