ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Genicot, D. Ray / Journal of Economic Theory
(
)
– 19
Now imagine that a single agent refuses an offer (and only one offer is made) at (m, z).
This induces a fresh minigame (m − 1, z
) = (m − 1,
(z)), where it is understood that
z
= (z) now refers to the vector (z
2
,...,z
m
). We then say that (m, z) negatively induces
(m − 1,
(z)).
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of agents in any minigame. We shall sup-
pose that the properties listed below hold for all stages of the form (m, z), where 2
m M
and z is some arbitrary vector of reservation payoffs (but a substring of r as discussed). We
shall then establish these properties for all stages of the form (M + 1, z).
Induction hypothesis. [A] For all stages (m, z) with 1
m M, there is a unique equilib-
rium. Either no acceptable offers are made, or all agents accept offers in the equilibrium,
and the principal makes non-negative profits.
Before proceeding further, some definitions. Let P (m, z) denote the principal’s profit at
any such minigame (m, z).Form
2 but no bigger than M + 1, say that a minigame (m, z)
is pivotal if it negatively induces the minigame (m − 1, z
), and the principal makes no
acceptable offers in that minigame. Otherwise (m, z) is not pivotal. (Note that a definition
of pivotality is included for stages of the form (M + 1, z).)
We now continue with the description of the induction hypothesis.
[B] If for 2
m M, (m, z) is a pivotal minigame, then look at the minimal k m
such that (k, z) is pivotal.
13
Then either the principal makes no acceptable offers at that
minigame, or—if the principal’s payoffunder the description that follows is non-negative—
the principal makes simultaneous offers to m − k + 1 agents, and begins the play of the
minigame (k − 1, z) at the same time. The simultaneous offers to the m − k + 1 agents—
call them agents k,...,m—satisfy the property that agent j (in this group) receives the
offer z
j
.
[C] If for 2
m M, (m, z) is not a pivotal minigame, the principal makes a single offer
to each agent, one period at a time, which are all accepted. Each agent’s payoff lies in the
range [z
1
,z
1
+ ], where was chosen at the start of this proof (see (6) and (7)).
The following lemmas will be needed.
Lemma 1. Suppose that 2
m M, and that [A] of the induction hypothesis holds. (1) If
the principal makes no acceptable offers during the minigame (m, z), then at its negatively
induced minigame (m − 1,
(z)), the principal makes no acceptable offers as well. (2) If
the principal makes equilibrium offers at the minigame (m, z), then at its positively induced
minigame (m − 1, z), he does so as well.
Proof. (1) Suppose not, so that the principal makes acceptable equilibrium offers at the
minigame (m,
(z)). Consider the strategy followed by the principal at this minigame, and
follow exactly this strategy for the minigame (m, z), ignoring one of the agents completely.
It must be the case that all m − 1 agents behave exactly as they did in the minigame
(m−1,
(z)). By [A] and our convention that offersare made when profits are non-negative,
all agents are thereby contracted. Finally, offer the ignored agent z
1
; he will accept. The
13
Recall that z is now to be interpreted as the old vector of reservation payoffs up to the first k terms.