5
Applying all this to the case at hand, Lord Hamblen identified a number of policies supporting denial
of the claim (ie that the defence of illegality should apply). These included avoiding inconsistency in
the legal system (ie while recognising diminished responsibility, criminal law treated the defendant
as guilty of, and hence responsible for, the death), the close connection between the crime and the
claim, and the general deterrence of crimes. The polices going the other way – such as upholding
duties of care and providing compensation to the victims of torts – were plainly outweighed by the
former policies. As the policies favoured allowing the defence, one needed to move on to the third
stage, and here the denial of the claim would not be disproportionate taking into account, for
example, the centrality of the conduct to the claim and the criminal guilt of the defendant in that
she knew what she was doing and that it was legally and morally wrong. Applying the approach in
Patel v Mirza, therefore, that the defence of illegality should succeed.
Furthermore, this policy-based analysis was consistent with the decision and most of the reasoning
of the House of Lords in Gray, albeit that there had there been no consideration of proportionality
by their Lordships. This meant that Gray was ‘Patel-compliant’ and should be followed in this case.
It should be realised that the facts of Henderson and Gray may be considered somewhat exceptional.
In Patel v Mirza the tenor of the majority judgments was that, at least in restitution of unjust
enrichment cases - because one is seeking to restore the pre-illegality position rather than to
enforce a contractual obligation upholding an illegal position - there is a very strong argument for
applying normal civil law rules unaffected by illegality and leaving the criminal law to deal with the
criminality involved. The same may be said of claims in tort and this derives support from Stoffel. But
Henderson and Gray show that there are limits to that approach.
Taken together, Stoffel and Henderson in the Supreme Court have served to clarify and indeed
simplify the application of the trio of considerations laid down in Patel v Mirza. With the overall aim
of avoiding inconsistency, one must identify and weigh the relevant policies for and against the
illegality defence and then, if the former outweigh the latter (ie the policies favour allowing the
defence), one must go on to consider whether allowing the defence would be a disproportionate
response.
Having said all that, in the light of these two cases, I do have some lingering concerns as to whether
the attempt made in Patel v Mirza to structure the analysis through a trio of considerations is to be
preferred to an approach which would have allowed the courts, more freely, to consider and
articulate a range of factors in arriving at their decision. There is some danger of the courts being
unnecessarily strait-jacketed into a mechanical approach when it may have been preferable to have
permitted the courts to consider all relevant factors and to articulate those considered important in
applying or rejecting the illegality defence in the particular case. Not least because of the
requirement, as far as possible, to respect precedent, I doubt whether courts needed the structure
provided by the trio of considerations in order to marshal the relevant factors. This links to the
further point that, rather than viewing the overall aim as being to avoid inconsistency in the legal
system, one might regard that policy as merely one of the relevant policies in play which will more
obviously have a central role to play in some cases than in others. Similarly, proportionality might
have been best treated as one relevant factor to be considered because, again, it may have greater
resonance in some cases than others.
It is important to add that the new policy-based approach should ensure that, in contrast to the old
unsatisfactory rules, new rules on the illegality defence can in time be formulated that are fit for
purpose and reflect sound underlying policies. Those new rules need to be sufficiently flexible to