British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India

This book provides a challenging analysis of British foreign policy at a time

when Britain possessed the biggest empire that humankind has ever known. In

this empire India had a unique position, comprising 97 per cent of Britain’s

Asiatic empire. All British statesmen deemed it essential to maintain their hold

over India whatever the costs, risks and enigmas of doing so.

Historians writing on British foreign policy have tended to focus on relations

with European countries and the Ottoman Empire, without imparting much

sense of what it meant for Britain to be the centre of a global empire. In

contrast, by highlighting the links between Britain’s foreign policy and Imperial

experience, this work focuses on aspects which have hitherto remained

marginalised. It also contributes to debates surrounding the origins of the First

World War, the forces behind expansion of empire, and the nature of imperial

connections.

Students and historians studying British foreign policy, Anglo-Indian relations,

international relations, diplomatic and imperial history, strategic history and

relations between Britain and India will find this a valuable and thought-

provoking work.

Sneh Mahajan is a Reader at Indraprastha College, University of Delhi and

has been Academic Visitor to the London School of Economics and Political

Science. Her publications include Imperialist Strategy and Moderate Politics (1983), a

Hindi translation of James Joll’s Europe Since 1870 (1991) and many articles and

book reviews in academic journals.

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Sneh Mahajan

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Aaron Gilette

Routledge Studies in Modern European History

British Foreign Policy

1874–1914

The role of India

Sneh Mahajan

London and New York

First published 2002

by Routledge

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge

29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,

mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter

invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any

information storage or retrieval system, without permission in

writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Mahajan, Sneh.

British foreign policy 1874–1914: the role of India/Sneh Mahajan.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Great Britain–Foreign relations–India. 2. Great Britain–Foreign

relations–1837–1901. 3. Great Britain–Foreign relations–1901–1936.

4. India–History–British occupation, 1765–1947. 5. India–Foreign

relations–Great Britain. 6. India–Foreign relations–1857–1919. I. Title.

DA47.9.I4 M34 2001

327.41054–dc21 2001048180

ISBN 0–415–26010–8

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

ISBN 0-203-16732-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-26216-6 (Adobe eReader Format)

(Print Edition)

Preface vii

Acknowledgements

xiii

1 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 1

2 Flaunting the Indian Empire, 1874–80 33

3 In the garb of moral imperatives, 1880–5 58

4 Courting the Triple Alliance, 1885–92 80

5 Facing the Franco-Russian combine, 1892–8 101

6 Seeking partnerships, 1898–1902 124

7 Russia: a friend at last, 1902–7 145

8 Nurturing the entente, 1907–14 168

9 Conclusion 197

Appendix 205

Notes 207

Bibliography 240

Index 257

Contents

During ‘the age of high imperialism’, about one-quarter of the global land

surface was distributed or redistributed as colonies amongst half a dozen states.

In such an age, for a great colonial power like Britain national security did not

imply just the need to take protective measures to ensure the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Great Britain. It implied preservation of its great power

status. The framers of British foreign policy linked Britain’s continued standing

as a great power inextricably with the retention and expansion of its worldwide

empire. Nowhere did this symbiosis of world power and empire seem more

apparent to them than in the Indian Empire.

India remained the centrepiece of

their Empire. By the early 1870s, the colonies of white settlement – Canada,

Australia, New Zealand and the Cape Colony – had been granted responsible

government. In 1880, of Britain’s global empire still ruled from London, the

Indian Empire, covered 85 per cent in terms of territory. Of Britain’s Asiatic

Empire, it covered about 97 per cent of the total area. In terms of population,

even in 1912, i.e., even after all the acquisitions of the age of imperialism, of

every 100 persons in Britain and its empire (dependent and self-governing

together) 10 lived in the United Kingdom, 5 lived in the self-governing domin-

ions, 12 in all other colonies put together and 73 in the Indian Empire alone.

Given the size and the resources of the Indian Empire, the issues relating to this

empire could not be peripheral to anything. This empire was jealously guarded.

The politico-military exercises carried out by the British government always

included issues that might threaten the security of the Raj. There has been an

outgoing debate amongst historians on the issue whether the Indian Empire was

an asset or a liability. The attitude of British rulers towards India was conde-

scending or patronising, when not contemptuous. But they had no doubt

whatever at any stage that control over India had to be maintained. In 1901, in a

memorandum on the ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and

Russia’, the Military Intelligence Division noted:

Speaking broadly as long as the Navy fulfils its mission, the British Empire is

impervious to the great land forces of continental nations except in one

point – India. Here alone can a fatal blow be dealt us. The loss of India by

conquest would be a death blow to our prosperity, prestige and power....

Preface

Next in importance, then, and second only to the security of the United

Kingdom itself, comes the question of the defence of India.

One comes across such statements in British archival records time and again.

On the continent, Britain’s permanent interest lay in the continuation of the

balance of power. During the period under consideration here, no single power

or combination of powers dominated the continent at any time. Britain was able

to maintain its naval supremacy also. Britain’s policy makers did not envisage

any threat to their ‘home’ country from any power. But they apprehended

danger to their Indian Empire from all their continental rivals at different times.

Many problems of British foreign policy arose out of the need to forestall or

counter this threat. International relations and antagonisms had to be manipu-

lated with an eye on their effect on the connection with India. India seemed

most vulnerable to pressure from Russia. In December 1901 Arthur Balfour

wrote to Lansdowne:

The weakest spot in the Empire is probably the Indian frontier…A quarrel

with Russia anywhere, about anything, means the invasion of India and, if

England were without allies, I doubt whether it would be possible for the

French to resist joining in the fray. Our position would then be perilous.

All British governments, irrespective of the political party that formed the

government at any given time, accepted that the Indian Empire had to be

defended. During 1874–1914, the statesmen responsible for taking foreign policy

decisions – Disraeli, Gladstone, Salisbury, Balfour and Grey – deemed it essen-

tial to maintain hold over India, whatever the risks, costs and enigmas of doing

so. Even during the Second World War the thought of relinquishing control

over India occurred only as a remote possibility. Visible or not, the questions of

defending the frontiers of the Indian Empire and the routes to India remained

powerful constituents of Britain’s worldview. To the extent that British statesmen

were conscious of the need to maintain the Empire, they were bound to work

for it.

However, in studies of British foreign policy, the issue of defending the Indian

Empire has received little more than formal acknowledgement. Some historians

have drawn attention to the neglect of the imperial factor in writing British

history. In the editorial to the 1993 issue of History Workshop, the editors

complained that it still seems possible for British historians to produce the social,

cultural and political histories of Britain of the last 300 years which more or less

ignore the fact that during this period Britain governed the most extensive

empire the world has ever seen. Whether these editors excluded historians of

British diplomacy from this stricture is not very clear. The noted historian P.J.

Marshall has absolved them and has said that diplomatic historians have long

abandoned the tendency to write almost exclusively Europe-centred histories.

But books published on questions on the how and why of British foreign policy

tend to pass over the role that issues arising out of the possession of India and

viii Preface

the defence of routes to India played in conditioning foreign policy decisions. In

hisThe Realities Behind Diplomacy, Paul Kennedy, who has produced several magis-

terial studies of international history, discusses the conditions under which the

British government would lead the nation to war and says that ‘the British would

certainly fight for India against Russian assault’.

But, in the text, the Indian

question at best peers through at certain places. This is as much true of the

surveys by Kenneth Bourne and M.E. Chamberlain, as of the more specialised

study by Zara Steiner.

This is true of many of the detailed studies as well. Richard Millman’s study

of the Eastern Question has been written after painstaking research into an

enormous range of primary sources. But like Seton-Watson’s classic Disraeli,

Gladstone and the Eastern Question published two generations earlier, it discusses the

Eastern Question as a series of anti-Russian manoeuvres and as an issue of

European balance of power.

Britain’s concern for the route to India is thrown in

only as an added dimension. The fact that Britain was taking interest in the

region primarily to protect the route to India is at best assumed.

The failure to

discuss the Eastern Question in the geopolitical context detracts from its useful-

ness. Same is the case of G. Martel’s study of Rosebery’s foreign policy. He

claims that he has used ‘every letter, report and memoranda that passed between

London and major capitals of Europe during this period’.

One running theme

in his book is that Rosebery wanted ‘to be with the Triple Alliance and not of it’.

He gives two reasons – one, that Rosebury regarded the Triple Alliance as

Britain’s best guarantee of security outside Europe and another that France and

Russia were viewed as antagonistic powers. But he does not ask further questions

like: What sort of security did Britain want outside Europe? Why were France

and Russia viewed as antagonistic powers? One reason why Rosebery (in fact all

British governments) tried to maintain friendly relations with the Central Powers

was that hostility of these powers to Russia forced Russia to keep part of its

armed forces on the European frontier and thus this relieved Russia’s pressure on

the northwest frontier of the Indian Empire. Similarly, France and Russia were

viewed as antagonistic powers not because they could pose any threat to the

British Isles but primarily because each of them separately seemed to have the

will and the capacity to threaten the Indian Empire – Russia on the northwest

and France in the east. After the Franco-Russian Alliance was formed, France

could delay the transport of troops to India via the Suez by using its navy in the

Mediterranean. Any discussion of Britain’s foreign policy in a purely European

context, thus, presents only a distorted view of international relations.

Some historians have taken note of the Indian factor, but their works relate

primarily to the Anglo-Russian setting in Asia.

The historian who has really

situated Britain’s foreign policy in a worldwide context and has taken cognizance

of the strains imposed on it by the possession of India is Keith Wilson.

His

conclusions that the British were much less interested in Europe than in the

empire, that they regarded themselves as being less threatened by Germany than

by Russia, and that for the British government the achievement of friendly rela-

tions with Russia was an end in itself hang on this issue. I wish to acknowledge

Preface ix

my indebtedness to his work. However, his work is largely confined to the decade

preceding the First World War.

In effect, even contemporary records – notes, letters, minutes, despatches and

speeches on foreign policy – do not really give an idea of the centrality of the

Indian factor. What could be the reasons for shunning references to the Indian

Empire? This could be the result of several factors. In foreign policy national

interest is the key concept. There is a broad general consensus about what

constitutes national interests. But these are rarely spelled out. In Britain it was

never disputed that the maintenance of the Indian Empire was a national

interest. As R. Robinson and J. Gallagher put it, ‘To all British statesmen, India

and the British Isles were the twin centres of their wealth and strength in the

world as a whole.’

British statesmen and politicians perhaps merely assumed

that there was no need to state the obvious. In any case, they are particularly

known for restraint and understatement in spelling out their motives.

Secondly,

in international relations, relatively seldom is it possible to assert that a particular

pattern of thinking resulted in this decision or that action. Hence, in explaining

the conduct of those determining a country’s international relations the impor-

tance of perceptions, ingrained attitudes, images and assumptions – both spoken

and unspoken – is being increasingly recognised. The underlying consensus that

control over India was non-negotiable remained an unstated presupposition in

this context and this is reflected in research by historians.

Another reason for not according cognizance to the Indian factor as a tenet of

British foreign policy could be the benefactors’ commitment to the endeavours of

a superior kind. British statesmen, officials and the public took exceptional pride

in their ethical commitments. They earnestly believed that Britain’s control over

the far-flung regions of the world promoted justice, peace and prosperity. But

control over India did not fit into the world order that they professed to establish.

Since the time of Robert Clive and Warren Hastings in the second half of the

eighteenth century, the Indian Empire was seen as an empire acquired by pursuit

of self-interest, plunder and exercise of arbitrary power. The result was that they

deliberately tended to leave out the Indian connection. For example, John Stuart

Mill left India out of his autobiography though he served at the India Office at

London for thirty-five long years and even his father was in the service of the

East India Company for decades.

So, this omission could not have been a

result of any oversight on his part. He seems to have left India out because it did

not fit in the picture he wished to project of a great mind being formed by inter-

action with other great minds. Another tendency has been to treat India as an

exception to whatever was applicable to other colonies. The radical politician,

Richard Cobden, whose name is synonymous with laissez-faire doctrines and free

trade, actually advocated that the British government in India should make an

all-out effort to promote the cultivation and transportation of cotton in India so

as to assist Britain’s cotton industry.

For the same reason, Sir John Seeley, in his

extremely influential book, The Expansion of England, found it difficult to fit India

into his typology of an organic British Empire he wished to project. Ultimately

he presented his arguments in two parts – one on British expansion in other

x Preface

countries and one on British expansion in India.

Politicians, officials and

scribes, and following them historians, have used phrases like ‘national interest’,

‘vital interests’, ‘British interests’, ‘imperial interests’, ‘Mediterranean interests’,

‘British interests in Constantinople’, etc., in the context of British policy in the

Mediterranean, the Near East and in the context generally of the Anglo-Russian

setting in Asia. In fact, as we shall see, these were euphemisms for ‘in the interest

of defence of frontiers of India’ or for ‘in the interest of the security of the route

to India’. Thus historians writing on Britain’s foreign policy have not been able

to leave readers with much sense of what it meant for Britain to be the centre of

a global empire.

In this book, an attempt has been made to turn away from the Euro-centric

preoccupations of historians and to situate Britain’s relations with the other

European states in a global context. It has been argued that the commitment to

defend the Indian Empire and to safeguard the routes thereto powerfully influ-

enced the perceptions, and hence decisions, of all those responsible for

conducting Britain’s relations with the Great Powers of Europe, namely, Russia,

France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. This focus on the Indian Empire

will help in placing Britain’s foreign policy initiatives in Europe, in the Near East,

the Middle East, North Africa, South Africa and Central Asia in a much wider

context of Britain’s interests and obligations. The fact that far-reaching precau-

tions were taken for the protection of the Indian Empire implies that some

benefits must have accrued to Britain. The work thus adds a non-economic

dimension to the long-standing controversy on the costs/benefits of imperialism.

In suggesting that the empire was beneficial, this study also underlines that

Britain’s foreign policy was influenced by innenpolitik, that is domestic, political,

economic and financial considerations and constraints.

This study centres on London. The government of India was a subordinate

government – an arm of the British government. The epicentre of relations of

the government of India with neighbouring states was London, not Calcutta,

Delhi or Simla. The mere hierarchy of power ensured that, in all external

affairs, the views of the metropolitan authority prevailed.

The book follows a chronological outline. There was marked continuity in the

attitude of the British government in so far as the question of security of the

Indian Empire was concerned. Each chapter covers a span of five to seven years

and terminates at oft-used dividing points marked by either change in govern-

ment or a shift of focus in foreign policy perspective. In highlighting how the

possession of India affected the choices made at the metropole, this study does

not exclude other interpretations. It explores a dimension, a decisive one, which

has so far been subsumed in the Eurocentric preoccupations of historians in

their studies of Britain’s relations with other European states. It is confined to the

period 1874 to 1914 because the study of the entire period of British rule in

India would have become unwieldy. In any case, in world history, this period is

described as the period of ‘neo-imperialism’, ‘high imperialism’ or ‘classical

imperialism’ and, therefore, any study of interaction between the metropole and

periphery during this period has relevance of its own.

Preface xi

Writing this book has been a most stimulating and enjoyable experience. This

subject has literally brewed for twenty-five years although serious research and

writing, done mostly along with my teaching assignments, have taken eight years.

I am most obliged to the British Council for providing a fellowship which

enabled me, decades ago, to do a Master’s in International History from the

London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to the

governing body of my college for granting two years study leave during 1990–2

which I used to collect material for this monograph at Delhi, Calcutta and

London. I am indebted to the University Grants Commission for providing a

grant under ‘Source Material Access Visitorship’ and to the London School of

Economics for inviting me as ‘Academic Visitor’ during 1991–2 that enabled me

to work at various repositories in Britain. I also wish to thank the Indian Council

of Historical Research for providing ‘Research Project Grant’. Above all I wish

to express my gratitude to the staff members of various archives and libraries

where I worked: the Public Records Office, the British Library, the India Office

Library and the British Library of Political and Economic Science in London;

the National Library in Calcutta; and the National Archives of India, the Nehru

Memorial Library, Delhi University Library, the Indian Council of Historical

Research Library, Indraprastha College Library and Devahuti-Damodar Library

in Delhi.

My colleagues and friends helped me and encouraged me in various ways. It

is a great pleasure for me to record my thanks to Professors James Joll, M.S.

Anderson, Ian Nish, Bipan Chandra, Bimal Prasad, Parthasarathy Gupta,

Suhash Chakravarty, R.L. Shukla and Monica Juneja, Drs Frank and Rita

Sebastianpillai, Veena Arora, Veena Sachdev and Mr Hasham. I would like most

sincerely to thank successive generations of ‘International History’ post-graduate

students of Delhi University and History (Hons) final year students of

Indraprastha College on whom I inflicted my own interpretation of international

relations and the nature of British rule in India. Their questions and comments

have sharpened the text considerably. Finally, I wish to add that I owe more to

my husband, Rajinder P. Mahajan and my family than they will ever know.

Acknowledgements

In the 1870s Great Britain was the ‘top’ nation, possessing a flourishing indus-

trial economy, the strongest naval force, the finest merchant fleet and the biggest

empire the world has ever known. Even by 1914, among the Great Powers,

Britain alone possessed territories and interests in every part of the globe. There

were many emulators in maritime and colonial fields, but no rivals for pre-

eminence. Those responsible for conducting the foreign policy of such a state

were bound to work for ensuring the security of the homeland as well as for

maintaining its Great Power status. This conditioned their perceptions and

hence the conduct of relations with other European powers.

Factors influencing British foreign policy

Defence of the homeland

As in all states in all ages, British statesmen formulated their foreign policy with

the aim of ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the British Isles.

In the post-1870 scenario when each ‘Great Power’ of Europe faced the possi-

bility of direct attack from at least two powers, British statesmen had far less

anxiety on this score. So long as they could ensure the predominance of their

navy, their country’s geographical position as an island off the north-west coast

of Europe made their country immune to any threat of invasion. Their main

concern was that the lowland region near the North Sea, forming the lower

basin of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt rivers, corresponding to modern

Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg, should remain free from domination by

another major power. It was both an economic and a strategic question because

it involved the effective flow of goods in and out of Britain as well as fear of

invasion proper. Under a treaty signed in 1839, five powers – Britain, France,

Russia, Austria and Prussia – had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. This

implied that if any of the guarantor states infringed that neutrality, each of the

others could claim a right (and in certain circumstances would have a duty) to

resist the infringement.

In 1870, at the time of the Franco-Prussian War,

Belgium’s neutrality was re-affirmed when both France and Prussia respected it

and Britain reiterated that it accepted its responsibilities as a guarantor.

1 Constructing Britain’s

foreign policy

Between 1870 and 1906 the British strategists did not contemplate, even

remotely, the problem of sending an expeditionary force to the continent. All

studies made of the possible invasion of Britain concluded that at best a raid of

relatively small proportions was feasible, for which Britain’s regular army was

sufficient. When the question of the military needs of Britain in a war with

France and Russia was considered in 1889, it was accepted that in view of the

strength of its navy, the invasion of the United Kingdom in force was so much

beyond the bounds of reasonable probability as not to be worth seriously consid-

ering.

All political parties agreed on the need to maintain a good margin of

naval supremacy. It was only when Germany decided to construct its own dread-

noughts that British statesmen gave thought to the possibility of direct attack on

the British Isles.

Ensuring great power status

It was vitally important for Britain’s policy makers to maintain Britain’s standing

as a great power. It is generally said that Britain’s great power status was based

on three things: its industrial and commercial strength, its maritime supremacy

and its worldwide empire. It may, however, be pointed out that trade and the

navy by themselves did not confer greatness on Britain. These were enabling

factors, or mere instruments of power. They cannot be evaluated in any context

other than that of determining to what extent these fulfilled the objectives for

which these existed. It was Britain’s empire which was the most visible expression

of Britain’s standing in the affairs of the world.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain produced about two-thirds of the

world’s coal, about half of its iron, five-sevenths of its steel and two-fifths of the

entire world output of traded manufactured goods. Britain was incomparably

the largest exporter of capital, of invisible financial and commercial services and

of transport services.

All British statesmen recognised that Britain’s continued

prosperity depended on the smooth and satisfactory flow of goods into and out

of the country. The need to guard the trade routes became inextricably woven

with the question of national security.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain enjoyed maritime hegemony. In

the 1860s and 1870s the Royal Navy was concerned with the French, Russian

and Italian navies, and in terms of strength it compared very favourably to any

one, two, or even all three of these naval powers. This navy was an amalgam of

two forces designed for two divergent, though related, roles. During the mid-

Victorian period, one force consisted mostly of ironclads and was meant for

national defence and for intervention in European affairs. The other contained

many types of ships from gunboats to corvettes, and performed the task of a

maritime constabulary.

Britain possessed over a score of naval bases around the

globe including Admiral Fisher’s ‘five keys’ that locked the world: Dover,

Gibraltar, Alexandria, the Cape and Singapore.

Britain’s naval mastery was the

most visible and potent instrument of Britain’s power and prestige. It ensured

the safety of worldwide trade, which amounted to 40 per cent of world trade

2 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

and uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs to Britain. Prior to the First World War,

over 60 per cent of the calories consumed in Britain were imported.

There was

such concern about the effect of war on the food supply that in February 1903 a

group calling itself the Association to Promote an Official Enquiry into the

Security of our Food Supply in Time of War was formed.

In 1904 Sir John

Fisher wrote: ‘If the navy is not supreme, no army, however large, is of slightest

use. It is not invasion we have to fear if our navy is beaten. IT’S STARVA-

TION’.

British strategists remained concerned about the ability to send

reinforcements to India in the shortest possible time. In this context, the navy

had a vital role. It also controlled the worldwide cable network. One comes

across frequent references to the humanitarian role of the navy, for example, in

the suppression of piracy and slave trade. But, as A.J. Marder says, this aspect

was commonly introduced to buttress Britain’s claims to naval supremacy.

The navy also acted as a very important instrument of foreign policy. In this

context, historians tend to refer mostly to ‘gunboat diplomacy’, that is, occa-

sional punitive expeditions. They also say that in the nineteenth century, after the

Crimean War, the navy did not fire a shot in anger against any great power. But

such arguments tend to obscure the Royal Navy’s pivotal role as a tool for foreign

policy. In early 1878, the British fleet was stationed off Constantinople. The fact

that it did not fire a shot cannot undercut the threat posed to Russia by its pres-

ence there. In 1881, the Liberal government under Gladstone was a party to the

naval demonstration that forced the Ottoman Empire to make concessions to

Montenegro and Greece. All British governments, irrespective of the party in

power, all strategists and businessmen and the people accepted that command of

the seas was essential to their commerce, to their empire, in fact to their very

survival. One task of the nation’s leadership was to achieve this. In 1894,

Gladstone resigned over his Cabinet’s decision to support the Admiralty’s

demand for more ships, but even he did not deny that Britain’s maritime

supremacy was a vital interest.

In the decade before the First World War, the

German decision to build a navy roused alarms and turned animosity between

Britain and Germany into open rivalry.

In 1870, Britain possessed the biggest empire. In the age of imperialism that is

under study here, the colonial criterion was added to economic, demographic

and military indices. It was expected that the ascendant powers would demon-

strate their might by expansion beyond their frontiers. This idea was obvious

everywhere; in the press, in scholarly debates and in the self-esteem of policy

makers. Between 1876 and 1915, about one-quarter of the globe’s surface was

claimed as colonies by a handful of states, mainly Britain, France, Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, the USA and Japan. Britain’s share was the

biggest; it increased its territories by four million square miles. France acquired

some 3.5 million square miles and Germany more than a million, while Italy

acquired just under one million.

Russia’s expansion was mostly into adjoining

territories and is difficult to measure. By the end of the nineteenth century

Britain’s empire extended over one-fifth of the world’s land surface. Britain had

interests in much of the remaining global surface. In the days when the pervasion

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 3

of Darwinist ideas and imperial expansion were reinforcing a hierarchical view

of the world, the possession of empire conferred on Britain a unique position in

the eyes of its own citizens. It is doubtful whether the idea of ‘burden’ or

‘mission’ ever meant much to the masses. But for them there certainly was

magnetism and music in the phrase ‘the empire of the world’.

Those who conducted Britain’s foreign policy showed a strong consciousness

that Britain’s Great Power identity required the retention of this empire. Those

outside the government commented on the popular excitement generated by

possession of the empire. Writing in The Nineteenth Century in the summer of

1877, Edward Dicey, an eminent journalist, said: ‘Preservation of our dominion

in the East is of paramount importance to us, only less important indeed, than

the preservation of our national independence’. He added that this opinion was

shared by a large majority of Englishmen.

A well-conducted Empire became a

matter of pride not just for the Liberals but for the Radicals as well. The latter

criticised only less savoury characteristics of imperialism like ‘jingoism’. Their

criticism rarely rose higher than mere polemic, and they fought shy of offering

any alternatives.

Even the Labour Party inherited this pride in the empire. Its

statement on colonial policy made as late as 1943 did not envisage dismantling

the empire. It pronounced that ‘for a considerable time to come’ most colonial

peoples ‘will not be ready for self-government’.

Importance of India

In Britain’s empire, as Table 1.1 shows, the Indian Empire had an overwhelming

presence. In 1880, it accounted for about 85 per cent of the entire global empire

of Britain which was ruled from London.

This dependent empire covered

2,246,000 square miles. Of this, the Indian Empire (British India and the

princely states together) extended over 1,904,900 square miles while the total

area of all other dependent colonies put together was only 341,100 square

miles.

In terms of population, in 1872, of all men, women and children living

in Britain and its empire, including persons living in Dominions with responsible

government, over 78 per cent lived in the Indian Empire. Even in 1912, that is to

say, after all the acquisitions of ‘the age of neo-imperialism’, in this empire 10.2

per cent lived in the United Kingdom, 5.4 per cent lived in the Dominions with

responsible government, 11.7 per cent lived in the dependent empire excluding

India, while 72.6 per cent lived in the Indian Empire alone.

In Asia, outside the Indian Empire, Britain possessed only Ceylon, the Straits

Settlements, Hongkong and Aden.

In official documents one often comes

across expressions like ‘the Eastern Empire’, ‘the Asiatic Empire’, ‘our Indian

Empire and other dependencies’, ‘our possessions in the Orient’, and so on.

Such expressions do not convey the fact that in 1881 the Indian Empire covered

some 97 per cent of Britain’s Asiatic Empire. While the Indian Empire covered

1,905,000 square miles, the rest of the empire in Asia covered only about 51,400

square miles. The phrases and expressions referred to above amounted to mere

euphemisms for the Indian Empire.

4 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

India also furnished the base from which Britain established political and

commercial relations with the countries in the Far East, South-East Asia, West

Asia and East Africa. It would not be out of place to mention that China remained

a region of marginal importance in Britain’s overall trade and strategy. Around

1900, though above 80 per cent of China’s trade was controlled by Britons,

only

about 3 per cent of British exports went to China; and by 1914 only about 4 per

cent of the total British capital invested abroad went to China.

China was not

even situated on the route to any destination of importance to Britain. On China’s

western frontier too, it was accepted that friendly relations with the government of

China were not likely to be of help in checking the expansion of Russia towards

the provinces on China’s western frontier because Peking did not exercise direct

control over the frontier provinces of Kashgar and Yarkand.

Britain wanted that it be left in unmolested enjoyment of its vast and splendid

possessions, of which India was the omphalos. Ever since the English East India

Company acquired control over parts of the Indian subcontinent, it had acted

with alacrity to even the remotest threat to its possessions. Even the European

Powers knew this. In 1798, during the French Revolutionary wars, the French

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 5

Table 1.1

Dependent colonies of British Empire in 1880 (thousands of square miles)

1 Europe

a Gibraltar

0.0

b Malta

0.1

c Ionian Islands

0.7

d Cyprus

3.6

2 Asia

a The Indian Empire (including Princely

States)

1904.9

b Ceylon

25.3

c Straits Settlements and Federated Malay

States

15.3

d Hongkong

0.4

e Aden

10.4

3 Africa

a Mauritius

0.8

b Seychelles

0.2

c Asscencion and St Helena

0.1

d Gambia

4.0

e Sierra Leone

30.0

f Gold Coast

91.7

g Lagos

28.6

h Basutoland

11.7

4 Caribbean and South America

110.8

5 The Pacific (Fiji)

7.4

Total 2246.0

Notes

The table excludes self-governing dominions in Canada, Australia and South Africa. The last of these

was given responsible government in 1872.

The table has been compiled from Davis and Huttenback (1986: 27–8).

government sent Napoleon to Egypt. Whether the purpose was to disturb

Britain’s communications with India or to carve out an empire in India, or

whether it was a move in the French strategy of defeating Britain, the point is

that even at this early date, India was considered valuable. The British, too, who

at that time had control only over the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and

a few conclaves in the rest of India, sent Admiral Horatio Nelson to Egypt, the

latter going on to win the famous battle of the Nile. In July 1807, when

Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I signed the Treaty of Tilsit, they held a series of

discussions about a joint invasion of India. The British government then

launched a diplomatic offensive. It sent missions to Sind, Punjab, Muscat,

Afghanistan and Persia.

To strengthen the outlying defences of India, the

islands of Réunion and Mauritius were captured from the French and those of

the Moluccas and Java were taken from the Dutch, who were allies of the

French. Subsequently, whenever control over India was even remotely menaced,

the British saw no choice but to strain every nerve and muscle to defend it. At

the time of the Great Revolt of 1857–8, the official and popular concern was

proof that the loss of the Indian Empire was seen as a national catastrophe,

which had to be prevented whatever the cost. In the age of new imperialism

after the 1870s, when the acquisition of colonies itself became a status symbol

irrespective of their value, it became imperative to ensure control over India. By

1902, in official circles, it became a doctrine of astonishing persistence that in

fighting for India, Britain would be fighting for its imperial existence.

The

determination to hold and manage this empire decisively influenced Britain’s

relations with the continental powers. James Joll aptly comments: ‘It was impe-

rial questions and especially those arising out of the possession of India and of

the need to control the route to the East which conditioned British Foreign

Policy’.

Britain and the European powers

The map of Europe had been redrawn as a result of three wars fought between

1864 and 1870. Britain remained on the sideline during this period. In 1864,

Palmerston’s government did proclaim Britain’s intent to uphold the territorial

security of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. But Prussia and Austria did

not pay attention to Palmerston’s threatening words. Ultimately, Britain stood

aside meekly as Austria and Prussia did as they pleased. During the Austro-

Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, Britain was virtually ignored by Europe. The

Franco-Prussian War ended with the total defeat of France and the surrender of

Paris to Prussian forces at the end of January 1871, and France was forced to

surrender the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the newly established

German Empire. Gladstone’s Liberal government did deplore the bloodshed, the

despoliation of France and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany,

but Britain’s interests were not directly involved and Gladstone’s government

never contemplated intervention. This war changed the balance of power deci-

sively in Europe, but this was not evident to most British contemporaries.

6 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Accustomed to centuries of French supremacy on the continent, they in fact

hailed Prussia’s victory as helping to create a balance of power.

The exclusion of Britain from European developments did cause unease in

certain quarters, but this feeling was not widespread. With a far-flung empire, a

flourishing economy and the greatest naval force in the world, Britons had other

concerns. The general mood was well captured by Disraeli, who told his electors

at the time of the Austro-Prussian War:

The abstention of England from any unnecessary interference in the affairs

of Europe is the consequence, not of her decline of power, but of her

increased strength. England is no longer a mere European Power; she is the

metropolis of a great maritime empire, extending to the boundaries of the

farthest oceans. It is not that England has taken refuge in a state of

apathy…She interferes in Asia, because she is really more an Asiatic power

than a European. She interferes in Australia, in Africa, and New Zealand,

where she carries on war often on a great scale.

At the same time, being a European power, geographically, culturally and in its

primary political and economic interests, Britain could not be indifferent to the

happenings on the continent. In the speech referred to above, Disraeli high-

lighted this aspect when he said that there would be ‘occasions in which it may

be the duty of England to interfere in European Wars’.

In discussing Britain’s relations with other countries, historians tend to argue

that Britain adhered to certain well-established principles and traditions.

Particular emphasis is laid on three of these: first, that Britain was a satiated

country which wanted to preserve peace and the status quo; second, that the aim

of British policy was to maintain balance of power on the continent; and third,

that during the closing decades of the nineteenth century Britain followed a

policy of ‘splendid isolation’. These factors were mentioned contemporaneously.

British historians discuss these in very self-complimentary idioms. But the anal-

ysis of British foreign policy shows that each of these seems pertinent only if

British foreign policy is situated in the European context alone. These appear

inadequate when analysed in the context of Britain’s worldwide concerns.

Britain was indeed interested in continuance of peace and was a satiated

power in the sense that it did not have any territorial ambitions on the continent.

Outside Europe, too, Britain enjoyed a hegemonic position and stood to lose by

any change in the world order. But, though satisfied, Britain remained fearful.

The essence of the situation was stated by none other than Gladstone, who

observed that with a great empire at each of the four corners of the world, ‘we

may be territorially content, but less than ever at our ease’.

As we shall see

later, the Indian frontier became a source of ceaseless anxiety so much so that at

the end of the nineteenth century war against Russia over this issue, rather than

defence of the Low Countries, was deemed the chief problem of British strategy.

Further, at no stage did any British government subordinate the pursuit of the

nation’s perceived interests to the general interests of maintenance of peace. Nor

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 7

do the British statesmen stand forth as partisans des status quo partout. They

extended the British Empire as and when it seemed feasible.

Coming to the second principle, the existence of balance of power certainly

served Britain’s interests. Any consolidation of Europe under one hostile power

or a coalition of hostile powers was rightly considered fatal to Britain’s political,

economic and strategic security. But it is doubtful if Britain had the necessary

resources to maintain the balance of power, that is, to manipulate antagonisms

between European powers to this end. Throughout the nineteenth century

Britain maintained a professional army that was smaller than Switzerland’s. Its

ability to influence continental affairs through its military presence was negli-

gible.

If the British were to land their army on the German coast, Bismarck is

reported to have quipped, he would call the local police and have it arrested.

On the eve of the South African War, the British army was in the doldrums. In

March 1909 General Ewart, the Director of Military Operations, prepared a

memorandum on ‘The Value to a Foreign Power of an Alliance with the British

Empire’. In this he concluded that the value was more ‘latent’ than ‘actual’.

Britain’s small professional army of six divisions was no match for the giant

professional armies of the European powers. Britain could and did use the

Indian army, which consisted of about 70,000 Britons and 120,000 Indians. But,

for political reasons, it could not be withdrawn from India for long.

Lastly, British historians have continued to argue that during the last decades

of the nineteenth century, Britain followed a policy of isolation. The self-

complimentary way in which the policy is viewed is highlighted by the addition

of the prefix ‘splendid’. For example, Kenneth Bourne comments: ‘The obsti-

nacy with which British Foreign Secretaries resisted supposedly tempting offers

of understanding and alliance mark them off from their colleagues overseas

perhaps more strikingly than everything else.’

Historians have even recounted

‘deviations’ from this policy.

But a cursory glance at Cabinet Papers and diplo-

matic exchanges highlights that though Britain did not sign any formal alliance

with any European power, down to 1914, Britain never remained either aloof or

unconcerned. As we shall see, Britain negotiated with all powers, great and not

so great, whenever its interests so demanded. The task of a diplomatic historian

is to analyse the subtleties of connection that existed between Britain and

Europe, not to dismiss them as non-existent. Britain’s relations with the

European powers were decisively influenced by Britain’s natural determination

to maintain its status as a great power and for this it seemed imperative to main-

tain the Raj.

During 1870–1914, international affairs were dominated by six self-styled

Great Powers: Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

British statesmen tended to divide these into ‘satisfied’ Powers and ‘restless’

Powers. France and Russia were seen as ‘restless’, ‘ambitious’, ‘hostile’ or

‘hungry’ Powers, while Germany and Austria-Hungary were seen as ‘satisfied’

Powers. Italy was included amongst the ‘hungry’ Powers, but its position was

different from that of France and Russia; as Salisbury commented, ‘the objects of

her appetite are no great matters to us’.

8 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

In 1871, a unified German state was established in Central Europe. In this

process Bismarck played a very important role. In Britain, its establishment was

not resented. In fact, many, especially the Conservatives, welcomed the establish-

ment of this unified state in the middle of Europe. They believed that the

humiliation inflicted on France was likely to keep the latter’s extra-European

ambitions in check. Germany’s efficient army could keep Russia’s ambitions

under restrain. Moreover, Britain and Germany had no reason to be antago-

nistic. As Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary in the Conservative government,

remarked, at least Germany knew that Britain would not make war on her, and

the reverse was equally true.

Bismarck’s renunciation of a grossdeutsch solution

further allayed fears. Throughout Bismarck’s period, Germany was looked upon

as a satisfied power likely to maintain a balance in Europe, and with limited

colonial ambitions. The pace of economic growth of Germany did not cause

concern at this time, when Britain possessed 31.8 per cent of the world’s manu-

facturing capacity compared with Germany’s 13.2 per cent.

British statesmen

also began to calculate that a power that possessed the most efficient army could

serve Britain’s purposes. Early in 1876, in a private letter, Odo Russel, the British

ambassador at Berlin, wrote that the co-operation of Bismarck ‘in the preserva-

tion of peace with us…would be a great gain’. He added: ‘An unaccountable,

ambitious, irresponsible genius with a million of soldiers at his disposal like

Bismarck is a friend to cultivate’.

Until the end of the century, an Anglo-

German war was never contemplated. During the 1880s and 1890s the brusque

methods of German diplomacy did cause annoyance. At times the newspaper

‘war’ between the two countries seemed to provide proof of antagonism. But, as

Paul Kennedy comments, ‘Germany was a nuisance, but Russia was the tradi-

tional enemy, and France a possible foe’.

The British government as well as the

press realised that it was difficult to spend too much time criticising the Germans

when other powers posed a greater danger. It was only towards the turn of the

century when Germany seemed to outperform Britain in the economic and

industrial fields and began to build a navy and talk of weltpolitik that many began

to perceive Germany as an antagonist.

After its defeat at Sadowa in 1866, Austria had accepted the fait accompli and

had given up hopes of regaining its position in Central Europe. It was disin-

clined even to expand towards the southeast. In the hyphenated state of

Austria-Hungary, which emerged as a result of the compromise (Ausgleich) of

1867, the Magyars obtained a position of equality with the Germans. Slavs

outnumbered both Germans and Magyars. As any increase in territory towards

the Balkans would have increased the proportion of Slavs still further, the

Hapsburg government worked to maintain the status quo, to avoid war and to

defend the monarchy’s interests by diplomatic means as far as possible.

firmly opposed movements for self-government by Croats, Serbs, Rumanians

and Slovaks in its own empire. It therefore wanted the multinational Ottoman

Empire to continue, because any success by the peoples of the Balkans in

obtaining self-government would have resulted in its own demise. Economically,

too, the capitalists at Vienna wanted the Balkans to remain under a single

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 9

government rather than disintegrating into many territorial units. Thus Austria-

Hungary stood to gain by the continuance of the Ottoman Empire; but it did

not have the means to uphold it. This fact was important for Britain. Britain

could harness Austrian support to stall Russia’s advances in this region. For

geographical reasons, Austria could prevent Russia from moving its forces

towards the Mediterranean or towards Constantinople by checking its advance

in the Rumanian bottleneck. Further, if Britain ever wanted to send its army

through the Black Sea to restrain Russia’s advance towards the Indian Empire,

the goodwill of Germany and Austria could ensure the co-operation of the

Ottomans in this task. It was widely believed that the Hapsburg Empire would

not last long. Grey described it as ‘a star that might dissolve’.

Austria came increasingly under Germany’s influence. In 1873, the

Dreikaisersbund was formed. This was a league of the Emperors of Germany,

Austria-Hungary and Russia, oddly described as ‘the Three Northern Courts’.

In London, the formation of this League at this time, its revival in 1881 and later

efforts to re-establish it throughout this period were watched with apprehension.

In British diplomatic circles this grouping was described variously as ‘the worst

combination against us’, ‘a misfortune’, ‘a nightmare’, ‘that chronic condition’

and so on. The Liberals saw in this an attempt to revive the Holy Alliance of

1815. Some others resented it because it rendered Britain diplomatically ineffec-

tual on the continent. But a very important reason for such views was the subtle

Indian connection. By relieving Russia of problems on its European frontier, it

assisted Russia’s Asiatic ambitions. If, on the contrary, Germany and Austria

were friendly to Britain rather than Russia, the Russian army would remain tied

to its European frontier and Britain would be relieved of anxieties regarding

Russia’s advance towards the frontiers of the Indian Empire.

Italy also emerged as a unified state in 1870, but it had to struggle to be taken

seriously as a Great Power.

It was a feeble military and naval power. In 1881 it

possessed twenty ironclads, of which twelve were small and poorly armed.

was not in a position to protect even its own seacoast, which had a circuit of

about 2,500 sea miles. Italy’s financial position rendered a large expenditure on

its fleet impossible. So, for Britain, the value of the Italian fleet as reinforcement

was not worth the obligation to safeguard Italian ports. Commercially, while the

value to Italy of Britain’s trade equalled that of France and Russia combined, for

Britain, trade with Italy was subordinate in importance to its trade with France

or Russia.

In 1882, the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy

was formed. From the mid-1880s, Britain courted Italy as a link for entering into

engagements with Germany. In the 1890s, when Britain courted Germany and

Germany insisted on Britain joining the Triple Alliance, the Foreign Office held

that while Germany and Austria were very useful friends as regards Turkey,

Russia, Egypt and even France, an alliance with Italy would be ‘unprofitable and

even slightly onerous corollary to the German alliance’.

France had been a rival of Britain for power and influence for centuries. It

possessed a fleet that was next in size to that of Britain, and this made France the

only country that could invade Britain. Even France’s empire was next in size to

10 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

that of Britain. France could make itself unpleasant across the globe. Britain had

taken a lead in defeating Napoleon, but after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815

something like ‘a Liberal Alliance’ had emerged based on similarity of political

institutions and principles. Even during the last years of Napoleon III, France

did not wholly lose British sympathy. The two countries worked together in

many areas around the globe including Greece, Turkey, Italy, Syria, China and

Mexico. In the 1870s, too, Gladstonian Liberals and the followers of Gambetta

talked in terms of ‘the Liberal Alliance’. After its defeat in the Franco-Prussian

War, France was very eager to recover Alsace and Lorraine. This created intense

enmity between France and Germany, so much so that France was not in a posi-

tion to wage a war against Britain. Yet, in most quarters, morbid distrust of

France persisted. The construction of the Suez Canal and later the occupation

of Egypt increased bitterness between the two countries. British Admiralty was

endowed with such healthy respect for the power of the French fleet that it took

it as axiomatic that the enemy in the next war, as in the past, would be France.

The possibility of France seizing London by a coup de main was discussed at

Cabinet level in 1888.

It was, however, the activities of the French in the vicinity of India and on the

route to India which were watched with nervous concern. The small-scale pres-

ence of the French at Pondicherry in India was never perceived as a threat. But

the French were expanding their Empire in South-East Asia, and this seemed to

have ominous implications for the security of the eastern frontier of India.

Further, having gained control over Algeria, the French looked covetously at the

other Muslim states on the African coast of the Mediterranean, Morocco,

Tunisia and Egypt. Of these states, French designs in Egypt, where they took

special interest since Napoleon had failed to bequeath it to them, caused most

anxiety. Distrust of France grew after France began to court Russia. This caused

unease even before the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

With the

coming together of France and Russia in the 1890s and apprehensions caused by

the building of railways by Russia in Central Asia, this question acquired more

ominous contours. France was advancing loans to Russia to build railways in

Central Asia so as to divert British energies to that region and allow France to

strengthen its position in North Africa.

During the same period the Admiralty

began to calculate that it could not send the fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean

in case Russia decided to seize Constantinople without first neutralising the

French fleet in the Western Mediterranean.

Russia was also seen as a rival. The two hegemons of the post-1815 world

were Britain and Russia. Britain was the greatest imperial, commercial and

maritime power, but the immense size of its territory, a population of 113

million in 1887, and the contribution it had made to the defeat of Napoleon all

made Russia a great European power. These two countries had remained virtu-

ally untouched by the revolutions of 1848 and, to contemporaries, seemed to be

havens of strength and stability. Britain and Russia did not have any common

frontier. British statesmen did not perceive any threat to their country’s maritime

supremacy from Russia at any stage. In the Baltic Sea, too, no differences arose

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 11

between Russia and Britain.

Yet, these two countries identified each other as

enemies. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century it was a common assump-

tion in Europe that the next great war – the inevitable war – would be fought

between them.

The question arises: why was Russia perceived as an enemy? Answering this

question, Richard Millman states: ‘It was the connection of two things, hatred of

Russia and defence of Turkish integrity, reinforced by the accessibility of Turkey

to sea power, which transformed the hostility felt for St Petersburg into the possi-

bility of military confrontation with her’.

Britain did feel committed to

maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But such an argument begs

further questions. Why was the question of maintaining the integrity of the

Ottoman Empire so important for Britain? When Russia did not pose any threat

to the security of Britain or its maritime supremacy, what lay behind Britain’s

antagonism towards Russia? Britain made determined efforts not just to obstruct

Russia’s advances towards the Mediterranean, but also towards West Asia and

Central Asia. Why did Britain take so much interest in Persia even when ‘the

city’ showed reluctance to invest money there?

Why did Britain send two mili-

tary expeditions to Afghanistan? Any discussion of these questions in the context

of balance of power in Europe expresses only the top layer of reality.

Answers

to all these questions are related to Britain’s determination to maintain its hold

on the Indian Empire, whatever the risks. Britain’s distrust of Russia stemmed

from Russia’s image as a giant sprawling south-eastwards and eastwards. Given

this Anglo-Russian setting, introduction to Britain’s relations with Russia merits a

detailed presentation.

Britain and Russia

The struggle between Britain and Russia raged from the Aegean Sea in the West

to the Sea of Japan in the East, sometimes as a cold war and sometimes as a hot

one. It involved the Near East, West Asia, the Central Asian region, the Hindu

Kush mountains, Tibet, Mongolia and the area up to the Pacific coast in the East.

In the Ottoman Empire, the interests of Britain and Russia were diametri-

cally opposed. The historic mission of Russia was to reach the Mediterranean

and thus acquire control over an ice-free coast for interaction with the rest of the

world. Meanwhile, Russia wanted to strengthen its position at Constantinople. At

this time the Ottoman Empire seemed to be edging towards disintegration. With

the gradual rise of nationalist aspirations amongst the Balkan peoples, the ruling

elite in Russia began to see the prospect of fulfilment of these ambitions. These

prospects were increased by the fact that the peoples in the Balkans were Slavs

and most belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church; thus they were of the same

race and religion as the Russians. The Pan-Slav cause stirred strong emotions

amongst a section of the Russian officials and intelligentsia. Britain worked to

prevent the establishment of Russia’s influence in this region.

Coming to Asia, in the Far East, Russia breached the port, later known as

Vladivostok, in 1859. But Russia’s expansion towards the Pacific was of less

12 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

concern for the Foreign Office because this area did not lie on the route to any

destination of importance to the British government. Russia’s efforts to expand in

this region were viewed as an aspect of general increase in the power of Russia.

But, as Britain’s reaction to the events of 1904–5 showed, Britain did not trivi-

alise even this aspect, and regularly made efforts to reach accommodation with

Russia in north-east Asia.

In West Asia, in the early nineteenth century Russia

had expanded in the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and had

thereby reached the eastern frontier of the Turkish province of Armenia and the

northern frontier of Persia. The wars with Persia during 1826–8 and with Turkey

during 1828–9 were linked with the Russian decision to expand southwards from

the Caucasus to the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris. It was felt that

Russia could establish its influence in Syria and Armenia through the patronage

of Christians in this area. This caused unease. As Salisbury wrote to A.H.

Layard, the ambassador at Constantinople, in 1878, ‘her [Russia’s] influence

over Syria and Mesopotamia would be a very serious embarrassment, and would

certainly, through the connection of Baghdad with Bombay, make our hold on

India more difficult’.

This was one reason why in 1878 it was thought ‘abso-

lutely and indispensably necessary’ to have a post nearer at hand than Malta,

and hence Cyprus was occupied. In Central Asia, after the Crimean War, Russia

expanded not in one wave but in two. The first started from Orenberg and

proceeded in the direction of Kabul in Afghanistan. In 1864 Chimkent was

occupied; this was followed by the occupation of Tashkent in 1865, Khokhand

and Bukhara in 1866 and Samarkand in 1868. With these annexations, Russia’s

sway extended up to the outlying portions of Afghan Turkestan. The second

movement started from the Caspian Sea and was in the direction of Herat, near

the Persian frontier. Khiva was occupied in 1873, and Merv in 1884.

It has been argued that projects of military advance in Asia were advocated

and executed only by ‘irresponsible’ Russians or enthusiastic governors of

provinces on the frontiers.

But there is sufficient evidence to the effect that the

plans of expansion had full support of the Russian government. In a circular

sent in 1864 to the consular officers abroad, Gorchakov, the Russian Chancellor,

patiently explained the reasons for expansion. These included the usual explana-

tions centring on the doctrines of necessity, power and spread of civilisation.

Motives behind Russia’s expansion do not really concern us here. Russian histo-

rians have tended to argue that Russia’s expansion in Central Asia began much

before the British started building their empire in India, that Russia did not aim

at conquering India and that the talk of threat to India was a smokescreen

created by British officials and historians to disguise their own expansionist aims

in India and beyond. As proof of this, they argue that the Russian authorities did

not take advantage of discontent in India against British rule nor did they give

assistance to discontented Indian rajas who approached them.

Whether Russia actually planned to invade India is not the issue here. The

real issue is that the British government thought that it might. Commenting on

the period from 1884 to 1892, R.L. Greaves writes: ‘No longer was Russia’s

approach regarded as a vague menace which might require attention some

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 13

day’.

But the truth was that the British government did not view the expan-

sionist activity of Russia in the vicinity of India with nonchalance even during

the first half of the nineteenth century, when Russian and British Empires were

separated by thousands of miles of plains, deserts and mountains. In this

context, the geo-location of Russia was of supreme importance. Across the

Atlantic, Britain did not view the expansion of the United States of America

with the same concern.

The Foreign Office, the War Office, the India Office

and the government of India all watched Russia’s activities carefully, sifted and

exchanged information regarding the motives and military potentialities of

Russia and co-ordinated different plans of action. Their anxieties and concerns

can be followed in the records of the Committee of Imperial Defence. All

defence proposals emanating from the government of India were reviewed by a

joint committee of the India Office, the War Office and then submitted to the

Prime Minister or the Cabinet.

Similarly, correspondence between the War

Office and the Foreign Office, reports, newspaper cuttings and so on from St

Petersburg, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople and Tehran, to the extent they

dwelt upon matters relating to the Near East, Far East, Africa and the rest of

Asia, were sent to Calcutta.

What sort of danger was envisaged from Russia’s expansion in Central Asia?

Few in authority at Calcutta or London seriously entertained the possibility of

bundling away Russia to Europe. Some scholars have argued that the British

feared that Russia would sweep the whole commerce of Asia, especially in

cotton, into its grasp, adding that this was an area where Russia would not have

to face competition from any European power.

But this argument does not

carry much weight, for Russia simply did not have the means to become a

menace to Britain’s economic interests there.

The reasons that made the British government view Russia’s expansion with

anxiety can broadly be summed up under four headings. First, the expansion of

Russia towards the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was perceived as a

threat to the most efficient routes to India – the Suez route and the overland

route. Second, it was believed that continuous southeastward expansion of

Russia in Central Asia could threaten Britain’s position in India. The bellicose

attitude of the press in both countries kept alive such fears not only in the minds

of British statesmen but in the minds of statesmen all over Europe. Most Liberal

politicians tended to dismiss as unimportant and unjustified the alarm felt by

London and Calcutta on this account.

Historians have also tended to criticise

the tendency to take an alarmist view of the situation. But the fear of invasion

by Russia cannot be dismissed as a ‘bogey’. In the tenth and eleventh centuries,

Mahmud Ghazni and Mohammad Ghauri invaded India repeatedly from

Ghazni and Ghauri, which were in the Afghan territory. Babur, who became the

first Mughal ruler of Delhi in 1526, was a native of Fargana near Samarkand,

which was occupied by Russia in 1868. In 1731 Nadir Shah of Persia had

invaded Kars on the Black Sea, and eight years later he ransacked Delhi. In this

background, the debate regarding Russian designs on India cannot be dismissed

as a hypothetical debate centring on hypothetical fear. The possibility of

14 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

confrontation with Russia conditioned the perceptions and images of those

responsible for determining Britain’s strategic options and foreign policy deci-

sions. Thirdly, Russia could unsettle the Raj merely by defeating a contingent of

the British army in any frontier skirmish. The British were conscious that the Raj

was based on the prestige of British arms. The Great Revolt of 1857 had

destroyed the assumption, if there was any, that India was being ruled by

consent. The government of India could not withdraw troops from India to fight

on the north-west frontier for fear of rebellion in the rear.

Britain’s defeat even

on the remote frontier in a mere skirmish could create as Salisbury noted, ‘a

spasm of sedition’ from ‘one end of India to the other’. He added ‘She will not

try to conquer it. It will be enough for her if she can shatter our government and

reduce India to anarchy.’

Finally, by taking advantage of Britain’s vulnerability on the Indian frontier,

Russia could extract concessions from Britain elsewhere. European statesmen

used phrases like ‘the Achilles heel’, ‘Britain’s feet of clay’, ‘le chorde sensible’ and

so on to portray Britain’s anxieties on this issue. In November 1899, Tsar

Nicholas II wrote to his sister that it was in his power to change the course of the

Boer War by sending a telegram ordering the Turkestan army to mobilise. ‘The

strongest fleet in the world can’t prevent us from settling our scores with England

precisely at her most vulnerable point’, he wrote.

In 1908, the Kaiser wrote

that the British had better realise that war with Germany means the loss of

India.

To the Tsar, he wrote: ‘Indian borders and Afghanistan are the only

parts of the globe where the whole of her battleships are of no avail to England

and where her guns are powerless to meet [an] invader. The loss of India is the

death stroke to Great Britain’.

In a conversation with Sir Henry Drummond

Wolff, the British Minister at Tehran, a Russian diplomat described the position

succinctly:

I perceive that all your foreign policy is based on India. You have held it

[for] more than a century. As is natural you desire to retain it, and you are in

the consistent belief that we wish to take it, your only motive in your

Mediterranean policy, on the Suez Canal or at Constantinople is to protect

India from Russia. I look on the Balkans as an Indian question.

This feeling extended to the European people. A Russian businessman told one

of the Rothschilds at Paris: ‘We cannot fight England and her ships in the

Chinese seas now, but we can help the Afridis against her’.

Where could Britain exercise pressure on Russia to prevent it from expanding

in the direction of the Indian Empire? The answer seemed to elude Britain’s

policy makers. Russia was a sprawling land power with a vast army. Britain’s

navy on the other hand, could not move on wheels. How was the whale to

contain the bear’s pace? Naval blockade could not inflict significant damage on

the Russian economy. There was little hope of penetrating Russia’s defences

from the side of the Baltic Sea. Broadly speaking, two types of strategies were

advocated. One school of strategists held that Russia was both accessible and

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 15

vulnerable on the Black Sea. They argued that only sending an expedition

through the Black Sea and strike at Russia’s underbelly in the Caucasus could

restrict Russia’s advance in Central Asia. It was believed that this army would

get support from the non-Russian population of this region. This would prevent

Russia from attacking the Indian frontier. This became known as the Black Sea

strategy, sometimes referred to as the Crimean strategy.

In the summer of

1855, the Russians were greatly alarmed when the British army penetrated the

Sea of Azov and occupied some coastal towns. In the 1860s Lord Lawrence, the

Governor-General of India, had advised that in order to check Russia, offensive

should be taken by Britain in the direction of the Black Sea. During the Russo-

Turkish War, Disraeli sent the British fleet up to Besika Bay twice. During the

1880s Wolseley, the hero of Tel-el-Kebir, and Brackenbury, the Director of

Military Intelligence, became staunch advocates of this strategy. But by the end

of the century, this strategy seemed increasingly less feasible.

The other school

advocated the strategy of meeting Russia beyond the northwest frontier of India

in superior force. In the 1860s and 1870s its proponents were referred to as ‘the

Forward School’. From the mid-1880s, Frederick Sleigh Roberts, who occupied

the position of Commander-in-Chief of India from 1885 to 1892 and of all

British forces from 1901 to 1904, became a very vocal advocate of this strategy.

He believed that Russia was assailable only through India and had to be stopped

there. For this, massive reinforcements would be needed. London came to

accept that resources would have to be mobilised for this purpose. Britain had

never been a land power in the continental sense. The British army had had a

threefold role: first, it served as a bastion of home defence; its second role was to

join the European powers in wars on the continent; and its third role was over-

seas defence, in which gradually the defence of India was accepted as the

primary task.

In 1884 when Russia occupied Merv, a maximum of 36,000 men were avail-

able in Britain for reinforcing the army in India.

Gradually, the construction of

railways by Russia in Central Asia increased the vulnerability of India. With this,

the demand of the government of India for reinforcements steadily increased. In

November 1904 this demand stood at 158,000 men, which Britain simply did

not possess. This imposed a tremendous strain on all framers of strategy and

diplomacy at London. In short, Russia was perceived as an enemy because it

posed a threat to the security of the frontiers of India and the routes to India

and hence to Britain’s Great Power status. At the same time, Russia was a

leading European power and was an intrinsic part of Europe’s diplomatic scene.

So the need to defend India against Russia was bound to affect Britain’s relations

with other European countries.

The phrase ‘the Great Game’ has been used to describe the Anglo-Russian

setting in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. As with all such phrases, it has

subsequently been used by different commentators in widely different senses, for

different geographical areas, and for different periods.

At this time, this phrase

definitely concerned British apprehensions regarding the safety and stability of

the Indian Empire arising from the expansion of the Tsarist empire in Russia.

16 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Like a game, it had excitements, calculations, tactical rules and a determination

to win. But politics is not just a game. It is high art as well. In this sense, grasp of

strategy and availability of means are very important. In this ‘Game’, from the

British point of view, the purpose was negative – to prevent Russia from reaching

the borders of India. There were no targets in terms of territory, which the

British wanted. They wanted to guard the Raj. Even when some offensive moves

were made, the purpose was not to expand but to ward off the possibility of

having to face Russia there. A very important feature of this ‘Game’ was the

consciousness of lack of means to face Russia in superior force on the northwest

frontier of India. As we shall see, resources were calculated to the last man (even

animal) available and to the last penny available. Still a winning combination

eluded the British. This limited the choices available to the managers of British

foreign policy in London and decisively influenced Britain’s relations with all the

European powers.

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was not included in the category of ‘Great Powers’ during

this period, nor was it wholly a European state. Yet it has been taken up here

because its formal jurisdiction extended over geographical positions which were

of the deepest interest not only to Britain but to all European powers. In the first

half of the nineteenth century, Britain had accorded the status of embassy to

missions in only five capitals, and Constantinople was one of these.

This

empire was situated on the confluence of two seas and three continents. In

Europe its authority extended over the Balkan Peninsula. In Asia, the empire was

comprised of four divisions: Anatolia (Asia Minor), Syria, Mesopotamia and

Armenia. A considerable portion of the province of Armenia, which extended

northward to the foot of the Caucasus and eastward to the Caspian Sea, had

been taken by Russia under the Treaty of Adrianople signed in 1829. In Africa,

the Ottomans had authority over Egypt and the Maghreb. Because of domina-

tion over these regions, the Ottoman government controlled major sea routes. It

had the power to close or open the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which

formed the highway between the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea. Its suzerainty

was recognised on the shores of the Levant, on the coast along the Red Sea, at

the head of the Persian Gulf and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Suez

Canal.

Throughout the nineteenth century, a feeling permeated the ruling elite

throughout Europe that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse or

dismantlement. Whenever there was encroachment on areas of interest of the

Great Powers, either through their own activities or indirectly because of ques-

tions arising out the nationalist aspirations of the peoples in the Balkans, a crisis

situation developed. Attempts made by European powers to secure their vested

interests in the event of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire formed the

basis of the Eastern Question. It brought European powers sometimes to

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 17

battlefields and sometimes to conference tables, leading to a series of public and

secret international agreements.

The Ottoman Empire was not a territorial neighbour of Britain. Yet,

throughout the nineteenth century, Britain worked to maintain it. The first

British pronouncement on the desirability of keeping the Ottoman Empire

intact dates from the period of the Napoleonic wars. In 1892 Salisbury wrote

specifically: ‘The protection of Constantinople from Russian conquest has been

the turning point of the policy of this country for at least forty years, and to a

certain extent for forty years before that.’

Why was Britain so keen to prevent

Russia from establishing itself at Constantinople? Why did Britain want the

Ottoman Empire to continue? Turkey had been a trading partner since the

sixteenth century. There were many who feared that the advantageous position

that Russia would acquire at Constantinople would enable it to use the Turkish

economy for its own purposes. One estimate made in 1877 indicated that if

British trade were excluded from European Turkey, the loss would be 12 million

pounds. But the economic stake of Britain in the Ottoman Empire could be

described as negligible. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, in order to

bolster Britain’s presence, when the government made efforts to build up an

economic stake in the Ottoman Empire, it found it difficult to tempt reluctant

British businessmen into making investments there. The government decided to

bear the burden itself. But even this did not work because funds were not avail-

able.

The Foreign Office was forced to fall back on energetic diplomacy. The

economic stakes of Russia in this region were negligible. In fact, Russia was

unique amongst the Great Powers in that even by 1917 it had no capital invest-

ments, railway interests or concessions in the Ottoman Empire.

The reason for

Britain’s abiding interest in the Ottoman Empire was that all short routes to the

East passed through this region. The Ottomans seemed to be the best occupiers

here because they were likely to be the most amenable to British influence. The

collapse or disintegration of this empire into smaller political units was likely to

establish the influence of Russia there. Britain was not ready to place its commu-

nication with India at the mercy of Russia, a power that was expanding in

Central Asia and was sure to acquire a navy.

It was constantly assumed, not only in London but in all European capitals,

that maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was of

special interest to Britain. Britain’s support was manifested most strongly during

the Mehmat Ali Crisis in 1839–40, the Crimean War in 1854–6, the Russo-

Turkish War in 1877–8 and the Bulgarian Crisis in 1885–7. Britain despatched

its most able diplomats to Constantinople to ensure that the affairs of this region

were settled in Britain’s favour.

At London, the interests involved were consid-

ered so vital that Britain was ready to maintain the autocratic empire even

though it involved denying the rights of self-government, self-determination and

nationhood to the people in the Balkans, despite Britain’s preferred commitment

to liberal ideals and values. In fact, soon after the Russo-Turkish War started, the

British Foreign Office spelled out Britain’s interests in the Ottoman Empire

unequivocally in a despatch to the Russian ambassador:

18 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be

imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend…the

most prominent of those interests are the…necessity of keeping open…the

communication between Europe and the east by the Suez Canal. An

attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its

approaches would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a grave

injury to the commerce of the world…The mercantile and financial inter-

ests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an attack

on that country, or its occupation, even temporary, for purposes of war,

could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the neutral Powers, certainly

not by England. The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a mili-

tary, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to

require explanation…The existing arrangements made under European

sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles

appear to them wise and salutary.

Britain also tried to assist the Ottomans in carrying out internal reforms in

different provinces so as to help create a contented population. Joseph Heller

comments that in this respect Britain’s goals were incompatible; Britain was

claiming to maintain the independence of the Ottomans and was, at the same

time, insisting that the empire be reformed from within.

The latter amounted

to denial of independence. But it would be well to point out here that Britain’s

goal was not to work either for independence or integrity of the Ottoman

Empire per se. Its purpose was to prevent Russia from moving in, and for this

purpose it wanted to ensure that the Turks were in a strong position to resist

Russia’s penetration.

Continuation of the Ottoman Empire served another purpose as well. The

Ottoman ruler was not just the Sultan of Turkey but also the khalifa, the religious

leader of the Muslims. Muslims formed about 15 per cent of the population of

the Indian Empire. There was a great deal of talk about the British Empire

being the greatest Muslim power in the world. The British could ensure the

loyalty of Muslims by supporting their khalifa. Even during the French

Revolutionary Wars, when Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, had tried to

befriend the French, the government of India had appealed to the Ottoman

Ruler, as head of Islam, to ask Tipu Sultan to desist from anti-British activities.

During the Crimean War, in order to win over Muslims in India the British

government tried to show off its association with the Ottomans and the govern-

ment of India wished that the British army would obtain some spectacular

success.

During the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–8, it was accepted that the

occupation of Constantinople by Russia would have adverse effects on the

loyalty of Muslim subjects in particular and all Indians in general. When this

question was discussed in 1892, Salisbury commented: ‘I need not dwell upon

the effect which the Russian possession of Constantinople would have upon our

position in India, which is so largely dependent on prestige’.

Even rumours

about the success of Russia could be harmful. Continuance of the Raj depended

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 19

not so much on British soldiers or even sailors but on the fear and awe which the

British commanded in India.

Defending the frontiers of India

In the north, the Indian Empire had a long land frontier extending in a half

circle touching, from east to west, Burma, Tibet, China, the Central Asian

khanates, Afghanistan and Persia. In the south it had an extensive seacoast.

Given Britain’s naval predominance, no envious rival could threaten British

hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Two small squadrons – often less than a dozen

sloops and frigates each, with an occasional ship of the line – were sufficient to

keep most of the Indian Ocean ‘out of bounds’ to intruders.

Even the land

frontier was insulated for hundreds of miles in the north by the Himalayas – the

highest mountain barrier in the world – and by desert in the west. The Indian

subcontinent had been invaded mostly from the northwest. Inside India, the

French presence at Pondicherry and Portuguese presence in Goa, Daman and

Diu did not even cause anxiety.

Once the British were entrenched in India, the British government did not

perceive any threat from the ambitions or activities of any state in the vicinity of

India. It perceived danger to its Indian Empire from all its continental rivals at

different times. The British government made all efforts to ensure that the Great

Powers of Europe kept their hands not just off their empire in India but off all

the states situated in the vicinity of India. In 1902 Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign

Secretary, who had extensive experience of strategic and diplomatic issues

because he had been ambassador at Rome, Viceroy of India (1888–94) and

Secretary for War (1895–1900), defined this policy:

it has…been one of our principal objects to encourage and strengthen the

states lying outside the frontier of our Indian empire, with the hope that we

should find in them an intervening zone sufficient to prevent direct contact between the

dominions of Great Britain and those of other great military Powers. We could not

however maintain this policy if in any particular instance we should find

that one of these intervening states was being crushed out of national exis-

tence, and falling practically under the complete domination of any other

power.

The government of India made efforts to create territorial buffers from one

end of India to the other. The coastal region of the Shan State in Burma was

annexed after two wars in 1823–6 and 1852. The entire kingdom was annexed

in 1886 when a threat was seen from the activities of the French government in

South-East Asia. An expedition was sent to Tibet in 1903. Efforts were made to

control the Central Asian khanates like Chitral, Gilgit and Hunza. Events in

Afghanistan were very closely watched. An expedition was sent to Persia in 1856.

Germany’s activities in Batum and in the direction of Baghdad were closely

watched. Though great expanse of desert and mountains separated the Indian

20 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Empire from Russian possessions, the British government monitored every move

made by Russia in the direction of India.

All these negotiations were

conducted and bargains were struck in complete indifference to the wishes of the

governments or natives of these places.

It was most important to defend the northwest frontier of India. India had

been invaded from this direction many a time. But, in the nineteenth century, the

government of India did not have to face any threat from the ambitions of the

Shah of Persia or the Amir of Afghanistan. Disraeli dismissed these states as

‘broken reeds’, while Salisbury described them as ‘empty sacks unable to stand

on their own’.

It was the activities of the Russians from beyond these states that

caused anxiety. For this reason the attitude of the rulers in these two states

acquired crucial importance. If these states were strong, independent and

friendly, then they could obstruct Russia’s designs. On the other hand, if their

rulers were favourably disposed towards Russia, an invasion of India was not

outside the bounds of practical possibility.

Persia was a vast country. But most of it was a desert, and in the nineteenth

century its mineral resources still lay dormant.

There was no co-terminous

frontier between Persia and British possessions in India until the Baluch chiefs,

who dominated the area between Sind and Persia, were brought under British

control in the 1870s.

To British statesmen, it seemed that Russia was in a

more favourable position in this region. Russia had brought the area around the

Caspian Sea under its control and was in a position to invade Persia from the

north. The British could not offer military assistance to the Persian government

in such an eventuality because Baluchistan, the region to the extreme west of

the Indian Empire, was a desert area and opened on the Persian side in Siestan,

which was also a desert.

Moreover, because of geographical proximity, Russia

could occupy Tehran before any help could be sent. Salisbury wrote: ‘Regions

in which Russian encroachments are likely to be made lie wholly beyond the

reach of any material assistance which HMG could furnish to the Persian

government’.

In this situation, only a friendly and strong Persia could stem the tide of

Russia’s expansion. The comparative stability of politics and society there,

together with the fact that this position was internationally recognised, provided

the right conditions. Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Holland and

Belgium maintained diplomatic missions at Tehran. Towards the closing years of

the nineteenth century, the British government tried to develop Persia as a client

state.

The British had a long established commercial presence in the Persian

Gulf dating back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, Nasir-

ud-din, the Shah of Persia from 1848 to 1896, also watched Russia’s activities

with unease and wanted to strengthen his state. In this situation, the Foreign

Office tried to take advantage of the Shah’s need for capital. During the late

1880s, the Imperial Bank of Persia was formed to act as a conduit for British

capital. But the government failed to tempt British investors to invest in Persia.

Thus, the efforts of the British Foreign Office to strengthen its position in Tehran

through sterling diplomacy failed.

Towards the end of the century, when

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 21

Russia conquered Khorasan on the northeast of Persia, the situation seemed

grimmer. Thereafter, the British government directed its efforts towards

preventing Russia from extending its influence in Seistan.

The question of

Seistan thus became very important. It occurs in all discussions during this

period.

R.L. Greaves speaks of the dual significance of Persia for Britain: the rela-

tionship to India and its relationship to Russia.

100

But there was no duality

involved. Britain perceived danger to its Indian Empire from Russia and Persia

became relevant because it lay en route. This was implicit in Salisbury’s view

that ‘were it not for our possessing India, we should trouble ourselves but little

about Persia’,

101

and in the comment of Hamilton: ‘The more you investigate

the sources of our interest in Persia the clearer it becomes that they are almost

exclusively Indian.’

102

Until 1859, the control of the legation at Tehran was

under the India Office. Thereafter, it was placed directly under the Foreign

Office. A substantial part of the cost of this establishment was paid out of the

revenues of India.

103

The people of India did not feel threatened by Russia. The

government of India too was a subordinate government. It could be left out

completely in determining the relations with Persia or Russia, as indeed

happened at the time of forming the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907.

104

Afghanistan was a landlocked country with ill-defined frontiers, touching by

the mid-nineteenth century Persia, the Indian Empire and many territories

under tribal chiefs, some independent and some quasi-independent. The British

government kept a watchful eye on this region even before the Indian Empire

reached the Hindu Kush in the 1840s. In 1836, when a Russian envoy appeared

in Kabul, the British invaded Afghanistan with a view to installing a friendlier

ruler. The expedition resulted in bloody failure mainly because of the intense

anti-foreign feelings of the Afghans.

105

Thereafter, the government of India

adopted a policy of deliberate aloofness. In 1856, when the Shah of Persia

attempted to gain control over Herat, Britain intervened militarily to prevent

him from doing so. At this stage, a treaty of friendship was signed with the Amir

of Afghanistan.

A new phase in Anglo-Afghan relations began in the 1860s following two

important developments. In 1863, Dost Mohammad, who had become Amir of

Afghanistan in 1842 after the First Afghan War, died. His death was followed by a

bitter and prolonged war of succession between his sixteen sons. Second, after

decades of virtual inactivity, Russia resumed its policy of expansion in Central

Asia. Two related issues emerged as a result of these developments. First, how was

Britain to deal with the situation arising out of the expansion of Russia in Central

Asia? Second, what kind of relations should Britain establish with Afghanistan?

This led to a prolonged and acrimonious controversy over the best means of

guarding the Raj. Two schools of thought emerged, the Closed Border School

and the Forward School. The debate between them centred on the questions as to

where, by whom and how Russian advances towards India should be checked.

John Lawrence, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1864 to

1869, a period that saw a bloody war in Afghanistan, became the high priest of

22 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

the Closed Border School.

106

Many statesmen in Britain and India supported

him, among them Viceroys Mayo and Northbrook, Sir Charles Wood, India

Secretary (1859–60) and Lord Privy Seal (1870–4), and Lord Derby, India

Secretary (1858–9) and Foreign Secretary (1874–8). The policy that they advo-

cated was both hailed by supporters and denounced by their opponents in the

phrase ‘masterly inactivity’. The keynote of their policy was that the British

should not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But such a policy was

to be based on the precondition that Russia should also not interfere. They

believed that only a settlement between London and St Petersburg could solve

the problem. In case a war had to be fought, they wanted to fight Russia ‘all over

the world’, in the direction of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea, as circum-

stances of the time might warrant.

The proponents of the ‘Forward School’, on the other hand, held that

Russia’s expansion towards the north-west frontier of the Indian Empire had to

be stalled by using the Kabul–Kandahar line as outworks of the Raj. They

believed that Russia’s policies in Central Asia were unpredictable because

Russia’s War Ministry and local military commanders enjoyed considerable

freedom.

107

They wanted the government of India to involve itself closely in

Afghan politics and to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the ruler

of Afghanistan. They also wanted the government of India to station a British

agent in Afghanistan. The chief proponents of the ‘Forward School’ were Sir

H.C. Rawlinson, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, Sir Robert Montgomery and Sir John

W. K a y e .

108

Rawlinson had first hand experience of the geography and politics

of Persia, Afghanistan, Arabia and Mesopotamia. Frere had been the Chief

Commissioner of Sind (1850–9) and Governor of Bombay (1862–7).

Montgomery had been Lieutenant Governor of Punjab between 1859 and

1865, while Kaye was the Secretary in the Political and Secret Department of

the India Office. The first three entered the India Office within a year of each

other during 1867–8. This foursome shared similar ideas about the ways of

defending the Indian Empire and became what J.L. Duthie describes as the

‘undetected cabal within the India Office during Gladstone’s first ministry’.

109

Though the assumptions and suggestions varied from person to person, they all

hawked a more forceful policy towards Russia. Their opponents described them

as advocates of ‘mischievous’ activity. Rawlinson even suggested that British

presence in Persia should be used for this purpose. He wished to create a ‘mili-

tary nucleus’ in Persia by raising a 5,000–10,000 men force of Persian soldiery,

‘armed, clothed, fed, disciplined and commanded by British officers’.

110

They

also believed that Britain simply did not have the resources to fight Russia ‘all

over the world’.

As far as Afghanistan was concerned, during the war of succession following

the death of Dost Mohammad in 1863, John Lawrence, who was a bitter oppo-

nent of ‘forward’ ideas, maintained an attitude of strict and scrupulous

neutrality.

111

He accorded friendly recognition to successive occupants of the

throne in Kabul. ‘If you wish to be friends with Afghanistan, beware of

meddling in their internecine quarrels’, advised Lawrence.

112

The Liberal

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 23

government at London agreed. In case Russia intervened, Lawrence believed, an

offensive should be taken from England in other parts of the world. By 1868,

Sher Ali, one of the claimants to the Afghan throne, had toppled all his rivals

and became the Amir. He did not show hostility towards the British. Yet, as long

as he ruled Afghanistan, he remained conscious that he did not owe his position

to British power. He was uneasy also about the effect of expansionist policies of

two European powers on the future of his state. He often described his country

as an earthen vessel between the two wheels of Russian and British imperialism.

The two viceroys who succeeded Lawrence – Mayo and Northbrook – continued

the policy of non-intervention. The Amir made efforts to get recognition for

himself and his descendants from the British government, and also assurances of

support in the case of a Russian invasion. But he stoutly refused to accept a

British Resident at Kabul, pleading that he could not take responsibility for the

latter’s security.

113

Meanwhile, in 1869, negotiations started between London and St Petersburg

– the Clarendon–Gorchakov talks – with a view to creating a neutral zone

between the two in Central Asia. These continued until January 1873 when they

ended without any formal exchange of notes. Russia indicated that it considered

Afghanistan outside of its sphere of influence and concluded that Russia would

be left a free hand elsewhere in Central Asia. The government of India asked

the Foreign Office to ensure that Roshan and Shignan, lying towards the north-

west of Afghanistan, be recognised as Afghan possessions. But in the final

despatch to St Petersburg, the Foreign Office used the word ‘claim’ repeatedly

and did not refer to the Amir’s sovereignty over these territories. At the same

time, the Amir was not called upon to vacate this territory and he continued to

govern it.

114

Both these issues created problems later.

In mid-1873, Russia sent its army towards Merv and occupied Khiva. This

re-opened the debate between the protagonists of the two schools. Thereafter,

the foremost advocates of the Closed Border School became ‘mervous’

115

about

the empire’s vulnerability. Even Northbrook began to advocate that the views of

‘Rawlinson and Company’ be given serious consideration.

116

He suggested that

Britain should give an unconditional guarantee of defence of Afghanistan in

return for the Amir agreeing to the stationing of a Resident in Kabul and

surrendering control over foreign affairs to the British.

117

But Gladstone’s

government refused to take any such step.

Guarding the routes to India

Given the distance of 11,730 nautical miles between London and Calcutta via

the Cape and some 8,000 nautical miles via the Suez, control over India could

be maintained only if there could be a guarantee of uninterrupted communica-

tions. The British government showed single-minded determination to ensure

control over all lines of communications between London and Calcutta. Given

Britain’s dependence on seaborne trade and the determination to maintain the

Indian Empire, all sea lanes were, for Britain, not mere means of communica-

24 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

tion but the very arteries for sustaining its empire and its economy. ‘Did our

possession of India necessitate our grasping at every avenue of approach to it?’

Palmerston is reported to have asked and then retorted, ‘Because I have a house

in York and a house in London, must I own all the Innes on the way’.

118

Yet, this

is precisely what the British government did. As we shall see, the British govern-

ment took pains to establish control over Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian islands and

Cyprus from one end of the Mediterranean to the other, then over the Cape of

Good Hope, Zanzibar, Mauritius, Aden, Seychelles, Colombo, Rangoon and

Singapore in the Indian Ocean. Together with control over Bombay, Madras

and Calcutta, these bases hung fairly evenly on the rim of the ocean like beads

on a chain.

Before the development of aeroplanes, there were two routes for getting from

London to Bombay and Calcutta. The first – the long, slow and safe way – was

around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean. It was

used for transporting passengers and goods. One advantage of this long route

was that it was through the open oceans and was comparatively free from inter-

ference by other powers. The other was the short route. Until the opening of the

Suez Canal in 1869 one had to travel by ship through the Mediterranean Sea,

then overland through the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt into the Red Sea, or

through Syria and Mesopotamia into the Persian Gulf. These were known also

as ‘overland routes’. These were high-cost routes, though the time taken was less

than half the time taken over the long route. Until the middle of the nineteenth

century these were used primarily for mail. The overland route through Egypt

was opened up for passengers in the 1830s. The passengers sailed to Alexandria,

went overland to Suez and then took another ship for Bombay or Calcutta.

119

Simultaneously, the alternative of travelling from Alexanderatta via Aleppo in

the Levant, then through Mesopotamia to Basra and onward to Bombay was

also seriously explored. This became known as ‘the alternate route’. This route

had been used extensively for trade with the Ottoman Empire during the

Mughal period.

The British government guarded its interests along all these routes with a

vengeance. Britain considered itself to be the immediate neighbour of all coun-

tries that had a coastline along these routes and watched their relations with

other countries. To take up the long route first, the Cape of Good Hope, situated

halfway between Europe and India, was the only port on the route to India

which was visited regularly by ships in the early nineteenth century. The advan-

tages of obtaining and holding the Cape had been urged as early as the time of

the American Revolution. In October 1781, the directors of the English East

India Company wrote that ‘the Power possessing the Cape of Good Hope has

the key to and from the East Indies, appears to us to be self-evident and unques-

tionable’.

120

By the end of the eighteenth century, travellers and official

surveyors were publishing books and pamphlets on the subject.

121

By the early

nineteenth century, phrases such as ‘key to the Indian Ocean’, ‘Master of Asia’

and ‘the Gibraltar of India’ had become a part of the lexicon of colonial and

company officials with or without a military background.

122

During the

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 25

Napoleonic wars, the British government established its control over the Cape of

Good Hope. Other European powers accepted this under the Vienna Settlement

of 1815. A campaign was simultaneously inaugurated to ‘regenerate’ the area

around the Cape so as to generate resources for its upkeep. But economically, the

Cape colony remained a liability.

123

This, however, did not make the British

government consider the idea of relinquishing its hold. This route remained

important even after the Suez Canal was opened. During the mid-1890s when

South Africa became ‘the real running sore’ in Anglo-German relations,

Kimberley, the Foreign Secretary, repeatedly warned Berlin that South Africa

was ‘perhaps the most vital interest of Great Britain because by the possession of

it communication with India was assured…[it was] of even greater importance

to England than Malta or Gibraltar’.

124

The Mediterranean was the most crucial link in the direct route to the East.

Britain would have taken an interest in this region in any case because of its

naval and commercial interests. But the desire to maintain its hold over India

made it imperative to keep a vigilant eye on this area. France’s best naval base,

Toulon, was situated in the western Mediterranean. Here the French fleet could

enter the Atlantic Ocean and threaten the long route or enter the English

Channel. The threat was magnified with the establishment of French control in

the Maghreb from 1830. But, given Britain’s control over Gibraltar and naval

supremacy, the Admiralty was confident of handling any eventuality in this

region. It was the eastern Mediterranean, which became a crucial theatre for

British strategists. Here, two areas of crucial importance were the regions around

the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the Suez. Britain considered this

area so important that Gerald Graham comments that ‘Britain was prepared in

a pinch to fight both France and Russia to keep her Mediteranean corridor

intact’.

125

Britain also wanted to ensure that its own warships had the right to

enter the Straits because this seemed to be the only area from where Britain

could invade Russia so as to prevent it from expanding towards the north-west of

India. In 1895 the Director of Military Intelligence noted:

The interests of the empire, India, and all Britain’s eastern possessions

required, that as long as Britain can keep it so, Russia should be vulnerable

through the Black Sea – to secure this, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus must

either be kept unarmed, or in the hands of Russia’s foes.

126

According to the accepted principles of the time, the Ottomans had full

sovereignty over the entire coast. By international agreement, the straits were

open to all commercial ships and closed to all non-Turkish warships in time of

peace. Russia wanted the straits to remain closed to warships of all other powers

so as to have a lock and chain at the Dardanelles for the protection of its shores.

Moreover, Russia wanted to reach the Mediterranean, and for this control over

the straits seemed necessary. Early in 1900 the Russian Chancellor, reviewing

Russia’s foreign policy prospects, agreed with the War Minister that seizure of

the Bosphorus was Russia’s most important task in the twentieth century.

127

26 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Britain assumed that Russia would somehow establish formidable naval power in

the Black Sea and, with control over the straits, the Black Sea would become a

Russian lake. Yet, both London and St Petersburg remained concerned about

the issue of passage of warships through the straits. But two factors should be

mentioned which make the attitude of both the powers seem incongruous. One

was that Russia started the construction of its Black Sea Fleet only in 1883, and

that at a very slow speed. At least some British statesmen believed that Russia

had no naval history, no maritime population and no resources.

128

Second,

under various agreements, the task of regulating the entry or exit of warships

through the straits was assigned to the Ottoman government. But it is doubtful if

it had the necessary power to regulate this traffic.

Under the Straits Convention of 1841, the principle of the closure of the

straits, hitherto applied to entry into the Black Sea, was equally extended to exit

from it. Russia was thus shut off from sending its non-existent fleet into the

Mediterranean. During 1854–6, Britain participated in the Crimean War when

Russia seemed to pose a threat to the independence of the Turkish Empire.

Under the Treaty of Paris, concluded after this war, Russia was prevented from

either building fortifications or a fleet in the Black Sea. Russia found this attempt

at compulsory disarmament very humiliating. Russia used the opportunity

created by the Franco-Prussian War to declare that it would no longer be bound

by ‘the Black Sea Clauses’ of the Treaty of Paris. Britain refused to let the matter

go. Odo Russel, Foreign Secretary in Gladstone’s government, told Bismarck in

November 1870 that Britain would go to war on this issue.

129

Britain did appear

adamant; at least, Bismarck believed that Britain would go to war on this

issue.

130

Russia did not in fact have warships in the Black Sea, but Russia was

pegging out claims for the future. For the same reason, Britain did not want to

take any risk. Finally, the matter was referred to a conference of European

powers, held in London. On the face of it, the purpose was to observe the moral

imperative that a treaty signed at an international conference should be changed

only at another conference rather than by unilateral action. The Treaty of

London, signed in 1871, did revise the Treaty of Paris so as to accommodate

Russia’s demand. But it admitted, for the first time, the principle that foreign

navies might enter the straits if the Sultan judged it necessary for safeguarding

the clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Thus the principle of the closure of the straits

was reversed to Russia’s disadvantage.

131

On the short routes to India, to the east of the Eastern Mediterranean lay the

Suez isthmus which was regarded as the master key to all trading nations. Ever

since Napoleon put his foot on Egypt, all British governments took it for granted

that any attempt by France to establish control over Egypt would compel Britain

to assume the heaviest of liabilities in foreign policy. In the 1830s, Mehmet Ali,

the Pasha of Egypt, conquered Syria and Mesopotamia. This in itself might not

have alarmed the British government. But there were other apprehensions.

Mehmet Ali’s designs were supported by the French government. Moreover,

Mehmet Ali could co-operate with Russia with the aim of partitioning Persia. In

1839, when attempts made by the Ottoman government to get back these

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 27

provinces failed, Palmerston, the energetic British prime minister, decided to

intervene. He concluded the Treaty of London with Russia, Austria and Prussia

and sent the British navy ‘to chuck’ Mehmet Ali into the Nile.

132

He stated his

reason unequivocally: ‘The mistress of India cannot permit France to be mistress

directly or indirectly of the road to her Indian dominions’.

133

This, comments

H.L. Hoskins, was equivalent to stating a British doctrine of paramount interest

in those portions of the Ottoman Empire through which ran the natural routes

to the East.

134

In France, under Napoleon III, de Lesseps put forward plans for the construc-

tion of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez that would enable the ships to travel

from the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian Sea.

135

Britain was likely to, and

eventually did, become the major user of the canal, but Palmerston fiercely

opposed the construction of the canal, and in this he enjoyed full support from

his countrymen. He was uncompromising in his opposition, as he said in 1851:

‘It shall not be made, it cannot be made, it was not to be made, but if it were

made, there would be a war between France and England for the possession of

Egypt’.

136

What were the reasons for such a vitriolic posture? H.E. Chamberlain

says that ‘the good reason’ was that ‘while the Royal Navy could command the

high seas, it could not control a “ditch” through someone else’s territory’.

137

forwarding this argument, sufficient weight is not attached to the geographical

location of the Isthmus and Britain’s single-minded determination to prevent

any European power from entrenching itself anywhere on any of the routes to

India. Palmerston viewed the whole issue in strategic terms, not commercial. He

did not believe that de Lesseps would overcome the natural obstacle to the

construction of the canal. But he definitely objected even to the digging of the

ditch, fearing that it would prevent the Ottomans from sending an army to

Egypt to re-establish their authority in case there was ever any need. In the

1830s Mehmet Ali, had sent his army in the opposite direction. The major

objection, however, was that the Isthmus of Suez provided an excellent bulwark

against encroachment, by any European power, especially the French, into the

Indian Ocean. A canal across the Isthmus of Suez, he feared, would increase the

influence of France from the Levant to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. He

feared that in the event of outbreak of any war, such a canal would enable

France to send its warships from Toulon to the Indian Ocean on this interior line

of communication in five weeks, as against ten weeks taken by British warships

from Portsmouth via the Cape.

138

Britons increasingly remembered the French

wars, especially the Egyptian expedition of 1798. Besides, since 1830, France

had improved its army faster than any other European power by developing

improved artillery. The French had also been training the army of Mehmet Ali

in Egypt and that of Ranjit Singh, the Maharaja of Punjab, in the Indian

subcontinent. The situation seemed grim enough to cause invasion scares in

1844 and 1852.

139

Palmerston believed that the Canal would permanently

destroy the insularity of India and would become a lance in the hand of France

to pierce the armour of Britain. France could seize the canal, close it to British

ships, capture Aden and Mauritius and reach the Malabar Coast. The question

28 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

of ensuring the defence of the Indian Empire was obviously considered more

important than commercial gains flowing from the availability of a shorter sea

route to India.

By 1869, the Suez Canal, twenty-four feet deep and ninety-eight miles long,

was ready. In Britain, its completion was viewed as ‘a national disaster’.

140

Neither the French nor the Khedive of Egypt spared Britain. The decoration at

Port Said everywhere studiously excluded British flags. But Gladstone’s govern-

ment could not ignore its strategic implications. In 1870 his government

appointed a committee of the Cabinet to consider how far the Suez Canal ought

to be regarded as available during wars for the transport of men and stores to

India.

141

As is well known, in 1875 Disraeli was able to purchase a majority of

the shares of the Suez Canal Company. In 1882, when the Liberals were once

again in power under Gladstone, Egypt was ‘occupied temporarily’. Within less

than a decade, the British decided not only to stay on in Egypt but also discov-

ered ‘vital’ interests in the middle of tropical Africa. These developments have

been taken up in the chapters that follow. While opposing the construction of the

Suez Canal, Palmerston made efforts to improve the overland route by laying

railway lines from Alexandria to Suez. This offered the advantage of rapid

communication and, at the same time, of preserving the isthmian barrier. It was

the French who, fearing that it would give a say to Britain in Egyptian affairs,

opposed the project. Nevertheless, the line was commenced in 1851. By 1857 the

line from Alexandria to Cairo was ready.

142

The railway line over the remaining

twenty-five miles to Suez was laid subsequently.

To the east of the Isthmus lay the Red Sea. The desire to have control over

the entire route made the British government take interest in this lap of the route

as well. Mehmet Ali’s conquests in Arabia had drawn the attention of the British

government to the need to rivet its position in this area. An expedition was sent

to Aden in southern Arabia and this port was occupied in January 1839. The

absence of any strong power on the shores of the Red Sea made Palmerston

take interest in the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in the African

horn on the western shores of the Red Sea. In 1847 he appointed a consul for

Abyssinia with a view to protecting the sea route to India and establishing a

Westernised client state there.

143

In 1867, an expedition was sent to Abyssinia

apparently to rescue the British mission there. But it was the country’s geograph-

ical location on the route to India which made Britain take such interest there.

The British government did not ignore even the ‘alternative route’ via Syria

and Mesopotamia. It was believed that at the height of the south-west monsoon,

when the weather caused difficulties for ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian

Sea, the Persian Gulf could be used. The British, therefore, sought monopoly

over the Gulf and the littoral areas flanking it to the north, the south and the

west. By the 1870s, the idea of a Baghdad railway extending to the Persian Gulf,

or all the way to India, was slowly but surely evolving. During the summer of

1870, a number of surveys for a possible railway line were carried on in the

mountains of the Syrian hinterland, and in July 1871, a Select Committee of the

House was appointed ‘to examine and report upon the whole subject of railway

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 29

communications between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Persian

Gulf.

144

The subject was taken up not because of commercial considerations but

because it would ‘strengthen our hold on India’.

145

But at the turn of the

century when Germany began plans for a Berlin–Baghdad railway, the project

was seen as a threat to the security of the Indian Empire.

Britain’s foreign policy and the government of India

The British Empire in India was governed as a distinct unit. It was too massive

ever to fall under the aegis of the Colonial Office. Until 1858, it was governed

through the East India Company. It was a chartered company and the charter of

the company came for renewal before the British government every twenty

years. The real power lay with the Board of Control, which was an organ of the

British government. The company’s chief officer in India was the Governor-

General. After the Revolt of 1857–8, the charter of the company was revoked

and territories and property of the East India Company were taken over by the

British government. It appointed the head of the Indian Empire, who was there-

after called the viceroy (the direct representative of British king or queen) and

the Governor-General of India. In Britain, a new cabinet position was created,

that of Secretary of State for India.

146

He was made responsible for matters

relating to the Indian Empire. Like all ministers, he was assisted by a parliamen-

tary under-secretary and a permanent under-secretary and also by a special

body called ‘The Council of India’.

The Council of India was an advisory body and consisted mainly of retired

Anglo-Indian administrators.

147

Its members had the right to study, evaluate and

help formulate despatches between India and Britain. It also possessed financial

sanction on loans and expenditure. But in matters relating to declaration of war,

conclusion of peace or negotiating with Asian states and rulers, the Secretary of

State was not bound to solicit its advice. Its opinion was valued because its

members were experts having first-hand knowledge of India. The members of

the Political Committee of the India Council had access to secret papers and

often exercised more influence than others. The actual influence of the India

Council varied from time to time, depending on the expertise and personalities

of the members or the inclinations of the current Secretary of State. It could be

very influential when the policies it advocated chimed with the policies of the

government of the time as happened during the late 1870s.

148

It is notable that

some policy makers had intimate knowledge of matters relating to British diplo-

macy as well as India because of the top positions they had occupied. At least

two Foreign Ministers of Britain had first hand experience of Indian affairs.

Salisbury, who remained in charge of foreign affairs for some twelve years, had

been the India Secretary twice, during 1867 and 1874–8. Similarly, Lansdowne,

who conducted foreign affairs during the crucial period from 1900 to 1905, had

been the Governor-General of India from 1888 to 1894. Conversely, two of the

Governors-General had been closely associated with diplomacy: Dufferin had

been ambassador at Constantinople and then at St Petersburg, while Charles

30 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

Hardinge had been permanent under-secretary at Whitehall and then ambas-

sador at St Petersburg. This created space for appreciation of Britain’s interests

vis-à-vis India at the top level.

In the Indian Empire, about 60 per cent of territory was directly under the

charge of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. Towards the end of the

nineteenth century this territory was divided into eight provinces headed by

governors or chief commissioners. In the rest of India, there were over 550

states, which were called the ‘Native States’ or the ‘Princely States’. Each of

these was nominally under an Indian head of state who recognised British

sovereignty, which was variously defined at various times. The actual authority of

the British rested on their demonstrated capacity for military intervention. The

British government of India controlled these states through officials called resi-

dents, who were placed in the courts of these ‘native’ states.

Generations of historians have argued that the strategic and political needs of

the British in Europe were different from, and occasionally in conflict with, those

of India and that the government of India enjoyed considerable liberty of action

especially in determining relations with other states in Asia. Phillip Darby, for

instance, points out that ‘India was an empire in its own right, and pursued an

imperial policy within its own sphere’.

149

Three types of explanations are

advanced in this connection. First, the distance between Britain and India

enabled the government of India to act in its own way either by calculated

design or inadvertently. Secondly, ‘the man on the spot’ tended to act in such

ways as not to leave much choice to the authorities at London.

150

Even the intro-

duction of telegraphic communication, it is held, did not make much of a

difference in this respect. Finally, it is argued, that the execution of policies in

any case lay with the government at Calcutta, and that the government of India

maintained direct relations with the states in the neighbourhood such as

Afghanistan, Tibet, Burma, Persia and the states in the Persian Gulf region.

151

In practice, however, the government of India could enjoy only limited power.

It was a subordinate government, an arm of the government at London. The

mere hierarchy of power ensured that in case of differences, views of the

government at London would prevail.

152

Moreover, once it was recognised that

Britain would cease to be a world power if it ceased to possess India, the ques-

tion of retaining the Raj became one of national interest. This created essential

unity of purpose and harmony between the authorities in London and

Calcutta/Delhi. For this purpose, the Foreign Office, the India Office, the War

Office, the government of India and the Committee of Imperial Defence care-

fully and systematically sifted and exchanged opinions and information

regarding Russia’s plans, actions and military potentialities. The government of

India was always consulted. All defence proposals emanating from India were

reviewed by a joint committee of the India Office and War Office and then

submitted to the Prime Minister and, after 1902, to the Committee of Imperial

Defence. But, in the end, it was the decision of the government at London that

prevailed. This happened in decisions on Cyprus in 1878, Tibet in 1903 and the

Anglo-Russian entente in 1907. It might be added that though the opinion of

Constructing Britain’s foreign policy 31

the government of India was often set aside with impunity, every conceivable

expense relating to foreign policy and strategic matters was paid out of the

revenues from India.

153

Britons did not perceive any threat to the security of their homeland during the

last decades of the nineteenth century. They wanted to retain their status as a

great power, for which maintenance of the empire was very important. In this

empire, India had an overwhelming presence. From the time parts of India

passed under the British, control over the Indian Empire was considered non-

negotiable. Given the distance between Britain and India, it was as important to

control the routes to India. The need to safeguard the frontiers of India and the

routes thereto became an unquestioned axiom of British foreign policy. Imperial

commitments, however, did not eliminate the importance of European connec-

tions. If the situation in Europe became unfavourable, it would have been

difficult to keep busy in distant lands. And whenever activities of the European

powers affected Britain’s Indian connection, relations with these powers were

bound to be affected. In the chapters that follow, an attempt has been made to

analyse the subtleties of the connections that existed between Britain and the

European states with a view to analysing the pressures imposed on British

foreign policy by the need to guard their Koh-i-noor.

32 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

In the early 1870s, when the Liberals were in power, a feeling was abroad that

Britain was not playing the role commensurate with its standing in the world.

The ‘failure’ to mediate in the Franco-Prussian War, to prevent Russia’s denunci-

ation of the Black Sea clauses and to modify the results of the Alabama

arbitration

all appeared to be instances of Britain’s spineless policies, self-efface-

ment or passivity. The grant of responsible government to the Australian

colonies in 1857, the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867 and the grant

of responsible government to Cape Colony in 1872 had increased the disquiet.

At the same time, the advance of Russia in Central Asia seemed to bring a

powerful European state menacingly nearer the frontiers of the Indian Empire.

Many began to argue that the Liberal recipes of laissez aller, non-intervention in

European affairs and ‘dismantling’ of the empire would not do. Even some

Liberals began to share these views. By this time, the Reform Act of 1867 had

enfranchised one out of every three male adults in Britain and had thus doubled

the electorate.

Benjamin Disraeli, the leader of the Conservative Party, who is often

described as ‘the arch tactician’, sensed that political capital could be made out

of the rising tide of criticism of the ‘spineless’ policies of the Liberal govern-

ment. He also appreciated that if Toryism was to survive in the days of

extension of franchise, it was essential for it to take up issues that would fascinate

the masses. He picked up the imperial theme, which enabled the Conservatives

to project their party as an epitome of the spirit of patriotism and glories of the

empire. In his speeches of 1872, he remoulded the image of the party. He

projected the Conservative Party as a national party which would strive to main-

tain the traditional institutions, uphold the empire of England and alleviate the

condition of the people. In the famous speech delivered at Free Trade Hall in

Manchester in April 1872, which has been regarded as one of the great

moments of Victorian rhetoric, he exhorted his audience to be proud of the fact

that the Queen of England had become ‘the sovereign of the most powerful of

the Oriental states’. He added that ‘there never was a moment in our history

when the power of England was so great and her resources so vast and inex-

haustible’. He expressed his conviction that the possession of a vast empire

should influence the standing of Britain in the hierarchy of nations. Towards

2 Flaunting the Indian

Empire, 1874–80

Europe he promised ‘a policy of reserve, but proud reserve’.

A little later, in

June, in his speech at the Crystal Palace in South London, he offered the voters

glory along with reforms. ‘The working class of England …are for maintaining

the greatness of the kingdom and the empire’, he said. He criticised the Liberals

for working deliberately and continuously for the disintegration of the empire.

He also indicted them for depicting India as an ‘incubus’ and for persuading the

nation to abandon India, despite the fact that India had been shown ‘with

precise, with mathematical demonstration to be the most costly jewel in the

Crown of England’.

The Conservatives in power

In the elections held in 1874 the Conservatives got a resounding victory. Disraeli

formed the government that continued until 1880. He regarded foreign policy as

the most important and the fascinating task of a statesman. He held that Britain

should follow sturdier and more forthright diplomacy and, in the process, stand

forth as the diplomatic leader of Europe. Throughout his period of office,

external events remained in the forefront of the national agenda. He strove to

make Britain act like a great European power as well as a great imperial power.

In the process, he gave new content to the concern for empire in which he

believed India had a special place. He unabashedly flaunted Britain’s possession

of the Indian Empire before the European nations with a view to strengthening

Britain’s voice in international forums. In conducting relations with the European

powers, he was careful to ensure the safety of routes to India and the frontiers of

India. This was the time when the word ‘imperialism’ had just entered British

political vocabulary. Until 1880 it was still regarded as neologism. Disraeli used

the words ‘empire’ and ‘imperium’ repeatedly in his speeches and manifestos.

But ‘imperialism’ did not yet connote a policy of territorial expansion. When

Gladstone and other Liberals spoke of ‘Beaconsfieldian imperialism’, the word

stood for greater activity of the Conservative government in European interna-

tional affairs and especially for Disraeli’s growing interest in the Indian Empire.

A comment on the controversy over Disraeli’s attitude towards colonies would

not be out of place here. At one stage, Disraeli had described the colonies as

‘millstones around our necks’ and as ‘dead weights’. It has been argued that, in

1872, being the archetypal opportunist that he was, he craftily annexed the

empire sentiment to the Conservative Party.

Towards the Indian Empire,

however, his views seem to have remained consistent. Even R. Koebner and

H.D. Schmidt, who describe Disraeli’s famous Crystal Palace speech as ‘a piece

of demagogic self-advertisement’, accept that ‘the only element in Disraeli’s

advocacy of the British empire, which was really of long standing was his belief

in the importance of the Indian Empire’.

It was in 1842 that Disraeli, at that

time a Tory backbencher, spoke in Parliament on the Indian Empire question for

the first time. The Afghan War had just ended in ignominious failure. In a

scathing criticism of the government, he said that if Russia did indeed pose a

threat to the Indian Empire then it had not done enough; it should have declared

34 Flaunting the Indian Empire

war both in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Describing the Indian Empire as ‘a

part of England’, he said that the difficulties of the Company in Central Asia

were England’s difficulties.

During the Revolt of 1857, Disraeli delivered a three

hour speech in the House of Commons in which he presented his analysis of the

causes of the Great Revolt. He said that the decline and fall of empires could not

be affairs of greased cartridges.

He also expressed his belief that the possession

of India conferred economic strength on Britain. Britain could use it as a

weapon to force other countries to reduce tariff duties. In its dealings with the

United States, Britain could threaten to import cotton from India; with Russia

Indian flax, hemp and tallow; and with Brazil, Indian sugar and coffee.

The beginning of Disraeli’s imperialism has been allocated to the Abyssinian

campaign of 1867. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House

of Commons, he had encouraged the sending of this expedition to rescue British

captives there and thus assert Britain’s position as a great power. This was also the

time when the government was facing a domestic crisis on the question of parlia-

mentary reform and, therefore, wanted popular support. Historians have debated

whether the two events were coincidental or consequential, or whether it was

subordinate officials who forced the hands of the government.

But the Indian

connection cannot be denied. At least, since the 1840s, the Foreign Office had

been engaged in episodic struggle to secure Britain’s strategic interests in

Abyssinia. This expedition to Abyssinia has to be situated in this context. It is

notable that the members of Parliament gave sanction to the expenditure incurred

‘obediently enough’.

In the press the news of its success was received with enthu-

siasm and bombast. The ready approval of Parliament and the press had much to

do with the strategic importance of this state on the route to India.

The main headings under which Britain’s foreign policy during 1874–80 is

generally presented read as follows: purchase of the shares of the Suez Canal

Company, the assumption of title of Empress of India by the Queen, Britain and

the Near Eastern Crisis, role in the Congress of Berlin, the Second Afghan War

and the South African War. It is worth noting, however, that the bottom line in each

case was concern for the frontiers of India or the routes to India. In describing his

policy as not just of ‘reserve’ but ‘proud reserve’, Disraeli underlined that any

policy of aloofness from continental entanglements was to flow from a conscious-

ness of Britain’s strength. He gave new content to British foreign policy by claiming

weight in the Council of Europe by virtue of Britain’s possession of a vast empire.

Britain had found the existence of Dreikaisersbund of Germany, Russia and

Austria very uncomfortable. It created a formidable front of the three monar-

chical states not only against the forces of disruption but also for diplomatic

co-operation. It seemed to highlight the elevation of Russia and the isolation of

Britain. In 1875, Disraeli got the opportunity to demonstrate that the British

government was not ready to stand aloof from international affairs any longer.

Since 1871, there had been recurrent rumours about a German assault on

France. By 1874, France seemed to be recovering economically from the wounds

of 1870–1 and reports were reaching Berlin about military preparations being

made in France. At this stage, during the first half of 1875, some inflammatory

Flaunting the Indian Empire 35

articles appeared in the German press suggesting that Germany was contem-

plating a pre-emptive invasion of France. Whether or not Bismarck inspired

these articles has not been finally established, but it led Disraeli to join Russia in

expressing concern in Berlin about these rumours. Bismarck denied any inten-

tion of molesting France and blamed German newspapers for the whole affair.

He also gave assurances of the peaceful intentions of Germany.

With this, the

war scare evaporated. Thus, without any risk or cost, Disraeli was able to

demonstrate the changed tone of Britain’s foreign policy. The co-operation with

Russia stimulated Disraeli’s imagination and he began to think in terms of an

agreement between Britain and Russia.

Share in the Suez Canal

Disraeli took a more sensational initiative in the imperial arena by arranging the

purchase of the shares of the Suez Canal. Britain had opposed the construction

of the Canal primarily because it was likely to expose its Indian Empire to the

warships of European powers.

Later, Britain had refused to take up any shares.

De Lesseps, resentful of Britain’s treatment of him, continually made trouble by

raising the dues charged to British shipping. By the time the Conservatives came

to power, it was apparent that the decision not to buy the shares of the Suez

Canal had been a mistake. Since the Canal was there, it seemed best to safe-

guard British interests by participating in decisions governing the Canal.

By 1875, the pecuniary embarrassments of the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail

Pasha, reached such a state that he faced the prospect of having to raise some

four million pounds by 30 November 1875. He sought a purchaser for his shares.

For this purpose, he commenced negotiations to sell his shares. Disraeli came to

know of this. He masterminded the affair with considerable skill. Without autho-

risation from Parliament, he was able to arrange the sum through his friendship

with the Rothschilds, the most international of all banking houses. He bought up

the entire stock and thus made Britain the largest single shareholder. He got full

support from the Queen, the Prince of Wales, the Governor-General of India

and the entire Cabinet. In the country, the purchase provoked general surprise at

first; then, after some hesitation, it was welcomed as a national triumph.

The

step was regarded as an emphatic assertion of British power before European

countries which had grown too accustomed to ignoring Britain. The question

was not just one of retrieving national honour. In Parliament, Disraeli recom-

mended the purchase not as ‘a financial investment’; but as ‘a political

transaction’ on the ground that it ‘secures to us a highway to our Indian Empire

and other dependencies’.

It is significant that the House of Commons, too,

voted money without a division.

Parading the Indian connection

To flaunt the Indian connection and to underline the centrality of empire for

Britain, Disraeli arranged the visit of the Prince of Wales to India. The Prince

36 Flaunting the Indian Empire

had set his heart on such a visit and Disraeli approved of the idea, believing that

the ceremonial aspect and personal contact would make Britain and India more

aware of each other. But there was the problem of providing funds for the

purpose. As Disraeli put it to Salisbury after visiting the Queen at Windsor, ‘He

has not a shilling: she will not give him one’.

It is significant that the House of

Commons sanctioned £52,000 for the round trip for the prince and his party, to

which the government of India was to contribute, and £60,000 for his personal

expenses, with minimum of difficulty.

In 1876 the government decided that Queen Victoria should be proclaimed

the ‘Empress of India’. The idea had been mooted in 1858 when the govern-

ment had issued the ‘Proclamation’ to the people of India announcing the end of

the East India Company and the taking over of the administration of India by

the Crown. When King William of Prussia took the title of Emperor of

Germany in 1871, the idea began to take definite shape in the Queen’s mind.

Disraeli took up the issue and introduced the Royal Titles Bill in the House of

Commons. It was presented as an omission from the Government of India Act

of 1858. In the House, justifying the decision, Disraeli argued that such a procla-

mation would serve notice on Europe that India was of major importance to

Britain and that the parliament of England was determined to uphold the

empire.

The House did not oppose the contents of the bill, though there was

opposition on a purely constitutional aspect.

In a darbar held at Delhi on 1

January 1877, Queen Victoria was proclaimed the ‘Empress of India’ with all

possible ceremony. The jubilant Queen held a small dinner to celebrate the

occasion, where she made it a point to wear only the jewellery that had been

presented to her by Indian rulers.

In the public mind, her elevation to the posi-

tion of Empress of India marked her transformation from ‘petulant widow to

imperial matriarch’. Thereafter, the monarchy became increasingly associated

with imperial imagery.

The crisis in the Near East

Revolt in the Balkans

In July 1875 there was a revolt in the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, which speedily ignited the century-old Eastern Question. There

was popular sympathy for the rebels in Serbia and Montenegro, which threat-

ened to drive these two states into conflict with the Ottomans. There was a wave

of sympathy for them amongst the Pan-Slavs in Russia. Even Austria-Hungary

could not remain indifferent, not only because it stood to lose by the success of

nationalist principle in its vicinity, but also because thousands of Serbs and

Croats were entering its borders. All British governments had shown grave

concern about happenings in this region. Disraeli was determined to safeguard

Britain’s well-known interests and, in the process, make the continent hear

Britain’s voice.

The general opinion in European chancelleries was that if nothing was done,

Flaunting the Indian Empire 37

the insurrection would spread. European powers, therefore, made efforts to bring

about a settlement between the Porte and its subjects by suggesting changes in

various aspects of the administrative policies of the Ottomans. Towards the end

of December 1875, the Dreikaisersbund powers prepared a joint programme of

‘reforms’ to be carried out by the Ottoman government in the rebellious

provinces which became known as ‘the Andrassy Note’, named after the

Austrian Foreign Minister. It was circulated to other European powers. France

gave ready support, while the adhesion of Britain was tardy and lukewarm. The

effort came to nothing because the Ottoman government did not make any

serious effort to implement the programme and the insurgents were in no mood

to accept any compromise solution.

When these proposals for compromise between the Porte and the rebels

seemed to fail, Bismarck made offers of an understanding to Britain three times

in the four weeks of January 1876.

There is difference of opinion amongst

historians as to the motives of Bismarck.

Broadly speaking, it seems that he

wanted to prevent the escalation of the crisis and so offered to oppose or support

the partition of the Ottoman Empire in return for unspecified British support for

Germany. But the British government remained cool towards such suggestions.

One reason, of course, was distrust of Bismarck’s motives. But another, and

more important, reason was that to the Conservative government, the interests

of Britain seemed likely to be better served by continuation of the policy of

maintaining the Ottoman Empire.

Meanwhile, the revolt spread to Bulgaria where the Ottoman government

suppressed it ruthlessly. One more effort was made to resolve the crisis during the

summer of 1876. On a suggestion emanating from Tsar Alexander, the Foreign

Ministers of the three ‘Northern Courts’ met at Berlin during the second week of

May. They worked out another programme of ‘concessions’ to be granted by the

Ottomans to their rebellious subjects. It was sent to London, Paris and Rome,

asking the governments there to say yes or no telegraphically. The British

government rejected the proposal. The ostensible reason was that Britain was

not being treated by Germany, Russia and Austria as an equal partner. This is

obvious from Disraeli’s oft-quoted statement: ‘They are beginning to treat

England as if we were Montenegro or Bosnia’.

But, as historians generally

accept now, Britain’s opposition did not spring merely from issues of procedure

or diplomatic protocol. Nor was Britain’s reaction extemporaneous. The issue

was fully discussed by the ambassadors of Britain, France and Italy at Berlin.

The real objection of the British government was that the Dreikaisersbund

powers had threatened to use force if the Ottoman government did not respond.

In this London saw an attempt, on Russia’s part, to infiltrate south-east Europe

and, possibly, to seize the straits. Disraeli gave vent to his feelings in a letter to the

Queen: ‘Had your Majesty sanctioned the Berlin Memorandum, Constantinople

would at this moment have been garrisoned by Russia and the Turkish fleet

placed under Russian protection’.

Though the British government rejected the Memorandum, it took necessary

precautions. The third paragraph of the Berlin Memorandum had suggested

38 Flaunting the Indian Empire

that in case the plan did not succeed all the powers should come to an agreement

upon the naval measures to be taken for the safety of foreigners and the

Christian subjects of the Porte. The Foreign Office immediately alerted the

Admiralty.

A warning was also issued against violation of agreement on the

straits question. On 24 May, a British fleet was sent to Besika Bay just outside the

Dardanelles. This was not done to strengthen the Ottoman Empire per se. ‘This

was done’, as Disraeli had commented without mincing words, ‘not…to protect

Christians or Turks, but to uphold your Majesty’s Empire’.

At Constantinople,

the arrival of the British fleet was welcomed by the Ottomans as proof of the

fact that Britain was on their side. This encouraged them to stick to the defiant

posture they had adopted. Meanwhile, the governments of Serbia and

Montenegro came under tremendous pressure from the people to intervene,

which increased noticeably with each failure of the European powers to force the

Ottomans to grant concessions. In June, Sultan Abdul Aziz died under myste-

rious circumstances. This resulted in confusion and uncertainty at

Constantinople and fostered a rebellious mood. On 30 June 1876, Serbia

declared war, followed by Montenegro the next day. Thereafter, the question

before the European powers was not just of pacifying the Balkan Christians but

of preventing further spread of war. In this situation, Russia and Austria carried

on talks alternately contemplating possibilities both of an Ottoman victory over

Serbia and of an Ottoman defeat.

Disraeli had hoped to rally the country behind the ‘national policy’ of

sustaining the Ottoman Empire. But, by July, reports began to spread in Europe

of the atrocities committed by the Ottoman army. This produced a powerful

revulsion against the Ottoman government. In Britain, Gladstone, who had

ceased to take interest in politics after his defeat in 1874, saw in the events in the

Balkans an opportunity to stage a comeback by stirring ‘national conscience’

against atrocities perpetrated by the Turks in Bulgaria. He was supported by

other Liberals and Radicals, who began to portray Russia as the champion of

the maltreated and misgoverned people fighting for their freedom. In a pamphlet

that appeared on 6 September 1876 under the title ‘Bulgarian Horrors and the

Question of the East’, Gladstone denounced the Conservatives for supporting

the Ottoman government which had followed barbarous policies to suppress the

Bulgar insurgents and projected Russia as the protector of Balkan Christians.

Public indignation against the Turks reached such a pitch that 200,000 copies of

this pamphlet were sold in a month. Gladstone kept public temperature running

high with fiery speeches. Subsequently, correspondents reached the war front

and sent reports on the plight of Serb and Bosnian refugees, which were

published in British journals. This added fuel to the humanitarian flame.

Meanwhile, in the Balkans, Serbia was not faring well. In this situation, Pan-

Slav volunteers began to leave Russia to join the insurgents. The government at

St Petersburg came under tremendous pressure to intervene. During the autumn,

the Ottoman army defeated the Serbs and was set to occupy the Serbian capital,

Belgrade. The British government became anxious that the Russian government,

calculating that ‘the atrocities agitation’ had emasculated London’s ability to

Flaunting the Indian Empire 39

retaliate, might declare war on Turkey. This would have increased the influence

of Russia tremendously. London became so alarmed at this stage that Disraeli,

Salisbury and Lytton, the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India, began to

think in terms of opening a front against Russia in Central Asia.

Finally, the

Russian government issued an ultimatum that forced the Ottoman government

to retreat. An armistice followed.

In this background, Disraeli promoted the idea of a conference of European

powers. Ultimately, such a conference was held in Constantinople from 23

December 1876 to 20 January 1877. The aim was to reconcile the Balkan

peoples to Ottoman rule by removing their well-grounded grievances. The Porte

agreed to participate in this conference only after Britain threatened to abandon

it to its fate in case it became involved in a war with Russia. Salisbury, at that

time the Secretary of State for India, represented Britain. On 23 December, the

day the conference began, the Sultan startled the representatives by promul-

gating a constitution on his own. However, the conference continued. Salisbury

tried to negotiate with Russia on the basis of division of the province of

Bulgaria into two autonomous units, but his efforts did not bear fruit because of

disagreement amongst the powers on the composition of the foreign military

force for occupation of these provinces and because Midhat, the Grand Vazier,

made it clear that the Ottomans would not ‘commit suicide’ by agreeing to the

dismemberment of the empire. It is significant that Salisbury’s brief also

included an exchange of views with Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador at

Constantinople, for working out a settlement to ensure the security of the north

west frontier of the Indian Empire.

When the Constantinople conference

seemed to fail, the chief regret of Salisbury was that prospects of a deal with

Ignatieff over Central Asia would also fail. So important was this issue for the

British government that D.R. Gillard comments ‘for this Salisbury would have

gladly sacrificed the Turks’.

During the Constantinople Conference, when efforts to revamp the Ottoman

Empire did not seem to succeed, both Disraeli and Salisbury contemplated the

possibility of partitioning the empire. Disraeli thought of negotiating with

Austria to this end. He also discussed the question with Shuvalov, the Russian

ambassador at London.

Salisbury began to see many virtues in this policy. He

wrote to Lytton that a partition would allow the Powers to achieve the ends for

which they had continually to intrigue and quarrel at Constantinople.

He even

asked certain military and technical experts to examine and prepare a note on

important strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean which could be occu-

pied to protect Britain’s interests in case the Ottoman Empire was partitioned.

It might be pointed out that this feeling in favour of partition of the Ottoman

Empire was not the result of the atrocities’ agitation. This shift in attitude was

the result of the growing conviction that the nutritious diet of loans had failed to

revamp ‘the sick man’ and that the Ottoman government would not be able to

stem Russia’s advance.

The European Great Powers failed to make the Porte

accept their proposals. On 20 January 1877, the Congress broke up in defeat.

By the beginning of 1877, it seemed certain that Russia would declare war on

40 Flaunting the Indian Empire

Turkey. Russia started negotiations with Austria to ensure the latter’s neutrality.

In any such war, Russia was sure to be victorious. No British government had

ever remained indifferent to any such eventuality. Britain had the most fervent

desire to prevent Russia from advancing, but it lacked the military resources to

do so. Its position on the continent too was unenviable. France, its ally during the

Crimean War, was now relatively impotent and was in any case, intensely

annoyed with Britain because of the latter’s purchase of the Khedive’s shares of

the Suez Canal. Italy, though sympathetic, was too weak to be of any conse-

quence. Germany, Austria and Russia, though far from being in complete

harmony, were sufficiently united to ignore Britain’s views.

The government

was very conscious of its lack of military resources. In June 1877, Salisbury, who

had become Foreign Secretary, wrote to Lytton: ‘Russia knows perfectly well that

she is unassailable by us…There is absolutely no point at which we could attack

her with any chance of doing serious injury…The result, of course, is that

Russia being unassailable by our arms, is deaf to our diplomacy and remon-

strances upon the subject of her advance in Asia have become a trite and not

very edifying Foreign Office norm.’

Even if the British government had the

military resources and necessary support from other powers, it seemed politically

inexpedient to make any attempt to establish its own control over

Constantinople. Muslims all over the world looked upon the Sultan of Turkey as

their Khalifa. Any policy of annihilation of Turkey would have outraged the

feelings of Muslims in India. Lytton even warned that the resentment of

Muslims would be shared by the Hindus and that any attempt to fight the Turks

would compel the British to depend on the power of the sword amidst a hostile

people enormously outnumbering them.

No such risk could be taken because

the memories of the Revolt of 1857 were still fresh.

In this situation London came to accept once again that only a Turkish break-

water could stem the tide of Russia’s expansion towards the Straits and that it

was best to sustain Turkey’s control on conditions that suited Britain. As Layard,

the ambassador at Constantinople, wrote to Salisbury a little later: ‘I believe that

even now she [Turkey] would offer a stronger bulwark against Russia than any

state or combination of states that could be formed out of Turkey in Europe’.

All talk of partition was given up. It is extremely interesting that even the British

public did an about-face on this issue. The people, who had lapped up 200,000

copies of Gladstone’s first pamphlet on Bulgarian atrocities during September-

October 1876, purchased only 7,000 copies of his second pamphlet which was

published in January 1877.

Gladstone’s brilliant and innovative campaign

hardly had any impact on foreign policy. The Russians no longer seemed to be

the self-sacrificing apostles of ‘civilisation’ as was the case only four months

earlier. Feelings against Russia became so intense that Gladstone had his

windows broken for his pains.

At the official level, in view of the importance of

the stakes involved, there was such panic that in mid-April Disraeli complained

that there were twelve members and seven policies in the Cabinet.

He avoided

summoning a meeting of the Cabinet until he could reconcile the varied and

opposing opinions of his colleagues.

Flaunting the Indian Empire 41

Russo-Turkish War

On 24 April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. Britain lost no time in issuing

a proclamation of neutrality. The Ottoman government viewed this as an exhibi-

tion of narrow selfishness and continued to nurse the fear that Britain would

participate in a European partition of Turkey.

But Britain’s proclamation was

accompanied by an important proviso: ‘so long as Turkish interests alone were

involved’. ‘Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread’, the British

government made it clear that there were interests which it was ‘equally bound

and determined to defend’. These interests were specified as ‘the communication

between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal, Egypt, Constantinople, naviga-

tion of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf ’.

Kenneth

Bourne comments that England ‘still had some interests for which he [Disraeli]

believed she ought ultimately to fight’.

This is a chronic understatement.

British interests in the whole region that linked Britain to the Indian Empire

were perceived as so important that throughout the Russo-Turkish War, virtual

panic permeated the British ruling elite when Russia seemed to succeed and

there was a matching sense of relief when the Turks were able to stop the

advance of Russia.

Initially Russia performed well. By June it looked as if the Russian army

would establish its sway over the Ottoman Empire within a month. During this

period Disraeli struggled to get the consent of his colleagues for taking steps to

prevent Russia from reaching Gallipoli or Constantinople. He advocated a policy

of reinforcing the fleet and strengthening the garrison at Malta. He tried to

persuade Gathorne Hardy, the Secretary of State for War, to send an army to

occupy Gallipoli so as to stop Russia from reaching the Dardanelles. He also

expressed his anxiety to Salisbury that Russia might reach Constantinople before

the English could establish themselves at the Dardanelles. Finally, at the end of

June, a British fleet was sent to Besika Bay at the mouth of the Dardenelles.

In July, the Turkish army was able to halt the advance of the Russian army.

Turkish generals won a series of victories and prevented the Tsar’s army from

proceeding beyond Plevna in northern Bulgaria. At this stage tensions within the

Cabinet eased. But, on 10 December, after a siege of 143 days, Russia was able

to break the resistance of the Ottoman army. On 4 January Russian troops

entered Sofia. By 20 January they were in Adrianople. After this, alarm in

Britain reached serious proportions once again. Britain was not ready to watch

while Russia seemed all set to march unhindered to Constantinople. At this stage

the Cabinet united behind the Prime Minister to a degree that had not been

possible for two years. The issues arising out of Russia’s advance towards the

Straits were discussed at the stormy meetings of the Cabinet on 21 and 22

January. So nervous were the Ministers at the prospect that they decided to take

drastic steps. These included sending a fleet through the Dardanelles, negoti-

ating an alliance with Austria and summoning Parliament to obtain a £6 million

vote of credit. The debate was held in both Houses of Parliament during the

first week of February and continued for four days. Finally, the motion on the

vote of credit was carried, as many as 328 members voting for the motion and

42 Flaunting the Indian Empire

only 204 against. Many Liberals voted with the government.

During the

debate, discussing the policy of the government Sir Strafford Northcote, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, spelled out three objects: maintenance of the

commercial freedom of the Black Sea, durable settlement of the Turkish

provinces and preventing ‘any power from establishing itself in a position

dangerous to our route to India’.

Meanwhile an armistice was signed between Russia and Turkey on 31

January 1878, the official version of which reached London on 5 or 6

February.

This did not ease the tension. In Britain the feeling remained that

Russia might be duping both Britain and the Porte in an attempt to establish

control over almost defenceless Constantinople. During February and March,

peace between Russia and Britain hung by a very thin thread. In view of polit-

ical uncertainty and suspicion of Russia, war fever gripped Britain. There were

public demonstrations throughout the country expressing a ‘patriotic’ aversion to

Russia and support for Her Majesty’s ministers. In the first week of February a

pro-war crowd including many workingmen ‘created a disturbance for several

hours’ near the Cannon Street Station in London. The crowd then marched to

the Guildhall waving Union Jacks and singing patriotic songs.

So intense was

the feeling against Russia that police protection had to be provided for Gladstone

to save him from ‘patriotic mobs’.

British interests and ‘Imperial interests’

became popular phrases. This was the period of the famous music hall song

which added the word ‘jingoism’ to British vocabulary.

Despite support from the public and Parliament, the government found it

difficult to formulate and execute a straightforward policy. Disraeli repeatedly

urged the Cabinet to sanction the occupation of Gallipoli. During this period,

the British fleet remained in the Sea of Marmora. During February, orders were

given for the fleet to be moved up to Constantinople three times in three

weeks.

This hesitation and vacillation

on the part of the government and the

panic that gripped the country were indicative of the intensity of the stakes

involved. In fact, these are the most visible instances of offensive operations. The

British squadron did not fire a shot while stationed off Constantinople, but the

British were conscious that its very presence there was a check on Russia. On 16

February the British Cabinet decided to advance a loan to Austria to enable it to

mobilise a sufficient force on its frontier.

Badly short of cash, the Turkish

government sold four vessels being built in Britain. Disraeli’s government bought

three of these with funds provided by Parliament in order to prevent them from

falling into the hands of any other power ‘by appeasement or treachery’.

By the last week of February the Russian army had reached San Stefano,

some ten kilometres from Constantinople. On 3 March, a treaty was signed there

between the Russian and Turkish governments. Under the terms of this treaty

Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro were made fully independent states; the first

two were considerably augmented in size. Bosnia and Herzegovina were made

autonomous states. Bulgaria was considerably enlarged and was made a tribu-

tary to the Ottoman ruler; it was to enjoy full autonomy under a Christian

government and was to have a national militia. The Russian government was to

Flaunting the Indian Empire 43

supervise the establishment of the new regime and to occupy Bulgaria for up to

two years. In the Asiatic parts of the Ottoman Empire, Russia claimed Ardahan,

Batum and Kars. The Ottoman government was made to pledge ‘reforms’ in

Armenia.

Britain reacted virulently. The entire course of the Russo-Turkish War had

demonstrated not just the weakness of Turkey but the determination of Russia

to expand. This reinforced Britain’s desire to sustain the Ottoman Empire as a

barrier against Russia’s expansion over the area around Constantinople and

Asiatic Turkey. Even before the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were offi-

cially conveyed to London, the British government let it be known that at least

some of its terms would have to be submitted to the scrutiny and approval of the

Great Powers. Throughout March, with Russian troops ringed around

Constantinople and with the British fleet within the Sea of Marmora, the atmo-

sphere in Britain remained charged. British reservists were mobilised, war loans

were approved and the First British Army Corps embarked on troops trans-

porters for Malta. On 27 March, Disraeli persuaded the Cabinet to summon to

the Mediterranean a large body of Indian troops to add weight to Britain’s

voice.

In April 1878, Salisbury made Britain’s objections to this Treaty unequivo-

cally clear in a circular to the European powers. He argued that the cumulative

effect of this treaty would be substitution of the influence and control of Russia

alone in regions where Britain was unwilling to see Russia in a position of ascen-

dency.

This region covered the flank of the Straits, the Persian Gulf and the

Suez Canal. This despatch was communicated to Parliament and flashed in

newspapers all over the continent. The British government objected particularly

to provisions relating to the new state of Bulgaria and to Asiatic Turkey. The

enlarged state of Bulgaria, referred to as ‘Big Bulgaria’ by contemporaries, was

in size almost as big as all the remaining Ottoman possessions in Europe. It was

taken for granted that its administration and garrisons would be in Russian

hands and that it would constitute a Russian sphere of influence. It was found

most objectionable that this state was to extend in the south to the Aegean and in

the east to the Black Sea, thus securing for Russia a double seaboard.

Constantinople was some 150 kilometres from its borders, and it was within easy

military reach of Russia’s own frontiers. Apprehensions were expressed that even

the remainder of the Sultan’s dominions in Europe would not remain in his

hands.

Russia’s acquisitions of Ardahan, Batum and Kars to the east of the Black

Sea seemed to make it virtually the mistress of Turkey’s Asiatic dominions.

Batum was one open port which could give Britain a base on the Black Sea from

where it hoped to implement the strategy of attacking Russia in the trans-

Caspian region.

It was apprehended that these acquisitions would give Russia

control over the Euphrates–Tigris valley and all highways from the Black Sea to

northern Persia. What seemed worse was that Russia could capture parts of

Armenia without inviting opposition from the European powers because this

part of Turkey mattered little to Europe. Layard discussed the question of

44 Flaunting the Indian Empire

Russia’s expansion in Armenia at great length.

He argued that such control

would give Russia command of Asia Minor, Azerbaijan and the

Euphrates–Tigris valley. Russia, in possession of Armenia and with the straits

open to its fleet, would be able to cut off access to India because the Suez was

not always dependable. Sinking a few ships in it could easily block it. Similar

views were expressed by Richard Temple, the Governor of Bombay, in his corre-

spondence with Salisbury.

Layard’s despatches were printed for circulation to

the members of the Cabinet, sent to the India Office and often to the govern-

ment of India and must have influenced the opinions of those responsible for

taking decisions. Besides these strategic calculations, concern for the prestige of

the Raj also entered the calculations of policy makers. A fear was expressed that

in view of Russia’s success, people in Asia, especially Muslims, would begin to

look upon Russia as the coming power. Salisbury said in Parliament a little later

that there was hardly any chance of acquiescence of Indians to British rule once

they knew that Russia’s power was dominant in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.

The British government did not even pretend that the Treaty of San Stefano

was compatible with its interests. Austria too had grievances against this settle-

ment, and made ostentatious preparations to improve its bargaining position.

After the war with Turkey came to an end, the weakness and isolation of Russia

made it difficult for it to resist the demands for a European congress. As early as

25 January 1878, Gorchakov had promised that those aspects of the peace settle-

ment which were of interest to European powers would be decided only by an

agreement between them.

The Ottomans, too, were exhausted and looked

upon Britain as their ‘saviour’. Therefore, Russia agreed to place the treaty

before a congress of European powers.

After considering many venues, it was decided that the Congress would be

held at Berlin. The powers which were signatory to the Paris Treaty of 1856

were invited, including Italy for Sardinia and Germany for Prussia. Bismarck

chaired the Congress, though he was aware that the attempt to mediate between

the two flank powers meant taking sides and hence alienating one of them. One

reason for his accepting the offer was his fear that there might be a war between

Britain and Russia which could escalate into a European conflagration with

consequences that could be unfavourable for Germany. It would have been diffi-

cult for Austria-Hungary to stay out of it. Disraeli and Salisbury attended as

British plenipotentiaries. The basic lines of settlement were worked out in the

preliminary agreements involving Britain, Russia and Austria.

Disraeli staged a coup de tete during the last week of May 1878 when seven

thousand Indian soldiers landed on the island of Malta.

The event created

tremendous excitement among all classes in Britain. The dramatic effect was

enhanced by the fact that the landing began on 25 May, the birthday of the

Queen. The spectacle of the soldiers of their empire landing so near the

European coast flattered the newly enfranchised working class, who perhaps

regarded it as a symbol of their own majesty. The purpose was to demonstrate

that Britain had at its disposal ‘an inexhaustible supply of men’ and hence the

ability to act as a terrene power. Disraeli looked upon it as an answer to ‘the

Flaunting the Indian Empire 45

sneers of our not having any great military force’.

Some Liberals and Radicals

did force a three-day debate on the issue in the Commons, but they were not

questioning the policy which this action represented. The issue they raised was

constitutional: why was Parliament not informed of this expedition before the

beginning of the Easter recess on 18 April? Ultimately, the government won,

with 347 votes in favour and 226 against. Not only were the speeches of the

Liberals less virulent in their condemnation of the government, but many

Liberals voted for the motion. In the division on the supplementary estimates

required for the expedition, Gladstone and Hartington abstained from voting.

The Congress of Berlin

The Berlin Congress began on 13 June 1878 and ended on 13 July the same

year. Under the Settlement the territorial possessions of the Ottomans were

reduced considerably. The independence of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro

were recognised. Austria was allowed to ‘occupy’ Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

powers also accepted the annexation of Bessarbia by Russia, of Thessali and

Epirus by Greece and garrisoning of the Sanjak of Novibazar

by Austria.

From the point of view of Britain, the most important provisions related to

Bulgaria. The state of ‘Big Bulgaria’ created at San Stefano was divided into

three parts: a reduced state of Bulgaria which was to be autonomous, a semi-

autonomous province of eastern Roumelia, and the third part (Macedonia) that

passed under unqualified Turkish rule. By creating a semi-autonomous Eastern

Roumelia, the Balkan mountain range was secured for the Turks as the last

barrier on Russia’s road to Constantinople.

By placing Macedonia under

Turkey, Russia was stopped from reaching the Aegean Sea.

In Asia Minor, Russia stoutly refused to give up control over Batum, Kars and

Ardahan. In the preliminary discussions during the last week of May, Salisbury

had merely succeeded in getting an assurance that the Russian frontier in Asiatic

Turkey would not be further extended. This caused considerable disquietitude in

London. Thereafter, the British government decided to revitalise and strengthen

the hold of the Ottomans over Armenia so as to make it a bulwark against

Russia’s drive towards the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal. On 4 June 1878,

before the Congress of Berlin started, Layard, on instructions from Salisbury,

signed the Convention of Defensive Alliance, better known from its most impor-

tant article as the Cyprus Convention. It provided that if Batum, Kars and

Ardahan were retained by Russia, Britain would defend Turkey’s Asiatic domin-

ions by force of arms. On his part, the Sultan promised to introduce necessary

‘reforms’ for the protection of Christians and other subjects in Armenia. In

order to enable Britain to supervise the execution of ‘reforms’, the Sultan

assigned the island of Cyprus to Britain to be ‘provisionally occupied and

administered’.

In fact, the question of occupying some strategic position in the Near East or

the Middle East was fervently discussed throughout 1877 and the first half of

1878.

The existing Mediterranean base at Malta appeared too far west to be of

46 Flaunting the Indian Empire

much immediate help in a crisis. It seemed desirable to have some place further

East from whence Constantinople and Egypt could be watched.

British

observers in this region – the British ambassador at Constantinople, the political

agent in Turkish Arabia and the chargé d’affairs at Tehran – recommended the

occupation of Mohammarah which was situated some forty kilometres from

Basra.

The British Foreign Office discussed other alternatives including

Alexandretta on the entrance of the Dardanelles, Crete, Lemnos and Mytilene.

The choice finally fell on Cyprus. There were several reasons for this choice.

This island possessed some harbours which, it was thought, could easily be forti-

fied and used as naval and commercial bases.

Militarily too, control over

Cyprus seemed very useful. Russia was expanding in Central Asia. The British

government had always remained uneasy about the fact that because of geo-

political reasons it was not in a position to put military pressure on Russia at any

point. Cyprus could provide the place from where a Russian army, advancing

towards the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal from the headwaters of the Tigris

and Euphrates or from the Caucasus, could be cut into two by the British.

Cyprus was preferable to Malta because it was nearer the scene of likely action.

Disraeli had also calculated that occupation of Cyprus would be useful in case

the need for a military occupation of Egypt arose. As he wrote to the Queen, ‘In

4 and 20 hours, almost in a night, a couple of your Majesty’s ships might carry a

couple of thousand men from that island to Alexandria’.

Salisbury laid so

much stress on the importance of a new base in the Mediterranean that he made

it clear to the Sultan that Britain was prepared to occupy this island whether or

not the Sultan issued the permissive firman. The stakes seemed very high.

Disraeli stated unequivocally in the House of Commons: ‘Our Indian Empire

is…a source of great anxiety, and the time appears to have arrived when, if

possible, we should terminate that anxiety…In taking Cyprus the movement is

not Mediterranean, it is Indian’.

Subsequently, a wing of a battalion was

stationed in Cyprus and the rest at Malta.

Even the insistence on introducing ‘reforms’ in Armenia was a well-calculated

move. It did not stem from any desire to improve the lot of the Christian subjects

of the Porte, or the Armenians in particular. The feeling at Whitehall was that a

discontented population could provide opportunity to Russia to interfere in this

region or even at Constantinople, while contented and loyal people would serve

as a bulwark against Russia’s advance towards the Persian Gulf.

This was the

aim behind giving the unilateral undertaking to defend Turkey’s Asiatic posses-

sions if the Turkish government made efforts to improve the condition of the

people. Besides, it was believed that Britain’s association would show to the

Armenians a stronger flag than the Turkish and would thus ensure their alle-

giance to Ottoman rule and make them resist Russia’s advance.

The

responsibility of defending Turkey’s Asiatic dominions by force of arms was

onerous. Although conditional, such an undertaking did involve an obligation to

go to war should the causus foedris arise.

Britain was not yet entrenched in Egypt.

Therefore, it seemed important that the Anatolia–Mesopotamia region remain

under the Turks. It is significant that until this time the project of a railway on

Flaunting the Indian Empire 47

this ‘alternate route’ had not been abandoned. Such a route could rescue the

British from all the complications arising out of any difficulty with the French or

the eventuality of the Suez route becoming non-functional.

In short, the arrangements relating to Cyprus and Armenia, have to be

viewed together. The aim was to ensure control over the route to the Indian

Empire. So keen was the British government to make this arrangement, that in

order to win French support for the move, it agreed to withdraw its objection to

the extension of French influence from Algeria to Tunis. It may also be

mentioned that in return for this ‘occupation’ Cyprus was made to pay an

annual tribute of £92,000 to the Ottoman ruler though, as Winston Churchill

admitted thirty years later, the Convention was made ‘for our purpose’.

Gladstone termed this Convention ‘an insane covenant’. It is significant that

when he became the Prime Minister, he did not cancel the lease of Cyprus even

after the occupation of Alexandria in 1882.

For the Foreign Office, even the provisions relating to European Turkey,

Armenia and Cyprus did not fully cover every ground of objection to the Treaty

of San Stefano. Without the right to enter the straits, Britain had no means of

adopting the Black Sea strategy of preventing Russia from advancing overland

towards India’s frontiers or to the Persian Gulf. Salisbury tried to get unequiv-

ocal assurance from the Russians that they would not turn Batum into a naval

base.

When Russia showed disinclination to give such an undertaking,

Salisbury began to contemplate an understanding with the Sultan that would

enable British warships to cross the Straits and make use of British naval

supremacy in the Black Sea so as to prevent Russia from expanding.

Under the

London Protocol of 1871, the straits had been closed to warships of all nations.

In his Despatch of 6 May 1877, Derby had described ‘the existing arrange-

ments’ as ‘wise and salutary’.

But by 1878, these seemed inadequate. After a

considerable exchange of views within the Cabinet and with the Ottoman

government, on 11 July 1878, just two days before the Berlin Congress

concluded, a declaration was made concerning the Straits Convention. It stated

that, in any future crisis, Great Britain must be allowed to judge whether the

Sultan was really free enough from foreign control to give or withhold his

consent to a British passage through the straits.

The net result of this declara-

tion was to transfer the decision regarding passage through the straits from

Constantinople to London.

It was thus the British lion that roared at Berlin. At the Congress, Disraeli was

seen as the Prime Minister of a leading country possessing a big empire whose

resources he could use as and when needed. He became a European celebrity.

Crowds followed him as he walked.

On their return to Britain, Disraeli and

Salisbury were welcomed with great fanfare for bringing ‘peace with honour’ and

as ‘the arbiters of the affairs of mankind’. One may wonder whether they

became arbiters, yet the ‘peace’ they had brought with them served Britain’s

purposes well. They had gone there not to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire but to prevent a hostile power from installing itself in this region of

crucial importance to Britain. They made provisions for stalling the advance of

48 Flaunting the Indian Empire

Russia towards Constantinople, the straits, the Mediterranean and the Persian

Gulf. To cap it all, Britain got control over Cyprus as an ‘observation post’.

It would not be out of place to comment on Richard Millman’s assessment of

this phase of the Eastern Question here.

He finds Britain’s three agreements –

with Turkey, Russia and Austria – ‘inconsistent and disingenuous’. This is an

outcome of the fact that he sees the purposes of Britain’s foreign policy as

ending the position of diplomatic isolation and placing Britain in the main-

stream of decision making at Berlin. But for Britain, these were not the motives.

Britain’s role in the Eastern Question cannot be assessed in any context other

than that of the commitment to maintain control over the Indian Empire for

which security of routes to India was an essential prerequisite and security of the

frontiers of India essential. Millman says: ‘The purpose of the pact with St

Petersburg was to scale down the clauses of the San Stefano treaty in order to

allow the Porte an independent existence in Europe’. Allowing an independent

existence to the Porte was not an end in itself. Britain made efforts to sustain the

Ottoman Empire in Europe because the Ottomans seemed to be the best ‘occu-

piers’ of the vital area around Constantinople and the straits and not for any

other reason. Further, on the Cyprus Convention, Millman comments that the

occupation of Cyprus for ‘preventing Ottoman disintegration in Asia following

upon Russian gains in Armenia…made little sense’. It seems to make little sense

to Millman because he analyses the Russian acquisition of Batum, Kars and

Ardahan in the context of their impact on the territorial integrity of the

Ottoman Empire in Asia. For the British government, the aim was not to main-

tain the Ottoman Empire for the sake of the Ottomans. The aim was to

maintain it so as to prevent Russia from expanding southwards towards the

Persian Gulf and thus becoming a menace to the ‘overland route’ or the short

sea route to India. Millman is right when he says that Salisbury gave ‘lip service’

in both his pact with Russia and the Convention with the Porte ‘to preserving

civilized government for Ottoman subjects in both Europe and Asia’. Here too

the British government genuinely wanted an improvement in the condition of

the Christians in Armenia, not because of humanitarian concerns but because of

the realisation that a contented population could be the best bulwark against

Russian expansion. Millman’s assessment is a typical example of presenting a

painstaking account of foreign policy sans the real perception of the interests it

was supposed to protect and promote. Contemporary records, both secret and

public, are replete with references that underline the determination of the

British government to maintain the Raj and also to stem the tide of Russia’s

advance towards the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and towards any other

region on the route to India.

Overture from Bismarck

Bismarck’s support for the Anglo-Austrian position at Berlin had created irrita-

tion in Russia. Disputes relating to the implementation of the Berlin

settlement sustained this atmosphere of unconcealed animosity between the

Flaunting the Indian Empire 49

two governments. During these disputes Britain and Austria tended to act

together. In order to strengthen his position in relation to Russia, Bismarck

signed a full-scale military alliance with Austria in the autumn of 1879. To

ascertain what attitude the British government would take regarding it, he also

placed suggestions for an Anglo-German alliance before Disraeli.

Such an

alliance was likely to hold Russia in check and also to keep France quiet in

case there was war between the eastern monarchies. In London, the proposal

received mixed reactions. Many welcomed it as a means of keeping Germany

and Russia apart. Others expressed fears that an alliance with the German

government would make France apprehensive, and France would turn to

Russia, thus making Britain’s two rivals join hands. Meanwhile, in October,

the signing of the Austro-German Alliance was announced. At London, its

formation was viewed with unconcealed joy because it prevented resurrection

of the Dreikaisersbund which had been Britain’s nightmare. It isolated and

hence restrained Russia from making a fresh move towards the Mediterranean

or the north-west frontier of India.

After this, Britain did not see the need

for an Anglo-German Alliance. Bismarck also did not discuss the matter after

the first sounding, perhaps because there were hints from St Petersburg of a

desire to improve relations with Germany.

This overture from Bismarck for an alliance between Britain and Germany

thus came to nothing. Nevertheless, it showed that both the countries saw each

other as ‘useful’ and ‘friendly’ states who could turn to each other in the event of

an emergency. At the same time, they avoided developing tighter bonds. Disraeli

did inform the Queen that Her Majesty’s government was ‘as free as air’;

but

the reason for not coming closer to Germany was deeper than this. Though both

nations viewed Russia with extreme distrust, there was no congruence in their

aims. For Germany, especially under Bismarck, it was far more important to have

a friendly Russia than a friendly Britain because it reduced chances of war on

the eastern front; in fact, on both fronts. Any agreement with Britain was likely

to irritate Russia and thus increase chances of such a war. Britain wanted to

befriend Germany, not because of any community of interest between them but

only because it was likely to create estrangement between Russia and the central

powers. This estrangement suited Britain because it was likely to keep Russia

occupied in Europe, thus preventing Russia from expanding towards its east and

south-east. This was likely to create security in a region where Britain least

wanted to fight.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War

While trying to keep Russia away from the Mediterranean coast, the British

government also made efforts to stem the tide of Russia’s expansion in the direc-

tion of India by bringing Afghanistan under its umbrella. Salisbury had been

the Secretary of State for India during 1866–7. In 1874, he was given the same

portfolio. He became known for advocating a policy of restraint in Central Asia

because of the advice he gave in June 1877 ‘to use large scale maps’ for

50 Flaunting the Indian Empire

assessing the distance between the Russian Empire and the Indian Empire. This

soundbite lingered in the memory of generations of strategists and historians

and was used for indicating that those who saw the ghost of Russia on the fron-

tier of India were being unnecessarily alarmist. But Salisbury never trivialised

the possibility of confrontation between Britain and Russia in Central Asia. The

phrase referred to above was a calculated misstatement. He himself clarified to

the Viceroy that he had used it to put balm on inflamed tempers, as ‘a sedative’

to make his policy acceptable.

During 1874–5, there was a virtual debate

between the proponents of the Closed Border and Forward Schools. The most

distinguished proponents of the Forward School – Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Robert

Montgomery and Sir Henry Rawlinson – were members of the Council of

India. When Salisbury became the Indian Secretary, the India Office was musty

with the odour of their ideas. Salisbury was confronted with the plethora of

memos on the Central Asian question. Soon after assuming office he decided to

devote himself to a study of India Office Records.

Forty volumes of docu-

ments were placed before him, a task too enormous even for a man as diligent

as Salisbury. In this situation he must have relied on the Historical Summary

and conversations with his colleagues at the India Office, and could not have

remained uninfluenced by their ideas. Salisbury became convinced that the posi-

tion of the British in India was ‘singularly unsuited, for purely defensive

strategy’. He accepted that the concept of ‘war with Russia all over the world’

advocated by protagonists of the Closed Border School was misleading and

meaningless because ‘Russia knows perfectly well that she is unassailable by

us’.

By 1876, Salisbury had developed such contempt for Lawrence’s policy of

‘masterly inactivity’ that, as he confessed to Lord Lytton, he found it difficult

even ‘to sit next to Lawrence for two hours’ when he thought of all the mischief

his policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ had caused.

He believed that Britain could

exercise pressure on Russia only through India, adding that ‘that is the part of

the question to which alone it is worthwhile to devote our thoughts’.

After the flare up in the Near East in July 1875, the Conservative government

watched Russia’s moves in Central Asia with great anxiety. Salisbury contem-

plated the possibility of ‘a serious embarrassment if there was trouble in

Europe’. He added, ‘unfortunately the probability of troubles in Europe

increases with every week’.

He instructed Northbrook through official

despatches and private letters to secure the admission of a mission or a Resident

to Kabul. Through this step, as he wrote to his successor at the India Office Lord

Cranbrook later, he hoped to make ‘use of the favourable moment to extract

what treaty stipulations we please’ and hoped to dominate ‘as completely as we

do in Khelat or Zanzibar’.

100

In this matter, Salisbury showed a sense of urgency

which was not reciprocated by the government of India under Lord Northbrook.

As already said, Northbrook had opposed all suggestion of forcing the ruler of

Afghanistan to accept a British Resident at Kabul.

101

On Northbrook’s resignation, Lord Lytton, who had been the British Minister

at Lisbon, was appointed the Governor-General of India. His appointment came

as a surprise even to Lytton himself. He had no experience of administration or

Flaunting the Indian Empire 51

Indian affairs. This did not stand in the way of his appointment.

102

In view of

the crisis in the Near East, it was considered advisable to have a person at

Calcutta who would execute the policy laid down for him at London. He was

handed over a letter in London itself containing future policy for him in India.

103

This letter was dated 28 February 1876 and, if sent through usual channels, it

would have fallen in the hands of Northbrook who relinquished office only

towards the end of March.

104

This despatch suggested a clear line of action. The

Governor-General was instructed to get at least a temporary British mission

received at Kabul and to ascertain the attitude of the Khan of Qalat, whose

territory covered the whole of what became the province of Baluchistan. He was

also to insist on the stationing of a permanent British Resident at Kabul.

Immediately on his arrival in India, Lytton opened negotiations with Sher Ali on

these issues.

105

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on

Turkey and gradually the possibility of Russia’s joining the war increased. In

these circumstances, as already mentioned, during October, Disraeli, Salisbury

and Lytton thought in terms of opening a front against Russia in Central

Asia.

106

In December, the government of India concluded a treaty with the

Khan of Qalat by which the British got predominant influence in the province,

security of the Bolan Pass and the right to occupy the town of Quetta, situated

at a distance of some 400 kilometres beyond the then British frontier. Quetta was

occupied in 1877. It was widely regarded as the bastion of frontal attack on

Afghanistan and vital for carrying on trade with Central Asian countries. Its

occupation was seen as an aggressive move even in British political circles.

107

This treaty enabled Britain to gradually occupy Baluchistan.

This move made Sher Ali apprehensive about British intentions, all the more

so because the Indian government was showing indifference to his approaches

for aid in case of attack by Russia on his country. The government of India

demanded as proof of the Amir’s trustworthiness that he station a British officer

at Kabul. For this purpose, negotiations were carried on with the Afghan repre-

sentative at Simla in October 1876 and at Peshawar during the first three

months of 1877. These negotiations failed because Sher Ali was not ready to

admit British officers into Afghanistan. He insisted, as he had been doing since

1868, that he could not guarantee the safety of a British Resident on account of

the intense anti-foreign feelings of his subjects.

108

Thereafter, the Viceroy with-

drew his vakil

109

from Kabul. To Salisbury, the Amir’s attitude seemed to be of

‘scarcely veiled hostility’, and he authorised Lytton to protect British frontiers by

such measures as circumstances should render expedient ‘without regard to the

wishes of the Amir or the interests of his dynasty’.

110

In April 1877, the Russo-Turkish War began and British statesmen were faced

with the prospect of seizure of Constantinople by Russia. Russia was simultane-

ously expanding in Central Asia. Russia occupied Kizzil Arvat on the route to

Merv. This brought Russia within 800 kilometres of Herat. British statesmen

expressed their consternation in belligerent tones. In a letter to the Queen,

Disraeli wrote:

52 Flaunting the Indian Empire

It is Lord Beaconsfield’s present opinion that in such case Russia must be

attacked from Asia, that the troops should be sent to the Persian Gulf, and

that the Empress of India should order her armies to clear Central Asia of

Muscovites and drive them into the Caspian.

111

Lytton pressed the British government to declare that ‘England will regard

the next step in advance as a casus belli and would send British officers to Merv to

assist the Turkomans against the Russians.

112

At Constantinople, Layard, in close

contact with Lytton and without informing the British Foreign Office, in the

summer of 1877, arranged a Turkish mission to Afghanistan with a view to

counteracting the influence of Russia’.

113

In India, in order to strengthen the

government of India’s position on the northern frontier, Lytton signed a treaty

with the Maharaja of Kashmir under which the British got permission to estab-

lish a British agency at Gilgit and to lay a telegraph line from British India to

Gilgit so as to watch the frontier from there.

Early in 1877, the Russo-Turkish War came to an end. The terms of the

Treaty of San Stefano, as already stated, caused great resentment in Britain.

Meanwhile, Russia decided to send a mission to Kabul to divert Britain’s atten-

tion from the events in the Near East. The Amir resisted Russia’s proposal and

offered to send his own men to Tashkent for talks. But Kaufmann, the Russian

Governor of Turkestan, refused to accept any such suggestion. In August, a

Russian military mission under General Stolytov reached Kabul to negotiate a

treaty with Afghanistan. Under the Treaty of 1873, Russia had accepted that

Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence.

114

By this time the Congress of

Berlin had come to an end, and the Treaty of San Stefano had been revised to

Britain’s satisfaction. But this did not seem to assuage anxieties about the security

of the Raj. The British government did not let the matter go. A more direct

surveillance on Afghanistan was deemed necessary. The government of India

decided that Sher Ali must accept a British mission as well. In September it sent

a mission under a veteran officer, Sir Neville Chamberlain, without obtaining

approval from London. The purpose of the mission was to make the Amir

accept British control over external relations, to receive British officers whenever

the British government thought desirable and accept the placement of a

Resident at Kabul. Before this mission reached Peshawar on 12 September 1878,

the Russian agent had left Kabul with a promise to return. Chamberlain was not

allowed to enter Afghanistan. Thereupon the Viceroy sought permission to

invade Afghanistan immediately.

115

The government in London could not toss the matter aside. It was not just a

question of affront to the government of India. It was one of checking Russia’s

advance towards India’s frontier. There was such heated discussion in the

Cabinet that Disraeli described this Cabinet meeting as ‘one of the most

remarkable meetings’ of the Cabinet in his memory.

116

Many members of the

Cabinet – Lord Chancellor Lord Cairns, Home Secretary R.A. Cross and

Salisbury – expressed misgivings about the plan to invade Afghanistan. They all

thought that their casus belli was not unimpeachable. Salisbury complained with

Flaunting the Indian Empire 53

great bitterness that the Viceroy was ‘forcing the hands of the government’ and

that he ‘thought only of India and was dictating by its measures the foreign

policy of the Government in Europe and Turkey’. Disraeli, on the other hand,

had no doubt that what was needed at that moment was ‘a demonstration of

[the] power and determination of England’. He wanted to take policy decisions

which, ‘if necessary, will be of a very decisive character’. Ultimately all ministers,

including Salisbury, decided to support Disraeli. The Cabinet advised the

Governor-General to send another message to the Amir, not for exploring the

possibility of avoiding war but with a view ‘to strengthen our case for

Parliament’. Disraeli also reported that ‘the military preparations were ordered

to be continued and completed…’ Thereafter the Cabinet directed the Viceroy

to require from the Amir ‘in temperate language an apology and acceptance of

a permanent mission within the Afghan territory’.

117

The ultimatum was

despatched on 31 October, requiring him to tender an apology for his conduct

by 20 November. On 21 November, columns of the Indian army marched simul-

taneously towards Kabul and Kandahar.

The expedition was successful. By the end of January 1879, southern

Afghanistan had passed into the hands of the British and Sher Ali’s power was

completely crushed. He fled, and died soon after. His son Yakub Khan estab-

lished himself on the throne at Kabul. The British signed a treaty with him in

May 1879 which is known as the Treaty of Gandamak. Under this, Yakub Khan

agreed to accept a British Resident at Kabul and to cede the districts of Pishin,

Sibi and Khurram valley to the British. In July 1879, Cavagnari reached Kabul

as Resident. But the Afghans refused to accept such a handling of their fate.

There was widespread revolt. On 3 September all members of the British

Residency at Kabul were murdered by Afghan soldiers, aided by civilians.

Another expedition was sent to Afghanistan, and after a bloody campaign,

Kabul was recaptured. In the northern region and in the area around Kandahar,

fighting continued. The Russians did not retaliate against this invasion; in

December 1879 they withdrew their mission and disavowed their treaty with

Sher Ali. But this did not make the British withdraw. Instead, in April 1880, with

the approval of Lord Cranbrook, Lytton initiated a policy of breaking up

Afghanistan, ceding Herat to Persia and detaching Kandahar from Kabul. But

this policy was rejected because occupation was proving very expensive. The

bloodshed and huge costs involved revived the memories of the debacle of 1842.

The Cabinet became so desperate that it would have preferred to let the Afghan

problem remain unresolved rather than prolong its occupation. It decided to

withdraw. By this time Abdur Rahman, one of the grandsons of Dost

Mohammad, had won over the Afghan troops in Afghan Turkestan and showed

promise of winning over the Afghans. Negotiations were opened with him,

118

but before these could be finalised, Disraeli’s government fell.

The accepted opinion on the Second Afghan War has been that it was

Lytton, ‘the man on the spot’, who disobeyed orders and forced the hand of the

government. Answering a question in Parliament, Disraeli himself stated that

‘hands of the Home Government had been forced by the inopportune haste of

54 Flaunting the Indian Empire

the Indian Government, who had precipitated the matter’.

119

Historians have

tended to endorse this opinion.

120

But a study of the Afghan question in the

context of Britain’s relations with European powers, particularly Russia, shows

that the origins of the Second Afghan War did not lie in the activities of a

hawkish Viceroy compelling a reluctant Cabinet to declare war. Lytton’s policy

can be understood only in the context of the quickening beat of impulses trans-

mitted from the metropole. The general policy at that time was of stemming the

tide of Russian expansion towards the Aegean Sea, the straits, Mesopotamia and

Persia as well as Afghanistan. A glance at Monypenny and Buckle shows that

Disraeli was very keen ‘to clear Central Asia of Muscovites’.

121

The entire tenor

of Salisbury’s policies also points in the same direction. As early as October 1875

he had written to Disraeli, ‘I do not propose to send a mission to Afghanistan

against the Amir’s wishes, but I propose to tell the Government of India to make

the Amir wish it’.

122

The British government wanted to act with some caution

because of the bitter experience of the First Afghan War. But this was mingled

with disdain because of the innate feeling of superiority amongst the rulers

during this age of imperialism. Added to this was the determination to guard the

Raj at all costs. The decision to invade Afghanistan was not an expedient hastily

devised either by the government of India or the British Cabinet following alarm

at Stolytov’s mission. It was taken at a Cabinet meeting after cool consideration

of likely effects, a report of which to the Queen covered sixteen pages.

123

The

ministers did express misgivings, but Afghanistan was invaded because ‘a demon-

stration of the power and determination of England’ was considered necessary.

The war in South Africa

Britain had always taken any threat to its position around the Cape of Good

Hope equally seriously. In 1870 there were four ‘white’ states in South Africa.

Two were British colonies – the Cape Colony and Natal – and two were

Afrikaner (Boer) republics – Transvaal (South African Republic) and the Orange

Free State. The British government felt insecure because the nearby African

kingdom of the Zulus was becoming highly organised and ambitious. The Zulus

resisted any attempt by the ‘white’ people to increase their influence. In 1872,

Gladstone’s government granted self-government to the Cape Colony. It hoped

that the new Cabinet there would take the initiative in cajoling the three neigh-

bouring ‘white’ states to submerge their regional sovereignties and form a

federation. But the Boers were unwilling. Even the government of the Cape

Province was not ready to shoulder the financial and defence burdens of the less

affluent neighbours. Therefore, it remained hostile to the idea of a Federation.

In spite of this, Natal was incorporated in six months’ time. In 1877 Transvaal

and the Orange Free State also joined the federation because they feared

destruction at the hands of the Zulus.

In 1877, Sir Bartle Frere was appointed Governor of the Cape Province and

High Commissioner for South Africa. He made plans to expand Britain’s

authority as far as the River Zambezi and beyond, to strengthen imperial

Flaunting the Indian Empire 55

defence along the coasts of South Africa and to delimit Portuguese claims in the

east and west. Destruction of the power of the Zulus seemed to him to be a

prerequisite for establishing British supremacy in this region. In view of the

preoccupation with the war in Afghanistan, London showed reluctance to extend

support. But ultimately the reinforcements Frere asked for were sent and

Zululand was invaded. This army suffered a crushing defeat at Isandhlwana in

1879. Thereafter, the government at London sent large additional reinforce-

ments. The Zulus were defeated and their power was broken by dividing their

territory amongst thirteen chiefs.

British historians continue to argue that the Prime Minister and his Colonial

Secretary, Michael Hicks Beach, were blissfully ignorant of what was happening

and that this war was ‘a perfect example of that dynamic which, once estab-

lished, drove local officials ever in search for imperial security’.

124

But in

appointing Bartle Frere as ‘the man on the spot’, the British government had

ensured that an expansionist policy would be followed. As the governor of

Bombay Presidency from 1867 to 1877, he had stood in the front rank of admin-

istrators who had advocated a ‘Forward Policy’ towards the north-west frontier of

India. In 1872 he had ruthlessly ‘suppressed’ the slave trade in Zanzibar. A

policy of restraint was the last thing that could be expected from such a person.

Disraeli failed to turn his success at the Congress into a political triumph.

From the height of its popularity in the summer of 1878, things went downhill

for the Conservative government. Military reversals in Afghanistan and Zululand

tarnished the ministry’s imperial record. In 1879 Gladstone returned to the

centre of political debate with a vengeance. He decided to stand in Midlothian

(the constituency around Edinburgh) and mounted a vigorous and demagogic

campaign centring on the excrescences of what he called ‘Beaconsfieldism’. By

this time the country was in the grip of a chronic recession. In 1879 an agricul-

tural depression also set in. As a result, the Conservative government was called

upon to handle a steadily worsening economy, declining revenues and hard times

for the common man. The general election of 1880 resulted in an unexpected

but decisive victory for the Liberals, who formed a government under Gladstone.

During his tenure Disraeli had re-launched the Conservative Party as the

national party and Britain as a great imperial power. He looked upon the Indian

Empire as a magnificent possession. In fact, all British governments did. They

always acted with alacrity whenever they perceived any threat, howsoever

remote, to its frontiers or the routes to it. Disraeli made the difference in doing it

in a pompous manner. He drew upon its strength to claim weight for Britain at

international forums. His entire external policy, one way or the other, centred on

the Indian connection. One question that caused deep anxiety was the crisis in

the Near East. During this crisis, the British government seemed to swing

between the two extremes of contemplating the partition of the Ottoman

Empire and working for its continuation. But these swings were not indicative of

lack of consistency in policy; rather they were indicative of the grave panic that

gripped not just the government of the day but the entire nation at the prospect

56 Flaunting the Indian Empire

of Russia reaching the Mediterranean and the consciousness of the lack of

means to stem this expansion. For the British government, the real issue was not

the future of the Ottomans. Nor was it, its likely effect on relations with other

European powers. Historians have tended to argue that Disraeli used the Eastern

Question ‘to assert Britain’s prestige’ and ‘to end Britain’s position of diplomatic

isolation’.

125

Bernard Porter, for example, says that to Disraeli the most satisfying

result of the Eastern crisis was that the Dreikaisersbund of Germany, Austria

and Russia was ‘both weakened and upstaged’.

126

But, for Britain, as for any

other state, relations with the neighbouring countries were a means to an end.

The aims were to prevent any strong power from acquiring control over the

Eastern Mediterranean region, and to sustain a regime that would be amenable

to Britain’s influence. It was only when the latter alternative seemed unattainable

that the British government entertained thoughts of partition. The most satis-

fying results of this phase of the crisis were that Russia was prevented from

establishing itself along the Aegean Sea, that ways were devised to stem Russia’s

advance towards the Persian Gulf and that Cyprus was acquired.

The government was supported enthusiastically by the Members of

Parliament, press and the people. Many Liberal MPs also supported it. As early

as August 1876, The Times commented that colonial as well as foreign policy had

settled into a system which was independent of party tendencies.

127

Even

Gladstone had no illusion about the widespread support that Disraeli’s policy

was receiving. ‘I am acting in the Eastern Question against the Government, the

Clubs, the London press (in majority), the majority of both Houses, and five-

sixths or nine-tenths of the plutocracy of the country. These make up a great

power’, he wrote.

128

In this context, the Indian question came up so frequently

that Florence Nightingale commented: ‘The Houses of Parliament now discuss

India as if it were a home question, a vital and moral question, as it is’.

129

Disraeli’s foreign policy initiatives were approved enthusiastically by the people.

By offering ‘glory’, he made them identify with ‘the great nation’ possessing a far

flung empire, of which India was the omphalos. In the process, the newly

enfranchised electors began to identify the Conservative Party with patriotism.

As a result of the policies advocated and pursued during this period, a feeling

had begun to emerge that Britain’s Empire was both legitimate and beneficial

and had to be preserved. By the 1880s, ‘the new imperialism’ was in full bloom

with the publication of John Seeley’s The Expansion of England in 1883 and John

Fronde’s England and Her Colonies in 1886, and the foundation of the Imperial

Federation League in 1884. It is true that Gladstone’s brilliant Midlothian

campaign produced success for the Liberal Party. But, as we shall see in the next

chapter, despite promises to ‘reconstitute’ foreign policy on the basis of ‘peace,

retrenchment and non-aggression’, even Gladstone’s policies produced similar, in

fact more tangible, results.

Flaunting the Indian Empire 57

In April 1880, the Liberals came to power with an overwhelming majority after

a prolonged moralistic and demagogic electoral campaign spearheaded by

Gladstone. This success was seen not just as an electoral triumph of Gladstone,

but as an electoral triumph of Gladstonian liberalism based on the economics

of free trade, politics of liberalism and morality of Christian virtues.

Generations of British historians have accepted that Gladstone sought to apply

the standards of morality, which would be normal in private life, to interna-

tional affairs and that this hampered the pursuit of national interests.

Midlothian in 1879, Gladstone had specified his version of the ‘right principles

of foreign policy’. He defined these as (1) good government at home, (2) culti-

vating the Concert of Europe, (3) avoidance of entangling engagements, (4) the

preservation to the nations of the world the blessings of peace, (5) acknowl-

edging equal rights for all nations, and (6) promoting the love of fredom.

analysis of British foreign policy during his tenure as prime minister, however,

shows that these principles were observed more in their breach and that there

was a very wide gap between the idealism of Gladstone’s words and the realism

of his actions.

Under the very first principle, Gladstone made a commitment to devote

himself to internal matters. He had criticised the excesses of Tory jingoism and

had accused the party of unwarranted emphasis on external policies and neglect

of domestic concerns. He was known for his interest in financial and legislative

matters. Further, his second tenure in office was bedevilled by domestic struggle

over the Irish question. Yet, Gladstone’s second ministry remained barren of any

achievement in the domestic sphere. The next two principles mainly concerned

Britain’s relations with European states. His efforts to cultivate the Concert of

Europe were not likely to produce positive results when Germany and France

were suspicious, Russia uncertain, and Austria and Turkey hostile. Though

desirous of avoiding entangling engagements, Gladstone was no apostle of non-

intervention. ‘He used military and naval force coolly and without

embarrassment’, comments H.C.G. Matthew, who studied Gladstone’s diaries

very closely.

Every Cabinet that he had sat in since 1843 had despatched a mili-

tary expedition.

The other three principles seemed to be of universal

application. But, in reality, ‘the blessings of peace’, ‘rights of all nations’ and ‘the

3 In the garb of moral

imperatives, 1880–5

love of freedom’ applied to the ‘white’ people only. He did not disapprove of

expansion into non-white regions of the world, and on two occasions he publicly

welcomed the acquisition of colonies by Germany.

On Gladstone’s imperial policy, Matthew puts the received view in a nutshell:

‘Gladstone sought no expansion of his Imperial responsibilities.’

During the

election campaigns, Gladstone had carried on a virtual tirade against Disraeli’s

forward policies on the north-west frontier of India, and in South Africa, Egypt

and the Near East. He had denounced the ‘system of annexations designed to ...

forestall other countries’.

He had committed himself to restoring independence

to the Boers and withdrawing from Cyprus, Asia Minor and Afghanistan. But

any appraisal of Gladstone’s policies has to stem from what he actually did, not

from what he sought to do. The policies that he adopted proved to be more in

line with what he said about Englishmen in general: ‘The sentiment of Empire

may be called innate in every Briton. If there are exceptions, they are like those

of men born blind or lame among us. It is part of our patrimony: born with our

birth, dying only with our death…’

The policies that he followed show that

Gladstone was a ‘Briton’ without any reservations. Once in office, ‘upright’ and

‘satiated’ Gladstone proved no different from ‘aggressive’ and ‘pompous’

Disraeli. Gladstone acted on the principle that imperial possessions had to be

defended. The Indian Empire was the most precious of them. His attitude

towards India was in line with his attitude towards international relations in

general – evasive, hesitant and ambivalent. Gladstone had said that India did not

add anything to the strength of the empire while it added immensely to the

responsibility of the government.

Yet, whatever he thought about Ireland, he

never proposed leaving India, if only on the ground that Britons had undertaken

‘a most arduous but a noble duty’ of spreading Western civilisation and ensuring

law and order.

Internally, despite a decisive victory in the elections, despite enjoying a

majority of 100 in the House of Commons, and despite commitment to a policy

of reform, Gladstone’s second administration did not begin in a climate of confi-

dence. New social forces, represented by the extension of franchise and the rise

of trade unions, were making influential sections of the Liberal Party turn

towards the Conservative Party. Many were keen to shift towards a strong foreign

policy as a means of showing that their party could be as patriotic as the

Conservatives in defending Britain’s presence abroad.

This group was headed

within the Cabinet by Hartington, who was India Secretary during 1880–2 and

War Secretary from 1882 to 1885, and outside by Sir Charles Dilke, the under

secretary for foreign affairs. The Radicals and Irish nationalists, on the other

hand, were opposed to a ‘moral’ pursuit of national interests. In fact, the dissen-

sions within the Cabinet were so intense that there were prolonged discussions,

often without any decision. The Queen distrusted the Prime Minister, whom she

described as a ‘half-mad fire-brand’.

Besides, Gladstone repeatedly threatened

to resign. This lent a sense of the transitory to the government. Above all, it was

the gap between idealistic professions and actual policies that form the hallmark

of this period.

In the garb of moral imperatives 59

Settlement after the Second Afghan War

Immediately on assuming office, the Liberals were called upon to deal with the

situation in Afghanistan. During the election campaign, the Liberals had

promised to reverse the policy of the Conservative government. On assuming

office, they recalled Lytton. This was taken as symbolic of a change in policy. It

might be repeated here that in view of the difficulties of controlling Afghanistan,

even the Conservatives had started withdrawing their army from the country

and had begun to explore the possibility of making Abdur Rahman the Amir of

Kabul. As a result, when Lord Ripon, the new Viceroy, took charge on 8 June

1880, Kabul was virtually without a government, Herat was in hostile hands and

Britain’s hold over Kandahar was uncertain. To top all this, during the last week

of July 1880 the British-Indian army suffered a crushing defeat at Maiwand to

the north of Kandahar, leaving 1,000 dead on the field.

Still, there were many who wanted to retain Kandahar.

They believed that

this would enable them to negotiate with Russia on favourable terms because the

Russians took as much alarm at Britain’s advance to Kandahar as the British did

at Russia’s advance towards Merv.

Some wanted to expand for commercial

reasons. Napier of Magdala wrote from Gibraltar, ‘A safe road to Kandahar will

give it a clear start, and, instead of purchasing Russian articles at Peshawar we

shall deliver British manufactures to Central Asia.’

The Cabinet was divided.

Northbrook, who had been the Governor-General of India and was at this time

the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Duke of Argyll, the India Secretary,

were in favour of withdrawing while Hartington remained neutral and

Gladstone was uninterested.

As a result, on the issue of Kandahar, no clear

directive was given to Ripon.

It was generally accepted that the districts of

Pishin and Sibi should be retained. A railway had been opened from the River

Indus to Sibi, while work on the railway from Pishin to Sibi had already started.

After assuming office, Ripon signed a treaty with Abdur Rahman recognising

him as the Amir of Kabul. The British ‘temporarily’ retained the two districts of

Pishin and Sibi. The Amir agreed to conduct relations with foreign powers

through the government of India. In return, the government of India agreed to

aid the Amir in case of unprovoked aggression on Afghanistan.

Ripon soon

began to think in terms of uniting Kabul and Kandahar if the Amir of Kabul

proved strong enough. By 1881, Amir Abdur Rahman was able to capture Herat

and Kandahar, and thereafter he was recognised as the Amir of Afghanistan and

its dependencies. The British army evacuated Kandahar in April 1881. From

1883, an annual subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees was given to him. Thus, the

Liberals who had condemned the Afghan war as ‘an example of reckless aggres-

sion unworthy of a civilized government’ not only brought Afghanistan within

British orbit but also helped themselves to two districts in the northwest, Pishin

and Sibi.

At that time it was emphasised that the occupation of Pishin and Sibi

was to be temporary, a kind of trust to be handed back when the situation

became favourable. But these districts were annexed irrevocably to the British

Empire in 1887. In his study of Anglo-Afghan relations during this period, D.P.

Singhal comments that ‘the irony of the situation is that these districts were

60 In the garb of moral imperatives

never to be returned to Afghanistan’.

In fact, there was no irony involved. The

Conservative government had ‘occupied’ Cyprus ‘temporarily’ while the Liberals

were to ‘occupy’ Egypt ‘temporarily’. The difference lay in the fact that while the

occupations of Cyprus and Egypt continued to be ‘temporary’ for decades,

Pishin and Sibi were annexed ‘irrevocably’ to the British Empire barely five years

later. One reason was that the British government did not have to offer justifica-

tions to any European power for its actions in this region. The professions of the

Liberal Party, the commitment of its leaders, and the prospect of settlement with

Russia were all subordinated to the desire to obtain what had been described as

‘scientific frontier’ for the Indian Empire.

Gladstone and the Concert of Europe

Gladstone made efforts to cultivate the Concert of Europe to settle those issues

in the Near East concerning smaller states which had remained unresolved since

1878. But his efforts in this direction did not succeed, for two reasons. One was

that at that time European governments tended to distrust Britain’s Liberal

government. They saw in Gladstone’s advocacy of concerted action a desire to

assert Britain’s power. Bismarck thought that Gladstone typified many of the

vices that he saw in his Liberal opponents at home.

He also feared that such a

concert would, in practice, amount to a London–Paris–St Petersburg axis.

Austria was hostile. The basis of Anglo-Austrian collaboration had been their

common interest in the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone had

removed that base when he had described Russia as the liberator of the Bulgars,

and had thus taken a pro-Russian stand. The Russian government had found this

stance gratifying, but it continued its expansion towards the Indian frontier and

this caused anxiety in London. France had been co-operating with Britain under

the Conservatives. As Balfour put it later, ‘a working compromise in a shared

hegemony at Cairo and Constantinople had emerged’.

But the two powers had

differences over many issues. Internally, the Anglo-French trade agreement of

the early 1860s was due for renewal. The Protectionists in France resented this

treaty and described it as grasping and selfish.

The question of Egypt exacer-

bated differences between the two countries. In the Near East, France did not

want to co-operate in any policy of coercing Turkey because it had set its eyes on

Tunis, and any anti-Turk policy was likely to offend the Muslims there. Relations

with Italy were no better. In 1878, Salisbury had given promises of support to

Waddington, the French representative at Berlin, regarding Tunis. When France

annexed Tunis in 1881 to the annoyance of Italy, Italy came to know of these

promises.

This made Italy resentful. The Ottoman government, too, was not

likely to co-operate with Gladstone, who had denounced it most unequivocally

during 1875–8. Historians now accept that despite the noises that Gladstone

made about the Bulgarian horrors, he did not really want the disintegration of

the Ottoman Empire.

He merely wanted ‘pruning of the rotten bough to

maintain the tree’, as H.C.G. Matthew puts it.

But the Ottoman government

harboured nothing but distrust of the intentions of Gladstone’s government.

In the garb of moral imperatives 61

The other reason for non-fulfilment of Gladstone’s vision of working through

a Concert of European Powers was that when European diplomats did get down

to brass tacks, Britain did not show any propensity to compromise on issues that

in any way touched his primacy over the entire region lying on the route to

India. In 1878, Montenegro had been promised the town of Dulcigno which was

under the Ottomans. Greece had been promised some portion of Epirus and

Thessaly, though the actual area was not specified. The Ottomans were not

inclined to part with these territories. They handed over Dulcigno only when

Gladstone proposed a blockade of the town. The question of providing compen-

sation to Greece did not prove easy to resolve. But a suggestion made by C.J.

Goschen, who had been the First Lord of Admiralty and was temporarily

ambassador at Constantinople at this time, gives an interesting insight into the

attitude of the Liberal government. To compensate Greece, Bismarck suggested

the transfer of Crete as an equivalent of Thessaly. The King of Greece refused

to accept this. Goschen thereupon tried to persuade Britain and Turkey that in

addition to Crete, Cyprus be given to Greece. He wrote:

… if Cyprus were thrown in with the present Turkish proposal…peace

ought to be certain; Europe grateful, Turkey convinced of indisputable

disinterestedness and England relieved in a most honourable way of the

Convention which Mr Gladstone called an act of madness.

The arguments were irrefutable and should have impressed the Liberal

government if it was serious about dispensing justice and sincere about

condemning the Conservatives for high-handedness. But the Honourable Prime

Minister remained unmoved. Arguments were discovered for retaining Cyprus.

It was said that at the time the government had adopted a policy of retreat in

Afghanistan and South Africa, surrender of Cyprus would adversely affect

Britain’s prestige. Needless to add, the same reasons applied for retaining Cyprus

which had led to its occupation in 1878, the need to have a base of operations in

the eastern Mediterranean east of Malta.

While deciding not to surrender

control over Cyprus, Gladstone’s government abandoned the other half of the

settlement regarding ameliorating the condition of Christians in Armenia. It

decided to withdraw British ‘consuls’ from there. This was not any act of renun-

ciation. Even the Conservative government had realised that their appointment

was proving expensive financially as well as politically, the latter because the

Turks as well as the Armenians looked upon them as unwelcome interlopers.

Gladstone put forward the argument that the surest way of achieving the desired

objective was to make it a concern of the European Concert. Gladstone’s solici-

tude for the downtrodden Christians did not stand in the way of relinquishing

the opportunity of improving the condition of the Armenians.

Similarly, disregarding his commitment to the principle of self-determination,

Gladstone became a party to the suppression of the movement of Bulgars in

Eastern Roumelia for union with Bulgaria. The reason was the apprehension

that various European powers were working to establish their influence over this

62 In the garb of moral imperatives

region that the British had always regarded as of vital interest to them. Russia’s

policy had been of expansion towards the Mediterranean. But at this stage,

Dufferin, who was the ambassador at Constantinople at that time, suspected that

the Germans wanted to acquire influence at Constantinople. He wondered:

‘Can’t it be that Bismarck’s project for a colonising railway to Baghdad with the

view of preventing the emigration of Germans to America is being revived?’

He also suspected that Austria was being egged on to turn its eyes eastwards by

Bismarck and his friends.

In an atmosphere full of such anxiety, the Liberal

government thought it best not to assist in the process that could lead to estab-

lishment of a bigger political unit.

The developments on the international scene during 1881–2 ruined whatever

prospects there were of co-operation between the European powers that

Gladstone had envisaged. On 18 June 1881, Bismarck, who had looked upon the

Austro-German alliance as a step in the direction of improving relations with

Russia, not only renewed the Dreikaisersbund but turned it into an alliance. It

provided that in case of war between Britain and Russia, Austria and Germany

would remain neutral. The three powers agreed not to oppose the union of the

two Bulgarian principalities created at Berlin in 1878. It further provided that

they would oppose the opening of the Straits to British warships by threatening

the Sultan with further dismemberment of the empire.

All these terms were

seen as antagonistic to British interests. By its very existence, this alliance

enhanced Russia’s sense of security on its western frontier, enabling it to concen-

trate on expansion in Central Asia, i.e., from the British point of view towards

the frontier of the Indian Empire. At the same time, by blocking the Royal

Navy’s entry into the Straits it made Britain’s strategy of putting pressure on

Russia from the Crimea redundant. These terms led directly to Penjdeh.

In May 1882, Bismarck brought Italy within his diplomatic orbit by forming

the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. This also meant that

the two liberal states of the West alone were excluded. However, relations

between Britain and France became very tense after the ‘occupation’ of Egypt

by Britain in 1882.

The conquest of Egypt

In 1882, Gladstone’s government sent a very efficiently organised expedition to

Egypt and established control over the country. This remains one of the most

controversial events of Gladstone’s government and forms a classic case study of

neo-imperialism.

Sale of shares of the Suez Canal in 1875 did not solve the financial prob-

lems of Khedive Ismail, particularly because he simultaneously attempted to

develop and modernise his country at an accelerated pace.

In 1876 he

suspended the payment of his debt while European powers intensified their

efforts to make the Egyptian government pay its debt. As a result, the years

following were characterised by endless negotiations and nearly inextricable

financial problems.

In this situation the economic condition of the people

In the garb of moral imperatives 63

became worse. Unemployment, indebtedness and, hence, discontent increased.

The notables, especially in the provinces, were irked by loss of their privileged

positions. All these ultimately provoked anti-foreign reactions. In February 1879,

there was a demonstration by army officers, after which the Conservative

government seriously thought in terms of some military action. It might have

done so had its troops not been tied down against the Zulus in South Africa.

In this situation, when Khedive Ismail expressed displeasure at the attitude of

the European powers, they pressurised the Sultan at Constantinople into

deposing him in favour of his son Tawfiq, who seemed more amenable to their

influence.

In July 1880, to settle Egypt’s debts and finances, European powers signed a

complicated Law of Liquidation. Under the arrangements made, 66 per cent of

the revenue of the state was assigned to the budget for the debt. This income

was put in the hands of a Debt Commission representing Britain, France,

Germany, Austria and Italy. Britain and France together had a majority of

votes.

The remainder of the revenue was left nominally in the hands of the

Egyptian government for administrative purposes. The result of these financial

arrangements was, as Alfred Milner, a journalist who later became associated

with the administration of Egypt, commented, that Egypt was financially ‘almost

unable to breathe without the consent of Europe’.

Within Egypt, this step

increased disillusionment with the foreigners as well as with their own collabora-

tionist government. Increasing unrest marked the years 1881–2. Early in 1881,

Ahmed Urabi Pasha emerged as the symbol of national hopes. He demanded

reform of the existing political system and condemned interference by foreign

powers.

The occupation of Tunis by France in 1881 seemed to expose the

aggressive intentions of European powers. In September 1881 Urabi led an

insurrection, demanding dismissal of all ministers, promulgation of a fresh

constitution and an increase in the size of the army.

Initially, informed Englishmen, including the Liberals under Gladstone,

believed that what they confronted in Egypt was a recognisably modern broad-

based nationalist movement.

But as soon as the governments of Britain and

France realised that the movement was directed against intervention by

European powers, they changed their attitude and decided to intervene to

suppress this movement. On 8 January 1882 they issued a ‘Joint Note’ in which

they declared to Tawfiq that his maintenance on the throne was considered by

them indispensable to the welfare of Egypt. The nationalists saw in this note a

thinly veiled threat of military intervention, but they were not intimidated.

Months of criss-cross negotiations followed in which all powers took some part.

In Egypt, meanwhile, the Chamber of Delegates began to demand a share in

earmarking that part of the Egyptian budget which was not committed to the

payment of interest on the debt.

There were anti-establishment riots and

demonstrations. On 31 January 1882, Tawfiq promulgated a new constitution

and made Urabi the minister for war. In this situation, the British government

came under increasing pressure to intervene from British residents in Egypt –

officials, businessmen, journalists, and others. They were worried about their

64 In the garb of moral imperatives

positions, property, trade and investments. Their chief complaint was not that

Egypt was sliding into anarchy but that the Khedive was not able to break the

power of Urabi and his supporters.

The appeal was, of course, made in the

garb of the moral duty of Englishmen to spread the ‘blessings’ of ‘modern’ civil-

isation in Egypt. It is significant that in the original draft of public statement on

the question of invasion of Egypt, it was admitted that intervention had been

necessitated by the attempt made by the Egyptians to demand control over the

budget. On second thoughts this passage was removed.

For bondholders in Britain, the prospect of a hostile nationalist government

in Egypt was unnerving. The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders mobilised

The Times, the financial press and those members of Parliament who had a

financial stake in Egypt’s economy.

One of these bondholders was the Prime

Minister himself; no less than 37 per cent of his total portfolio was invested in

Egyptian stock in 1882.

Thus, a man of Gladstone’s expertise in financial

matters had invested more than a third of his portfolio in stock dependent on the

credit of a regime which he had tirelessly denounced for its untrustworthiness

and deceit. This was the background in which, in May 1882, Britain and France

sent their fleets to Alexandria to intimidate the nationalists.

This had the

predictable result of provoking patriotic demonstrations not just in Alexandria,

and Cairo but throughout Egypt. On 11 June there were riots in Alexandria

which left fifty Europeans dead and over sixty wounded, the British Consul

among them. These riots sounded alarm bells in London. It is significant that,

despite the pressures imposed by the weight of external indebtedness, the

Khedive was able to quell these riots on his own and restore order.

There was

no general collapse into ‘anarchy’. During this period, Urabi and his supporters

began fortifying Alexandria and strengthened coastal artillery. Seymour, the

British Admiral there, saw in these attempts a threat to the fleets of European

powers. By the end of June the Admiralty, the War Office and the India Office

began to recommend action on the ground that the route to India was in

danger.

At this stage Gladstone vociferously expressed his misgivings about

invading Egypt, but he gave sanction for the bombardment of Alexandria. On 3

July Admiral Seymour received authority to silence the guns and destroy the

earthworks if fortification of Alexandria continued.

The British government went ahead in a most determined manner. On 11

July, the British navy bombarded the fort at Alexandria for ten and a half hours

continuously, reportedly killing 2,000 Egyptians. Alexander Schölch shows that

this action was designed to precipitate a crisis at a favourable moment.

At this

point, the French drew back and the French fleet sailed away. Italy also decided

to abstain, but the British government persisted. Robinson and Gallagher have

taken great pains to show that the British government was moved by its concern

that abstention would allow France ‘to steal a march on them at Cairo’.

But

French pressure was non-existent after late January, when Frecynet came to

power. H.C.G. Matthew, from Gladstone’s diaries, draws the conclusion that ‘no

expression of regret or reluctance qualified Gladstone’s determination’.

The bombardment of Alexandria failed to destroy the Egyptian artillery.

In the garb of moral imperatives 65

What was more important, it failed to destroy the spirit of the Egyptians. The

‘insurgents’ cut the telegraph lines at Alexandria between Britain and India,

making the Red Sea cables useless. This was viewed as a grave matter, for it

threatened communication between London and Calcutta.

It also highlighted

that power, if not authority, continued to pass from the Khedive and his minis-

ters to Urabi and his supporters. Therefore, the British government decided to

invade Egypt. Ostensibly, this expedition was sent at the behest of Khedive

Tawfiq to assist him in putting down a rebellion led by Urabi. But until the

bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July, the Khedive had in fact supported

Urabi. It was only on 16 July that the British Consul, Cartwright, informed Lord

Granville telegraphically that the Khedive had dismissed Urabi as Minister of

War and forbidden all Egyptians to aid him.

It is notable that Gladstone, who

had expressed his discomfort about having to defend the bombardment of

Alexandria in the House of Commons, endorsed this decision to invade Egypt

barely nine days later. The members of the House of Commons, too, sanctioned

an expenditure of £2,300,000 for the expedition on 27 July. The vote was passed

by 275 to 19 votes.

The motion was supported overwhelmingly, even though

the then Prime Minister, setting aside all financial canons of Liberal ideology,

proposed to provide this amount by increasing the income tax by three and a

half pence. On the contrary, in France, two days later, when Frecynet’s ministry

asked for a vote of credit for expedition to the Canal, the motion was defeated.

After the fall of Gambetta towards the end of January 1882, the French had

tended to retreat from a forward policy in Egypt while Britain tended to go

ahead. France’s policy has been explained in terms of change of government at

Paris.

But the differences in the attitudes of the British and French govern-

ments were not the result of accidents of French politics. Robinson and

Gallagher have rightly stated the reason: ‘Commercially and strategically, the

waterway was important to so many British interests that its safety was generally

accepted as a vital national concern. For the French, on the other hand, Arabi’s

revolt did not seem a serious danger to national security.’

France’s main

interest lay in ensuring security on the Rhine frontier. The Italians too refused to

join the British. The Ottoman ruler attempted to intervene. But the British

stopped him from doing so.

The expedition to Egypt was planned with enthusiasm and 16,400 troops

were sent from Britain with great promptitude and all needful supplies. An army

was also called from India. In fact, a government expressly elected for its opposi-

tion to imperialist policies made arrangements to make the British and Indian

armies each travel 5,000 kilometres in order to attack the Egyptian army in its

own land. On 13 September, this army, led by Sir Garnet Wolseley, destroyed the

Egyptian defences at Tel-el-Kebir and followed this up with a successful attack

on Cairo. ‘Only’ 450 British soldiers died. ‘There was never a tidier operation’;

comments Sir Robert Ensor.

Within a day the Egyptian army was completely

routed and Ahmed Urabi surrendered. This was seen as a spectacular exhibition

of Britain’s power. After Tel-el-Kebir, Gladstone was a jubilant man.

He cele-

brated the triumph enthusiastically. He asked the Archbishop of York and the

66 In the garb of moral imperatives

Bishop of London to have the church bells rung. He instructed the War

Secretary to have the guns fired in London parks.

On their return, the troops

were welcomed with obvious enthusiasm. Gladstone also recommended a

peerage for Wolseley.

Urabi was imprisoned and the Khedive was reinstated. The British ‘occupied’

Egypt ‘temporarily’. Gladstone announced that the country would be evacuated

as soon as the Canal was safe and Egyptians were able to manage their financial

affairs. The British government quickly moved to dismantle the vestiges of joint

Anglo-French control in Egypt. As far as the Canal was concerned, Britain

showed a readiness to enter into a guarantee with the other powers to preserve

the freedom of the Canal for the passage of all ships in any circumstances, but it

reserved the right to defend the Canal from any act of aggression against Egypt

as long as it was necessary for Britain.

The occupation attracted remarkably

little criticism in Britain at that time. Most Liberals approved of intervention in

1882 to protect the Canal as they had applauded the purchase of shares in 1875,

to protect ‘the gate and key to India’.

Criticism came later when arguments

were marshalled to show that the government had intervened to protect the

interests of British bondholders who had been battening on Egypt.

The received and accepted view on the ‘occupation’ of Egypt for almost a

hundred years has been that Britain had no territorial ambitions in Egypt, that

Britain was compelled to intervene because Egypt had become a corrupt and

bankrupt state which was unable to maintain law and order, that Urabi, who

opposed Khedive’s power, was an unrepresentative mutineer, that ‘men on the

spot’ forced the hands of the government in London, and that Gladstone’s

government intervened most reluctantly when the French left the British govern-

ment in the lurch. These views emerged contemporaneously during the

propaganda campaign launched by the British government when the strategy of

‘rescue and retire’ was abandoned and the British government decided to ‘stay’

in Egypt.

These were sustained by historians who elaborated, refined and

generalised these arguments. Robinson and Gallagher, in their well-documented,

masterly and extremely influential study of the official mind on the partition of

Africa, present a picture that closely resembles the official view.

They argue

that ‘each fateful step seemed to be dictated by circumstances rather than will’.

There was such a gap between public statements and decisions taken that even

Sir Edward Malet, who presided over Anglo-Egyptian relations as Consul-

General in Egypt from 1879 to 1883, confessed some twenty years later that he

had not been able to discover the key to the enigma of the Liberal government’s

Egyptian policy in 1882.

Gladstone’s reluctance to intervene and the conse-

quent ‘embarrassment’ in Egypt is woven so neatly and obviously into

contemporary records, accounts and perceptions that generations of historians

have accepted (and still accept) that Gladstone, who ‘occupied’ Egypt, was an

innocent idealist who came to believe in the propaganda of others and that he

was outmanoeuvred by the ‘hawks’ in the Cabinet.

Eldridge, for example,

comments that after Tel-el-Kebir the British were ‘trapped’. He finds the jubi-

lance of Gladstone after this victory ‘surprising’.

In the garb of moral imperatives 67

However, recent research shows that Egypt was not descending into anarchy,

that the Khedive was able to quell the riots, that law and order in Egypt had not

collapsed, that it was not the Egyptians who attacked the British fleet but the

British Admiral Seymour who had bombarded Alexandria, that the British

government persisted even when other powers held back, that the expedition to

Egypt was meticulously planned, that Gladstone’s diaries do not show any

expression of regret or reluctance, that Gladstone’s government acted in a most

determined manner, and that the celebrations that followed the victory in Egypt

were full of triumphalism. In short, the whole course of events during 1881–2

unfolds the saga of a determined and purposeful effort, not of an establishment

afflicted with reluctance or of a person afflicted with moral qualms. Even Urabi

could not be denounced as a mere rebel or a self-seeking opportunist. After these

events the British government thought in terms of punishing Urabi. It is inter-

esting that the issue was dropped when it was discovered that sufficient evidence

could not be culled from the diaries captured after his surrender to support

indictment of his complicity in the riots.

The victories at Tel-el-Kebir, and then at Cairo, were so complete that the

British government was in a position to declare either annexation or protectorate.

The question arises: why did Britain decide merely ‘to occupy’ Egypt, not annex

it, and that too ‘temporarily’? The intention to withdraw on the part of the

British government also persisted, as is obvious from the fact that as many as

sixty-six official declarations to this effect were made.

It might be mentioned

here that in international relations, temporary ‘occupation’ was in style at that

time. Austria-Hungary had ‘occupied’ Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878; Britain

had ‘occupied’ Cyprus in the same year. In 1881, as already said, Britain ‘occu-

pied’ Pishin and Sibi on the Northwest Frontier of India and at this stage Britain

decided to ‘occupy’ Egypt. There were several reasons why Britain decided only

to ‘occupy’ and not annex. One was that annexation would have been a more

dramatic blow to the stability of the Ottoman Empire than ‘temporary’ military

occupation. As the events of 1875–8 have shown, from the British point of view, a

pliant Ottoman state was a better ‘occupier’ of the route to the East than Russia.

Therefore, Britain did not want to be seen as working for the disintegration of the

Ottoman Empire. Besides, Islamic law prohibits surrender of territory without

war and any attempt to annex Egypt would have entailed a war with Turkey,

which Britain wanted to avoid. In any case, ‘occupation’ seemed to ensure all the

advantages of control while seemingly absolving the Liberal government of the

charge of being an aggressor. Annexation would have been politically explosive.

Under the arrangements made, Turkey remained the de jure sovereign power; the

de facto situation was that the Khedive was under British control and Egypt

became practically a British protectorate.

Britain did not to share power there

with France. Egypt was supposed to revert to the Egyptians after its finances had

been put in order. Repeated assurances of early evacuation did prove diplomati-

cally tiresome, but control over Egypt was perceived as so important that the

British preferred to remain ‘entrapped’ in the Egyptian ‘house of bondage’ and

face embarrassment in European councils rather than consider evacuating it.

68 In the garb of moral imperatives

No one valued more highly the tradition of disinterested public service than

Gladstone. He was always very sensitive to any suggestion that he had acted

from anything less than the highest principles. His public statements have been

repeated so often by so many historians that, even after the discovery of his

assets drawn up in his own hands showing that Gladstone’s personal holding of

the Egyptian loan accounted for about 37 per cent of his portfolio, they are not

ready to admit that Gladstone could have acted in self-interest. Despite unam-

biguous evidence available on this point, they refuse to pick up the key to the

enigma of Gladstone’s Egyptian imbroglio. Having noted the statement showing

that a third of his portfolio was invested in Egypt, P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins

comment: ‘This is not to say that Gladstone was motivated by crude self-interest

but it does suggest that he was likely to see the creditors’ point of view with some

clarity if it could be presented as an issue of principle, and especially one that

was in the wider public interest.’

H.C.G. Matthew also absolves Gladstone of

any charge of taking decisions in pursuit of self-interest.

He says that from the

study of Gladstone’s diaries he has not found any conscious awareness of any

association between his personal investments and ‘order’ in Egypt. But the fact

remains that the Liberal government under him acted in a most determined

manner. This calls for some comments. One, Gladstone was capable of consider-

able self-deception. His teasing obsession with retirement and old age, while

continuing in office at the same time, is one example of this. He was perhaps

loath to acknowledge even to himself the sheer strength of his ambition or the

intensity with which he enjoyed power and adulation. His diaries and letters do

not show any awareness of association between his personal interests and the

policy adopted in Egypt because he would not confess even to himself any such

cogitation. Two, it was not as if in taking a strong line in Egypt Gladstone was

promoting self-interest. That would be too crude a charge against a statesman as

righteous as Gladstone is believed to be. But the fact remains that Gladstone

invested his savings on the credit of a regime which he frequently denounced for

its deceit and untrustworthiness. It certainly highlights that he knew that, given

Britain’s long-standing interests in Egypt, in the last resort, the British govern-

ment would never abandon Egypt.

Now the crucial question arises: why was Gladstone so sure that in case of

any threat to Khedive’s government, the British government would act decisively

in Egypt? Or, in other words, what were these interests that were so decisive?

Two streams of arguments have been put forward in this context: one, economic

and financial, and the other strategic. The former – the ‘bondholders’ thesis’ –

was advanced contemporaneously, most notably by W.S. Blunt, who argued that

the reason for military operations in Egypt was the need to defend ‘British pecu-

niary interests’.

Subsequently, the cotton factor was added. It was argued that

Egypt provided the largest market in Africa for British cotton goods and

supplied raw cotton to British cotton mills.

Cain and Hopkins emphasise the

financial aspect. They say that the deeper origins lay in the expansion of

European trade and investment after 1838, and especially in the growth of

public sector borrowings from the 1860s. They say that Britain was the principal

In the garb of moral imperatives 69

creditor when Egypt slid into bankruptcy and also the principal trading partner

taking, in 1880, 80 per cent of Egypt’s exports and supplying 44 per cent of its

imports.

Political motives have also been emphasised. It has been argued that

the expedition had the effect of uniting the Liberal Party and rendering the

Conservatives speechless.

The motives for acquiring Egypt cannot be viewed in such narrow economic

or political contexts, or in the context of developments in 1882, or even the

preceding decade. From an economic point of view, Britain did have more than

half the share of Egypt’s total trade, Britain’s share being £10.5 million out of

20 million. But what this argument camouflages is the fact that this was a very

small fraction of Britain’s total trade. Total imports and exports of Britain at this

time amounted to £550 million, and thus Britain’s trade with Egypt amounted

to less than 2 per cent of its own total trade. Egypt was important to Britain

because it lay astride the vital route to India. The strategic argument was repeat-

edly invoked. Northbrook, at that time the First Lord of Admiralty, wrote: ‘As

long as India remains under British rule the interests of England and of

India…go far beyond the traffic in the Canal, for [they] demand that no other

nation should be allowed to dominate Egypt.’

Gladstone himself described

Egypt as ‘our one really vulnerable point’.

He knew that the Canal could never

be secure without Britain’s domination as with it. To Ripon he wrote:

Apart from the Canal, we have no interest in Egypt itself which could

warrant intervention (in my opinion). But the safety of the Canal will not

co-exist [?] with illegality and military violence in Egypt: and I doubt

whether Parliament and the nation would have sanctioned, as they almost

unanimously sanctioned, our proceeding, except for the Canal.

No British statesman could forget that the Canal was the indispensable link

between the Mediterranean fleet and the Indian army, the two great factors of

power which backed British diplomacy both east and west of the Suez. The

route was important for trade with the East in any case. By the end of the

century, some 70 per cent of the tonnage that passed through Egypt was British.

In the 1870s it was also discovered that Britain could procure Indian wheat

through the Canal. Before this, the journey via the Cape had lasted five months,

during which half the grain was lost. But after the opening of the Canal, wheat

could be shipped in 25 days from Bombay to Marseilles. After 1878, India

supplied over 10 per cent of the total import of wheat into Britain. This released

Britain from dependence on imports from Russia and the USA.

Historians tend to argue that while claims of sectional and economic inter-

ests could only divide the nation, the threat to the Canal was invoked because it

served to unite it.

The Free Traders and Radicals in Gladstone’s factitious

Cabinet combined and extended their support when intervention was justified

in the name of world communications, free trade and spread of civilisation.

The question is, why was it accepted that the argument centring on the threat to

the Canal would unite the nation? To say, as Scholch does, that the argument

70 In the garb of moral imperatives

about the safety of the Canal was put forward as an afterthought,

or to argue,

as Hopkins does, that the Canal did not emerge as an issue until two weeks

before the bombardment of Alexandria,

amounts to closing one’s eyes to the

coherence of the policy that the British government pursued in this region

throughout the nineteenth century – a single-minded policy of preventing any

hostile power from entrenching itself in the entire region across the route to

India. It was Britain’s concern about the route to India that explains Britain’s

policy in this region in 1798, 1815, 1839–40, 1853–4 and 1875–8. The manner

in which the British government worked for obstructing the cutting of the Canal

through the Isthmus of Suez, despite full consciousness of the advantages likely

to accrue to Britain, shows that economic considerations were subsidiary to this

strategic need.

Discussing Gladstone’s views on empire, H.C.G. Matthew says: ‘Strategic

concern about “the route to India” was not one of his principles of foreign

policy.’

But the point is that it could not just be one of the principles. Like the

defence of the British Isles, continuation of control over the Indian Empire was

perceived as a national interest. And national interests are generally not defined.

They form the unspoken assumption of foreign policy. Britain did not invade

Egypt because it was receiving adverse reports about the government in Cairo or

because it had built up sufficient economic stakes in Egypt, but because control

seemed to be slipping from Britain’s hands into the hands of the ‘xenophobic’

patriots who showed a determination to rule their own country in their own way,

and because the establishment of a nationalist regime in Cairo was seen as a

threat to British control over the route to India and, hence, to Britain’s Great

Power status. The bondholders, the City and ‘the man on the spot’ could be

effective because their own interests in investments, business and positions in

Egypt chimed with the perception of Britain’s national interest. In the case of

Egypt one cannot even say that the actual happenings later belied the British

government’s anticipations. It was none other than Gladstone himself, who in

1877 as leader of the opposition, had said that, ‘Our first site in Egypt will be the

almost certain egg of a North African Empire that will grow and grow…’

Gladstone’s government was more calculative and combative than Robinson’s as

Gallagher’s reading of the evidence indicates.

Expedition to Sudan

After establishing control over Egypt, the British government became involved in

Sudan as well. Khedives of Egypt had ruled over Sudan for sixty years, but

Egypt’s hold over Sudan remained slender. Even before Britain’s invasion of

Egypt, Mohammad Ahmed had emerged as the ‘Mahdi’ or ‘messiah’ and had

raised a banner of revolt against Egypt’s domination. It was widely believed that

control over Sudan was essential to keep the natural frontiers of Egypt secure. At

this stage, however, the government at London decided not to interfere.

Ultimately, Khedive Tawfiq raised an army to suppress the Mahdi, which was

placed under the command of an English officer, William Hicks, and Sudan was

In the garb of moral imperatives 71

invaded. In the autumn of 1883 this army was massacred by the Mahdi’s forces,

which increased the power and prestige of the Mahdi. The British government

could not remain indifferent to the Sudanese question because of its link with

Britain’s control over Egypt. Besides, as Rosebery, the Lord Privy Seal at that

time, reminded his colleagues, success of a Muslim rebel was likely to have

adverse effects on the prestige of Britain because the Queen, as the Empress of

India, was the greatest of the Muslim powers.

He added that if the Mahdi

succeeded in setting Arabia ablaze, the whole Eastern Question would be

reopened.

It also became clear that Egypt could not pay the cost of extensive operations.

The British Cabinet decided to send an expedition to Sudan. General Charles

Gordon was chosen for this purpose. He had the reputation for being experi-

enced, incorruptible and at the same time, self-willed. He had been

Governor-General of Sudan during 1877–80. He was not given any categorical

instructions. He left London in January 1884. After initial success, he tried to

pursue his own policy. By March he was out of direct telegraphic contact,

perhaps deliberately.

The government was immersed in the issues relating to

Ireland and parliamentary reform, but something had to be done to rescue

Gordon. Months were spent wrangling over the size and scope of the relief expe-

dition. Various alternatives were considered, including the possibility of sending

an army from the south and from the Red Sea side. As in the case of Egypt, the

strategists became concerned about the security of communications eastwards.

Hartington at the War Office suggested that the ports of Sudan, particularly

Suakin, be defended.

Ultimately, in September 1884, Wolseley was sent to take

command. For four months his army fought its way against time up the

uncharted Nile. The nation followed its progress carefully. Gordon became the

icon of the age. On 5 February 1885, the news of the fall of Khartoum and the

probability of the death of Gordon reached London. It aroused a sense of rage.

Gladstone was universally blamed for this debacle, and was booed in public.

The Liberals were smeared with accusations of spinelessness and defeatism.

There was such an uproar in Parliament and outside that Gladstone’s govern-

ment barely survived the outcry. Within two days Wolseley was instructed to

destroy the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum. A railway inland from Suakin to

Berber was commenced. However, Wolseley was in an extremely hazardous posi-

tion, and meanwhile the situation in Central Asia had flared up. Wolseley was

told that in view of military dangers in Central Asia, ‘we are unwilling to take any

step in the nature of further general declaration of policy’.

The government

eventually decided to abandon Sudan to the Mahdi in spite of demands for

revenge for Gordon.

At the same time, it was also made clear that Britain would

not remain indifferent to interference by any European power in this region.

The settlement of Egyptian finances

Despite preoccupations with the Irish Crisis, parliamentary reforms and the

debacle in Sudan, Gladstone’s government devoted itself to the task of settling

72 In the garb of moral imperatives

Egyptian finances and the position of bondholders with tenacious consistency.

Egypt’s financial condition had continued to deteriorate because of the

campaign in Sudan, the cost of British garrisons and the demand for compensa-

tion for the destruction of European life and property during the riots in

Alexandria in 1882. By the end of 1883, there was a deficit of nearly £1 million

in Egypt’s budget. This financial crisis made Gladstone’s government highly

vulnerable to attack at Westminster as well as in the international arena.

Since the occupation of Egypt was declared to be a temporary arrangement,

nothing was done to alter the control of Egypt’s finances by the International

Debt Commission. Britain had to depend on the goodwill of its members. The

French looked upon the ‘occupation’ of Egypt by Britain as their worst humilia-

tion since Sedan. It broke ‘the liberal entente’ and kept Britain and France at

odds for two decades. As French opposition to continued British occupation was

certain, it became very important for Britain to get the German vote. This could

also ensure the votes of Austria and Italy. In the estrangement between Britain

and France, Bismarck saw an opportunity to acquire colonies and to cultivate

France. In the scramble for Africa, he threw his whole diplomatic weight on the

French side, so much so that many English statesmen began to suspect that a defi-

nite understanding had come to exist between Germany and France. In this

background, in June 1884 Britain convened a Conference of Powers at London

to discuss British proposals for balancing the Egyptian budget. It was decided that

Egypt’s finances would be maintained by the International Caisse de la Dette, on

which each of the Great Powers would have a vote. But, despite a preliminary

agreement between Britain and France, German support for the French position

caused great confusion and forced Granville to close the conference.

Bismarck wielded the baton egyptien with a vengeance. Britain recognised the

German claim over Angra Pequena and agreed to the holding of an interna-

tional conference on West Africa to be presided over by Bismarck. The West

Africa Colonial Conference met in Berlin from November 1884 to February

1885. It defined the boundaries of the Congo Free State to be created by King

Leopold of Belgium and discussed the question of free navigation on River

Niger. Just a few days after this conference, Bismarck announced the creation of a

German protectorate through a chartered company on the East African coast

opposite Zanzibar. Britain accepted this. It was not as if Britain was not inter-

ested in this region. In fact, it lay as a bloc across the Cape to Cairo route on

which many Britons had dreamed of building a railway. More important than

this was the fact that Britain had always taken keen interest in the whole East

African coast that lay on the long route to India. As early as the 1820s it had

watched the French occupation of Madagascar with concern.

Later, Britain

had claimed paramountcy over the entire coast from Suez to Mozambique

through its client states, Egypt and Zanzibar. In the 1880s, when interest in this

area, especially in Kilimanjaro, increased, members of Gladstone’s Cabinet asso-

ciated with colonial policy – Granville, Derby, Kimberley, Dilke and

Chamberlain – began to advocate a policy which Gladstone thought savoured of

annexationism.

Gladstone thereupon asked Sir John Kirk, the British Consul at

In the garb of moral imperatives 73

Zanzibar, to report on Kilimanjaro, ‘the country with an unrememberable

name’.

The latter reported that it should be brought under the British

umbrella: ‘Could we admit another occupation like that of Madagascar on our

alternative route to India?’,

he queried. Subsequently, to strengthen its own

position in Egypt against France, Britain recognised German claims over

Cameroon, Togoland, New Guinea and Fiji. A settlement was reached on the

Egyptian question under which partial international control over Egyptian

finances was re-established. Britain reiterated its intention to evacuate Egypt and

guaranteed free navigation on the Suez Canal. The Sultan of Turkey, who threat-

ened with losing Egypt altogether, decided to become a party to this agreement.

South Africa

In South Africa too, Gladstone compromised his ideals for the sake of strength-

ening Britain’s hold over the Cape region. While in opposition, Gladstone had

criticised the annexations of Transvaal and the Orange Free State and the

involvement of Disraeli’s government in the Zulu War. After Gladstone came to

power, ‘after trying various alternatives’, British control was established over the

land of the Zulus. Because of the stand taken by Gladstone in his election

campaign, the Boers expected that Gladstone would give them back their inde-

pendence. But Gladstone’s government decided that continuation of the

Confederation was important to the British and discovered arguments to show

that the natives really wanted British rule. It decided to continue ruling the

Boers. One consideration behind bringing the Afrikaners as well as Africans

under British umbrella had been the desire to ensure Britain’s control over the

region that lay at the confluence of two oceans and commanded the most used

route to the East generally, and especially to India. The Admiralty continued to

base its strategy on the Cape route until the 1890s, though the shipping lobby

gave Suez a higher priority.

The destruction of the power of the Zulus had the

paradoxical result of emboldening the Boers. They became even more keen to

make themselves independent. They rebelled in December 1880, and within

three months they inflicted a humiliating defeat on the British army in the battle

of Majuba Hill. Though embarrassed, Gladstone’s government decided to nego-

tiate. The Boer states did not yet have access to the sea; therefore, they did not

yet seem to present a serious enough threat to the Cape route. In August 1881,

the Convention of Pretoria was signed, granting the Boers independence under

the suzerainty of the British Crown. What ‘suzerainty’ meant was never defined.

The Boers of Transvaal were keen to secure an outlet to the sea so as to free

themselves commercially from dependence on British ports. Therefore, in 1884

they broke the Convention by expanding across the agreed frontier into

Bechuanaland. In mid-July 1884, the British Parliament decided to annex the

entire south-west coast up to the Portuguese border. At this stage, the Germans

made pre-emptive moves and annexed Angra Pequena, just north of the Cape

colony. Gladstone’s government was bitterly annoyed. It then acted decisively

and annexed Bechuanaland. The aim was to restrict German expansion east-

74 In the garb of moral imperatives

wards and Transvaal’s expansion westwards. It may be mentioned that

Gladstone did not fight ‘very hard’ against these expansionist moves.

100

The Penjdeh ‘Incident’

On 30 March 1885, Russian and Afghan troops were engaged in a skirmish at

Penjdeh, a little known place in Central Asia to the north-west of Afghanistan.

The Afghan army suffered heavy losses and retreated. This Penjdeh ‘incident’

unleashed so much tension between Britain and Russia that most observers

thought that war was unavoidable. It seemed that Russia had timed the step well.

This was the time when the British government was facing embarrassments on

the financial issues in Egypt and the British army was embroiled in Sudan.

Britain immediately decided to put the Sudan question on hold.

The skirmish at Penjdeh was really not an isolated incident. It has to be seen

in the background of events since 1880. As already discussed in the context of

the Second Afghan War, Britain extended the Indian Empire westwards by

annexing Baluchistan and ‘occupying’ Pishin and Sibi in 1881. By this time

Russia’s expansion towards the Mediterranean had been stalled. In 1881, the

Three Emperors’ Alliance was signed after which Russia considered itself

protected on its western frontier and was in a position to resume the process of

expansion in Central Asia.

101

During the half century preceding 1880, Russia

had advanced some 2,000 kilometres from the Caspian towards Herat in

Afghanistan. In the four years ending in June 1884, Russia advanced by about

1,000 kilometres along the same line.

102

In view of Russia’s expansion, Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan began to

press the government of India to make arrangements to define the frontier of his

own state towards the north-west. This was an open frontier. But the British

government was not in a position to accede to the Amir’s wishes because the

India Office had discovered that the Amir had considerable claims beyond the

Oxus River which had been overlooked by Britain in the settlement with Russia

on this issue in 1873. In January 1884, the Amir took matters in his own hands,

crossed the Oxus and occupied Roshan. This precipitated a clash with the

Governor of Bukhara. It was in this background that Russia announced the

annexation of Merv on 13 February 1884.

103

From a strategic point of view,

Merv was crucial because it brought the Russians almost to the Afghan frontier.

It was some 300 kilometres from Herat, which was widely regarded as a gateway

to India. The government of India advised the Amir to strengthen the Herat

fortification. In view of the concern expressed by the British government, Britain

and Russia appointed a commission in May 1884 to settle the frontier issue.

104

Afghanistan was not represented, but the Amir showed a consciousness of the

advantage he could derive from such a settlement. He is reported to have said in

his Darbar that once the settlement was reached between Britain and Russia,

any Russian violation of the frontier would compel the British to come to his aid.

On the face of it, the reaction of the British government to the annexation of

Merv was subdued. But, in reality, virtual panic gripped policy makers and

In the garb of moral imperatives 75

strategists. This was accentuated by the uneasiness felt at the naval situation

following the disclosure by W.T. Stead, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, that the

number of first-class battleships possessed by the French equalled that possessed

by Britain. This created such intense clamour that Gladstone’s government was

forced to spend an extra £5.4 million on warships, ordnance and coaling stations

in that year alone.

105

At the same time, strategists were forced to give serious

thought to ways in which to meet the threat posed by Russia’s expansion in the

direction of Herat. In the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, Major J.S.

Rothwell prepared a memorandum in July 1884 on ‘England’s means of offence

against Russia’. He stressed that Britain had very ineffectual means of coercing

Russia. Russia’s sea-borne trade was not substantial, and hence a naval blockade

would not inflict significant damage on Russia’s economy. Only 36,000 men

were available for offensive operations from Britain. They could not penetrate

Russia’s defences at the Baltic to strike at St Petersburg. Any decision to send an

army through Afghanistan had the risk of loosening Britain’s military grip on

India at a dangerous moment. He held that Russia was still vulnerable from

Batum. This port could be seized by a coup de main and then an expedition could

be sent towards the Caspian Sea where it could get support from the people in

the Caucasus. But, for the success of this strategy, it was essential that relations

with Turkey be such so as to secure for the British fleet an immediate entry into

the Black Sea.

106

This memorandum was printed for circulation to the Cabinet.

The other strategy of sending an army from India was also discussed when

the government of India fixed a meeting with the Amir of Afghanistan. The

government of India wanted to arrive at a decision before this meeting.

107

March 1885, in a private telegram to Salisbury, Dufferin, the Viceroy, postulated

two eventualities: one, ‘Do we intend to declare war if Russians cross the Afghan

frontier?’, and two: ‘Are we determined to keep Herat out of the hands of Russia

at any price?’ The Viceroy also made it clear that if a war started, the govern-

ment of India did not have the armed strength to meet Russia in superior force.

The strategists in India calculated that if a war started, by 7 July Russia would be

able to place 100,000 men before Herat while the government of India could

place only 55,000 (17,000 British and 38,000 Indian) men there. It was accepted

that 30,000 British infantry and 2,000 cavalry would have to be retained in India

to maintain the Raj.

108

The Viceroy’s telegram was circulated to the members of

the British Cabinet. Their comments show that the ministers were in a

belligerent mood. After prolonged discussions, the British government decided to

make Herat a casus belli.

109

On 25 March, the government of India was asked to

inform the Amir that ‘an attack on Herat will mean war between us and Russia

everywhere, and the Amir will leave us to fight the battle in the way we think

most likely to secure success’.

110

On the question of sending reinforcements, the

government of India was told that ‘we have determined to take, at once,

authority to call out our reserves’. Explaining the reasons to the Queen,

Gladstone pointed out that ‘rapid enforcement of the British army in India

stands related to the imperial duty of so high an order’.

111

This was the background in which the clash between Russian and Afghan

76 In the garb of moral imperatives

forces took place at Penjdeh in March 1885. The expedition to Sudan suddenly

paled into insignificance. War between Britain and Russia seemed imminent.

The ministers displayed an unequivocal readiness to fight Russia. To many, it

was a sharp pointer to the untrustworthiness of Russia’s assurances.

112

Some

Cabinet members showed a readiness to resign if any expedition to Sudan was

sent against the background of trouble on the north-west frontier of India.

Others were prepared to withdraw from Egypt altogether.

The man who had constantly preached a reduction of armaments to lessen

the danger of war, Gladstone, asked Parliament to sanction eleven million

pounds for spending on defence, and got it.

113

This was the largest grant for

military purposes sanctioned by Parliament since 1815, leaving aside the years of

the Crimean War. The British government showed readiness to lock horns with

the Russians. In early April the Foreign Office despatched telegrams to major

embassies warning them that a situation of ‘utmost gravity had arisen’.

114

The

Admiralty was asked to watch the movement of all Russian ships.

115

Granville in

the Foreign Office and Northbrook at the Admiralty began to consider the possi-

bility of a naval war in the Far East. Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell, then

Commander-in-Chief of the China station, was instructed ‘to occupy Port

Hamilton’.

116

The idea was to use the latter as a base of operations against

Vladivostok, which was held by Russia. This was duly carried out, and on 26

April the governments of China, Japan and Korea were notified that such action

had been taken. Even documents announcing a state of war between Britain

and Russia were printed.

117

The government of India was given assurances of

reinforcements from Britain. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-

Chief began to work on several plans of campaign.

118

A special squadron of

ironclads was assembled for possible service in the Baltic.

119

In short, in the diplomatic correspondence of this time and in the exchanges

between London and Calcutta during this period, one constant theme was that

Britain was hovering on the brink of war.

120

Britain showed its readiness to fight

despite full consciousness that it was difficult either to implement the Black Sea

Strategy or to meet Russia in superior force on the north-west of India. Why?

The explanation has to be sought in Britain’s determination to maintain its hold

over India, for which it was ready to pay any price. The point was not whether

Russia could or wanted to conquer India. The point was that the Raj was based,

above all, on the prestige of British arms, and for that reason Britain could not

afford a defeat even on a remote frontier. As Salisbury told the Lords:

Your frontier may be as strong as you please, your fortress may be as

impregnable as you please; but if the prestige of the Power coming against

you is greater than your own, it will penetrate through the barrier, it will

undermine your sway, it will dissolve the loyalty and patriotism of those

you rule.

121

Besides, any sign that Britain lacked the means to defend its empire was likely

to have an adverse effect on Britain’s standing in Europe. As Rosebery, who had

In the garb of moral imperatives 77

just joined the Liberal Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal, wrote: ‘All Europe is laughing

at us. Our nose has been pulled all over Europe.’

122

While taking these steps, the government in London continued to hope that

Russia would not think that Herat was worth a general war. The Liberal govern-

ment approached the Kaiser to ask him to become the arbitrator in the Afghan

boundary settlement.

123

Meanwhile, Russia urged Bismarck to put pressure on

the Ottomans to resist by force of arms any British attempt to enter the Black

Sea. For Bismarck, the maintenance of the Dreikaisersbund had clear priority

over any regard for British interests.

124

He had renewed this Bund at Kremsier

in 1884. Ultimately, the Triple Alliance Powers delivered a united warning to the

Turks against allowing the British navy to enter the Black Sea. This deprived

Britain of the chance to adopt the only feasible plan of striking in the Caucasus

through the Black Sea. Bismarck believed that this had contributed to the main-

tenance of peace.

125

Tension eased only when Russia accepted a proposal for

arbitration. The Amir did not show any attachment to Penjdeh. This made it

easier for each state involved to start negotiations once again on the question of

determining the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia.

At this stage, on 12 June 1885, an exhausted and bitterly divided Liberal

government in Britain resigned after defeat in a chance vote in the House of

Commons. This was the time when the Irish issue was ablaze, the parliamentary

reform programme was in progress and relations with the European powers

were in a sorry state.

Historians have continued to portray Gladstone as a victim of circumstances.

126

But a scrutiny of his policies reveals that his approach was extremely coherent

and consistent. He had come to power with the clear agenda of curtailing impe-

rial responsibilities. But his government added more to the empire than any

other ministry. In the garb of moral imperatives, he absorbed Egypt. When he

invested 37 per cent of his savings in Egypt, he must have calculated that his

countrymen would find ways of establishing control over Egypt, and this proved

right. After occupying Egypt, his government tenaciously held on to it in spite of

the fact that Britain had to face embarrassment in the Councils of Europe, in

spite of increasing criticism internally and in spite of the consciousness that

provision for additional administrators, soldiers and finance would have to be

made. It is doubtful if it was the ‘occupation’ of Egypt by Britain that triggered

off the partition of Africa. But there is no doubt that the resolve to stay on in

Egypt did not slacken under any British government, Liberal or Conservative.

The cause of entry ensured that there would be no quick return. Gladstone’s

government itself sent an expedition to Sudan. Subsequent governments, in

order to establish control over the source of the Nile, became involved in the

whole eastern half of Africa. In Egypt, whilst the Sultan of Turkey remained

suzerain, real power lay in the hands of the British Agent and Consul-General, a

post occupied by Evelyn Baring (created Baron Cromer in 1892) from 1883 to

1907. The metamorphosis of Baring and others at Cairo from liberalism to

paternalism was the result of much more than a moral commitment. The route

78 In the garb of moral imperatives

to India had to be defended whatever the risks. It might also be mentioned that a

good proportion of the military expenses were charged to India even though the

government of India had not been consulted about the expedition.

127

Similarly,

the whole course of the Penjdeh crisis showed the intensity of concern about the

defence of the frontiers of the Indian Empire. On the continent, Gladstone had

begun by arranging co-operation between the European powers. But by 1885,

Britain was at odds with France over Egypt, with the Central Powers over co-

operating with Russia, with Germany on the issue of passage through the straits,

and with Russia over expansion towards the Indian frontier. There was some

truth in Salisbury’s jibe that ‘the Liberal government had at least achieved their

long desired “Concert of Europe”. They have succeeded in uniting the continent

of Europe – against England.’

128

We shall see in the next chapter that during

1885–92 under Salisbury, the Conservative government made efforts to ensure

control over Egypt, and to strengthen Britain’s position against Russia and

France by arranging co-operation with the central powers.

In the garb of moral imperatives 79

In the 1880s, Britain continued to enjoy primacy in the imperial, naval and

commercial fields. The task before British statesmen was to ensure that their

country remained in unmolested enjoyment of this position. But they faced

many challenges. In the economic field, faced with depression, European coun-

tries were adopting protectionist policies. This was bound to have adverse effects

on Britain’s economy. This period also saw a race amongst world powers for

acquisition of colonies irrespective of their value. Within two decades, most of

Africa and many parts of Asia were partitioned into territories under the formal

rule or informal political domination of a handful of states.

Since Britain was a

power with worldwide interests, it felt threatened everywhere. Across the

Atlantic, relations with the United States were cool and threatened to become

worse because of issues such as the Bering Sea seal fisheries and the Sackville-

West Affair.

But the matter of greater concern was that Britain seemed

friendless on the continent. At the time of the Penjdeh crisis, Germany and

Austria-Hungary had stood by Russia and had together put pressure on the

Ottoman government not to give permission to the British navy to enter the

Black Sea. Thus Britain was deprived of a means to defend the Indian Empire

should the occasion arise. Relations with France could not improve until the

Egyptian wound had healed. Moreover, being a colonial power next to Britain,

France could and did cause problems. At this time the British government

became uneasy about French expansion in South-East Asia, which was seen as a

threat to the security of the Indian Empire’s eastern frontier. Nor did the

prospect of war with Russia recede after the Penjdeh crisis. Throughout 1885 it

was believed that Russian troops might march on Herat and that the presence of

Russians at this key centre would seriously endanger the security of British India.

Added to the widespread challenge to its imperial position and diplomatic

isolation was a consciousness of lack of military resources. During the Penjdeh

crisis, Britain had promised to supply reinforcements to India. But an examina-

tion of the actual position showed that the situation was perilous. Sir Henry

Brackenbury, Director of Military Intelligence, concluded in 1886 that because

of lack of cavalry and departmental services, Britain could not place even two

complete army corps in the field for foreign or home defence.

Even if available,

it was believed that the armed forces could not ensure the security of the Indian

4 Courting the Triple

Alliance, 1885–92

Empire should Russia choose to use the powerful position it had established in

Central Asia. As General Roberts wrote, ‘the first disaster would raise

throughout Hindustan a storm compared with which the troubles of 1857 would

be insignificant’.

There was also widespread unease about Britain’s naval posi-

tion. In 1884, when there were disagreements with France over conflicting

imperial claims in Egypt and with Russia over expansion in Central Asia, it was

found that the Royal Navy was not as superior in strength as the public had been

led to believe.

Apprehensions were expressed that Britain’s obsolescent ships

would not be able to protect Britain’s maritime commerce from the fast French

raiders. Within the country, the political situation seemed uncertain. Two general

elections had followed in quick succession during 1885 and 1886. The two-party

system seemed to be crumbling. Even the government formed in 1886, which

lasted six years, depended for its continuance on an uneasy coalition of the

Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists.

The man who headed this government was Robert Gascoyne Cecil, the third

Marquess of Salisbury. He remained Prime Minister from 1886 to 1892, except

for a brief spell from February to July 1886 when Gladstone formed a govern-

ment for the third time.

He was an experienced statesman. He had been India

Secretary in 1867 and again during 1874–8. From 1878 to the fall of Disraeli’s

government he had been Foreign Secretary. In 1883 he became leader of the

Conservative Party. After he became Prime Minister, he retained the foreign

affairs portfolio.

He was able to conduct the country’s foreign policy according

to his own concepts and designs without much hindrance from his colleagues,

without serious criticism from the Opposition,

and without much reference to

the advice of the Foreign Office.

But his government had to labour under

many disadvantages. Writing to the Queen, he listed these as follows: ‘Without

money, without any strong land force, with an insecure tenure of power, and

with an ineffective agency, they have to counterwork the efforts of three Empires,

who labour under none of these disadvantages’.

He concluded that the

Cabinet was called upon to ‘make bricks without straw’.

In the country at large, this was the time when the influence of the land-

owning classes, to which Salisbury belonged, was waning.

The Franchise Act of

December 1884 had extended the borough qualifications to the counties and

had thus ‘suburbanised’ the electorate.

Disraeli had identified the Conservative

Party with the people, the glories of empire and the spirit of patriotism. But

Salisbury had no faith in the ordinary people or in Disraeli’s concept of ‘Tory

Democracy’. Nevertheless, working-class conservatism not only persisted but also

grew. The Primrose League was established in 1883 by the admirers of Disraeli

with the goal of promoting the Tory principles, among others, of attachment to

imperial ascendancy of Great Britain. Imperialist rhetoric accompanying the

perception of threat to Britain’s global position by acquisition of colonies by

other European powers and celebrations on the occasion of the Queen’s Jubilee

in 1887 helped it grow. By 1891 the Primrose League had a membership of over

one million.

Against this background, voices were raised in favour of more

positive government action and ‘forward’ policies to protect the empire.

Courting the Triple Alliance 81

Salisbury had to take this imperial sentiment into account, though he believed

that the problems facing Britain and lack of resources to protect what Britain

had demanded a policy of restraint.

In foreign affairs, Salisbury devoted himself to strengthening Britain’s diplo-

matic position by courting the Triple Alliance. The policy he followed has

generally been described as that of leaning on the Triple Alliance without

belonging to it.

To remain with the Triple Alliance he took many steps, sending

friendly messages to Bismarck for an alliance, giving way on virtually all colonial

questions, forming the Mediterranean Agreements and concluding the

Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty. Historians have situated these initiatives in the

context of the Egyptian imbroglio and the Bulgarian crisis. On Egypt, Britain

did need Bismarck’s support on the Financial Commission. Since France and

Russia were not likely to co-operate with Britain, Britain came to depend on the

Triple Alliance powers, which in practice meant Germany. Similarly, Germany’s

co-operation was needed in the Balkans, where during 1885–6 relations between

Russia and Bulgaria had deteriorated. Britain wanted to hem in Russia. While

these issues were important, it is not sufficiently emphasised by historians that

one weighty consideration that determined the choices before Britain’s policy

makers was the need to enlist Germany’s co-operation in guarding the Raj so as

to forestall the situation which had emerged during the Penjdeh crisis. This crisis

had highlighted the fact that Britain simply did not have the means to adopt

either the strategy of the Forward School of meeting Russia beyond the North-

west frontier of India in superior force or adopting the traditional reposte of

sending its forces through the Black Sea. If the two enemies of Britain, France

and Russia, combined, then Britain was likely to face what the Director of

Military Intelligence described as ‘the worst combination we have reason to

dread’, an alliance of France and Russia against Britain.

Russia’s expansion towards the Indian Empire had to be stalled by diplomacy,

and this is what Salisbury sought to do by leaning on the Triple Alliance. This

course served Britain’s purposes in two ways. One, it gave Britain the option to

adopt the Black Sea strategy. Second, by creating estrangement between Russia

and the central powers, it was likely to oblige Russia to keep part of its army on

the Polish frontier. This could dissuade Russia from sending its army towards

Britain’s Indian Empire.

Thus, amiable relations with the central powers could

provide relief to Britain at a time when, according to the Intelligence Branch of

the War Office, Russia was hourly strengthening its position in the Black Sea, in

Transcaspia, in Persia and in Central Asia, while Britain had failed to do so in

Persia and Asia Minor.

Germany too had embarked upon an active colonial

policy in 1884–5 and had acquired a colonial empire five times the size of its

European homeland. But Bismarck showed no sign of thinking that colonies

would benefit Germany. The British perhaps felt that Germany’s desire for

colonies was natural. Hence, they continued to believe that under the steward-

ship of Bismarck, Germany was a satiated power with only limited colonial

ambitions and that its interests lay in not disturbing the balance of power on the

continent.

82 Courting the Triple Alliance

When Salisbury assumed office in June 1885, Britain and Russia were

engaged in negotiations to determine the boundary between the Russian Empire

and Afghanistan. By the end of the month, these negotiations had reached a

deadlock because Russia tried to part with only a portion of the Zulfiqar Pass

while earlier the Afghan government had been given to understand that it would

get the whole of the Zulfiqar Pass. Like the Liberals earlier, the Conservatives

found the situation so threatening that Russia was given a warning to the effect

that any advance on Herat would mean war.

Ultimately, by September, Russia

yielded on this issue. The Anglo-Russian agreement could only be signed two

years later, in 1887, and during these two years there were many minor flurries

of alarm.

Offer of alliance offer to Germany

During his short-lived first administration, Salisbury explored the feasibility of

arriving at an understanding with Germany. In August 1885 he sent Sir Philip

Currie, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Berlin with a

‘paper’ that Currie showed to Bismarck’s son, Herbert Bismarck. It suggested ‘a

close union between the greatest military power and the greatest naval power’.

Hope was expressed that such a union would ensure for Germany the safety of

its continental possessions in the event of European complications and to Britain

it would give freedom to defend its interests in the event of unprovoked aggres-

sion on the part of Russia against the Indian Empire. In this paper, the

determination to defend India even at the cost of unleashing a general war was

expressed unequivocally:

The point on which we should concentrate the greatest part of our energies

would be the cutting of the communications between Russia and her

Central Asian possessions. For this it would be an absolute necessity for us to

obtain an entrance to the Black Sea for our ships, and this we should

unquestionably do by some means or other, whatever view Europe might

hold as to the localisation of the war.

On receipt of this proposal, Bismarck did not react immediately, but instead

adopted ‘a sphinx-like pose’. Apart from distrust of British parliamentary institu-

tions and differences over ideology, Bismarck felt that Germany would not gain

anything by supporting Britain against Russia over Afghanistan. He was aware

that though renewed in 1884, the Dreikaisersbund did not eliminate Austro-

Russian rivalry in the Balkans. He did not want to alienate Russia at a time when

the German General Staff was growing increasingly alarmed about Russian

troop concentration along the Polish border and about Germany’s prospects in a

two-front war.

In fact, the antagonism between the bear and the whale suited

Bismarck for, by keeping Russia’s energies diverted to the East, it eased pressure

on Germany’s eastern frontier. He did not gain anything by relieving Britain of

anxieties on the Indian border. As he told the Kaiser: ‘If the Russian army has

Courting the Triple Alliance 83

nothing to do in Asia, it will make itself busy on its western borders’.

Some

right-wing newspapers in Germany openly encouraged Russia to take what it

wanted in Asia. In fact, in 1885 many diplomats, amongst them Bernhard

Bülow, at that time attached to the St Petersburg embassy, and Holstein, a very

influential official at the Foreign Office, were disappointed that war between

Britain and Russia had been avoided. Bismarck replied only after three months,

but courteously and at length. He clarified that he was ‘unwilling to side for or

against England or Russia on points where their interests were opposed’.

This

overture to Germany thus came to nothing. But it was significant in that, in

order to guard the Raj, the British government had shown readiness to take a

distinct step forward into Europe. It could not afford to antagonise Germany.

Despite the failure of this effort, Salisbury continued to send friendly messages.

He supported Germany in Zanzibar and the Caroline Islands. During the first

six months of his second administration also, Salisbury virtually gave way to

Germany on all colonial questions.

The conquest of Upper Burma

Meanwhile, a crisis had been brewing near the eastern frontier of the Indian

Empire, in Burma. The British government took interest in this region

throughout the nineteenth century. Two wars were fought with the Burmese king

during 1824–6 and again in 1852, after which the British government annexed

the entire coastal region of Burma comprising Arakan, Pegu and Tennaserim.

On 1 January 1886, the Conservative government annexed Upper Burma as

well.

This time it was the expansion of empire by the French in the vicinity of

Burma which prompted the action. Unlike Afghanistan, Burma never became a

nerve centre of international relations, in part because this region was accessible

to the British navy. But this expedition to Burma merits a brief consideration

because it highlights the extreme concern about the security of the Raj and

shows that Britain wanted other European powers not just to keep their hands

off the frontiers of India but also off neighbouring states as well.

In the 1860s, spurred by the French Third Empire’s ethos of expansion of

trade and empire and la gloire, the French embarked on a policy of expansion in

Cochin China. After 1870, the French continued to expand in South-East Asia.

Until then, the British government had seen no reason to be apprehensive.

Britain’s trade in Siam as well as its military and maritime strength in South-East

Asia were overwhelmingly superior to the puny resources of the French naval

station at Saigon. Moreover, the natural route of expansion from Cochin China

was thought to lie northward, in the direction of Tonkin and South China,

and

therefore it was believed that France was not likely to expand towards Siam and

Burma. The situation changed in the early 1880s. In 1881, the French seized

Hanoi and invaded Tonkin. In 1884, Cambodia was incorporated into the

French Empire. By this time the French were manifestly irritated over the ‘occu-

pation’ of Egypt by Britain, and Bismarck was known to be stoking their colonial

ambitions. Both Britain and France began to suspect each other of wishing to

84 Courting the Triple Alliance

extend their own influence over Siam, which lay between their respective

empires. Several reports of economic and military activities of the French in the

vicinity of British Burma and the Straits Settlements began to reach Calcutta

and London. These set British policy makers wondering about the final limits of

French ambitions in this region.

This was at the time when Russia had announced the annexation of Merv.

Even the Liberal government began to take a gloomy view of the situation.

Kimberley wrote to Ripon: ‘The temper of the French is such that there is no

amount of aggressiveness in the east we may not expect’.

Britain did not seem

to have the necessary military and financial resources to fight Russia. The

prospect of facing Russia and France simultaneously was unnerving indeed. ‘If

we are to burn the candles at both ends, in the north-west in fear of Russia and

in the south-east in fear of France, we shall reduce India to bankruptcy’,

commented Ripon.

Meanwhile, the government of Burma under King

Thibaw (1878–85) made efforts to establish contacts with European countries. In

April 1883 it informed the government of India that some officers were being

sent to Europe to gather information on industrial arts and sciences.

The

Foreign Office suspected from the first that this mission had a political purpose.

It promptly asked the Quai d’Orsay not to forget ‘the very peculiar situation of

that country in relation to British India’.

Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at

Paris, met Jules Ferry many times between June 1884 and January 1885 in this

connection.

The French were not averse to this opportunity of establishing political and

commercial relations with Burma. Because of geographical proximity, the

French government was taking more interest in Siam than in the more remote

and land-locked kingdom of Upper Burma, but its negotiations with Siam for

political and commercial co-operation were proving abortive. Moreover, France

suspected that the British wanted to annex Chiangmai in Siam to the west of

Lower Burma, which was already a part of the British Empire. This could

imperil France’s new frontiers in western Tonkin. In this situation, some influ-

ence in Burma could create a sort of regional counterpoise. It is difficult to deny

that Jules Ferry sought, through commercial negotiations with the Burmese, a

position of advantage over the Upper Irrawady which would enable France to

restrain any thrust through Siam.

At Paris, meanwhile, the France-Burmese Commercial Treaty was concluded

on 15 January 1885. Thereafter a French consul was appointed at Mandalay,

and rumours of railway and mining concessions to the French circulated.

Outside Burma, a treaty was signed between France and China at Tientsin in

June 1885, under which the Chinese government ratified French rule over

Annam and much of Cambodia. During 1884–5 the governments in Britain and

India were flooded by petitions from chambers of commerce in Rangoon,

Calcutta, London and Liverpool demanding free trade in Burma and the end of

Thibaw’s rule.

These views were echoed in the press.

By this time the Penjdeh incident had made the British government take steps

preliminary to war. It was obvious that if Britain became involved in a war

Courting the Triple Alliance 85

against Russia, France could drag Britain into another war in the east. The Chief

Commissioner of Upper Burma, for example, wrote: ‘If we are not at war with

Russia, France won’t go to war with us about Upper Burma, while, if we are at

war with Russia, France is likely enough to be at our throats on the Egyptian and

other grounds’.

When the Conservatives came to power in June 1885, the

young and ambitious Randolph Churchill became India Secretary. He was

convinced that the British should have paramount influence in Burma.

He also

believed that a forward policy in Burma would make the government popular

and win votes for the party in the forthcoming elections. In the elections held in

November, the question of immediate action in Burma did become an electoral

issue.

On 22 October 1885, an ultimatum was sent to the Burmese government

giving one week’s notice. After its expiry, an expedition was despatched. The

king surrendered after feeble resistance. The news of victory reached London

after the elections were over and could not influence the voters. The electoral

reverse and the prospect of the return of the Liberals did not make Salisbury

and Churchill consider any change in policy. The only hitch in annexing Burma

was the likelihood of it becoming a financial liability, because it was believed that

the economic resources of Upper Burma might not be able to sustain British

administration. Ultimately it was decided that financial control and responsibility

of administration be assigned to the government of India. On 1 January 1886,

Upper Burma was proclaimed a part of the British Empire. The Indian taxpayer

was made to pay for Upper Burma’s deficit.

The Burmese carried on a

sustained struggle against British control well into the twentieth century.

Randolph Churchill underlined the importance of the threat from the French

in taking the decision to annex Burma: ‘It is the French intrigue that has forced

us to go to Burma, but for that element we might have treated Thibaw with

severe neglect’, he wrote.

Historians, on the other hand, have tended to high-

light the economic and financial aspects.

Both these views contain some truth.

Much before the French started taking interest in this region, the British had

fought two wars there. Thus they were not likely to remain indifferent to devel-

opments in this region. As far as interest in trade and investments is concerned,

this annexation can be seen as a consequence of the forces that led to the parti-

tion of Africa during the same period. But it also shows that the British

government was extremely sensitive even to the semblance of hostile activity on

the part of any European power in the vicinity of India.

Guarding interests in the Near East

In 1885, the Conservative government faced a fresh crisis in the Near East also.

On 18 September 1885, the people of Eastern Roumelia rebelled against the

Sultan of Turkey, and the next day Prince Alexander, the ruler of Bulgaria,

proclaimed its union with his own state. This new state of Bulgaria and Eastern

Roumelia was bigger than other states in the Balkans, and this created a commo-

tion in the region. The Serbs, the Greeks and other peoples in the Balkans were

86 Courting the Triple Alliance

sure to seek compensation. The Great Powers were faced with a fait accompli.

These developments could escalate into a major crisis because the issue involved

their interests.

The European powers would have liked the Ottomans to handle the situation

themselves. But, as in 1875, the Ottoman ruler was content to appeal to the

European powers for help. In 1878, Russia had created ‘Big Bulgaria’ at San

Stefano and had been deeply resentful of the reversal of this decision at the

Berlin Congress. But subsequently, its efforts to create a subservient state of the

Bulgars had failed. Prince Alexander of Battenburg himself had emerged as the

most formidable opponent of Russia’s Balkan strategy. Russia was furious at this

ingratitude. This new check on the pan-Slavic ambitions of Russia suited

Vienna, but any attempt at intervention by Austria was likely to escalate into an

Austro-Russian war, and Bismarck was very clear that Germany was not likely to

gain anything for its sacrifices even if Austria was victorious. If anything, such a

conflict was likely to rekindle the Polish question. In this situation, Bismarck

decided to stand by the Dreikaisersbund and support Russia in Bulgaria on the

grounds that Bulgaria was in the eastern half where predominance of Russia

was recognised under the Dreikaisersbund, but he was disinclined to let Russia

increase its influence. So the Dreikaisersbund was destined to fail.

Most observers expected Salisbury to oppose this resurrection of Big

Bulgaria. He had taken the lead in opposing it at the Berlin Congress in 1878.

Salisbury’s first reaction was to uphold the Berlin settlement and join the ‘Three

Northern Courts’ in opposing this union and supporting the Ottomans. He had

made overtures for an understanding to Germany, and such a stance could

produce positive results in that direction. Salisbury even proposed a naval

demonstration to give moral support to the Sultan. He reacted favourably to

Bismarck’s proposal for a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople to find a

formula to solve the crisis. On 22 September 1878, he instructed Sir William

White, the ambassador at Constantinople, to join the Powers in upholding the

Treaty of Berlin.

But, within a few days, he reversed his position, decided to

abandon Turkey and support the union of Bulgaria, ostensibly on the grounds

that the British government’s policy was ‘to cherish and foster self-sustaining

nationalities’.

He also proposed a personal union of two Bulgarias under

Prince Alexander, with each part retaining its institutions. The question arises:

why this volte face? Broadly, three factors explain this change. One, Salisbury

realised that the Ottoman Empire was too weak to stem Russia’s expansion. In

his letter to White, he expressed his disgust at the Ottomans who had ‘no spark

of vitality left’ and who ‘stretched no hand to save their province’.

They had

also failed to fulfil the obligation they had undertaken in 1878 to garrison the

Eastern Roumelian frontier so as to prevent Russia from advancing towards

Constantinople in any future war. Second, since 1882, the Turks had been indig-

nant over the occupation of Egypt by Britain. In 1885 they had refused to give

permission to the British fleet to enter the straits. Finally, it was felt that a self-

respecting enlarged Bulgaria would form a more effective barrier to Russia’s

advance towards Constantinople and the Mediterranean. In this situation, the

Courting the Triple Alliance 87

British government decided not to go too far either in support of the Ottomans

or the Bulgars. Giving expression to Britain’s position, Salisbury told the

German ambassador, ‘we are fish’.

By the time the conference met in early November, none of the Powers were

ready to work for its success. The conference was nevertheless held ‘to drown the

question in ink’.

As soon as it became clear that the Conference would not be

able to evolve some acceptable settlement, Serbia declared war on Bulgaria. But

Serbia’s performance did not match its ambitions. Only Austria’s intervention

saved it from total defeat. Greece also mobilised and was restrained by the

European powers, who resorted to a naval blockade. Britain participated in this.

There were reasons for believing that the situation would escalate. It was

Bismarck who, making use of the alliance of 1879, restrained Austria from

proceeding further. Gladstone’s return to power in February 1886 added a

further complication. The governments of Russia and Greece began to think

that British policy might be reversed. Rosebery, now Foreign Secretary, hastened

to convince everyone concerned that nothing new would be attempted.

By the time Salisbury became the Prime Minister again in July 1886, it

seemed certain that Russia would intervene. A month later Russian agents forced

Prince Alexander to abdicate. This provoked loud protests in London and

Vienna. Russia’s action was taken as a curtain-raiser of a plan to invade

Bulgaria. The British government began to see the possibility of Russia at

Constantinople. This would be ‘the ruin of our party and a heavy blow to our

country’, wrote Salisbury.

London also remained worried that Russia might

open a front in Central Asia. From Britain’s point of view, even France was

becoming a centre of uncertainty. The latter half of 1886 saw the rekindling of

the revanchist passion in France as a result of the ‘rise’ of General Boulanger,

‘the dashing figure on horseback’. In May 1886 he became War Minister. The

resultant patriotic fervour was directed primarily against Germany, but Britain

was also targeted. Relations between Britain and France were far from friendly

not only because of the Egyptian sore but also because of bickering in the New

Hebrides, Morocco, Newfoundland and South-East Asia. French chauvinists

wanted to secure Russia’s help in a war against Germany. In Russia too, the

Panslavs relished such a prospect. This contributed to the apprehension that in

the eventuality of a war against Russia, France might not remain neutral.

In this situation, when Russia was active in the Balkans and the British

government was doubtful of its ability to face Russia’s superior force in the

Balkans or in Central Asia, Britain’s policy makers suggested two alternatives.

Randolph Churchill at London and Sir Robert Morier at the embassy at St

Petersburg advocated an Anglo-Russian entente. Churchill held that Britain should

work for an understanding with Russia ensuring security of the Indian frontier in

return for giving recognition to Russia’s ambitions in the Balkans.

The Pan-

Slavs in Russia, who wanted to fight first Austria and then Germany, entertained

the idea of improving relations with Britain. The fact that Britain and Russia

were engaged in intensive negotiations on the Afghan issue provided opportuni-

ties for an exchange of views. During the Afghan negotiations, Giers, Russia’s

88 Courting the Triple Alliance

Foreign Minister, did express the hope that the discussion on Afghanistan would

be a stepping stone to better understanding all round.

This suggestion failed to

tempt Salisbury. It was not easy to give up the long-standing commitment to

maintain the Ottoman Empire. Besides, authorities at London were united in

their distrust of Russia’s plans and promises. In 1882 the India Office had drawn

up an exhaustive review covering nearly 150 printed pages contrasting Russia’s

assurances and actions during the preceding two decades and concluded that

past experience did not justify any trust in Russia’s pledges.

Dufferin, the

Viceroy of India, and Kimberley, the India Secretary, endorsed this view. Even

Salisbury shared this general distrust of Russia and was sceptical of resting the

defence of India upon the guarantees of Russia.

Others advocated a policy of accommodation with the Triple Alliance. This

was likely to make the strategy of a naval thrust through the Black Sea feasible.

In addition, by entangling Russia on its European frontier, it was likely to provide

relief to Britain on the Indian frontier. Brackenbury, the Director of Military

Intelligence, wrote later: ‘They think of Russia as if she had no European fron-

tier, no Triple Alliance to consider, no Eastern Question in Europe and, as if, her

one aim and object was the conquest of India’.

The rumours of rapprochement between Britain and Russia, as also the

possibility of understanding between Russia and France, made Bismarck uneasy.

The time had also come for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. But none of the

powers of the Triple Alliance viewed this with satisfaction. Each felt that it

derived little benefit from the alliance’s continuation. But given the international

scenario, Bismarck wanted it to continue. It was in this background that

Salisbury put forward the suggestion for agreement with Italy. Bismarck deftly

fostered this. An agreement between Britain and Italy would increase the latter’s

worth in Austria’s eyes and enable Bismarck to renew the Triple Alliance. Italy,

given its long coastline, stood to gain by joining a great naval power.

What were Salisbury’s reasons in suggesting an agreement with Italy? If one

is to go by a note on his motives penned at leisure before leaving office in 1892,

advising his successor to be ‘as friendly to Italy as we reasonably can’, he defined

Britain’s interest in such an understanding as follows:

Italy, hard pressed by her financial necessities, might abandon the Triple

Alliance and go over to France. In that case Austria and Germany would

also feel themselves unequal to maintain a possible attack from Russia and

from France. As Bismarck has repeatedly indicated, Germany would in that

case offer herself to Russia, and it is well known that the alliance of Russia

can be had at the price of acquiescing in her designs upon

Constantinople.

It was thus the desire to ward off the eventuality of an alliance between

Germany and Russia that weighed heavily with Salisbury in making the agree-

ment with Italy and, subsequently, in standing by it.

Ultimately, on 12 February 1887, Britain and Italy exchanged notes

Courting the Triple Alliance 89

expressing a common desire to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean

and to co-operate to that end.

Another exchange took place between Salisbury

and Kalnoky, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, on 24 March 1887 with

reference to the Aegean and Black Seas, though the Balkans was not specifically

mentioned. Even Spain was brought into the picture through an agreement with

Italy on 4 May 1887. On 20 February 1887, the Triple Alliance was renewed

largely on Italy’s terms. From Germany, Italy secured the promise of support in

its colonial ambitions, and from Austria the recognition of a position of equality

in the Balkans. It is accepted that Italy’s connection with Britain contributed to

this renewal of the Triple Alliance.

In February 1887 the British government also opened negotiations with the

Ottoman government with a view to defining Britain’s position in Egypt, where

promises to evacuate were proving extremely embarrassing. Sir Henry

Drummond-Wolff was sent to Constantinople for this purpose. He had carried

on negotiations with the Ottoman government in 1885 at the time of the

Penjdeh crisis. Historians tend to discuss this mission primarily in the Egyptian

context,

but the Indian dimension was extremely important as well.

Drummond-Wolff was asked to offer the evacuation of Egypt after three years to

the Sultan in return primarily for three things: one, legal title to the political

surveillance of the Canal; two, the right of re-entry in case signs of internal or

external danger to the Canal re-emerged; and three, access through the straits to

the Black Sea for British warships. The first of these conditions stemmed from a

desire to have a say in matters relating to the Canal. The right of re-entry was

asked for to retain control over the Suez railway and also over the telegraph line

between Britain and India, the only overland portion of which passed through

Egypt. In case of political uncertainty, Britain did not want to take any risk.

The third condition was intended to give Britain the means for adopting the

Black Sea strategy to create a diversion in case Russia threatened India’s frontier.

After patient negotiations, Drummond-Wolff managed to work out a draft

acceptable to the Porte. But Russia and France acted hand in glove, and

managed to stall this effort. The ambassadors of these two countries asked the

Porte to conclude agreements with them embodying similar concessions to the

French in Syria and the Russians in Armenia.

Britain wanted to keep all

European powers out of these Asiatic provinces of the Ottomans, and even after

the cutting of the Suez Canal, Britain wanted to have the option of an alterna-

tive overland route. It also wanted to obstruct Russia’s expansion towards the

Persian Gulf. For these reasons, rather than giving rights to Russia and France in

these provinces, the British government opted to drop the negotiations alto-

gether. It is no accident that at this juncture the project of a railway from the

Mediterranean Sea to Bombay via Baghdad was revived.

Commenting on the

reaction of the European powers to the Drummond-Wolff Convention,

Robinson and Gallagher say that the issue had ‘grown into a battle of prestige’

between the two groups of powers and became an index of their relative influ-

ence over the Ottoman Empire.

For Britain, at least, it was not a mere question

of prestige or relative influence over Constantinople. It was a question of having

90 Courting the Triple Alliance

or not having the means to thwart Russia’s expansion towards the northwest

frontier of its empire. Britain’s ability to maintain its Great Power status was at

stake.

This co-operation between France and Russia in sabotaging the settlement

with the Porte underlined the need to have some means of strengthening

Britain’s position in the Near East and Asia Minor. Germany, Austria and Italy

had stood by Britain firmly and steadfastly at the time of these negotiations. At

Sophia, in the meantime, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was elected to succeed

Prince Alexander to the throne of Bulgaria, but Russia doggedly opposed his

election. By August there seemed to be a real danger that in order to force

Bulgaria to have a ruler amenable to itself, Russia would send an expedition to

Varna. In fact, rumours remained current during the second half of 1887 that

Russia was planning military action against Bulgaria or Turkey.

As already

mentioned, the Dreikaisersbund had broken down. But Bismarck did not want to

drop the Russian parcel. Hence, in June 1887, he signed a separate, secret treaty

with Russia, the Reinsurance Treaty. While he was keen to prevent any

confrontation between Austria and Russia, he was not ready to bear the brunt of

Russia’s resentment. So he encouraged Austria and Italy to court Britain with a

view to maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The British Cabinet

had reservations about entering into an agreement against Russia to which

Germany was not a party. Ultimately, Britain gave in when the central powers

agreed to cover the straits and Asia Minor as well. On 12 December 1887, an

agreement was signed between Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary under which

the three powers agreed to co-operate to maintain peace and the status quo in

the Near East, the freedom of the straits, Turkish authority in Asia Minor and its

suzerainty in Bulgaria. Thus, Britain’s interests in the Ottoman Empire were

covered. They also agreed that if the need arose, the three powers would ‘imme-

diately come to an agreement as to the measures to be taken’.

This was called

the second Mediterranean Agreement, though it had little to do with the

Mediterranean. Germany was not a party, but the association of Germany was

underlined by the fact that it was the German ambassador at Constantinople

who was asked to inform the Sultan that a close accord existed between Britain,

Austria and Italy for the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans

and the integrity of Turkey.

How far did the Mediterranean Agreements involve a commitment on the

part of Britain to join Austria and Italy in the eventuality of war? Technically,

there was no obligation to go to war. Salisbury insisted on an exchange of notes

rather than the signing of a convention. He maintained that Britain’s parliamen-

tary institutions did not permit the government to undertake pledges and

engagements to go to war in a hypothetical contingency.

Nevertheless, the

British government had undertaken the commitment to co-operate with Austria

and Italy in case the status quo in the Balkans, the straits and Asia Minor was

disturbed. This was an obligation with far-reaching implications. Simply because

the war did not come, the obligation did not become innocuous. Salisbury knew

that he had virtually made Britain an associate member of the Triple Alliance.

Courting the Triple Alliance 91

After the first Mediterranean Agreement, he had written to the Queen that it

was ‘as close an alliance as the parliamentary character of our institutions will

permit’.

From a debate in parliament on foreign affairs, even the European

powers had come to know that at least an exchange of views had taken place

concerning the Mediterranean directed either against France or against

Russia.

In the letter to the Queen, Salisbury had also written: ‘Your Majesty’s advi-

sors recommend it on the whole as necessary in order to avoid serious danger’.

What serious danger did Salisbury want to ward off ? Salisbury showed keenness

to sign this agreement despite fears of being lured into rescuing Bismarck’s

‘somewhat endangered chestnuts’. He realised that Bismarck was pushing other

powers to bear the brunt of Russia’s resentment without making Germany a

party to the agreement. Salisbury also felt that Britain together with Italy,

Austria and Turkey might become embroiled in a war against Russia, thus

giving Germany an opportunity to humiliate France further.

Why did

Salisbury take such a risk? The situation in Europe was not really alarming.

Britain had signed a series of minor agreements with France during the autumn

of 1887, including one on the Suez Canal.

Tension with Russia had eased

after the Afghan Boundary Commission completed its labours in July 1887. The

key to intense anxiety on his part seems to lie in his concerns about the Indian

Empire. After the First Mediterranean Agreement Salisbury had written to the

Queen:

If, in the present grouping of nations, which Prince Bismarck tells us is now

taking place, England was left out in isolation, it might well happen that the

adversaries, who are coming against each other on the Continent, might

treat the English Empire as divisible booty, by which their differences might

be adjusted; and, though England could defend herself, it would be at

fearful risk and cost.

The manner in which France and Russia co-operated at Constantinople to

deny Britain a settlement over Egypt strengthened the need to ensure the co-

operation of the central powers. Besides, during 1886–7 France seemed to be

increasingly using the Suez route for commercial and strategic purposes. In

1886, France sent troops to Cochin and Annam through the Suez Canal. In the

same year, the route to Madagascar through the Canal was converted into a

steam route.

All such developments were watched with concern. Randolph

Churchill echoed the general sentiment when he wrote: ‘We shall never give up

India and we shall stay in Egypt for a long time to come’.

Ensuring naval predominance

In 1889, the British government took the decision to expand the navy on a

scale never before seen in peacetime. The occasion was provided by reports in

the press in January 1888 of extraordinary preparations by the French navy at

92 Courting the Triple Alliance

Toulon. This issue was discussed in the British press for months, and there was

much discussion in the Cabinet as well. In France, by this time, Boulanger had

been dismissed from the army and was using all his energy to ignite revanchist

passion. This served to heighten the atmosphere of tension. By May–June,

Britain was in the grip of an invasion scare. The chances of ‘a bolt from the

blue’ were seriously discussed. On 14 May 1888, Garnet Wolseley, the hero of

Tel-el-Kebir and Adjutant-General at that time, addressed the House of Lords

on the question of military preparedness. The attendance was so high that

Salisbury noted it was the largest gathering he could recall.

Pleading for an

increase in the size of the armed forces, Wolseley said that aside from

garrisons for India and the colonies, three regular army corps and six cavalry

brigades were needed for home defence alone, and a further two army corps

for any planned embarkation. The ‘Blue Water’ School, on the other hand,

argued that the way to protect Britain and the empire lay in the command of

the sea.

This invasion scare made a review of Britain’s naval resources imminent.

The British navy was superior to any individual fleet. It is interesting that the

Admiralty had not exerted pressure to expand the navy. It did not perceive any

threat to Britain’s security. In February 1888, replying to Salisbury’s request for

reinforcement of the Mediterranean fleet, George Hamilton, the First Lord of

the Admiralty, reported that the French navy was not big enough to cause

concern for the security of the United Kingdom. ‘If the French mean business

it is not to the Mediterranean but to China and Australasia that reinforcements

should go, as our commerce can be hit’, he opined.

One month later,

explaining to the House of Commons the reasons why the Admiralty did not

lay down a large number of ships at the same time, he said that so rapid was

the change in design and in the development of speed that the ships would

probably be obsolete or useless in ten or fifteen years.

The government did not

perceive any threat to its naval position from any other country. As to France,

Salisbury held that as long as France’s relations with Germany remained

strained, it could not pose any danger to Britain. Italy had only ten small first-

class ships, and reports about the efficiency and personnel of even these were

not very encouraging.

The Russian fleet in the Black Sea was so small that it

was believed that the Turkish fleet would’ most certainly deal with it alone with

the greater ease’.

This was the background against which, in the summer of 1888, Salisbury

asked the Admiralty and the War Office to report on the possibility and conse-

quences of the French seizing London by a coup de main. The Admiralty

discounted any chance of a French invasion on the British Isles, but agreed that

the operation was mechanically possible.

This was sufficient for Salisbury. He

decided to take ‘full precautions’ against even ‘a distant possibility’ on the

ground that ‘our stake is so great’.

A special Select Committee was formed to

consider the question of military preparedness. In the spring of 1889, Lord

Hamilton said in Parliament that Britain’s establishment should be on such a

scale that it should be equal to the naval strength of any two countries.

Courting the Triple Alliance 93

1889, the Naval Defence Act was passed under which the two-power standard

was adopted; that is, Britain committed itself to maintaining a force of battle-

ships equal in number to the combined strength of the next two powers. It

decided to spend an additional sum of £20 million over the next four years on

building new ships. This standard was confirmed time and again by responsible

statesmen of both parties over the next twelve years.

The question arises: when the Admiralty was not interested in expansion,

when the British government did not perceive any threat from any power, why is

it that the government adopted this ambitious programme of expansion? Why

did Salisbury think that Britain’s stake was so great that full precautions must be

taken against even a distant possibility? One reason was that Britain’s policy

makers had a lurking feeling that the military means at their disposal to meet the

obligations they had undertaken under the Mediterranean Agreements were not

adequate. Bismarck had been throwing hints that if Britain expected assistance

from the Triple Alliance in defending its Mediterranean interests, its naval pres-

ence in the Mediterranean should be strong enough to enable it to reciprocate.

At Berlin, Britain’s decision to adopt the two-power standard was welcomed as a

pro-German gesture. But from this it would not be proper to conclude, as C.J.

Lowe does, that passing this Act was ‘to provide a force, by the early nineties, to

contain both France and Russia in the Mediterranean, thus enabling Britain to

maintain her links with the Triple Alliance’.

It is relevant to point out that

establishing links with the Triple Alliance by itself was not the purpose of

Britain’s foreign policy decisions at this time. The purpose was to strengthen

Britain’s global position by ensuring the support of the Triple Alliance powers

against Russia.

The real issue that was causing disquiet was the growing sign of Franco-

Russian collaboration. Since the rise of Boulanger, French chauvinists and the

Pan-Slavs in Russia had each been urging their respective governments to

conclude an alliance.

At the beginning of 1888, there were renewed rumours

that France and Russia might enter a formal alliance and that, in particular, their

fleets might co-operate in an effort to drive British forces out of the

Mediterranean.

In October 1888, Russia floated its first loan in the Paris

market. Russia had also commissioned three powerful battleships for its Black

Sea fleet, which were likely to be ready by 1890. Thus, at a time when, despite

the Mediterranean Agreements, the British government continued to feel inse-

cure and continued to be suspicious of Bismarck’s motives, expansion of the

navy was a sure way of enabling Britain to face the Franco-Russian combination

in the Mediterranean without relying on the central powers.

Bismarck’s alliance offer

In January 1889, Bismarck made an offer of an alliance with Britain, which was

formally conveyed through Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador at London. He

suggested an arrangement directed against France and offered Britain a free

hand in East Africa. Bismarck’s real aims have continued to puzzle historians.

94 Courting the Triple Alliance

Salisbury’s reaction to this alliance offer was circumspect, though he recognised

the importance of the news. About Salisbury’s reasons, historians have tended to

concentrate on considerations of domestic politics. The Conservative Party

depended on the goodwill of the Liberal Unionists for survival and they were

opposed to any entanglements in Europe. Besides, there was acute dissension

over the Irish issue. In this situation such an alliance would have produced a

domestic political row of the first order. But it seems that the same considera-

tions that made the British government strengthen the navy made Salisbury

decline this offer. Though the Naval Defence proposal was announced in March

1889, the decision had been taken by January.

Bismarck had proposed an alliance directed against France. This served to

confirm Salisbury’s long-standing feeling that Germany was out to crush that

country. Paul Kennedy says that in Salisbury’s correspondence of this period,

such an apprehension is expressed again and again.

Salisbury did not want to

encourage the process which could make Germany assertive and could result in

Germanic domination of west-central Europe. This was also the period when

Francesco Crispi, given to dreams of grandeur, had adopted a belligerent atti-

tude towards France. Bismarck was trying to ensure Britain’s support for Italy.

This in fact reinforced the British government’s desire not to formalise its rela-

tionship with the Central Powers. Bismarck also referred to the threat posed by

Washington,

but Britain did not want to antagonise the USA. At the same

time, Bismarck made no mention of Russia, and it was against Russia that the

British had always desired Germany’s support. Wihelmstrasse was aware of this.

Brooding over Britain’s reaction, Holstein at the German Foreign Office

wondered whether, in order to ensure British support, Germany would have to

offer to guarantee India.

In fact, the existing diplomatic alignment served

Britain’s interests well. In case of Russia’s descent on Constantinople, Austria

would oppose Russia and, under the Triple Alliance, Germany and Italy would

opt for a policy of restraint. By April 1889, the Boulangist movement in France

had also collapsed. Besides, Britain had no wish to be dragged into a war against

France on behalf of Crispi’s ambitions. Britain had already taken the decision to

strengthen the Royal Navy, and one aim was to avoid committing Britain further

to the Triple Alliance and to guard itself in case France and Russia joined

together. In this situation, Salisbury could afford to leave the alliance offer ‘on

the table, without saying yes or no’.

Since Britain’s refusal was not a public one, the tacit agreement between

Britain and Germany to lean towards each other without formalising their rela-

tionships continued. They remained on friendly, but uncommitted, terms and

collaborated in colonial and diplomatic affairs.

The decision to stay in Egypt

In April 1888, the Suez Convention was signed between Turkey and the

European powers making the Canal free and open whether in peace or war to

the vessels of all countries. The Khedive (i.e., the British government) had

Courting the Triple Alliance 95

insisted on, and was given, the right to take any measures which he saw fit to

secure the defence of Egypt.

The provisions of this Convention were framed to

meet the conditions which were expected to subsist subsequent to the evacuation

of Egypt by Britain.

During the middle of 1889, the French approached

London for a settlement accepting the terms which Drummond-Wolff had asked

for in 1887 and the Porte had refused. But the French ambassador was informed

that there could be no more talk of withdrawal from Egypt on old terms. The

question arises as to what made the British government change its policy during

this year. The foremost reason was stated by Randolph Churchill much earlier:

‘We shall never give up India and we shall stay in Egypt for a long time to

come’.

The British government always feared that if it withdrew from Egypt

and the Ottoman Empire was partitioned, then the Canal might fall into the

hands of another power.

But the promise of early evacuation had put a great

strain on British diplomacy. Britain needed a majority of votes on the Financial

Commission, and this made British dependent on Germany’s goodwill. Bismarck

extracted the full price for this co-operation, demanding compliance from

Britain with Germany’s aims. Gladstone had complained repeatedly that

Bismarck virtually ‘tortured’ Britain over Egypt, while Salisbury expressed irrita-

tion at the Bismarckian habit of chantage.

In November 1889, the threat to

Mediterranean interests seemed grave enough to the British government to make

it reinforce the Mediterranean fleet. The very next month, the Admiralty

decided that the Channel Squadron was to be considered as an adjunct to the

Mediterranean fleet in case of war with France.

Assertion of control over

Egypt could relieve Britain of such anxieties.

The situation within Egypt also pointed to the wisdom of the continuance of

control over Egypt. In 1885 Salisbury had referred to ‘our hated presence’ in

Egypt in the context of the reaction of the European powers to occupation.

But even in the eyes of the people of Egypt, it was becoming a ‘hated presence’.

Nationalist movements tend to have momentums of their own and cannot be

switched off. Feelings against alien control were acquiring deeper roots. In this

situation, only continued occupation, would enable the British to keep the lid on

the unresolved internal crisis and thus retain supremacy. Moreover, in 1889, for

the first time since 1882, Egyptian finances showed a surplus.

Thereafter, the

occupation of Egypt seemed less of a liability, both financially and politically.

Although France was still hostile and Britain still required the consent of a

majority of the powers to introduce new financial measures, there was far less

urgency to secure their support. In this background the warm altruistic jargon

that only the ‘beneficent’ British administration could provide ‘law and order’

became more acceptable. By the end of the decade, only Gladstone and his old

guard continued to stick to the idea of withdrawal. Even Joseph Chamberlain,

who had been a most uncompromising critic of imperial policy, turned into a

fierce retentionist. In a public speech at the Guildhall in November 1889,

Salisbury announced that the British government would pursue the task it had

undertaken in Egypt irrespective of whether it were assisted or obstructed by

other powers.

96 Courting the Triple Alliance

The partition of Africa, 1889–92

With the decision to stay in Egypt, the British government discovered vital inter-

ests in the heart of Africa also. It was believed that whoever held control over the

Sudan and the source of the Nile would have the power to starve Egypt of water

and thus would, by sheer force of its geographical situation, dominate Egypt.

Until the Dervishes under the leadership of the Mahdi controlled the Sudan,

there was no reason to fear because they did not have either the arms or tech-

nology to cut off the flow of the Nile. But, as Baring wrote and Salisbury

concurred, the establishment of a ‘civilised’ power in the Sudan on the Nile

valley would be a calamity to Egypt.

If Britain was to hold on to Egypt, it

could not afford to let any European power acquire any area as far south as the

headwaters of the Nile in the Uganda region.

At the time of Kirk’s mission to East Africa in 1884, Granville and Dilke at

the Foreign Office and Hamilton at the Admiralty, had urged that from the

Indian Empire’s point of view, Britain should pursue its interests in East Africa at

the expense of those in West Africa.

But the partition of 1884–8 took place

almost without Britain’s participation because of the need to ensure the support

of Germany. Once the idea of holding onto Egypt began to acquire shape, the

need for Germany’s support decreased. But Britain could not remain uncon-

cerned about Africa because the other powers had begun to take interest there.

By this time, chartered companies were being formed as the means of

supporting overseas ventures at minimum cost. The Imperial British East Africa

Company was established in 1888 with McKinnon as chairman, and the next

year a royal charter was granted to Cecil Rhode’s British South Africa Company.

But a feeling began to grow in London that in East Africa the German company

was making better progress. The German company carved out an extensive

empire on the mainland opposite Zanzibar, established a protectorate over Witu

and was contemplating expansion towards the Great Lakes.

In the process,

there were frequent clashes with British commercial interests. By this time,

Rhodes had begun to envision a railway from Cape to Cairo and linked it to the

acquisition of territory in Zambesia. This was the background in which

Salisbury decided to negotiate with Germany. In January 1889, while dropping

hints about an Anglo-German alliance, Bismarck had mentioned that he was

tired of colonial quarrels and flag-hoistings and that he wanted to settle colonial

questions.

Thereafter, the matter was taken up in great earnest. However,

various issues were settled only after Bismarck’s fall.

In March 1888, Kaiser William I died. His successor, Frederick William,

survived him by barely three months. The new Kaiser William II was an apt

representative of a new Germany that was conscious of its growing power and

was impatient for recognition. In March 1890, Bismarck ‘resigned’ on a

domestic issue. But this did not cause any noticeable change in the attitude of

either Britain or Germany as far as negotiations over colonial affairs were

concerned. The men of ‘the new course’ in Germany – Caprivi, the new

Chancellor, Marschall, the Foreign Minister, and Holstein – were all keen on

settling colonial affairs and generally on a successful understanding with Britain.

Courting the Triple Alliance 97

The negotiations between these two countries coincided with the German deci-

sion not to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Salisbury offered to hand

over the island of Heligoland

100

in the North Sea in return for recognition of

British claims to some areas in East Africa. This was at a time when the

Germans were cutting the Kiel Canal and were finding it humiliating that an

island so near their country should be in foreign hands. Besides, the acquisition

of this island seemed important for covering the eastern access to the new Canal.

Kaiser William II found the bait irresistible. Besides, after the decision not to

renew the Reinsurance Treaty, Germany needed Britain’s goodwill more than

ever. Negotiations were carried on during the summer of 1890 during which the

British government altered the definition of western boundary from the basin of

the Nile to ‘the western watershed of the Nile’. Thus the Nile was sealed off

from the Germans not only at its headquarters in Uganda, but also throughout

its upper courses. Neither from the west through Bahr-e-Ghazal, nor from the

east through Abyssinia and Zanzibar, could any European power threaten the

valley.

101

In other words, in exchange for Heligoland, the Germans recognised a

British protectorate over Zanzibar and the areas on the Upper Nile, later called

Uganda and Kenya.

102

Within the Cabinet, there was no consensus over colonial policy. Many minis-

ters showed hostility towards Germany’s claims and opposed the proposal to

cede Heligoland. Salisbury expected opposition to the agreement from the

House of Commons. But, to his relief, the attack in the House of Commons was

‘of the guerrilla order’.

103

Only 61 members voted against the agreement.

104

The members of various parties were ready to hang together in pursuit of what

was perceived to be national interest, in this case the defence of the short as well

as the long routes to India. Salisbury also made efforts to get the consent of

France and Italy to this settlement. France had been one of the signatories to the

Treaty of 1862 to regulate the affairs of Zanzibar. Salisbury was able to get the

approval of France in return for conceding a free hand in Madagascar and huge

territories in western Sudan. To keep France away from the source of the Nile,

Britain leased a part of southern Sudan to King Leopold of the Belgians.

Salisbury found it difficult to get the consent of the Italian government under

Crispi because Italy had been taking an interest in Abyssinia. But a treaty was

signed after Rudini succeeded him, under which British and Italian spheres of

interest were defined from Kismayu on the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. In

German colonial circles, this agreement was received with dismay. It led almost

directly to the formation of the ultra-chauvinistic and Anglophobic Pan-German

League, which was to maintain unremitting pressure upon the government to

pay due regard to Germany’s interest abroad.

105

Salisbury had a daunting agenda. Britain was friendless on the continent. Its

policy makers were called upon to guard Britain’s most prized possession – the

Indian Empire – against Russia’s onslaught without having the military means to

do so, and to guard Britain’s interests in the Ottoman Empire when it seemed

difficult either to prop it up or to ensure its goodwill. About Salisbury’s attitude

98 Courting the Triple Alliance

to this, a sentence of his, penned in 1887, is often quoted: ‘Whatever happens

will be for the worse and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen

as possible’.

106

To describe his foreign policy, historians have tended to use

various epithets with negative connotations like ‘spineless’, ‘reticent’, ‘a policy of

obeisance’ and ‘a policy lacking vigour’. His preference for leaning on the Triple

Alliance without formally joining it is taken as a proof of his lack of firmness.

But the policies Salisbury adopted served Britain’s interests extremely well. He

did not resort to a policy of bombast after the fashion of Disraeli or to exposition

of moral values in the manner of Gladstone. His was a pragmatic, flexible, far-

sighted and low-risk policy, which enabled him to guard the country’s status as a

great power. Britain was not likely to gain by formalising relations with the Triple

Alliance. He created an accord a quatre that was likely to restrain Russia’s

advance in Central Asia by forcing Russia to keep a part of its army on its

European frontiers. At the same time, it saved Britain from assuming any obliga-

tion to assist Germany in a war against France. In short, he got the advantages of

Germany’s friendship without the encumbering engagements of an alliance.

Avoidance of an alliance with Germany is not proof of lackadaisical policy but

of sound statesmanship.

Many of the decisions taken by his government produced positively decisive

results. It adopted the two-power standard, which remained the bottom line

for all decisions relating to the size of the navy for at least two decades. It

took the bold decision to stay in Egypt, thus bringing a long, cumbersome,

embarrassing period of uncertainty to an end. This was followed by decisive

action in the direction of bringing the valley of the Nile and the East African

coast under Britain’s control. In 1885 Bismarck had turned down Britain’s

overture for an alliance, believing Britain to be a quantité negligeable in European

politics.

107

Four years later, Salisbury turned down Bismarck’s offer politely, but

firmly, and from a position of strength. What is even more remarkable, in the

eyes of German statesmen, Britain remained a friend and a potential ally.

When he made the colonial bargain with Germany, he did not merely

exchange Heligoland for Zanzibar but rather ensured the security of Egypt by

establishing Britain’s sway over the Nile basin. He made many attempts to

patiently negotiate an agreement with Russia over Persia and Afghanistan. The

need to improve relations with Russia seemed more pressing when, towards

the end of his second tenure, Salisbury began to feel that even with the

concurrence of the central powers it might not be possible to adopt the Black

Sea strategy. In case the British fleet was engaged in the eastern

Mediterranean, the French fleet at Toulon would not only be in a position to

attack the British fleet in the rear, it could escape into the Atlantic and thus

pose a threat to the British Isles. In other words, in attempting to defend the

empire, the government might be making the homeland vulnerable.

108

1891, he invited the French fleet to visit Portsmouth on its way back from the

sensational visit to Kronstadt. His aim, as he wrote to the Queen, was to show

‘that England had no antipathy to France or any partisanship against her’.

109

He seems to have realised that the real security for Britain and its empire lay

Courting the Triple Alliance 99

in some arrangement with Russia and France. This is what Britain ultimately

did; but the path was long, uncertain and tedious. For the moment, Britain’s

two enemies of long standing seemed to be joining hands. Britain’s reaction to

this development moulded Britain’s policy during the decade that followed.

This forms the theme of the next chapter.

100 Courting the Triple Alliance

In August 1892, when Gladstone kissed the Queen’s hands for the fourth time,

the Franco-Russian Alliance was already in the offing. During the last week of

July 1891, a French squadron had visited Kronstadt and was accorded an enthu-

siastic welcome there. A month later, in August, there was an exchange of letters

between the two governments. If peace was threatened, the two powers agreed

not merely to consult each other but also ‘to agree on measures’ to be taken. A

year later, during the month when Gladstone formed the government, a military

convention was signed between the generals of the two countries. Under this,

Russia promised support to France even against Germany alone. In return, the

French agreed to mobilise (though not necessarily to go to war) even if Austria-

Hungary alone mobilised against Russia.

The convention was to last as long as

the Triple Alliance, though neither France nor Russia knew the term of the

latter. Tsar Alexander, basically because of his misgivings regarding allying with

a republican state, gave his approval only in December 1893, to which the

French reciprocated on 4 January 1894.

This joined Russia and France firmly

through a military convention and formal alliance. The negotiations leading to

this alliance, as in all such cases, were carried on secretly. In fact, the first public

mention of the alliance was made only in mid-1895. But the Kronstadt visit of

the French fleet had been a public affair, and from reports in the French press,

Britain and Germany were quick to sense that friendly exchanges had taken

place between the two countries. After the Alliance was signed, the European

powers did not know its terms, but they all tried to decipher what it stood for.

From 1894, all questions in diplomacy centred on the intentions of France and

Russia.

In Britain, during the six-year period from 1892 to 1898, the Liberals were in

power for the first three years and the Conservatives thereafter. The success of

the Liberals had given rise to anxieties that a policy of imperial retreat might be

in the offing. In the election campaign, the Liberals had made it clear that they

stood for opposition to foreign ventures, the system of alliances and control over

Egypt. The French saw themselves as beneficiaries of this programme, while

Germany remained apprehensive about the intentions of the government. In

practice, however, nothing changed. The Liberal Unionists went over to the

Conservatives. The views of the Liberal Imperialists, who remained in the

5 Facing the Franco-Russian

combine, 1892–8

Liberal Party, were eventually to be close to those of their Tory opponents.

Moreover, Gladstone appointed Archibald Philip Primrose, the fifth Earl of

Rosebery, as Foreign Secretary. Rosebery wanted to take a firm line. He was

patently anxious to convince observers that there would be continuity in foreign

policy, so much so that he asked Salisbury not to tell him about the contents of

the Mediterranean Agreements so that he could deny their existence when ques-

tioned.

One reason for offering him the portfolio was that he had vast

knowledge about the empire.

He liked the label ‘Liberal Imperialist’,

and

wanted the Liberals to associate themselves with ‘the new sentiment for empire

which occupies the nation’. In March 1894, Gladstone resigned and Rosebery

became the Prime Minister. Kimberley moved to the Foreign Office. He was

knowledgeable about the empire because he had been the Colonial Secretary

twice and then India Secretary in all Liberal governments since December 1882.

On 25 June 1895, Salisbury returned to premiership. He dissolved the House

in order to gain parliamentary strength. He formed a government with the

Liberal Unionists, and together they had an overwhelming majority in the

House.

At this stage he was at the peak of his career, and was considered the

most influential diplomat in Europe.

But he could not enjoy the same free hand

in foreign policy that he had enjoyed between 1887 and 1892. He looked weary,

while his Cabinet colleagues became more assertive. Joseph Chamberlain, the

leader of the Liberal Unionists in the Commons, became so influential that he

was regarded as virtual co-premier. He chose to become Colonial Secretary. This

office had not been very important in the immediate past, when major negotia-

tions in Africa had been handled by the Foreign Office. In joining the Colonial

Office, Chamberlain’s aim was to inject life into this ‘neglected estate’. George

Goschen at the Admiralty interfered in matters relating to foreign policy. Joseph

Chamberlain, Hicks Beach and Hartington,

the Colonial Secretary, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Lord President respectively, were vocal in

imperial affairs and often advocated more extreme alternatives than Salisbury

favoured.

This was the time when European powers were showing an irresistible urge to

acquire colonies. Even in Britain, enthusiasm for imperial ventures was distinctly

greater than before. The politicians who were coming to power and their busi-

ness, social and intellectual supporters were keen to enhance Britain’s world

interests, which seemed increasingly threatened by the colonial ambitions and

trade rivalries of other European powers. Factors like growth of the yellow press

catering to mass readership and the spread of ‘scientific’ social Darwinist notions

of international relations had made average Britons ever more sensitive about

their country’s standing in the world. All this manifested itself in the demand for

more assertive diplomacy. Any concessions, any slights – real or imagined – were

deeply resented. It is this that explains the hysterical and vitriolic reaction of the

British press at the time of the Kruger telegram in January 1896 and the

Fashoda ‘incident’ in July 1898. Those called upon to decide the country’s

foreign and imperial policies seemed baffled by the sheer weight and number of

external problems. Rosebery complained: ‘Our foreign policy has become more

102 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

of a colonial policy and is becoming every day more entwined with our colonial

interests than has ever been the case before.’

In 1895, when Britain abstained

from intervention in the Far East, he explained: ‘For did we not strictly limit the

principle of intervention, we should always be simultaneously engaged in some

forty wars.’

Even Salisbury, who was known for cautious and pragmatic

responses, expressed, at times, a very predatory view of international relations.

In his famous ‘living nations speech’ he said: ‘For one reason or another – from

the necessities of politics or under the pretence of philanthropy – the living

nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying…’

As imperial

possessions came to be regarded as the hallmark of great nations more than ever

before, the guarding of the Raj became more important.

Influence on strategy

France and Russia had not really combined against Britain but, in London as

everywhere, this combination was looked upon as an anti-British move. The visit

of the Russian squadron to Toulon had provoked wild demonstrations of

Franco-Russian solidarity as well as outpourings of anti-British feelings. Britain

had looked upon these two countries as the restless powers which were likely to

gain from any upheaval in Europe. France had an interest in regaining Alsace

and Lorraine, and Russia in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Until this

time, British strategists had held that singly or in concert, these two countries

were really not in a position to pose any threat to the British Isles. In 1888 and

1889, when the contingency of the French seizing London by a coup de main was

discussed at the Cabinet level, it was accepted that in view of the strength of the

navy, the invasion of the United Kingdom by France was so much beyond the

realm of reasonable probability as not to be worth considering.

By 1892, however, the situation had undergone a sea-change as a result of

several factors: the near certainty of French naval assistance to its Russian ally,

the growth in the size of the Russian fleet and the certainty that the Turks would

not be able to follow an independent policy. In the spring of 1892,

Brackenbury’s successor as the Director of Military Intelligence, General E.F.

Chapman, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain C.A.G. Bridge,

reported that in the new situation, if the British fleet was employed at the

eastern end of the Mediterranean, the French fleet at Toulon could escape into

the Atlantic and the English Channel where it could pose a great peril to

Britain.

In view of this contingency, many new schools of thought emerged

amongst strategists. The Channel School wanted the channel squadron to be

strengthened. The Mediterranean School held that the only way of perpetuating

English naval supremacy in the Mediterranean was by keeping a fleet there at

least equal to the French fleet. The ‘Scuttlers’ wanted the Admiralty to admit

that, in the time of war, they could not hold the Mediterranean and wanted to

abandon the Mediterranean in case of war. They believed that in time of war,

the government would have to rely on the Cape route for commerce and

communications with India. London did not really fear any sudden, unprovoked

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 103

war of aggression, but British statesmen became concerned about the conse-

quences of co-operation between France and Russia outside Europe. Britain’s

interests clashed with theirs in so many areas that, to Britain, it seemed that its

two rivals had joined hands. In this connection, some historians have tended to

argue that this alliance did little to worsen Britain’s position. They have

advanced two types of arguments: one, that France and Russia were reluctant to

get involved in each other’s imperial disputes,

and, two, that in the imperial

field, their areas of rivalry did not overlap.

While Russia took interest in the

Balkans and in Central Asia from Afghanistan to Tibet, the chief interests of

France lay in Egypt and other parts of Africa, and in South-East Asia. But there

were reasons to view this combine with anxiety. Though the interests of France

and Russia lay in different geographical regions, taken together these regions of

interest lay along the frontiers of the Indian Empire from its eastern to its

western end, and along the routes to India.

In fact, this turned the problem of guarding the Raj into a nightmare. The

military strategists argued that Britain’s military establishment fell far short of

Britain’s needs. General Roberts, who had been commander-in-chief of the

army in India during 1885–92, had always articulated the view that in the event

of war with Russia, the decisive battle would have to be fought beyond the

northwest frontier of India. He had no faith in the success of ancillary opera-

tions in the Baltic, the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea. For the defence of India

against Russia, he wanted that Britain should always be able to fortify India and

send reinforcements, and that the British army and colonial forces be converted

into one gigantic reserve for the Indian army.

As commander-in-chief, he

pressed London to accept his views, and he got full support from Chapman.

we shall see, this was not an easy task. Britain simply did not have the men or

money to send necessary reinforcements. After the alliance between France and

Russia, it was realised that the French navy would hamper the movement of

troops from Britain to India in the case of war with Russia in Central Asia or in

case of an internal upheaval like that of 1857.

The Franco-Russian collaboration made even the Black Sea strategy redun-

dant. During the Crimean War, the British fleet had enjoyed free passage

through the straits because of its alliance with the Turks and free movement in

the Mediterranean because of its alliance with France. Even so, the British had

found it extremely difficult to fight the Russians. By 1890, these conditions did

not obtain. Since the occupation of Egypt, relations with Turkey as well as

France had come under severe strain. The Turks had begun to fortify the Straits

‘with the guns pointing to the Mediterranean’, as Gordon Martel puts it.

seemed that it was not possible for Britain to operate in the Eastern

Mediterranean. The admirals no longer considered the question of whether it

was possible to force the straits. Instead, they were preoccupied with the question

whether or not the Mediterranean would have to be abandoned altogether in the

event of war. In 1892, in a joint report of the Directors of Military Intelligence

and Naval Intelligence regarding Britain’s ability to protect Constantinople, it

was concluded that:

104 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

…unless we had the concurrence of France which is of course an absurd

hypothesis, or unless we had first destroyed the French fleet at Toulon,

which at all events must be a very distant contingency, it is not legitimate for

us to employ our fleet at the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

It was for Salisbury to draw the conclusion that the protection of Constantinople

from Russian conquest, which had been the turning point of the policy of this

country for forty years and to a certain extent forty years before that, was no

longer feasible. He continued, ‘if Russia were mistress of Constantinople…the

route to India through the Suez Canal would be so much exposed as not to be

available except in times of profoundest peace’.

The certainty of French naval assistance to Russia in the event of complica-

tions in the Near East or Russia’s thrust towards India, and the stationing of a

Russian Squadron at Toulon since October 1893, had made the situation worse.

By this time Russia had created the Black Sea Fleet which practically had the

right to enter the Mediterranean any time. It was also believed that Russia’s fleet

in the Baltic had become formidable. It could reach Constantinople by sea. This

meant that to exercise pressure on the Sultan, Russia would not have to use the

long land route. Thus, much before the majority in the Cabinet had contem-

plated giving up the policy of ‘splendid isolation’, strategists had reached the

conclusion that without allies Britain could no longer meet the dangers of the

future. In 1893 itself, when Russia made a formal claim to territories in the

Pamir region and France threatened Bangkok, it seemed that the two allies were

taking concerted action against Britain at the two extremes of the Indian

Empire. To British statesmen and strategists, the two antagonists seemed to pose

a challenge unparalleled since Napoleon and Alexander met at Tilsit in 1807.

Beside this, all other dangers seemed minor annoyances. The noisy movements

of the Germans in Africa, Asia and the Pacific were not yet viewed as threats to

the security of the British Isles or the British Empire. In fact, the Germans found

the attitude of Rosebery and Kimberley annoyingly condescending.

The

Americans, whose strength was obviously increasing, were at most irritating in

the Caribbean. Japan by now was causing some uncertainty over its intentions in

China. The Spanish were, at worst, rude about Gibraltar.

To face the Franco-Russian combine, the British government took steps in

two directions. It decided to further enlarge the Royal Navy, and it decided to

revamp Britain’s international position.

Strengthening the naval position

The exchange of visits by the Russian and French fleets made the press and the

public notice that the circumstances were changing. By 1893, concern began to

be expressed about the inadequacies of Britain’s naval position.

The Naval

Intelligence warned that if existing naval programmes of these countries

continued apace, within two years, Britain would go from a two-battleship

advantage over France and Russia to a three-battleship disadvantage. In

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 105

December 1893, there was a heated debate in Parliament, during which the

Conservative opposition accused the government of doing nothing to offset an

increasingly unfavourable balance of forces in vital strategic areas.

In this

background Earl Spencer, the First Lord of Admiralty, proposed a substantial

increase in the pace of construction of ships. Gladstone opposed the proposal

bitterly, but within a few months he was forced into retirement and a smaller

version of Spencer’s plan was adopted. Soon, this programme was enlarged to

include a total of nine new first-class battleships, thus ensuring for the immediate

future the maintenance of a slight numerical edge over the combined forces of

France and Russia.

The programme had direct impact on foreign policy. The

government could not opt for a strong foreign policy lest it result in an explosion,

at least until these additional ships were ready. But the huge ship-building

programmes of 1894 and after gave the British heavy numerical superiority over

the Franco-Russian alliance.

Revamping Britain’s international position

The Triple Alliance

In June 1891, the renewal of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary

and Italy was announced. At London, this combination was viewed as less of a

menace than the Franco-Russian alliance. These countries were perceived as

‘satisfied powers’. Italy did have territorial ambitions in North Africa, but these

did not seem to threaten British interests. Besides, Germany had also looked

upon the Franco-Russian Combine as a disquieting factor, and Wilhelmstrasse

feared that it might be aimed against the central powers. It therefore tried to

persuade Britain to join the Triple Alliance. A Quadruple Alliance of Britain,

Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy was likely to be a formidable

combination.

Rosebery made efforts to be on friendly terms with members of the Triple

Alliance. At the same time he did not join them formally. He thus continued the

policy that Salisbury followed during his second tenure, that of being with the

Triple Alliance but not of it.

Why did Rosebery not join it? This has been

explained in terms of exigencies of domestic political scene. It has been argued

that any entanglement in Europe was likely to provoke hostile attacks from the

Radicals in the Commons, and to make even the Liberal Unionists uneasy. But

there were more pressing reasons for not joining the Triple Alliance than fear of

causing political furore. Answering this question, Gordon Martel argues that the

Franco-Russian front created a near perfect counterpoise to the Triple Alliance.

Britain’s presence on one side of the fulcrum would have disturbed the balance

of power and emboldened the European powers to adopt an aggressive

posture.

But it was not attachment to balance of power on principle or the fear

of disturbing it that explains Britain’s foreign policy during this period. Britain

did not join the Triple Alliance simply because Britain’s interests were not served

by joining it. In fact, the very existence of the Triple Alliance (without Britain

106 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

joining it) served Britain’s interests extremely well. It compelled both Russia and

France to keep a major portion of their forces on their frontiers against Austria

and Germany in Europe. This in itself was likely to restrain them from resorting

to aggressive ventures elsewhere, and thus it provided relief to Britain in Asia

and Africa. Moreover, in spite of sharing distrust of Russia, the areas of concern

for Britain and Germany did not really coincide. Each of these powers wanted

support in their own areas of concern: Britain to prevent Russia from advancing

towards the frontiers of the Indian Empire, the Mediterranean and the Persian

Gulf, and Germany to prevent Russia from becoming too bold on its European

frontiers. Conversely, each of the powers gained if Russia was preoccupied in the

other’s area of concern. There could be no alliance where no party gained by

co-operation.

Germany made efforts to strengthen the bonds established in 1887 and

worked to secure Britain’s support for Italy in the Mediterranean and for Austria

in the Balkans. Britain was not interested in promising naval co-operation in the

Mediterranean to Germany’s two weak and nervous alliance partners.

In any

case, with increasing co-operation between France and Russia and their

increasing naval strength, Italy’s position had become even more precarious. In

February 1894, when Kalnoky, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, pressed

Britain to clarify its policy with regard to the Straits and Constantinople,

Rosebery made it clear that Britain would co-operate if Britain could count on

the Triple Alliance to prevent France from taking part in the struggle. This could

be done only if Germany joined. Germany was not willing to consider any such

suggestion unless Britain first joined the Triple Alliance. Thereafter, negotiations

broke down. Both the powers resorted to silent retaliation against supposedly

unfriendly acts in Congo, Egypt and Transvaal. When negotiations were carried

on these issues during 1893–4, Germany tried to move closer to France, while on

questions relating to Central Asia, Germany tried to prevent co-operation

between Britain and Russia by drawing Britain’s attention repeatedly to cases of

co-operation between France and Russia.

In 1896, the Germans welcomed the

success of the Conservatives. The ascendancy of the Conservatives in Britain

seemed to narrow the ideological gap between the two nations. On his part,

Salisbury made friendly noises about the desire to join the Triple Alliance.

But

improvement in Anglo-German relations was, at best, temporary.

The Siamese crisis

The first real crisis the Liberal government was called upon to face in foreign

affairs was the Siamese crisis in July 1893. It concerned the defence of the

eastern frontier of the Indian Empire where, by 1886, the British had established

control over the whole of Burma. In 1887, the French had created Indo-China

by joining together Cochin, Annam and Tonkin. Subsequently, they remained

busy in rounding off the western frontier of their empire in southeast Asia. In

this process, they were pressing upon Siam, which Britain wanted to retain as a

buffer between their own and the French Empires in Asia. In 1889, and again in

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 107

1892, W.H. Waddington, the French ambassador in London, approached

Salisbury proposing that Siam be divided into British and French spheres of

influence.

This would have created a common frontier between the British and

French Empires. London had always opposed any such attempt. The govern-

ment of India endorsed this policy, and let London know that a coterminous

frontier with France would impose too heavy a burden on India. It would require

a garrison of three regiments, expenditure of an additional £2 million a year

and construction of a railway line.

The British government wanted Siam to

continue as a viable buffer state. In fact, Salisbury’s government had not

permitted the Straits Settlements Administration to annex Pehang, Kelatin and

Tringam, which bordered on Siam and where Siam’s suzerainty was vague,

as not to weaken or irritate the Siamese government.

In 1893, however, the French government decided to act. Demanding annex-

ation of territories on the east bank of River Mekong, it invaded Siam. It

announced a blockade of Bangkok and, it seems, ordered British gunboats to

move out of the Mekong River. On 21 July the British minister at Bangkok sent

a telegram warning the government at London ‘to expect fighting unless British

government…prevented it’.

The British government decided not to intervene,

and this encouraged France to go ahead alone. French gunboats subjected

Bangkok to several days of blockade in early August. The Siamese submitted in

total defeat, and the French were able to annex the region east of the Mekong.

Contemporaries as well as historians have condemned Rosebery’s attitude as

too cautious, defensive and vacillating.

But this was not so. In fact, no British

government could have been indifferent when the defence of India was at stake.

Gordon Martel, who has done extensive research on Rosebery’s foreign policy,

has argued that far from vacillating, Rosebery assumed a very strong, indeed a

bellicose posture, short of intervening directly and immediately.

Martel shows

that Rosebery confessed later to Dufferin, who was British ambassador at Paris

at that time and had been the Governor-General of India when Britain had

annexed Upper Burma, ‘we were moving fast to a word I shudder to pronounce,

which was “war”’.

He also talked of carrying on a silent war – ‘une guerre

sourde’ – all over the world.

No European country could be allowed to estab-

lish a frontier coterminous with the frontiers of the Indian Empire. He was not

frightened by the prospect of French retaliation in Europe or Egypt, but instead

expected to frighten them. It is significant that neither Gladstone nor the

Cabinet restrained Rosebery at any stage. The threat of ‘silent war’ was

embodied in a printed despatch available to all in the Cabinet to see.

adopted this belligerent posture in spite of the fact that the government of India

repeatedly expressed its inability to assist Britain in the war or to take on the

administration of more regions.

The British government was also fully aware

of the difficulties of providing the necessary manpower to defend the northwest

frontier. Yet, Rosebery told Gladstone that ‘if we are firm, the French will give

way’.

The firm stand on the part of Rosebery was instrumental in diffusing this

crisis. It enabled the French Foreign Minister Develle to take a stiff stand against

those in Paris who advocated a policy of expansion. By 31 July, he made it clear

108 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

that Britain was determined to maintain Siam as a buffer state. Thereafter,

France lifted the blockade of Bangkok. In August, Develle assured Dufferin that

he regarded the Siamese question as buried.

France did annex the eastern part

of Siam, but as far as Britain was concerned, the state of Siam that was left was

considered sufficient to act as a ‘tolerable buffer’ between the Indian Empire and

the new frontier of the French Empire.

Patrick Tuck has argued that Siam came closer to losing its independence

during the nineteenth century than has hitherto been realised primarily because

the British were not prepared to go to war to preserve its existence.

This is

correct. From this, Tuck concludes that Siam always ranked lower in British

priorities than other frontier states such as Afghanistan or Persia. The level of

anxiety regarding security of the eastern frontier of India against France was

certainly lower. But the reasons have nothing to do with the relative insignifi-

cance of Siam. The reasons relate to grand strategy. Persia and Afghanistan

were seen as buffer states against the expansion of Russia, which was a sprawling

land power and was impervious to attack by the British navy. By contrast, French

colonies were dependent on constant sea communication with the mother

country, which Britain could always disrupt. Secondly, for France, Germany was

the enemy nearer home and, therefore, it was not in a position to really chal-

lenge Britain.

It was for these reasons that, though Britain was keen to

maintain Siam as a neutral buffer, it saw no point in threatening war or making

preparations for war as it had done at the time of the Penjdeh crisis.

It has also been said that this crisis had a direct impact on Anglo-German

relations. When the news of French gunboats at Bangkok reached London,

Kaiser William II was at Windsor and Rosebery appealed to him for assistance

against France. The Kaiser was so alarmed by the panicky reaction of the British

government that he concluded that one could not depend on the British govern-

ment under the Liberals. He felt that Britain had nearly involved Germany in a

general war. After this, he abandoned the policy of cultivating Britain, which he

had been following for three years. He turned to alternative means of keeping

France and Russia in check.

He tried to drive a wedge between France and

Britain by pushing France into an open clash with Britain on imperial issues in

Africa. Martel has dismissed this whole episode centring on Rosebery’s appeal to

the Kaiser as a concoction. He says that it does not fit into the available evidence

on Rosebery’s whole diplomatic design.

Rosebery believed that the members of

the Triple Alliance should not be allowed to think that Britain depended on

them for support outside Europe. In fact, he told the Queen that it was

becoming of Her Majesty’s dignity to settle the matter without appealing to the

Triple Alliance.

The Pamir Tangle

The Liberal government was called upon to face the problem of Russia’s expan-

sion at the other end of the Indian Empire, the northwest, also. The Boundary

Commission of 1885 had settled the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 109

from the Zulfiqar Pass to the Oxus, but the rest of the frontier had remained

undefined. In the mountainous and desolate region of the Pamirs, there were

territories that were virtually no man’s lands. The government of India wanted

the Afghans or the Chinese to fill these gaps so as to stall the possibility of the

establishment of a co-terminus frontier between Russia and the Indian Empire.

Meanwhile, both Britain and Russia continued to expand in this region. Russia

expanded in the Pamirs,

and in 1888 the Trans-Caspian railway was

completed up to Samarkand and branches connected it to Tashkent and Adijan

in the vicinity of China’s frontier. The Trans-Caucasian railway to Julfa was also

commenced. The government of India also adopted a bold forward policy

aimed at establishing control over small states like Hunza, Nagar, Chitral and

Gilgit, lying to the west and northwest of Kashmir and northeast of

Afghanistan. In 1889, an army contingent was stationed at Gilgit. Within two

years, Hunza and Nagar were occupied.

In 1892, taking advantage of a

succession dispute in Chitral, an expedition was sent there from Gilgit and a

small contingent of the army was placed in Chitral.

The Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, resented the expansion of the

British and Russians to areas near his territory.

He had refused to allow British

officers to be stationed near his frontier, to receive any mission or to permit the

British to lay a telegraph line between Peshawar and Kabul. He objected to the

construction of the railway line without his prior consent to Chaman which, he

held, fell in Afghan territory. He resented the minatory tone of communications

from Calcutta.

He also tried to establish monopolies over trade in different

items and began to impose heavy taxes on traders which, in turn, was resented

by the British.

The basic problem was that while the Amir of Afghanistan

looked upon himself as a sovereign ruler, the British government looked upon

him as a vassal. Meanwhile, the Russian government was insisting that the Amir

vacate Roshan and Shignan, over which the British government had recognised

Russia’s authority under the agreement of 1873. This issue was becoming

embarrassing for the British. To discuss all these matters, the government of

India decided to send General Roberts to Kabul. In July 1892, it asked the Amir

to receive him in the autumn of that year.

At this stage, in August, the Liberals came to power. The first reaction of the

Liberal government was one of irritation at this entanglement. An indignant

Gladstone commented that he had never heard of the Pamirs.

But the issue

could not be left on the table because Russia was seen as threatening the security

of the Indian Empire. Rosebery expressed the general mood when, within days

of assuming office, he wrote to Kimberley, ‘Her Majesty’s Government cannot

remain passive.’

It is relevant to underline here that the Liberal government,

which was to divide on every issue of foreign policy for the next three years,

stood united over this. Gladstone, Rosebery, Kimberley and Campbell-

Bannerman opposed the proposal to send General Roberts to Kabul to negotiate

with the Amir. They felt that as the foremost advocate of the forward policy,

Roberts would not treat the Amir sympathetically and would only drive him into

the arms of Russia.

The British government torpedoed the proposal by not

110 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

extending the term of Roberts beyond March 1893. It did not relent even when

Lansdowne, the Viceroy, threatened to resign.

The government of India also

failed to persuade the Amir to receive the mission.

It is interesting that

Rosebery tried to use the unanimity of opinion against Russia in the Cabinet to

persuade the government of India to send a military expedition to the Pamirs.

His aim was to demonstrate the grit of Britain to the members of the Triple

Alliance by showing that he could make Russia listen without relying on the

assistance of other European countries.

The idea appealed also because such

an expedition would have been paid for out of Indian revenues. The government

of India, however, firmly opposed the proposal and expressed itself in favour of

a negotiated settlement of the Pamir tangle.

In a situation in which the Amir’s

attitude was one of sulky acquiescence, Russia’s one of assertiveness and the

government of India’s one of reluctance to intervene militarily, the British

government adopted a multi-pronged strategy of encouraging China to assert

itself, negotiating with Afghanistan and, finally, settling the matter with Russia.

At the time, the Manchu government in China was being called upon to face

Russia’s expansion in Manchuria, France’s expansion in Indo-China and Japan’s

expansion in Korea. Britain was also watching Russia’s penetration towards the

Pacific with concern. Until the 1890s, the British had controlled the Pacific side

of China by naval supremacy. But the commencement of the construction of the

Trans-Siberian railway in 1891 had made it obvious that Russia was penetrating

into this region from the north-west of China. The British government tried to

encourage China to occupy the no-man’s land in the Pamirs. China had a strong

legal position; under a protocol of 1884, Russia had accepted Chinese suzerainty

over many strategic passes in the Pamir region.

But in 1891 the Chinese, faced

with an Afghan force, had meekly withdrawn from their post at Somatosh. This

had made both London and Calcutta sceptical about using Chinese claims as a

means of stemming the tide of Russia’s expansion.

It was felt that there was no

point in cultivating the Manchu government because it was not able to control

the governors in distant areas. In any case, the Chinese government was facing

foreign pressure nearer its centre – in Korea and Manchuria – and was not in a

position to exert influence over remote frontiers. The government of India

insisted that it was best to be militarily prepared for facing any challenge to its

position on the Indian frontier, and Lansdowne pointed to the awkwardness of

substituting a Chinese alliance for this basic necessity.

In these circumstances, the British government was reduced to urging St

Petersburg to complete the process of delimitation of the frontier commenced in

1885. This had many advantages, including settling the question of Russia’s

expansion and improving relations with Russia, as well as reducing Britain’s

dependence on the Triple Alliance. Russia accepted the suggestion because it

wanted to forestall the eventuality of Britain joining the Triple Alliance.

Moreover, at this time France was being rocked by the Panama Canal scandal,

which strengthened the Tsar’s misgivings about allying with a republican state.

The Amir acquiesced because he was weary of Russia’s pressure on his frontier.

Ultimately, a mission was sent to Kabul under Mortimer Durand, the Secretary

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 111

to the government of India in the Foreign Department. It reached Kabul in

October 1893. Within a month, Durand was able to sign an agreement with the

Amir under which the Amir agreed to relinquish the territories beyond the Oxus

which had been under his occupation. An agreement was signed defining the

Indo-Afghan frontier. On matters relating to trade, railways, telegraphs and so

on, Durand did not achieve much success, but he succeeded in convincing the

Amir of the need for co-operation between the two countries.

The mission

eased tension between Britain and Russia to the point where in 1894, Rosebery

said in a public speech that relations with Russia had never been more hearty.

The two governments appointed a joint commission to mark the frontiers

between Russia, Afghanistan and China. Afghanistan was placed in the position

of a consenting party only.

The process of delimitation failed to create an atmosphere of mutual trust.

This became clear on the issue of Chitral. In 1892, a small British force had

been placed there, but the local leaders resented its presence and looked upon

this action as an intrusion into their internal affairs. At this stage, the question

arose as to whether Britain should continue to hold Chitral or withdraw. Lord

Elgin, who had been appointed Viceroy in 1894 precisely because he was a

Liberal and had no trust in the forward policy, as well as Sir George White, who

had succeeded General Roberts as Commander-in-Chief, expressed themselves

strongly against withdrawal. Their main argument was that any Anglo-Russian

understanding was bound to be short-lived. They also used the Far Eastern card

to support their case, arguing that unless Britain was strong on the northwest of

India against Russia, Russia could use Britain’s weakness to cajole Britain into

supporting it in the Far East.

In the elections of 1895, the question of Chitral

became an issue in Britain’s party politics. It was openly said in the press that the

purpose of the expedition was to establish effective British authority there so

that, when any settlement was made with Russia, Britain could claim its right on

the ground of effective possession.

The process of delimitation of the frontier proved to be a long one. The

British commissioner was instructed not to leave any gap between the Chinese

and Afghan territories.

In 1895 the Pamirs Delimitation Agreement was

concluded with Russia. In this demarcation, a narrow piece of Afghan territory

was placed all the way along between the Russian and British Empires in Central

Asia. Thus, the purpose of not having a contiguous frontier between the Russian

Empire and Britain’s Indian Empire was achieved.

Britain and the Sino-Japanese war

In the Far East, too, the Conservative government was called upon to face a new

situation. During 1894–5, China and Japan fought a war in which Japan

inflicted a humiliating defeat on China. The speed and completeness of Japan’s

victory shocked the whole world. In April 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was

signed between the two countries. It provided, amongst other things, for the

complete independence of Korea, cession to Japan of Formosa, the southern tip

112 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

of Manchuria and some other territories, and the ‘opening’ of new ports. The

Russian government saw in these terms a direct threat to its interests in

Manchuria and proposed to Britain that they should co-operate in putting pres-

sure on Japan to moderate the terms. When defeat of China had seemed

imminent, Britain had proposed a joint intervention to maintain the balance of

power in the Far East. But, at this stage, the British Cabinet decided not to act.

This was not a manifestation of commitment to the policy of isolation. On this,

Christopher Howard aptly comments that all powers decide on certain occasions

not to collaborate with others in intervening at particular junctures if their inter-

ests so require.

There was no temptation to intervene even in defence of

commercial interests in China. Britain’s trade with China amounted to a mere 3

per cent of Britain’s foreign trade, though it amounted to over 80 per cent of

China’s total trade.

It was also argued that a confident Japan might refuse to

listen, and this could be a blow to Britain’s prestige in the East. Britain could not

afford this.

However, the decisive consideration seems to have been that Britain

simply had no interest in curtailing the power and influence of Japan in the Far

East and in improving Russia’s standing. As Rosebery stated, it was unwise to

alienate ‘a power of great magnitude in those seas’, especially one which had

territorial interests to defend against Russia.

Any increase in Russia’s power

anywhere did not suit Britain in any case.

The Russians were annoyed. Ultimately, France and Germany replaced

Britain in Russia’s good graces. France was an ally. Germany saw in this proposal

a chance to befriend Russia. The resultant ‘Three Power Intervention’ forced a

revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki to Japan’s disadvantage. So far as its

impact on Britain was concerned, this ‘Triplice’ unmistakably created the sceptre

of a three-power combination against Britain in the Far East. Britain’s isolation

was brought home immediately on the issue of advancing a loan to China to

enable it to pay the indemnity imposed under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The

British government had taken it for granted that, in view of its enormously

preponderant commercial interests in China, it would be made a party to the

proposal.

But, to its chagrin, it learnt that a loan had been advanced and

Britain had been left out. This theme was replayed with even more menacing

overtones following the Kaiser’s telegram to President Kruger to which reference

will be made in the section on South Africa.

The Eastern Question

In 1894, attention turned once again to the Near East when news about the

revolt of Christians in Armenia and about its brutal suppression by the Turks

began to reach European capitals. In Britain, it provoked public outcry, pressing

the government to intervene to make the Ottomans introduce ‘the reforms’

promised under the Cyprus Convention of 1878. The Russian government also

wanted the Ottomans to pacify the ‘rebels’ because a successful revolt in

Armenia was likely to encourage similar revolts in Russia. This was the time

when London and St Petersburg were carrying on talks on the Pamirs issue.

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 113

Rosebery did not care for the ‘reforms’, but he saw in this crisis an opportunity

to placate his colleagues as also to improve relations with Russia by co-operating

on this issue.

On his initiative, a commission of inquiry was formed on which

Britain, France and Russia were represented. Before the commission reported,

relations between Britain and Russia became strained on the issue of putting

pressure on Japan. The commission did complete its work in 1895, but by this

time the report had already become redundant.

By the time Salisbury became the Prime Minister in the summer of 1895,

reports were reaching London that ‘atrocities’ were being perpetrated against the

Armenians with a vengeance. This infused new life into Gladstone, who started a

fresh campaign against the ‘great assassin’. In this situation, Salisbury was called

upon to justify his policy to his countrymen as well as to protect British interests

in the Near East. He first tried to revive the policy of co-operation with Russia,

but when efforts in this direction did not succeed, he tried to put pressure on the

Sultan. In mid-August, he warned the Sultan that he would make ‘a grave and

calamitous mistake’ if he refused to listen to the advice of the European

powers.

In order to intimidate the Sultan, he moved the British fleet from the

Syrian Coast to Salonica.

He also got Cabinet approval for operations in the

Red Sea.

By this time, Philip Currie was sending alarming reports about

danger to the lives of Europeans.

Late in 1895, Salisbury urged Goschen, the

Naval Lord, to send the British fleet through the Dardanelles to coerce the

Sultan and to stall Russia’s descent upon Constantinople. The Admiralty

strongly opposed the proposal. The Cabinet also refused to send the British fleet.

The Prime Minister felt so hurt that he said that he was ‘cut to the heart’; he

jibed that British ships were always to be kept wrapped in silver paper for fear of

their being scratched.

In 1897, the question of renewal of the Mediterranean

Agreements came up. Austria-Hungary wanted to revise the terms by including

more binding engagements relating to the straits. Salisbury was willing to renew

the Agreements as they stood. But he had reservations about enlarging their

scope. Thereafter, Austria decided not to renew the Mediterranean

Agreements.

Thus, the Anglo-Austrian entente regarding the Balkans came to

an end. Subsequently, Austria made a settlement with Russia, the Muraviev-

Goluchowski Agreement signed on 5 May 1897 under which the Balkans was

put on ice.

Historians have tended to argue that during the period covered in this

chapter, as Britain’s position in Egypt became stronger, the British government

began to lose interest in Constantinople and the Straits.

Several developments

do point to this conclusion. First, the British government was becoming increas-

ingly concerned that the Ottoman Empire could not sustain itself and that

Britain did not possess the means to revamp it. Salisbury was convinced that the

Ottoman Empire would not survive for long. He expressed contempt for the

inertia at Constantinople very often. Second, the coming together of France and

Russia had been a disquieting factor and had intensified consciousness of the

lack of means at Britain’s disposal to take a decisive stand at the Straits. In 1895,

the Cabinet had refused to send British fleet to the straits. As already said, this

114 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

had perturbed Salisbury deeply. Third, the exchanges between Gladstone,

Rosebery, Kimberley and the service chiefs during 1892–4 show a deep concern

that there was nothing Britain could do to prevent the Russians from swooping

down suddenly on Constantinople.

Salisbury is said to have told Hatzfeldt, the

German ambassador at London, that he was prepared to let Russia occupy

Constantinople and seek Egypt as compensation for Britain.

But it is important to remember that in this extremely important geo-political

region Britain’s stake did not lie in the continuance or otherwise of the Ottoman

Empire or in having control over Constantinople or Cairo or both. Britain’s

purpose was to have some means of preventing Russia from reaching the fron-

tiers of India and ensuring security of the shorter route to India by preventing

Russia from entrenching itself at Constantinople. The British government’s

policy has to be situated in this context. A few months after coming to power, in

November 1895, the Conservative government established a Defence

Committee of the Cabinet. It asked the Directors of Naval Intelligence and

Military Intelligence to report on the measures to be taken to counteract the

effects of a successful Russian occupation of Constantinople. The bulk of the

arguments in their reports weighed against the conclusion that British occupa-

tion of Egypt could equalise or in any way affect acquisition of a position of

influence and control at Constantinople by Russia.

In his memorandum,

Admiral Beaumont wrote:

Once the Black Sea is a Russian lake with the Dardanelles as her safe outlet,

Russian influence and power will extend through Asia Minor and Syria, and

England will be separated from India by the distance of the Cape route.

When the ministers in the Cabinet did not allow Salisbury to send the British

fleet up the Dardanelles in 1895 to intimidate the Sultan, the reason was not

indifference to the fate of Constantinople. The reasons were that Currie’s

reports were considered unduly alarmist and that the Cabinet did not think that

Russia’s strike at Constantinople was imminent. In fact, as Salisbury himself

wrote to the Queen, the Cabinet had agreed that the country might have to go

to war in defence of the straits.

Further, Keith Wilson has discovered ‘impres-

sive and conclusive evidence’ to argue that Salisbury did contemplate the

break-up of the Ottoman Empire, but he further argues that Salisbury’s ‘dream’

included not just control over Egypt for Britain but also over the southern slope

of the Taurus with Syria and Mesopotamia.

In the event of partition of the

Ottoman Empire, Salisbury thus thought not just of Egypt but of British domi-

nation over the entire east Mediterranean coast and Mesopotamia with

‘Dardanelles open to all the Powers’. This was a plan to make secure not only

the route to India but also the Indian Empire itself. It is true that in 1897 he did

not renew the Mediterranean Agreements. The reason was not lack of interest

in this region. He was ready to renew them as they stood. What he did not want

was to enlarge their scope. While taking the risk of non-renewal, Salisbury had

told Edward Monson, the ambassador at Paris, that Britain would continue to

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 115

act in defence of the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression.

It is inter-

esting that in February 1896, the Turkish government proposed negotiations for

the conclusion of a convention on the basis of the maintenance and protection

of the Sultan’s rights over Egypt and the adoption of measures to secure, against

all attack, the freedom of communication between Britain and India. Salisbury

did not expect much benefit from re-opening the question and declined to do so

on the ground that Britain’s aim was not only to provide good government to the

Egyptian people but also to preserve a through route to India.

By this time, in

order to consolidate its control over Egypt, the British government was consid-

ering ways of establishing its control over the valley of the Nile.

In 1897, when the Greeks started a war against the Ottomans for the libera-

tion of Crete, the Ottomans were able to defeat the Greeks. This dissipated the

idea that the Ottoman Empire was decomposing. British public opinion was

staunchly philhellene, yet the British government did not intervene militarily.

After the Greeks were defeated, Britain did insist on virtual independence for

Crete.

Thereafter, Russia became more involved in Central Asia and Britain in

ways of thwarting Russia’s expansion in that direction. In 1898 Kaiser William

II visited Constantinople; this was symbolic of the increasing interest taken by

Germany in the Near East.

Ensuring control over Egypt

During the election campaign of 1892, Gladstone had committed himself

publicly to the evacuation of Egypt. On assuming office, rather than taking up

the Irish question, he first drafted a memorandum on evacuation. But his

colleagues in the Cabinet, including a Radical Cobdenite, John Morley, advised

their chief to proceed cautiously and Gladstone accepted their advice. On this,

Gordon Martel comments that they showed a readiness to abandon their princi-

ples for the sake of remaining in power.

But, more than any other

consideration, it was the total commitment to retain control over this strategi-

cally vital area, and an awareness of this on Gladstone’s part, that explain the

decision to hold on to Egypt. Gladstone’s administration decided not only to

retain control over Egypt but also to mop up what was left of the Nile basin right

up to its source.

The whole issue came up before the Cabinet when, towards the end of 1892,

the new Khedive, Hilmi Pasha, tried to get rid of British administrators.

The

Cabinet was in favour of sending British troops to Egypt to intimidate the

Khedive. Gladstone opposed this proposal so apoplectically that he is reported to

have commented: ‘they might as well ask him to set a torch to Westminster

Abbey’.

But British soldiers were sent to Egypt, British administrators were

reinstated, and Westminster Abbey stayed where it was. With this, Britain laid at

rest any doubts about Britain’s determination to rule Egypt. In fact, ever since

Britain had occupied Egypt, even the remote and shadowy lands up to the

source of the Nile were dragged into the grand strategy involving control over

Egypt, security in the Mediterranean and the route to India. Any move by any

116 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

European power in this region became classified as a threat to British interests.

Threats to this region seemed to come from all directions. France seemed

resolved to enter the area to restore national self-respect which, France felt, had

been bruised in 1882. Towards the east of the Nile basin, Emperor Menelek of

Abyssinia aspired to push the limits of his empire up to the right bank of the

Nile and could seek French co-operation. Rosebery encouraged the Italians, who

were trying to expand towards Abyssinia, to oppose him. In Congo, Leopold of

the Belgians was dreaming of extending his empire eastwards. To establish

control over the source of the Nile, the British Foreign Office wanted a tighter

grip over Uganda. The problem centring on control over Uganda had been

brewing for some time. Salisbury’s government had refused to come to the

rescue of Imperial British East Africa Company from its financial crisis, and

consequently the Company had proposed to evacuate Uganda by 31 December

1892. Gladstone, Morley and Harcourt expressed themselves strongly in favour

of evacuation, but Rosebery wanted to retain control. Within the Cabinet and

outside, he used every card ranging from the fear of massacre of Christian

missionaries, adverse effect on Britain’s prestige and impact on vulnerability of

Egypt to muster support for his policy. The question arises: why was Rosebery so

keen to retain control over Uganda? He was not convinced by his own argument

about the threat to Christian missionaries. Even economic benefits were not

likely to accrue as the experience of the British East Africa Company had

shown. He tried to win support by referring to benefits that could be expected in

future and used the phrase ‘pegging out claims for the future’, which has stuck to

him ever since.

Only the desire to save Egypt from any threat whatever and

thus ensure control over the route to India can explain his insistence on retaining

control over Uganda.

Rosebery found some statements of Salisbury ambiguous enough to reopen

the question. In November 1892, the Cabinet agreed to conduct an inquiry.

Gerald Portal, who had had long experience of working in that region, was sent

for the purpose. The primary reason for choosing him was that he was likely to

turn in the report that Rosebery wanted.

In the report, he did his duty.

This

report came up before the Cabinet on 20 December 1893. By this time the

Russian fleet had been to Toulon, and the general naval scare had begun. In this

atmosphere, Rosebery received enthusiastic support. There were bitter debates

in the House of Commons as a result of the decision of the Cobdenite Radicals

to fight on the issue of imperialist policies, but on 20 March 1893 Labouchere,

the Radical leader, moved a resolution to reduce the grant for Portal’s Uganda

mission; the resolution was defeated by 368 to 46 votes. A year later, a similar

motion on the issue of establishing protectorate over Uganda was carried by 218

to 52 votes.

100

The overwhelming opinion in the House of Commons as well as

outside was for keeping the French out of the Upper Nile basin.

In order to shut out the French, Rosebery made a treaty with Leopold of the

Belgians who was expanding his power towards Equatoria and had reached

Lado on the Upper Nile. It seemed better to have Leopold in this region than the

French. Under an arrangement made in May 1894, the British government

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 117

agreed that it would not have any objection to expansion in Equatoria and Bahr-

al-Ghazal. In return, Leopold leased to Britain a strip of territory running along

the eastern border of Congo adjoining the western frontier of German East

Africa. The purpose was to reopen the corridor for the Cape-to-Cairo railway,

which Britain had failed to ensure in 1890. This agreement produced an explo-

sion of annoyance in Germany and France. This made Leopold withdraw from

the treaty. But the arguments over the Nile and Niger became so heated, that in

March 1895, Sir Edward Grey, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the

Foreign Office, made the announcement that any French advance into the Nile

valley would be interpreted as an unfriendly act.

101

It became clear that Britain

could block the expansion of France only by dealing directly with Paris.

On 1 March 1896, Italy was defeated by the Abyssinians in the Battle of

Adowa. This defeat inaugurated the final stage in the partition of Africa. The

Italian government appealed to Britain for help. The Kaiser advised Salisbury,

who had become Prime Minister by then, to go to the rescue of the Italians,

against whom the French were helping the Abyssinians. He also referred to a

deep Franco-Russian plot to despoil the British Empire.

102

At first Salisbury was

reticent, but within a week, he changed his mind and decided to send an expedi-

tion towards Dongola, nearly 300 kilometres south of the Egyptian frontier,

under Herbert Kitchener, who was Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the

Egyptian army at that time.

103

The plight of the Italians was only a pretext for

invasion to convince the Parliament and to maintain friendly relations with the

Triple Alliance. Britain did not attach any weight to Italy’s fleet, and hence

desire for Italy’s support could not be one of the reasons for this move.

There were other reasons for Salisbury’s decision. The defeat of Italy had

shown that the Abyssinians under Menelek were more formidable than expected.

The Dervishes in the Sudan would be immensely strengthened if they joined

victorious Menelek and received support from France. Moreover, since the

Sultan of Turkey had not paid any heed to Britain’s advice to stop the massacre

of Armenians, it seemed important ‘to make the Sultan feel at some other part

of his dominions that he cannot inflict an insult upon us without suffering for

it’.

104

Salisbury wanted the expedition to have the ‘prestige effect’ in the whole

Muslim world, particularly in India.

105

Further, in 1895, the Admiralty had

refused to send the Royal Navy to the straits, which amounted to an acceptance

that Britain did not have the resources to assert itself at Constantinople. The

corollary was that if Britain wanted to ensure control over this route to India, it

should have firmer hold over Egypt. It is significant that the movement to

Dongola was not in the direction of Kassala, the base of the Italians, but in the

direction of Khartoum. Salisbury explained this to Cromer on 13 March, the

day after the Cabinet took the decision:

The decision…was inspired specially by a desire to help the Italians at

Kassala, and to prevent the Dervishes from winning a conspicuous success

which might have far-reaching results. In addition, we desired to kill two

birds with one stone, and to use the same military effort to plant the foot of

118 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

Egypt rather farther up the Nile. For this reason we preferred it to any

movement from Suakin or in the direction of Kassala, because there would

be no ulterior profit in these movements.

106

The Conservative government was certain that the Parliament would jib at

the expense this expedition would involve. Therefore, it asked the Caisse for

permission to use the appropriated revenues. Given the diplomatic setting in

Europe, Germany, Austria and Italy voted in favour of Britain, and France and

Russia refused to extend support. France had already decided to advance

towards the Sudan.

107

Russia did not merely support France, but calculated that

the passage through Suez would help the movement of French troops to the Far

East and, therefore, thought it wiser to weaken Britain’s control over this region.

Ultimately, France and Russia claimed that a split vote was invalid and permis-

sion was withheld. Even Egyptian money was not available. Cromer was irritated

at the prospect of having the surplus of £630,000, for which he was budgeting,

being frittered away in the Sudan.

108

Kitchener, however, continued to advance and, in September 1896 Dongola

was captured. The question of further advance depended on the availability of

funds. Salisbury did not think that Parliament would be disposed to oblige.

109

But the concern for empire far exceeded the expectations of Salisbury. In

November 1896, when the government asked the House for a grant of £800,000

to pay back the money illegally borrowed from the Caisse and to pay for the

railway and gunboats, the motion was passed. Only fifty-seven members voted

against the motion.

110

Clearly, no risks could be taken over the route to India.

This had become all the more clear, at least to those responsible for taking deci-

sions, when the Director of Naval Intelligence reported to the Cabinet Defence

Committee: ‘There would be only one way in which England could not only

maintain herself in the Mediterranean at all, but continue to hold India, and

that is by holding Egypt against all comers and making Alexandria a naval

base.’

111

Very soon, it was being said publicly that one of the advantages of

going to Dongola was that it was on the road to Khartoum.

112

To keep the pace

of expedition extremely slow, Kitchener was asked to advance, but at the same

time to build the railway behind him. There were reasons for this. One of these

was that, as Keith Wilson has emphasised, in 1896 Salisbury was considering the

possibility of partitioning the Ottoman Empire and therefore he wanted to

wait.

113

Another reason was that he had planned the advance to the source of

the Nile from the south as well.

114

Soon after assuming office, Salisbury had pressed for building the railway

with all speed from Mombasa towards Lake Victoria, a distance of over 1,000

kilometres. In April 1897, in strict secrecy, the government secured a grant of

£35,000 from the treasury for this purpose.

115

In June 1897, Salisbury sent

Major MacDonald to make his way to Fashoda from the south with some 500

men. The purpose of this military expedition was to persuade the tribes in this

region to side with the British rather than with the French. MacDonald had

hoped to capture Fashoda within a year, but the Sudanese garrison at Uganda

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 119

mutinied and the effort was futile.

116

Despite its failure, this effort is symbolic of

the intensity of concern on the part of the British government to retain its hold

over Egypt. Meanwhile, in June 1896, France had sent an expedition to Sudan

under Major Marchand. According to Marchand himself, the purpose was to

confront England boldly on the Upper Nile, no matter what the conse-

quences.

117

After the thrust from Uganda failed, Salisbury instructed Kitchener in

January 1898 to make the final advance to Khartoum. Simultaneously, to isolate

France, he approached Russia for a settlement suggesting ‘partition of prepon-

derance’ in both China and Turkey. If Russia would recognise the British

position along the Yangtse and in Egypt, Arabia and the southern reaches of the

Euphrates, then Britain would respect Russian interests in northern China, the

straits and the Euphrates north of Baghdad.

118

This effort proved abortive, but it

might have had some effect in preventing co-operation between France and

Russia during the Fashoda crisis. Salisbury decided to base his position on the

right of conquest. In April 1898, Kitchener was able to defeat a large Dervish

army at Atbara to the south of Berber. In June he received sanction, with an

overwhelming majority in the Commons, for £750,000.

119

In September,

Kitchener won a decisive victory over the Dervishes at Omdurman near

Khartoum. This marked the end of the Khalifa’s rule in the Sudan.

In October 1897, Salisbury had mused, ‘If we ever get to Fashoda, the diplo-

matic crisis would be something to remember.’

120

Events proved him right. Both

Kitchener and Marchand reached Fashoda on 19 September 1898. Kitchener

hoisted the Egyptian flag, on which he decided to keep an eye. Marchand made

it clear that he would not retire without orders from his own government. The

news reached Europe on 25 September. Passions were aroused on both sides of

the Channel. The British bluntly pressed for evacuation by the French. The

French pleaded for delay. For two months, the two powers stood at the brink of

war, seemingly over the ownership of the desert of the Upper Nile. Salisbury

played his cards well. Sudan was British by right of conquest after the victory at

Omdurman. He had carefully worked out the rest of the strategy relating to the

route to Fashoda, hoisting of flags, future of Sudan, telegraph lines and so on.

After the confrontation at Fashoda, the majority in the Cabinet led by Joseph

Chamberlain did not want to think in terms of compromise. Their attitude was

that if the row had come, it might as well come then as later.

121

On 28 October,

war orders were signalled to the Mediterranean fleet, and the next day the

Channel fleet was ordered to Gibraltar. France’s naval position was much

weaker. In the Mediterranean, France had fifteen battleships as against eighteen

of Britain. In any case, France could not withdraw its army from the mainland

because of enmity with Germany. The French had thought that Britain was

bluffing. They had calculated that Britain would not take the risk of fighting on

the African mainland with what the French considered to be ‘second rate

soldiers’. They also thought that the worldwide commercial interests of Britain

would always prevent it from placing communications at risk.

122

The French

were, in fact, taken aback by the virulence of reaction in Britain. On 2

120 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

November Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, reluctantly accepted the

inevitable and ordered Marchand to withdraw unconditionally.

123

This episode during which the British government contemplated war with

France over the possession of an abandoned Egyptian fort lost in the marshes of

the valley of the Nile has been described as ‘the most absurd’ and ‘bizarre’ of

episodes. Not only did the government adopt an intransigent stand, but it also

got full support. There were moments of misgivings about the grant of money

by the Commons, but, as we have seen, the House always co-operated. Nearly all

the politicians and newspapers stood firmly behind the government.

124

Why was

the government so intransigent? Why did it get near unanimous support? One

reason put forward has been the need to assert Britain’s prestige and status as a

world power. Britain seemed to have climbed down in Africa and in the Far East.

The general feeling was expressed by Francis Bertie: ‘Unfortunately France,

Russia and Germany have got it into their heads that we shall never stand up to

One First Class Power, much less 2 or 3.’

125

Hence, in this crisis the government

decided not to yield. But there was a more important reason: control over Sudan

was considered necessary for controlling Egypt. Throughout the nineteenth

century, before the cutting of the Suez Canal or after it, Britain had never made

any compromise on the issue of having predominant influence over this region.

While the French were pegging out claims for fulfilling an erstwhile ambition,

Britain was defending what was always regarded as a vital national interest. In

the Niger, where Germany had wielded the Egyptian baton to cultivate France

and threaten Britain, Britain did not object to France’s efforts to carve out an

empire. But there was a difference between pilfering in the valley of the Niger

and in trying to expand in that of the Nile. The route to India had to be

defended.

South Africa

For the same reasons South Africa became the thorniest problem in Anglo-

German relations in Africa. Cecil Rhodes’ drive to the north, German assistance

to the Boers and the future of Portuguese colonies all created blazing rows

between the two countries.

As has been seen, the settlements of the early 1880s had deliberately left the

relations between Britain and the two Boer Republics undefined.

126

During the

decade following, two developments changed the situation. First, in 1886 gold

was discovered on the Witwatersrand and almost overnight Transvaal became

massively rich. Many foreigners, mainly Britons in South Africa (who became

known as Uitlanders), began to pour into Transvaal seeking to make their

fortunes. The other major development was that having acquired German South

West Africa in 1884, Germany began to show interest in Transvaal.

The Prime Minister of the Cape Province, Cecil Rhodes, who was also the

managing director of the British South Africa Company which had established

control over Zambesia (officially renamed Rhodesia in 1897), tried to create a

revolution against President Kruger of Transvaal by using the Uitlanders. For

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 121

this purpose, towards the end of 1895, he organised a ‘raid’ to the Transvaal led

by his lieutenant, Dr Jameson. The plan did not succeed; Jameson was captured

by the Boers and Rhodes was forced to resign as prime minister of the Cape

Province. The Kaiser became so excited by the fiasco that on 3 January he sent a

telegram to Kruger congratulating him on his success.

The British press reacted to this telegram in such a sharp and vitriolic manner

that the German government was taken aback. This stood in sharp contrast to

the much milder tone over the Congo quarrel in 1893. The reason was not just

that this time a forceful imperialist like Chamberlain was the Colonial Secretary.

The reason was rather that the Germans had challenged Britain’s vital interest at

the Cape. Even Kimberley, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, had warned Germany

in December 1894 that to preserve its supremacy in South Africa, Britain would

not ‘recoil from the spectre of war’.

127

The reason for renewed interest in

Transvaal on the part of investors, entrepreneurs and, therefore, the British

government, was definitely the discovery of gold and the consequent economic

prosperity in this region.

128

But strategy was also very important. A hostile, pros-

perous and ambitious regime devoted to nation-building, modernisation and

expansion, such as Kruger’s Transvaal was becoming more likely to challenge

Britain’s position at the Cape, over which all British governments had been so

very sensitive. Germany’s open support for Kruger magnified this threat.

Thereafter, South Africa remained a running sore in the Anglo-German rela-

tionship.

The period following 1892 was one of unprecedented strain for Britain’s strate-

gists and diplomats. Britain’s two antagonists had joined hands. This was also the

period when the slightest incidents in the remotest parts of Asia and Africa – in

Siam, the Pamirs, North China, the source of the Nile – became matters of

intense concern. In this situation, Britain tried to be accommodating to Russia

and France and to co-operate with Germany. While Russia remained hostile and

France felt humbled, Germany proved exacting and troublesome. In the end,

though the anxieties concerning the empire did not abate, it was saved and

increased in size.

Gordon Martel has called his study of Rosebery, ‘Imperial Diplomacy:

Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy’.

129

He looks upon Rosebery as a

failure because the latter left all the European powers disgruntled. He further

contends that it was this setback which convinced Rosebery that he should not

seek political office again. But the basic premise on which he has based his

conclusion calls for some comments. The purpose of a nation’s foreign policy is

to preserve the state and its status in the family of nations. While cultivation of

friendly relations with neighbouring states is helpful, this cannot be viewed as the

purpose per se. During this period, the British government did not perceive any

threat to the United Kingdom. It worked to preserve the Great Power status of

Britain, for which maintenance of the empire was of crucial importance.

Rosebery succeeded in this respect and, therefore, it is uncharitable to dub him a

failure. Salisbury continued to cultivate the Triple Alliance, but London’s links

122 Facing the Franco-Russian combine

with Berlin, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople steadily became weaker. The

Mediterranean Agreements lapsed. Deterioration in relations between Britain

and Germany became particularly marked. Many factors contributed to this: the

rise of nationalist suspicions and colonial ambitions, the talk of weltpolitik in

Germany which amounted to proclaiming the desire to become a world power,

and the decision to build a navy which created the need to stir up Anglophobia.

During the second half of Salisbury’s third administration, sustained efforts were

made to sign an alliance with Germany while the problem of providing security

to India reached an impasse. These issues are taken up in the next chapter.

Facing the Franco-Russian combine 123

Despite the warm glow of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897 and the

triumph of Fashoda, it was not of imperial power that the Britons were most

conscious of during the closing years of the nineteenth century. The evidence of

Britain’s decline was much more visible. What Britons noted was that their

country was losing its mid-century lead in economic, colonial and naval strength,

that despite the end of the economic depression, Britain’s growth rate was less

than that of some other countries, and that the balance of economic and mili-

tary power was shifting towards Germany, Russia and the USA. Between 1880

and 1900 Britain’s share of world manufacturing output declined from 22.9 per

cent to 18.5 per cent, while that of Germany increased from 8.5 per cent to 14.8

per cent.

The resulting commercial rivalry was featured prominently in the

newspapers of the two countries.

Besides, the Germans were embarking on welt-

politik, the Russians were busy overcoming the biggest handicap in overland

expansion – distance – by building railways, the United States had started flexing

its muscles and Japan was making confident moves. On the continent, many a

cartoonist portrayed a breathless, ageing and retreating John Bull.

This is not the place to examine whether the power of Britain was actually

declining or to examine the reasons thereof.

What is relevant here is that just as

Britain’s position as a leading nation had conditioned the formulation of foreign

and imperial policies during the preceding decades, so did the consciousness of

decline become the most critical element in determining these policies. British

statesmen and strategists became more conscious of the threat the Franco-

Russian combine posed to their interests, of deteriorating relations with other

continental powers, of the enormity of their commitments all over the world and

of the slender resources at their disposal to defend them.

At the decision-

making level, the need to defend the Indian Empire against the sprawling Tsarist

Empire was a very important constituent of this mood.

At this time many ministers, mainly Liberal Unionists – Joseph Chamberlain,

Lansdowne and Hamilton

– began to question the policy of remaining aloof

from European alliance blocs. They held that in the new realities of power poli-

tics, the assumptions on which Britain’s foreign policy was based were outworn,

even dangerous. They wanted to fight the battle for supremacy economically by

adopting a policy of protection, and colonially by reducing Britain’s commit-

6 Seeking partnerships,

1898–1902

ments and diplomatically by alliance with some country or other. Since it was

believed that differences with Russia and France were too fundamental to be

settled by any compromise, in concrete terms the ending of ‘isolation’ meant a

British commitment to Germany or to the Triple Alliance as a whole.

Chamberlain, the leader of the Liberal Unionists and the most influential

member of the Cabinet at that time, proved the most vocal advocate of this

course. In this context, historians have tended to attach only marginal signifi-

cance to the strains imposed on policy makers by the need to ensure the defence

of the Indian Empire. A study of the papers of the Cabinet, the Foreign Office,

the War Office, the Committee of Imperial Defence and the private papers,

however, shows that the consciousness of lack of means to guard the Raj was a

decisive factor in determining the options available to the British government.

Changing strategic realities

Towards the end of the century, Britain’s anxieties about its ability to defend the

Raj had heightened because of two developments. The first was that the tradi-

tional riposte of the Black Sea strategy was no longer available. The second was

that Russia was constructing a network of railways close to the Indian frontier.

At a time when it was becoming clear that Britain would have to stop Russia on

the northwest of India by armed combat, the question of defending the Raj

became a matter of grave concern.

Generals Wolseley and Brackenbury had been advocates of the Black Sea

strategy since the 1880s. However, it was gradually becoming obvious that it

would not be feasible to adopt this strategy. In discussing the reasons for the

increasing non-feasibility of this strategy, personal factors have been underlined,

including the internecine, sometimes malicious struggle for power and influence

between the two generals, Wolseley and Roberts, and also decline in the influ-

ence of Wolseley and Brackenbury.

Wolseley had been the hero of Tel-el-Kebir,

but after he failed to reach Khartoum in time to rescue Gordon in 1885, he lost

the confidence of both the Liberals and the Conservatives. He could never exer-

cise influence commensurate with his reputation. The command of the Indian

army that he desired continued to elude him. He became Commander-in-Chief

of the British army in 1895, but during the Boer War, he found that in crucial

matters of intelligence, strategic planning and selection of commanders, he was

sidestepped. Brackenbury served in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office

until 1889. Thereafter, he was made the Military Member of the Executive

Council in India. In India, where Roberts was the Commander-in-Chief, he was

given an uncomfortable reception. But more important than these personal

factors was the fact that the preconditions on which the Black Sea strategy was

based had ceased to exist. It was a settled principle of naval warfare that in no

case was the British fleet to enter the Straits unless Turkey was an ally,

but since

the mid-1880s, this condition was not available. In 1885, at the time of the

Penjdeh Crisis, on Germany’s advice, the Ottomans had refused to give neces-

sary permission to the British navy to enter the Black Sea. Moreover, with the

Seeking partnerships 125

Russian decision to build a navy, the situation in the Black Sea had changed.

Russia had also shifted the Asian supply lines from the south to a safer route

north of the Caucasus range.

Batum had been considered a possible site for

British attack, but as early as 1887 Brackenbury was reporting that it was not

likely to remain vulnerable.

In the 1890s, as soon as signs of the Franco-

Russian collaboration became visible, the strategists realised that they could not

plan any offensive in the Mediterranean without first neutralising France or

arranging co-operation with the central powers. Britain did not have very happy

experiences of co-operating with Germany.

While Britain seemed unable to evolve any strategy of putting military pres-

sure on Russia, Russia seemed to be consolidating its empire by building railways

in a very patient and methodical manner. Neither financial strains nor difficulties

of hostile terrain seemed to stand in the way. In addition to constructing the

longest trans-continental railway – the Trans-Siberian Railway – between 1891

and 1903, Russia had laid a railway network in Central Asia. By 1885 a Trans-

Caspian Railway had been completed to Askabad.

In 1888 it reached

Samarkand via Merv with branches to Tashkent and into Fargana. By 1899 the

rail–sea–rail route from Baku to Merv and then on to Kushk on the Afghan fron-

tier was commenced.

Work on the Orenberg–Tashkent railway had begun.

When completed by 1904, it was expected to link the Central Asian region

directly with European Russia. These railways were often referred to as ‘the

sword of Damocles’ suspended perpetually over Russia’s opponents and as ‘the

real villain of the piece’.

The dramatic expansion of railways by Russia was

watched with anxiety by British statesmen and strategists.

Russia was also making efforts to establish direct channels of communication

with India. In the 1880s the government of India expressed a desire to open a

consulate in some imperial city of India. Salisbury was prepared to view this

proposal sympathetically. But the government of India expressed indignation.

It argued that there was practically no trade between Russia and India and,

therefore, the consulate would not have any legitimate work to do. It also

expressed the fear that the Russian government probably had some secret agents

in India and that the Russian consul would become the focus of intrigue.

December 1890 the heir to the Imperial Russian throne, Nikolai Alexandrovich

Romanov, visited India and was received by the Governor of Bombay.

His visit

was closely watched. In March 1900, in order to placate Russia and despite

remonstrances from the government of India, a consulate of the Russian govern-

ment was opened at Bombay.

The same year, the Society for Oriental Studies

was set up in Russia under the patronage of the Court.

The government of

India watched all such moves with utmost apprehension.

Facing Russia in superior force

While railways seemed to make Russia one vast continuous empire, the protec-

tion offered to the Indian Empire by the biggest navy in the world seemed

irrelevant.

It was believed that with distance obliterated, Russia would be able

126 Seeking partnerships

to move its massive army towards Afghanistan and to maintain the supply

lines.

Besides, Russia seemed to have a vast reservoir of manpower. There were

many, like Salisbury and Kimberley, who wanted to retaliate by constructing rail-

ways on the north-west of India. Salisbury pressed, as persistently as he could,

for an elaborate programme of railway construction from India to Kandahar

and on to Herat, from Quetta to Nushki on to Seistan and from the Persian Gulf

to the inland cities and finally to Tehran.

Salisbury complained that it was ‘the

Indian neglect that afflicts me’.

On this, R.L. Greaves comments: ‘Had these

lines been completed, England could have met the enemy far from India’s

borders, threatened Russia’s flank and interrupted her transport system.’

But

such an argument can be described only as wishful. It does not take into account

the tortuous nature of the terrain and the chronic lack of resources at Britain’s

disposal both in terms of manpower and finances. Such an attempt would have

been unsound from a strategic point of view also. As was pointed out even at

that time, it would have created continuous lines of communication from St

Petersburg to Calcutta, thus making Russia’s task of threatening Britain in Asia

easier.

In this situation, the British government thought it best to rely on the

Russo-Persian Convention of 1900, under which Persia had bound itself not to

construct any railway nor allow any foreign power to do so.

At least since the Penjdeh Crisis, it was accepted at London that massive

reinforcements would be needed for the defence of India should Russia choose

to use the powerful position it had attained in Central Asia. The question was

considered in 1889 at a conference where representatives of both the Admiralty

and the War Office were present. They laid down as a general principle that it

was the duty of each subordinate government of the empire to provide, as far as

its financial ability permitted, sufficient troops for its local defence. It was also

accepted that it was the duty of the imperial government to see that adequate

provision was made for the defence of the empire as a whole in a great war.

But the basic question was, from where would the reinforcements be drawn? In

1891 the Secretary of State for War, Edward Stanhope, charged the army with

five missions. It had to provide ‘effective support to the civil power’ in the

United Kingdom, to supply forces for India, to garrison all fortresses and

coaling stations, to mobilise regular and auxiliary forces for the defence of the

home islands and, in case of necessity, to send abroad two army corps.

But

sending reinforcements from the regular forces meant drawing from the forces

available to protect Britain against the possibility of invasion. This could have

exposed the ‘home’ islands to sudden attack. Already there were murmurs that a

disproportionate number of battalions were deployed outside Britain.

Sending

reinforcements by withdrawing garrisons from other colonies, in particular

Egypt and South Africa, could have compromised the level of defence there.

Even the size of the British army could not be drastically increased. The

prospect of maintaining a large standing army on the home terrain was one that

filled many Englishmen with suspicion. This also involved increase in expendi-

ture and, hence, higher levels of taxation.

Subsequently, the question of the defence of India in a war with France and

Seeking partnerships 127

Russia was never fully faced. Arnold-Forster, who became War Secretary in

1900, complained repeatedly that there was no statement of the exact purpose

for which the British army existed.

In any case, the South African War found

Britain’s small professional army in the doldrums, shot through with apathy and

snobbery, trailing the continental armies in size and intelligence facilities, and the

Royal Navy in prestige. Defeats in South Africa further diminished the army’s

status. The government of India, on its part, made it clear that in view of the

dangers confronting it – the consolidation of Russia’s power, the huge arma-

ments kept by the Amir of Afghanistan and the extension of its responsibilities to

Burma – its army of nearly 75,000 British soldiers and 150,000 Indian soldiers

was ‘astonishingly small’.

In January 1899, George Nathaniel Curzon became

the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. He had visited Central Asia in

1894 and was acknowledged as an expert in Central Asian affairs. From 1895 to

1898 he had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Both

Curzon and General Roberts believed that Britain could win what they saw as

the struggle for supremacy in Asia only through massive reinforcements from

Britain. They wanted to convert British and colonial militias into one gigantic

reserve for operations on the Indian frontier. Many politicians in Britain –

Chamberlain, Brodrick and Dilke – saw the proposal to strengthen the army in

India as the least controversial method of guarding Britain’s imperial power,

especially because it could be done at India’s rather than Britain’s expense.

But, as we shall see, this course could not be adopted because of constraints

centring on the availability of financial and human resources.

The outbreak of war in South Africa brought the question of defence of the

Indian Empire to the fore once again. In February 1900, some intelligence

reports were received indicating that Russia had begun to advance towards the

Indian frontier.

Immediately the government of India was asked to report on

the sufficiency, or otherwise, of the forces in India in the event of a Russian

attack on Afghanistan. In April 1900, the government of India communicated its

views. It postulated a forward policy of occupying the Kabul–Kandahar line. For

this purpose it put forward a demand for 30,000 troops at the outbreak of hostil-

ities, with 70,000 more to follow in the event of a prolonged war.

This demand

became the basis of a heated debate that followed. When the government of

India was asked to confine itself to a scheme of a purely defensive nature, it

replied that as many troops would be needed for a purely defensive strategy as

for an aggressive one, if not more, and added that any policy of retreat, even

though dictated by tactical considerations, could not be adopted for the Indian

Empire because it was likely to affect the prestige of the Raj adversely.

This

demand became the irreducible minimum, and all subsequent calculations were

made with this as the basis.

It is notable that, at London, the Intelligence Division of the Army reached

the same conclusion. In a memorandum entitled ‘The Military Needs of the

Empire in a War with France and Russia’, E.A. Altham of the Intelligence

Division of the army estimated that Russia could at any time place 50,000 to

60,000 men in Afghanistan, with countless numbers to follow, limited only by the

128 Seeking partnerships

total number they could support.

An interdepartmental committee was

appointed to study the Indian defence question. In its report of December 1901,

it accepted that the forces based in India were clearly too small to deal by them-

selves with the full brunt of a concerted attack from Russia. It made suggestions

for increasing India’s permanent garrison by the addition of 30,000 British

soldiers.

In the summer of 1903, Balfour informed the Viceroy that the

Committee of Imperial Defence had provisionally accepted that an immediate

reinforcement of 30,000 and a subsequent one of 70,000 would be necessary

should Russia invade Afghanistan after completing the Orenburg–Tashkent

railway.

This decision came at a time when the majority in the Cabinet was aghast at

the increasing cost of defence. This was the time when politicians of all hues

competed to offer social services and packages of benefits to the newly enfran-

chised and were demanding funds for social spending. Enmeshed in the

traditions of Gladstonian orthodoxy and in the Boer war, Hicks Beach,

Chancellor of the Exchequer, simply refused to entertain financial proposals

relating to defence. In 1901, a quarrel between him and the service chiefs nearly

broke up the Cabinet. It was not that allocation for the armed forces had not

increased. Between 1895–6 and 1901–2 army estimates, excluding the cost of

war, had risen from £18 million to £30 million while those of the navy had

increased from £19 million to £30 million. This increase exceeded that of any

other European country.

But the margin of national safety had remained as

narrow as ever. European countries were strengthening their navies, and

competitors were emerging outside the continent. In view of this, the Admiralty

was compelled to consider the revision of the two-power standard in favour of

the less attractive criterion of ‘a remarkable certainty of success in a war with

France and Russia’.

It also undertook a worldwide reorganisation of Britain’s

naval forces, strengthening Britain’s naval position in Europe at the expense of

the Far East and the Western hemisphere.

By 1903 Selborne complained: ‘It is

a terrific task to remain the greatest naval power when naval powers are

increasing in numbers and in naval strength, and at the same time, to be a mili-

tary power strong enough to meet the great military power in Asia.’

As for the

army, in October 1900, Brodrick, who had succeeded Lansdowne at the War

Office, presented a scheme for six army corps stationed in Britain of which three

would be ready at any time to be sent abroad. This was accepted with acclama-

tion in the House of Commons.

But by early 1903 support for this scheme had

collapsed, largely because it would have resulted in substantial increases in the

army estimates.

The Treasury tried to pass on the additional financial burden to the govern-

ment of India. In a letter to the War Office written a little later, it built up its

case in the following terms:

The Indian Government requires the services of a certain number of white

soldiers. The Secretary of State is compelled to obtain these soldiers

through the Home Government. While an obligation thus rests upon HMG

Seeking partnerships 129

to meet, to the best of their ability, the requirements of India in this respect,

there is a corresponding obligation upon the Indian Government to pay the

whole cost of the forces supplied. So far as my Lords are aware, there has

never been any undertaking to provide India with all the forces she requires

at a fixed price, and they are unable to admit that she is entitled to throw

upon the British Exchequer the cost of supplying her at a loss.

But the government of India was not ready to buy this line of argument. It

replied that a war against Russia was an imperial war since in such a war ‘it

cannot be doubted that not merely the credit but the very existence of the

British Empire would be at stake’. It concluded that ‘it would be in imperial as

distinct from Indian interests that the expense would be incurred and it is, in

our opinion, by the Imperial Exchequer that it should, therefore, be borne’.

Curzon believed that India’s army fell far short of India’s needs.

Within

India, by this time, political consciousness was growing. At every session of the

Indian National Congress, resolutions were passed demanding a reduction in

expenditure on the armed forces.

The newspapers in India were already

complaining that India was being dragged into imperial and international

complications from which it would be free if it were not ruled by Britain.

Curzon pointed to the undesirability of taking the risk of arousing political

discontent in India.

The question was not just of finding enough financial resources for the

purpose. There were other impediments in the way of increasing the size of the

army in India. Since the Uprising of 1857–8, it was accepted that for main-

taining the Raj, the proportion of British to Indian troops should be 1:2 for the

Bengal army and 1:3 for the Madras and Bombay armies. By the end of the

century, in view of the spread of nationalist feelings amongst Indians, it had

become all the more important to maintain this proportion. Britain, at this time,

was engaged in the prolonged and bloody war in South Africa, which had left

even the British army depleted. In fact, an alarming proportion of volunteers

during this war were found unfit for military duty. This created the fear that the

British race was deteriorating and led to the creation of the ‘Inter-Departmental

Committee on Physical Deterioration’.

In view of all this, it did not seem

possible to get the numbers that were needed for service in India.

Even if men and money were available, there were other difficulties. As early

as 1889, at a joint conference of the army, Admiralty and the India Office, it was

concluded that if Britain was at war with a major naval power, no reinforce-

ments could be sent to India without strong escort ‘until the British navy cleared

the seas’.

In 1901, when this question came up again, it emerged clearly that,

in view of the Franco-Russian Alliance, France would impede the transport of

troops to India. Hamilton wrote:

If we were fighting Russia alone, the task would be easy enough, but

assuming at the time of the Fashoda dispute France had not given way, and

we had gone to war with France, and Russia had then invaded Afghanistan,

130 Seeking partnerships

until the French fleet was disposed of or masked, we could not have sent out

the required reinforcements.

Since the navy could not guarantee the safe convoy of reinforcements,

Nicholson, the Director General of Military Intelligence, proposed that the army

in India be permanently strengthened by adding 15,000 British troops. But

again, the government of India was not ready to bear the cost. The policy

makers were thus caught in a catch-22 situation.

Hence, many grotesque schemes emerged. It was suggested that a force of

10,000 white police should be raised which would make available 30,000 troops

of the ‘obligatory garrisons’.

An interesting suggestion was made that the

Gurkhas of Nepal, who were employed in great numbers in the Indian army, be

counted as foreigners and Indian troops raised against them in order to maintain

the requisite 1:2 ratio between foreigners and Indians.

It was also thought

prudent to be ostentatious about whatever preparations were being made.

Balfour, for example, told Brodrick that there was no reason for secrecy

regarding orders which were being sent to Argentina about mules and horses: ‘It

is just as well that the Russians should know that we are prepared for eventuali-

ties, and though I can hardly believe that they are prepared to make war on

Afghanistan, they will be less likely to do so the more they see that we are

prepared to face this contingency.’

There was nothing in the way of territories that Russia possessed and Britain

desired. Further, Russia did not offer any points by way of targets, the capture

of which could mean victory in case of war. Nor were there any areas from

where Britain could apply pressure on Russia. As already said, the Black Sea

strategy could not be adopted. The Baltic was not even considered a point of

attack. About Port Arthur and Vladivostok, it was held that any blow there

would not ‘so fatally injure the Russian Empire as to force an early and advan-

tageous conclusion of war’.

In this situation, E.A. Altham made a suggestion

for an all out colonial war against Russia in a paper written in August 1901

entitled ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia’. This

paper has been described as an ‘epoch making’ paper.

Altham argued that

since Russia did not offer any target either to the army or to the navy, the

capture of which would either lead to termination of war or at least deliver a

decisive blow to Russia, the army should be used in conjunction with the navy

to fight a worldwide colonial war against the weaker member of the alliance,

namely, France. Control of French colonies was dependent on constant sea

communication with the mother country. Interruption of this would lead to a

French defeat, which would induce the excitable French democracy to upset

their government. Meanwhile Britain would stand on the defensive on the

northwest frontier of India and wait for Russia to be forced out of the war as a

result of lack of financial help from France.

This was a dubious strategy based

not on principles but on expediency. Needless to say, the War Office never

accepted it. Still it is interesting that, faced with the inability to provide for the

defence of India against Russia, an all-out war against its ally, France, was

Seeking partnerships 131

proposed. The very fact that such suggestions were made highlights the level of

anxiety on this account.

Strengthening the buffers

As already said, in case of Russia’s advance towards India, the power and atti-

tude of the rulers of Persia and Afghanistan was likely to be of decisive

importance. But, at the turn of the century, relations with both the states were

such that the British could not rely on their friendly co-operation. Curzon had

no faith in the ability of these states to maintain their independence. He wanted

to solve the problem by an aggressive display of British power and criticised

Salisbury’s hand-to-mouth diplomacy.

London was more conscious of the

constraints caused by the non-availability of armed forces. Salisbury had once

complained that Curzon always expected him to act as if he had five hundred

thousand men at his back, and the criticism was a just one.

Abdur Rahman had been the ruler of Afghanistan since the Second Afghan

War. During the twenty years that followed, he had strengthened his position

considerably. But in case of Russia’s advance, the government of India could not

be sure of his attitude. He could reject any offer of help, request help on impos-

sible conditions, or decide to take care of himself.

It was believed that the Amir

had 100,000 trained soldiers at his disposal. There were constant rumours that

he was trying to enter into relations with Russia. Curzon’s efforts to introduce

railways and telegraphs into his country remained fruitless.

In February 1900,

when Britain was engaged in bitter fighting in South Africa, Russia put forward

the proposal that in view of the completion of the Trans-Caspian railway and

long contiguous frontier, there should be a regular system of direct communica-

tion between Russia and Afghanistan.

The whole question of relations with

Russia over Afghanistan was discussed in this connection. Ultimately, Russia’s

request was not accepted. Curzon gave expression to the general feeling: ‘No

reverses in South Africa, in my opinion, can possibly justify a precipitate aban-

donment of the whole of our Afghan policy for the last twenty years.’

October 1901, Amir Abdur Rahman died. His son and successor, Habibullah

Khan, ceased to reply to letters sent to him, abstained from drawing subsidy and

declined several invitations to visit India.

The subsidy was given to the Amir to

keep him ‘straight and loyal’. With the Amir hostile and Russia ambitious, the

situation looked grim.

In Persia, both Britain and Russia were considering the consequences of

economic bankruptcy and deterioration of political authority. In his book Persia

and the Persian Question, written before becoming the Viceroy of India, Curzon

had argued that the Persian Gulf and southern Persia were areas of special

concern to Britain and that all powers should be kept out of these areas, by

force if necessary.

After becoming the Viceroy of India, he sent two

despatches on the Persian question in 1899 and 1901 in which he criticised

Salisbury’s ‘buffer policy’ and suggested that the old policy of maintaining the

independence and integrity of Persia be given up and Russia’s ‘superior inter-

132 Seeking partnerships

ests’ in the northern half be acknowledged in return for recognition of Britain’s

interests in the South.

He wanted Whitehall to designate the line in Persia

beyond which the Russians would not be permitted to move without encoun-

tering British resistance. On the basis of these despatches from Curzon,

Lansdowne wrote to Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran, using

Curzon’s ideas and even his language. In his reply Hardinge suggested a policy

of winning over Persia by some courtesies and by providing generous loans to

Persia. On the latter he wrote, ‘The more we get her into our debt, the greater

will be our hold and our political influence over her government.’

In August

1902, the Shah of Persia visited London and was made a Knight of the Garter

despite King Edward’s reluctance.

But this did not produce the desired results.

Hamilton complained: ‘the Shah accepts the Garter and then approves finally of

the new tariff without referring to us.’

As to the loans, financiers in London

remained reluctant to respond to patriotic appeals to invest in Persia. In this

situation, the Imperial Bank of Persia, British controlled but nominally a Persian

institution, failed to act as a conduit for British capital.

Arthur Hardinge had

also suggested that if Russia effected a military occupation of northern Persia,

Britain should make a corresponding move in the south. This immediately

raised all issues centring on military intervention. Balfour argued that if the

policy advocated by Hardinge was adopted, then inland expeditions might

become necessary, for which necessary resources might not be available.

The

eventuality did arise within less than a year. In the summer of 1903, Russia

threatened to intervene to suppress the popular movement in Tabriz. Hardinge

warned Russia that if it intervened, Britain would move in the south and east.

Russia held back. To give further boost to Britain’s standing in this area, Curzon

was asked to make a stately tour through the Persian Gulf accompanied by an

impressive naval escort.

Exploring diplomatic alternatives

In the exchanges between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the War

Office, the Admiralty and the India Office, one constant theme was the

consciousness of lack of means to defend the Indian Empire. The ominous

conclusion was drawn that the result of this would be the loss of India.

This

was seen as a death-blow to Britain’s imperial position. The doctrine that in

fighting for India Britain would be fighting for its imperial existence became a

doctrine of astonishing persistence.

Even the foreign powers were aware of

Britain’s concern on this account. Charles Scott, the British ambassador at St

Petersburg, reported that Russia was massing troops in Central Asia to prevent

Britain from sending reinforcements from Asia to South Africa and also to make

Britain understand that if it associated itself with Japan, things could be made

unpleasant in Central Asia.

Similarly, in working out the 1900–01 war plan,

the French General Staff calculated on Russia applying pressure in Tashkent to

threaten India in the case of an Anglo-French war.

Money was advanced to

Russia for building railways in Central Asia.

Seeking partnerships 133

This led to a confused debate on foreign policy. Chamberlain, Hamilton and

Lansdowne began to feel that Britain must either be ready to pay for a larger

army, or it must have allies or friends on the continent. They wanted to solve the

problem through diplomatic means. Salisbury, Hicks Beach and many Liberal

Unionists believed that any radical departure in foreign policy was uncalled for.

Salisbury’s experiences of arriving at some settlement with Germany, France or

Russia were not very pleasant. As to the Franco-Russian combine, he held that it

was not based on anything like hearty goodwill or community of interests and

was, therefore, not likely to last

But he welcomed settlements of a local nature

and did not stand in the way of those who sought to improve relations with other

powers in Europe.

Since France and Russia were rivals of long standing, in

concrete terms this meant that efforts needed to be made to improve relations

with Germany and the other Triple Alliance Powers. But an agreement with

Russia remained the beau ideal of the British Cabinet. We shall see that each over-

ture for alliance to Germany during 1898–1901 was weighed in the Russian

context, and before making each diplomatic move, the possibility of reaching

some settlement with Russia was explored.

The Chinese melon

The first effort to collaborate with Germany was made in China. China’s defeat

in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–5 threw into question its ability to survive as

a sovereign state and made way for the further penetration of European powers

into China. Germany was the first to act. Taking advantage of the murder of

two German missionaries, in November 1897 Germany occupied Kiaochow

with its small fishing harbour at Tsingtao on the coast of Shantung. Within

Germany, this step increased the Kaiser’s prestige tremendously. But this exer-

cise in weltpolitik had an adverse impact externally. Friendship with Russia,

nurtured for so many years, came to an end almost overnight. Russia retaliated

by sending its fleet to winter at Port Arthur. Germany turned to Britain for co-

operation against Russia. The British Cabinet was keen to prevent Russia from

installing itself at Port Arthur. Yet, Britain did not respond favourably to

Germany’s offer.

This decision has been explained in terms of the desire to

prevent any attempt by the European powers to partition China. ‘The mainte-

nance of the territorial integrity of the two ‘‘dying empires’’, the Ottoman and

the Celestial, had been the cornerstone of British policy in the Near and Far

East’, comments T.G. Otte.

It is also argued that Salisbury wanted to avoid an

aggressive policy in China at a time when Kitchener was marching down the

river Nile towards Khartoum.

But an additional reason was the desire to

avoid taking an anti-Russian position. To counter any move on Britain’s part,

Russia could open a front on the north-west of the Indian Empire, and there

Britain did not have the necessary resources to meet Russia in superior force. In

the Far East, too, Britain’s position was weak. In June 1895, the ‘Triplice’ had

excluded Britain from the loan given to China. Russia had also strengthened its

position. It was going ahead with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway

134 Seeking partnerships

and had successfully negotiated for the construction of the Chinese Eastern

Railway.

Instead of co-operating with Germany against Russia, Britain first made an

overture of understanding to Russia. On 17 January 1898, Salisbury telegraphed

O’Connor, the ambassador at St Petersburg, to ask Serge Witte, the Russian

Finance Minister, whether it was possible for Britain and Russia to work together

to maintain the integrity of China because their objects were ‘not antagonistic in

any serious degree’.

A week later he expressed a readiness to extend the accord

to Turkey.

But the proposal fell through as soon as Russia realised that the

maintenance of Chinese sovereignty implied withdrawal from Port Arthur and

Talienwan, situated some 80 kilometres east of Port Arthur. Witte frankly

explained to O’Connor that Russia would eventually absorb the provinces of

northern China.

Along with these overtures to Russia, Salisbury worked to

secure concessions from the Chinese government for Britain in the Yangtse

valley. He tried also to negotiate with the USA.

In March 1898, Germany formally obtained the lease of Kiaochow. Russia

followed quickly and obtained the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan. Russia’s

acquisitions caused widespread disappointment and plunged the British Cabinet

into a crisis. Salisbury’s gestures of an understanding with Russia were seen as

prime examples of palpable weakness, both in Parliament and in the British

press. But the British government refused to challenge Russia. This was a well-

considered decision. Arthur Balfour, who had assumed charge of foreign affairs

during Salisbury’s illness, informed the Queen that after deliberating ‘for more

than three hours and a half ’, the Cabinet arrived at the decision that it was not

worthwhile to risk a war with Russia in order to keep it out of Port Arthur.

the House of Commons, he admitted that a strong British stand might have

bluffed Russia out of Port Arthur but, ‘if the bluff had been called Britain would

have found herself forced into a war – a risk not worth taking’.

In the back-

ground was a lurking consciousness that Russia might open a front on the

north-west of the Indian Empire. The British government, thereafter, decided to

secure compensation for itself, the port of Weihaiwei. Chamberlain condemned

the policy of obtaining ‘compensation’ in these areas and in the Yangtse valley

which, he said, tacitly condoned Russia’s actions.

Many circles in Britain – the

China Association, the business community and many in the Cabinet and the

Foreign Office – were also critical of this policy of ‘grab’.

The business

community at this time was obsessed with the assumed potential of a market of

400 million Chinese. But Whitehall decided against adopting a policy of

confrontation vis-à-vis Russia.

Alliance offers to Germany

One result of these events was that Chamberlain and his supporters in the

Cabinet began to look for allies to strengthen Britain’s position. They tried the

Americans, who were engaged in conflict with Spain, and then the Japanese.

Their principal effort was with the Germans. Chamberlain made an offer of

Seeking partnerships 135

alliance in secret conversations with Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador at

London, in March 1898 and then through public speeches.

Balfour supported

him. Salisbury’s resistance was at best feeble. It does not seem that there were

apprehensions as yet in British political circles about the meaning of the naval

and colonial policies being inaugurated by Bülow and Tirpitz, the Chancellor

and the Chief of the Navy respectively, in Germany. At that time, Germany was

only the sixth-ranking naval power in the world. There had been disputes

between the two countries over Samoa, Togoland, the Cameroons and

Southwest Africa, but Britain’s real interest in these regions was of marginal

significance. Britain’s interests in the Far East were also not of such vital impor-

tance as to cause an about turn in foreign policy. It was the position of Russia in

Central Asia that caused insecurity. In his sensational ‘long spoon’ speech at

Birmingham on 13 May 1898, in which Chamberlain had criticised Salisbury’s

policy of isolation and had made the offer of an alliance to Germany, he had

also reasoned that war with Russia could only be successfully pursued if Britain

gained an alliance of a strong military power.

Talks between Britain and

Germany continued off and on until June 1898. Ultimately, these came to

nothing. One reason on the German side was that in taking the decision to build

a navy in 1897, the government wanted to create ‘a political power factor against

England’. The German government needed to fan the anti-British tone to get

the naval bills through and, at the same time, it wanted to avoid irritating Britain

lest a conflict broke out before the fleet was ready.

War in South Africa

Meanwhile, a crisis was brewing in South Africa. After the discovery of gold and

diamonds, Transvaal seemed to be emerging as the richest spot on earth. Its

growing wealth could give it a dominant influence over the rest of South Africa.

Even the Cape Province seemed destined to become a mere economic depen-

dency of the Boer Republic. The British government tried to cut off Transvaal’s

only outlet to the sea through the Delgoa Bay, which was a part of the

Portuguese possessions. It opened negotiations with Portugal, which was passing

through a financial and political crisis. But the Portuguese government did not

co-operate, and the German government intervened to demand compensation.

The negotiations fell through. Alfred Milner, the governor-general of the Cape

Colony, also opened negotiations with President Kruger on the question of

Uitlanders’ right to vote, but these remained inconclusive. President Kruger

declared war on 12 October 1899. But it is significant that much before that, on

6 September, Chamberlain had secured the consent of the Cabinet to what was

virtually an ultimatum to the Boers. Presenting the issue before the Cabinet he

had said: ‘What is now at stake is the position of Britain in South Africa’ and

had added that ‘the issue was whether, in this region, British supremacy was to

be finally established and recognised, or forever abandoned’.

The Boers

adopted guerilla tactics and fought bravely. For the British army, defeat followed

defeat. During the first two months of the war the Boer armies laid siege to the

136 Seeking partnerships

towns of Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking. The British were stunned to find

their country so poorly prepared. Some 50,000 soldiers were called from the

colonies, including India, to fight the Boers. Two heroes – Generals Roberts and

Kitchener – were sent. By the spring of 1900 the British army was able to

retreve each town in turn. On 5 June 1900 Roberts entered Pretoria. With this,

the war was almost over though Boer guerillas forced two further years of hard

and brutal fighting. Peace was ultimately signed in May 1902. Thus, for main-

taining its hold over the Cape, Britain fought a very expensive and bloody war

that cost it £300 million and 30,000 lives.

When British forces were locked up in South Africa and were suffering

defeats, there were persistent reports that Russia was trying to draw France and

Germany into an alliance against Britain. Even in normal times, this would have

been a nightmare. But at this time the prospect seemed unnerving indeed. With

the Indian army depleted, the British government anxiously looked to see what

use Russia would make of its pressure point in Asia. There were constant reports

and rumours of Russian forces being despatched to Trans-Caspia. War Office

Intelligence reports of early February 1900 indicated that during the previous

two months, up to 150,000 Russian troops had been moving on Kushk.

regards Afghanistan, Arthur Godley, the Under-Secretary of State for India,

wrote to Curzon: ‘We are expecting almost daily to hear of trouble in

Afghanistan. I can hardly doubt that Russia will make a move within the next 2

or 3 weeks.’

In this background, on 30 November 1899, while the Kaiser was on a visit to

Windsor, Chamberlain made another alliance proposal, this time for an

Anglo–German–American alliance. But Bülow remained cool towards any such

suggestion. One reason was that the German government was planning to push

through the Second Naval Law, virtually doubling the size of its fleet.

It is

significant that in early 1900, when Russia opened the question of establishing

direct relations with Afghanistan, both Hamilton and Godley tried to use

Russia’s suggestion as ‘a peg on which to hang something in the shape of a

general working agreement with Russia’.

100

Godley even said that if Russia’s

demand was to be accepted sooner or later, it was best to accept it at that stage

adding: ‘If we have to swallow the pill, we had better pretend to like it.’

101

This

effort to improve relations with Russia also did not succeed.

In October 1900, Salisbury reorganised his Cabinet. In this reshuffle, many

members who had advocated ‘a new course in foreign policy’ received key posi-

tions. Lansdowne moved to the Foreign Office, Brodrick to the War Office and

the Earl of Selborne became the First Lord of the Admiralty. These men – as

also Hamilton, who remained India Secretary – shared the alarm at the threat

perceived from Russia, wanted to reduce expenditure on the armed forces and

believed that Britain’s anxieties could be relieved by diplomatic means.

Lansdowne had been the Viceroy of India from 1888 to 1894 and then

Secretary of State for War from 1895 to 1900. His ‘new’ approach to foreign

policy has been seen in the context of the continental alliance system and the

relative decline of British power.

102

But, because of the offices he had occupied,

Seeking partnerships 137

he was in a unique position to appreciate the strategic and military impasse on

the north-west of India. He showed a willingness to negotiate with any power

whose help might bolster Britain’s position against Russia.

103

Brodrick, as a

boyhood friend and admirer of Curzon,

104

was likely to be more aware of

demands for reinforcements emanating from Calcutta. Selborne held that in

view of their naval position, and the demands for strengthening the army,

Britain could no longer afford to regard every power as a potential enemy.

105

Hamilton was in favour of a settlement with Germany and the advantages he

saw were that it would ‘effectively maintain the peace of Europe’ and that it

would ‘very greatly strengthen our position in India’.

106

He was ready even to

join the Triple Alliance if need be. His support proved invaluable for Lansdowne

because Curzon steadfastly criticised the policy of becoming ‘entangled prema-

turely’ in any continental alliance with a great European power.

107

In fact, on

the question whether Britain could maintain its global position without giving up

the policy of non-alignment, Salisbury found himself ranged on one side and the

remainder of the Cabinet on the other. During 1901, his colleagues sounded out

Germany, France, Japan, Russia and the USA.

At the time of the Cabinet reshuffle, negotiations were going on with

Germany on China. The occasion had been provided by the Boxer Uprising

there. In June 1900, some Christian missionaries had been murdered. Later, the

Boxers laid siege of foreign legations in Peking. The European powers organised

a joint military expedition to rescue the Europeans trapped there. Britain was

preoccupied in South Africa and, therefore, participated only reluctantly. During

the autumn of 1900, representatives of the European powers met in Peking to

settle relations with the Manchu government. At that time, Russia made efforts

to secure concessions for itself in Manchuria. This created anxiety in London.

The reason was not any threat to British interests in north-east Asia; Manchuria

was a remote area. Rather, Britain was concerned because this would have

strengthened a country which was seen as an enemy. But the factor that caused

most anxiety was that Russia and France might be able to secure Germany’s co-

operation. This would have resurrected the ‘Triplice’, a combination that Britain

feared. As Chamberlain argued: ‘An alliance between Germany and Russia,

entailing as it would the co-operation of France, is the one thing we have to

dread, and the clash of German and Russian interests, whether in China or Asia

Minor, would be a guarantee of our safety.’

108

In this situation, Britain decided once again to turn to Germany or, to use

Chamberlain’s blunt statement, make Germany ‘throw herself across the path of

Russia’.

109

Germany on its part, having inaugurated weltpolitik, wanted to prevent

Britain and Russia from partitioning China to the exclusion of itself. At the same

time, it did not want to incur the hostility of Russia on the issue of Manchuria

where Germany had no direct interest. The result of all this was that Germany

signed an agreement, the Anglo-German-China Agreement, on 16 October

1900 undertaking to uphold the territorial integrity of China and the Open

Door. But the whole agreement was rendered innocuous by the insertion of a

fluid phrase relating to freedom of all trade in China, ‘as far as they can exercise

138 Seeking partnerships

influence’. This phrase turned the agreement into what John Hay, the American

Secretary of State who is associated with ‘the Open Door notes’, aptly described

as ‘a horrible practical joke on England’.

110

The Anglo-Japanese alliance

On 3 January 1901, The Times reported that the local Russian and Chinese

authorities had signed an agreement on Manchuria, the Alexiev–Tseng

Agreement.

111

If ratified, it would have legitimised Russia’s control over

Manchuria. Japan took alarm over this, as any extension of Russia’s influence in

the vicinity of Korea was unacceptable. Japan approached Britain and suggested

that together they should warn China against negotiations with any other

European power, and even gave a hint that it would go to war with Russia if

Britain would keep the French fleet in check.

112

During the third week of April

Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador at London, proposed that Britain and Japan

should endeavour to arrive at some permanent understanding for the protection

of their interests in the Far East.

113

Britain’s dilemma was that, without Japan,

Britain would have become isolated in the Far East, while with Japan alone as an

ally, Britain could not afford to take a stand against Russia anywhere.

114

Britain

could not even look the other way because Japan’s actions could result in the

revival of the ‘Triplice’ of 1895, while any settlement between Japan and Russia

could create a joint Russo-Japanese front. This would have extended Britain’s

‘isolation’ to the Far East. In this situation, Lansdowne remained non-committal

towards Japan while he made friendly overtures to Russia as well as to Germany.

Britain had always longed for a settlement with Russia and had made

repeated efforts in that direction. In March 1901, Lansdowne made a suggestion

for a direct Anglo-Russian agreement on questions relating to the railways in

Manchuria and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Russia’s reply, received after

about a month, was ‘remarkably friendly’. But the negotiations did not really get

underway, and foundered over apparently minor obstacles concerning the condi-

tions for a loan to China.

115

Another effort to reach an understanding with

Russia was made during autumn when negotiations for an Anglo-Japanese

Alliance were well on the way. But Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister,

brusquely rejected Britain’s proposal.

116

During the spring of 1901 Britain made one more effort to secure

Germany’s co-operation in the Far East. But Wilhelmstrasse remained evasive.

On 15 March 1901, Bülow, now the Chancellor, stated categorically in the

Reichstag that in the Anglo-German agreement there was no reference to

Manchuria.

117

This marked the end of Britain’s efforts to co-operate with

Germany in the Far East for the purpose of ‘keeping a ring’ for Russia and

Japan. But the effort to form some agreement with Germany was not given up.

Three days after Bülow’s speech, Lansdowne discussed the question of an

understanding of ‘a more durable and extended character’ directed against

France and Russia with Eckardestein, who was officiating as German ambas-

sador at that time.

118

The negotiations continued throughout the summer of

Seeking partnerships 139

1901 with such seriousness that J.A.S. Grenville comments that the British

ministers debated, ‘not whether they should co-operate with Germany but upon

what terms they should do so’.

119

Towards the end of May 1901, the German government conveyed that if

Britain wanted to ally itself with Germany, Germany would expect Britain to

join the Triple Alliance. Bülow held that only such total commitment on the part

of Britain would compensate Germany for risking a permanent estrangement

from Russia.

120

It is significant that although Lansdowne had strong misgivings

about assuming such wide-ranging commitments, he did not reject the German

proposal at once. He instead asked Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Under-

Secretary at the Foreign Office, to prepare a draft treaty. At least two influential

members of the ‘Inner Cabinet’ – Balfour and Hamilton – showed a readiness to

accept Germany’s terms. Their anxiety about the security of India was a vital

consideration. It would ‘enable us to reduce our expenditure both military and

naval’, wrote Hamilton to Curzon.

121

Balfour thought that it would give Britain

worldwide security. Finally, it was Salisbury’s ‘masterly’ memorandum which

poured cold water on the proposal. He put forward three arguments: first, that

the continental powers were not likely to combine against Britain when they did

not do so during the South African War; second, that ‘the liability of having to

defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia’ was ‘heavier than

having to defend the British Isles against France’; and third, that Britain’s parlia-

mentary system did not permit any British government to assume any

engagement involving the casus belli.

122

He did not mention the problems created

by Russia’s pressure on India. Given Salisbury’s long association with the Indian

Empire, this could not be the result of oversight. One reason could be that any

allusion to threaten the Indian Empire from Russia’s expansion would have

weakened the case against an alliance with Germany. Besides, Salisbury strongly

believed that Germany would ‘never stand by us against Russia’ because it was

‘in mortal terror on account of that long undefended frontier of hers on the

Russian side’.

123

By the middle of 1901, it was clear that Britain had been left high and dry.

Only the Japanese option remained. By July, reports were reaching London that

Russia and Japan were trying for reconciliation.

124

At this time, Lansdowne

raised the subject of an understanding with Japan.

125

The negotiations made

headway only after failure of approaches to Germany and rebuff from Russia.

But, from this, it would not be proper to draw the conclusion that the Anglo-

Japanese accord flowed from the failure to conclude some agreement with

Germany or Russia. Reasons have to be sought in the general perception of

inadequacy of resources to defend Britain’s empire, which had led to the search

for allies in the first place. Zara Steiner aptly comments that ‘it was the Russian

threat and the failure to conclude an understanding with Germany which lay

behind the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’.

126

After the negotiations opened in August,

many ministers began to see concrete advantages in the process. Their support

stemmed from the feeling that unless the burden of defence was shared with

some country, Britain would have to choose between a dangerously weak mili-

140 Seeking partnerships

tary establishment and higher taxation. Selborne looked forward to relief from

the strains imposed on the navy. The Admiralty had failed to promise safe trans-

port of troops, if available, from Britain to India. Selborne expressed himself in

favour of an alliance with Japan because in the Pacific, while the Franco-Russian

combine had nine ships ‘built and building’, Britain had only four. An Anglo-

Japanese alliance could provide a superiority of eleven to nine. He argued that

this would ‘add materially to the naval strength of the country all over the

world’.

127

Many members of the Cabinet – Salisbury, Balfour, Hamilton, Hicks Beach,

Chamberlain and some others – had reservations about making any alliance

with Japan, but they did not press their objections to the point of complete rejec-

tion of the proposal. Salisbury prepared a carefully reasoned memorandum, but

it lacked fire.

128

Other members, while expressing their misgivings, added that

they would accept the proposal if other members of the Cabinet were agreed

upon it. George Monger says that it was these qualifications that saved the

proposal.

129

It is worth noting that even those who opposed the proposal hung

their arguments on the Indian question. Arguing that any alliance with either

Japan or Germany would be ‘useless’, Balfour wrote to Lansdowne that if war

should arise out of either a German or a Japanese alliance, it would have to be

fought against Russia and France and the ally in one case would be Japan and in

the other Germany. He added:

A quarrel with Russia anywhere about anything means the invasion of India

and if England were without allies, I doubt whether it would be possible for

the French to resist joining in the fray. Our position would then be

perilous.

130

Hamilton also opposed the proposal because of its likely impact on the defence

of India. He held that checked in the Far East, Russia would turn its energies to

Central Asia and expressed the apprehension that, as a result of this alliance,

Central Asia would see a Russian coup before the end of 1902.

131

Balfour, Hicks

Beach and Chamberlain wanted that more strenuous efforts be made to secure

the promise of help with regard to the defence of India from Japan.

132

The War

Office and the India Office tried to insert a reference to Japan’s co-operation in

guarding Britain’s interests on the frontiers of India, but Japan showed reluc-

tance to assume responsibility outside East Asia. The British Cabinet took the

decision to pursue the matter later.

133

It is significant that even the opposition,

especially the Liberal Imperialists, expressed their misgivings in the Indian

context. Their fear was that any alliance with Japan would render an eventual

British rapprochement with Russia impossible.

134

Like the British ministers, many senior leaders in Japan also were torn

between their desire to negotiate with Russia and the proposal for an alliance

with Britain. Ito Hirobhumi, a distinguished Genero and former prime minister,

was in favour of a settlement with Russia. When London forwarded the draft of

the treaty on 6 November 1901, no reply was received from Tokyo for five weeks,

Seeking partnerships 141

primarily because of the absence of Ito from the country. This delay caused

suspense and anxiety at London.

135

Ultimately, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was

signed on 30 January 1902. The two parties mutually recognised the indepen-

dence of China and Korea. It was stated that Japan was interested ‘in a peculiar

degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea’. It also stipu-

lated that, to safeguard these interests, if one partner became involved in a war

with another Power, the other would remain neutral. In case another power or

powers intervened against the ally, the signatories would consult frankly. The

alliance was to remain in force for five years.

136

Within the Foreign Office and in the press, this alliance was seen as marking a

sharp departure from the fixed policy of not having any alliances.

137

Amongst

historians, there has been a prolonged debate as to whether the conclusion of

this alliance marked the end of isolation or not. The problem arises mainly from

the difficulty of defining what the stage of ‘isolation’ was. But some comments

are called for. It is true that the chances of casus foederis arising were much fewer

in the case of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, yet the British government had

surrendered, without reserve, into the hands of a foreign power the decision

relating to peace and war. Lansdowne admitted candidly, ‘In approaching the

Japanese we have indeed virtually admitted that we do not wish to continue to

stand alone.’

138

The Cabinet had taken the risk with the full consciousness of the

possibility of getting involved in a war not only in the Far East but of having to

fight ‘all over the world’ in case France was called upon to join Russia on some

‘obscure’ issue. This marked the termination of the policy of remaining aloof

from definite commitments. This alliance is often situated in the Far East alone,

as an attempt to create an anti-Russian front in the Far East and as a move to

counterbalance the combined naval strength of France and Russia in the

Pacific.

139

In this context, it is important to remember that while any increase in

Russia’s power anywhere was a matter for anxiety, Britain’s vital interests were

not adversely affected by the expansion of Russia towards the Pacific. Hence, it

would not be right to explain such an important departure from foreign policy in

terms of fear of Russia’s expansion towards the Pacific. It has also been argued

that the motive behind signing this alliance with Japan was to concentrate British

warships in home waters against the new threat from Germany.

140

But, at this

stage, Britain was not in awe of Germany’s naval power or its potential.

141

It was

the problem of defending the Raj that formed the backdrop for the diplomatic

initiatives. This was the period – the winter of 1901–2 – which saw the squabble

between the India Office and the government of India about the military

requirements of India, between the Admiralty and the War Office over escorting

reinforcements to India, between the War Office and the Treasury over addi-

tional funds, between the Exchequer and the service chiefs over allocations to

armed forces and between the British government and the government of India

about sharing the burden of providing additional troops to defend India.

Towards the end of 1901, when negotiations with Japan were in full swing,

Lansdowne made yet another effort for an accord with Germany. He suggested

that the two countries conclude a series of small-scale agreements which would

142 Seeking partnerships

not commit them to definite action but would declare the identity of their inter-

ests in certain areas of the world.

142

But Metternich, the new German

ambassador, rejected the proposal unhesitatingly stating that it should either be

‘the whole or none’.

143

This was the last time that Lansdowne proposed any

alliance with Germany. At this stage it is relevant to raise the question: why did

an Anglo-German alliance not happen? This question becomes additionally

interesting in view of the fact that both countries viewed Russia as an antagonist

and had made repeated efforts to come to some understanding. Elaborate long-

term explanations have been offered such as the distrust of British democracy

within the ruling establishment in Germany which made Germany insist on

open military commitment ratified by Parliament, the trade rivalry, the inaugu-

ration of fleet building activity by Germany, Salisbury’s impatience with

methods of German diplomacy, and so on. Important as these factors are,

incompatibility in the interests of the two countries vis-à-vis Russia has to be

assigned substantial weight.

One problem in Anglo-German relations was that though their antagonists were

identical, the geographical regions of their antagonisms were not. While Britain

remained anxious about the security of the Raj, Germany was in mortal terror

of its long contiguous frontier with Russia to its east. Since the time of Bismarck,

the German government had held that a war between Britain and Russia was

inevitable.

144

It believed that owing to its scattered and vulnerable possessions all

over the world, Britain faced so many dangers in so many areas that it was

bound to seek an alliance with Germany sooner or later. Wilhelmstrasse took the

view that Germany could secure better terms by postponing a decision until

Britain was more hard-pressed.

145

On the other hand, the opinion at London

was that the contiguity of the frontiers of Russia and Germany and the Franco-

German combine had made Germany’s position ‘as vulnerable as ours’, and that

Germany would submit to the British definition of their understanding.

146

Even

the German government was extremely conscious of this. The Kaiser had

commented: ‘The length of [the] Russo-German frontier forces Germany to

walk wearily.’

147

Another aspect of their mutual relations is also very interesting.

Each remained extremely conscious that it stood to gain more by the continu-

ance of the enmity of the other with Russia than by their mutual friendship. The

Anglo-Russian setting in Central Asia served Germany’s purpose because, by

keeping Russia engaged in that quarter, it relieved pressure on Germany’s

eastern frontier and in the Balkans. Similarly, Britain stood to gain by continued

antagonism between Russia and Germany because this forced Russia to keep

part of its army on its eastern frontier and thus provided respite to Britain on the

northwest frontier of India. All other reasons for non-fruition of efforts for

alliance between Britain and Germany were subsidiary to this. A political agree-

ment, like the army and navy, is an instrument of power. It cannot be evaluated

in any context other than that of determining to what extent it would fulfil the

objective for which it is designed. Far from increasing the power of either Britain

or Germany, any agreement between them was likely to make their problems

Seeking partnerships 143

more formidable. An Anglo-German accord did not happen because it was not

likely to add to the strength of either country. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was

likely to bolster Japan’s determination to stand up to Russia and thus increase the

prospect of war between these two countries. This induced Britain and France to

move closer. France was no more eager to fight over Russia’s interests in China

than Britain was to get entangled in any war against Russia for the sake of

Japan’s ambitions in East Asia. Hence, both wanted to remain aloof from any

Russo-Japanese conflict. Britain and France, therefore, worked for improvement

of relations between them. The British had been tenaciously exploring the feasi-

bility of an understanding with Russia. France could prove to be a conduit in

that direction as well. By 1907, Britain had formed an entente with France and

also an entente with Russia, a development regarded as inconceivable in Berlin.

Until the summer of 1902, Britain did not have any war plan for defending

Britain and the empire against Germany or the Triple Alliance. After 1907,

Germany was perceived as the principal enemy. These developments form the

theme of the next chapter.

144 Seeking partnerships

The first half of 1902 saw the growth of optimism regarding Britain’s interna-

tional standing. The Boer War had drawn to a successful conclusion. There had

been no continental coalition against Britain. The Hay–Pauncefote Treaty of

1901, under which Britain accepted that the United States would have the sole

right to build a canal across Central America connecting the Atlantic and the

Pacific, had softened relations with the United States and allowed for reduction

of forces in that part of the world. Following the alliance with Japan, there was

relief in the Far East as well. On the other hand, some developments were

causing concern. The experience of success in South Africa had been more

unnerving than exhilarating. It led to the demand for a fresh appraisal of

strategic and defence policies. On the economic front, following a general reces-

sion in trade, the debate upon Britain’s capacity to preserve its economic lead

was acquiring more pessimistic contours. The failure of efforts to arrive at some

settlement with Germany was seen as a pointer to inexorably diminishing diplo-

matic bargaining power.

When negotiations for an alliance were dropped in December 1901, neither

Britain nor Germany thought that these would not be renewed. At that time,

Russia and France were perceived as enemies while Britain did not have any plan

of war directed against Germany or the Triple Alliance. But within five years,

the diplomatic scene changed dramatically. By 1907, ententes were formed with

France and Russia while Germany emerged as the principal enemy. When this

process started, Balfour was at the helm of affairs. In July 1902, on Salisbury’s

retirement, he became Prime Minister. He was in awe of Russia’s power and was

prepared to harness all resources to defend the Indian Empire. Lansdowne

remained Foreign Minister.

Historians have tended to explain this new course in British foreign policy in

terms of the growing anxiety about the overall increase in the power of

Germany.

But, in this connection, it would be well to remember that efforts to

look for an associate, initiated in 1898, had been coincidental with the grave

consciousness of the inadequacy of resources at Britain’s disposal to defend the

Raj. Repeated efforts to sign agreements with Germany did not produce positive

results. The problem of the defence of India remained unresolved. The failure

to befriend Germany had ended the hopes of seeing Russia entangled in Europe

7 Russia: a friend

at last, 1902–7

as well as of taking recourse to the Black Sea strategy. The tenacious effort to

evolve ways of meeting Russia in superior force on the north-west frontier of

India had made British statesmen even more nervous about Russia’s designs and

left them aghast at the lack of human and material resources at their disposal to

maintain Britain’s global position. The agreements, first with Japan, then with

France and then Russia, have to be viewed as fruition of the policies initiated in

1898. These moves did not flow from any desire to create any anti-German

front. In the negotiations carried on with France, Paul Kennedy has not found

any ‘reference at all’ to any general strategy of checking the Kaiser’s weltpolitik.

The aims were to ease Britain’s global difficulties and to find some way of

remaining out of the conflict in the Far East. Germany’s attitude and activities

during this period were important only in so far as these augmented the general

sense of inadequacy of resources.

Relations with Germany

Despite the failure of efforts to sign an alliance with Germany, the British

government tried to arrange co-operation with the German government on

certain specific local issues. In December 1902, the two countries co-operated in

sending a debt-collecting expedition to Venezuela in South America.

Within a

few days, Venezuelan ships were captured and a port there was bombarded.

These actions caused resentment in the United States. But Germany rejected the

proposal to refer this affair to the Hague. Ultimately, the matter was settled when

Venezuela decided to give way to German demands. During this period there

was an outburst of Germanophobic sentiments in Britain. Hamilton summed up

the feeling of many in the Cabinet: ‘It conclusively disposes of any idea of our

being able to form or make any alliance with them for the future.’

George

Monger traces the turn in the attitude of Chamberlain from the policy of an

alliance with Germany to a policy of settlement with France and Russia from

this affair.

The British government’s decision to co-operate with Germany on the ques-

tion of the Baghdad railway produced a similar reaction. Towards the closing

years of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans had decided to resume foreign

borrowings. This set off the scramble for economic concessions and political

influence in the Ottoman Empire. Britain secured the right to build 380 miles of

tracks of the Smyrna–Aidin Railway, and Russia received a monopoly of railway

construction in the provinces of Asiatic Turkey near the Black Sea and the

Russian border. In 1902, the Deutsche Bank signed an agreement with the

Ottomans and acquired the right to construct a railway from Haidar Pasha, situ-

ated on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, to the Persian Gulf. Britain had always

been interested in this region. This railway was likely to reduce the time that the

mail took to reach India by three days and sixteen and a half hours over the

Suez route.

Both Balfour and Lansdowne were in favour of not taking a nega-

tive approach. The Foreign Office concurred. The feeling there was that despite

doing all it could to obstruct the construction of the Suez Canal, the Canal had

146 Russia: a friend at last

been constructed. So the British government decided to take part in the new

enterprise.

Coming soon after the Venezuelan fiasco, this news created a furore

in the press. Within the government, the real opposition came from those who

believed that co-operation with Germany would have adverse impact on rela-

tions with Russia.

The scheme sounded alarm bells also because it proposed to

link the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. The British government had

never allowed any foreign power to develop a stake in the region lying on the

route to India.

The efforts to co-operate with Germany, thus, did not produce positive

results. During these diplomatic confrontations, bitter and public arguments

amongst leaders of the two countries were conducted through the press, which

fanned mutual antagonism. In the economic field, Germany was, by this time,

clearly outperforming Britain. In Britain, the feeling grew that the Germans

were capturing world markets by exporting at ludicrously low prices and regu-

lating imports by protective tariffs. The years 1902–3 saw a bitter debate on tariff

policy. At the Colonial Conference, which had been held at London in 1897 to

coincide with the Queen’s jubilee, a resolution on the subject of protective tariffs

had been adopted. But at the Third Colonial Conference held five years later,

the policy of imperial preference was rejected.

In May 1903, Chamberlain

launched his attack on commercial policy based on free trade and advocated the

creation of an imperial zolleverein and imposition of tariffs upon imports from all

other countries. This movement for changes in tariff policy exacerbated distrust

between Britain and Germany. Besides, the Naval Laws of 1897 and 1900 had

not gone unnoticed in Britain. After the passing of the second Naval Law,

Custance, the Director of Naval Intelligence, argued that since the German navy

would be larger than the fleet of Russia, the strength of the British fleet would

have to be calculated against the navies of France and Germany as the two next

maritime powers.

In 1902, the British embassy at Berlin sent in a report that

the German navy was ‘professedly aimed at that of the greatest sea power –

us’.

To get support for building the navy, it was necessary for the German

government to carry on a propaganda campaign against Britain, which became

particularly virulent during the Boer War. There was considerable discussion in

German newspapers on the feasibility of a surprise attack on Britain. German

leaders frequently alluded to weltpolitik. To the British, weltpolitik seemed to

symbolise not just Germany’s desire to become a world power but its urge to

dominate. By 1902, the anxiety level had reached a stage that Selborne, who had

earlier been an advocate of an Anglo-German alliance, agreed to stay on as the

First Lord on the condition that the government decide to have an ‘adequate’

margin of battleships above the two-power standard.

Meeting Russia in superior force

When prospects of any understanding with Russia or co-operation with

Germany seemed as remote as ever, there were many who began to argue that

rather than running after any power, Britain should adopt a tough-minded

Russia: a friend at last 147

approach to the task of meeting Russia’s challenge in superior force.

At that

time, Britain’s small army was shaken by the humiliation it had faced in South

Africa. Not only was there no accepted statement of the army’s role, the army

lacked a directing agency. In 1890, the Royal Commission under Hartington had

recommended the establishment of a general staff, but no action had been

taken. The Liberals, who were in power at that time, had been disinclined to

create a body ‘who sit apart and cogitate about war’.

Towards the end of 1895

the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was established, but its role was not

defined. It was only in 1902 that the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was

formed. It became the direct link between military experts and the Cabinet, and

had the potential to influence defence as well as foreign policy decisions.

Technically, it consisted of the Prime Minister and whosoever he chose to

summon. In practice, under Balfour it was attended by the Prime Minister

himself, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the War Secretary, the India Secretary,

the Commander-in-Chief and the Director General of Military Intelligence.

In 1904, the War Office was reconstituted, and thereafter the Chief of the

General Staff and Director of Military Operations replaced the last two

members. In the same year, the CID got a secretariat; Sir George Clarke, who

had established his reputation as an efficient defence administrator, strategist and

amphibious tactician, was made its secretary. In 1905, the Foreign Secretary, the

Colonial Secretary and Lord Esher, who was known as a great imperial strate-

gist, were also made members.

What threat to British security was considered so grave as to lead to the estab-

lishment of this body? It is true that the experience of the Boer War had come

as a jolt, but by 1902 this war had been won. It has also been argued that it was

the fear of Germany that led to the setting up of the CID.

But, though a

section in the Foreign Office and the Admiralty had begun to perceive danger

from Germany by 1902, Germany was not yet viewed as a rival. W.J.

McDermott, in a very well-argued paper, has concluded that it was the threat to

the British Empire from France and Russia which led to the establishment of the

CID.

But, as Fashoda had confirmed, France by itself was not in a position to

offer any challenge to Britain. It was the combination of the two which had

become a matter of concern. The contingency that the British strategists feared

the most was a war with Russia in Central Asia in which France could obstruct

the sending of reinforcements from Britain, or a Russian invasion of India in

case of complications in Europe. Given the growing concern at the lack of

means to meet Russia in superior force in Central Asia, an empirical investiga-

tion of the actual problems involved in Indian defence and the need to

co-ordinate foreign policy with actual military power seem to have been decisive

considerations in the formation of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The Committee of Imperial Defence concentrated a greater part of its atten-

tion upon a Russian assault. Of the eighty-two meetings held during Balfour’s

tenure as Prime Minister, forty-three were devoted almost entirely to the vexed

problem of safeguarding the Indian Empire. Some seventy-five papers were

placed before the Committee on this question. The word ‘inordinate’ has often

148 Russia: a friend at last

been used to refer to the amount of time devoted to this issue.

This, in fact, is

an indication of the centrality of the concern for India on the part of Balfour

and his government. The Admiralty tended to remain aloof from the proceed-

ings of the CID.

The reason for this was that the primacy of the Admiralty’s

role or the maritime strategy was never questioned; hence it did not feel the need

to discuss this issue. Though called the Committee of Imperial Defence, the CID

was a British rather than an imperial body. It was left up to the Dominions to

decide what use they wished to make of it. In fact, they asked no questions and

sent no delegates to it, although a Canadian minister once attended a meeting

while in London on other business.

The first issue that the CID took up in its first meeting on 12 December 1902

was that of the defence of India.

In the early exchanges, the War Office and

the government of India agreed on one fundamental issue, that it was difficult to

defend India from its existing frontier. They accepted that the occupation of the

Kabul–Kandahar line offered a better opportunity to limit Russia’s freedom of

action with an attractive economy of force.

This brought the question of the

vulnerability of either end of this line to the fore. No danger was seen from the

northwest side of this line where, it was felt, the British garrisons at Chitral and

Gilgit would bar Russia’s advance. But on the southwest, Seistan in the southeast

of Persia seemed to be the area from where Kandahar could be invaded.

Early in 1904, information began to reach London that the construction of

the remaining 380 kilometres of the Orenberg–Tashkent railway was being

pushed forward with feverish haste.

It was received with anxious concern at the

War Office and the India Office. When the matter came before the CID,

Brodrick, then India Secretary, reminded the members that in July 1903 Balfour

had pledged to send 30,000 soldiers to India in case of Russia’s invasion, with

70,000 to follow.

Lord Roberts, who had been the commander-in-chief in

India and was at this time the commander-in-chief of all British forces,

demurred, stating that because of various deficiencies the War Office could

provide only 48,000 troops.

Arnold-Forster, the War Secretary, and the strong

delegation from the War Office comprising of Neville Lyttelton, Chief of

General Staff in Britain, James Grierson, the Director of Military Operations,

and C.W. Douglas, the Adjutant-General, pointed out that if 100,000 troops

went to India, ‘there will be no troops left for any other imperial purpose’.

But

the CID preferred to accept the advice from the India Office and the General

Staff and remained committed to sending 52,000 non-existent soldiers to India

in case of war with Russia.

Non-acceptance of the 100,000 figure would have

been tantamount to admitting that Britain did not have the resources to defend

its Indian Empire. Curzon had indeed said that ‘the only alternative we can see

is that Britain must remain without the means of defending the Indian

Empire’.

Subsequently, the estimates of the number of troops that Russia could deliver

on the Afghan frontier as also the military bill of the government of India

continued to increase.

During the spring of 1904 the results of the ‘Kriegspiel’

organised at Simla during the previous summer by Kitchener, the hero of Sudan

Russia: a friend at last 149

and South Africa and, since 1902, the commander-in-chief of the Indian army,

to test various invasion scenarios reached London. By November, Indian

demands for reinforcements had risen to 158,000 men.

Such was the intensity

of concern for the defence of India that Kitchener prepared a scheme for the

complete overhaul of the entire British Indian army which, he thought, was

organised ‘solely for the preservation of internal order without thought of

external aggression’.

He proposed reducing the ‘obligatory garrison’ stationed

throughout India so as to double the number of divisions available for war on

the northwest. This aim was to be accomplished in five years.

By 1904, the problem of defence of the Indian Empire had reached such

alarming proportions that the British government was called upon to lock up all

its troops in the defence of the Indian Empire, leaving even the British Isles

undefended. The consciousness of its inability to supply manpower for the

defence of India was a constant theme in the deliberations of the CID. There

seemed reason to believe that war with Russia would strip the Empire of all its

readily available forces. It was clear that Britain would have to find some means

of putting muscle into the strategy of defending India. Many in Britain began to

feel that the requisite number of troops could be made available only by imposi-

tion of some form of conscription. But the proposal was not accepted, because it

was believed that the political cost of conscription would be very high. Roberts,

the nation’s most popular soldier, became so convinced of the need for conscrip-

tion that he resigned from the CID to create opinion in the country in favour of

conscription. By 1902, many in the Conservative government tended to accept

that the only solution to their military difficulties was recourse to some form of

compulsory military service.

As they looked more closely at a possible campaign, War Office analysts

became increasingly aware of the peculiar difficulties of war in this remote

mountainous region of Central Asia. One problem was that of ferrying the

available troops to India as soon as possible because Russia’s ally, France, was

likely to hamper the transportation of troops to India. The War Office was not

ready to take the risk of delaying reinforcements. In a paper it pointed out: ‘Such

a delay as this might be fatal to our Indian Empire, it would certainly be fatal to

our prestige. Sacrifices must be made and risks must be run to avoid such a disas-

trous contingency’.

To overcome this problem, it was suggested that between

10,000 and 15,000 troops be maintained in South Africa which could be

despatched across the Arabian Sea in the event of an emergency.

The scheme

foundered on the issue of arranging funds for the purpose. The War Office even

contemplated hiring its own ships to send in convoyed troops to India and, if

necessary, enlarging its transport department to enable it to undertake this oper-

ation,

and worked out its own transport routes. Then there was the problem of

transporting troops from the railheads to the theatre of war, if and when they

became available, and of sustaining them there. One War Office memorandum

noted that only 10,000 men could sustain themselves for a year at Kabul without

external supplies.

Calculations were made regarding the number of camels

needed for the purpose and the amount of fodder needed for them. Clarke

150 Russia: a friend at last

calculated that to feed five divisions in Kabul, thirty-one days’ journey would be

needed requiring 23,479 camels excluding any allowance for animal fodder.

All

these schemes died without getting very far from committee meetings, but they

are indicative of mounting anxieties at the policy-making level.

In this situation, many interesting suggestions emanated from Calcutta as well

as London which highlight the desperation of the policy makers. Curzon

suggested that Britain should obtain a lease of the area near River Helmund in

Seistan and develop its resources through dams and an irrigation network. He

estimated that this would fetch a revenue of £330,000 a year. But he envisaged it

primarily as ‘a valuable adjunct of diplomacy’. His argument was that this would

give Britain the power of ruining Seistan at pleasure if British wishes were not

complied with or in the event of Persia siding with Russia.

But Balfour did not

accept this ‘thunderbolt’ from Curzon. He believed such a power over the

destiny of Seistan could never be exercised. ‘Would it be possible to starve the

peasants in Seistan because a corrupt government at Tehran had appointed a

Governor to whom we objected?’ he asked, and added: ‘There are some punish-

ments so severe that they never can be administered’.

In London, it was

suggested that Russia’s poverty be exploited by attacking France’s colonial

empire with the hope that if France ‘could be detached [from Russia], the finan-

cial position of Russia would make it extremely difficult for her to continue the

war alone’.

The task seemed daunting because of financial implications. After the Boer

War, the cost of serving the national debt had risen by more than 50 per cent.

C.T. Richie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer during 1902–3, warned that

unless the rate of increase in government spending was reduced, it would not be

possible to maintain politically acceptable levels of taxation. He was particularly

keen to reduce expenditure on defence.

The government remained torn

between the desire to achieve economies and to provide for the defence of

India. Under pressure from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Arnold-Foster produced a bewildering series of schemes for army

reform. The motive in each case was to reduce manpower and, thereby, costs.

Each, in turn, foundered on political objections or resistance from within the

military establishment. Proposals to eliminate the home defence militia were

vetoed in Parliament, less for sentimental reasons and more because these

seemed to leave the United Kingdom unprepared for the eventuality of inva-

sion. Suggestions were put forward for creating a two-tiered system with short

enlistment overseas, which were opposed by the General Staff as disruptive and

inefficient.

So strong was the desire to augment the armed strength and, at the

same time, to achieve economies that in January 1905 Arnold-Foster requested

that a joint committee be established to consider the proposition. ‘Given that the

country cannot afford to pay more than 25 millions a year for the Army, how

can that money best be spent upon the maintenance of a force capable of

supplying the military needs of the Empire?’

Balfour did appoint a small

committee to investigate, but nothing could be done before Balfour was forced

out of office.

Russia: a friend at last 151

Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet

While the Committee of Imperial Defence was trying to grapple with the stag-

gering problems of distance, terrain and resources, the government of India

tried to strengthen its influence in the states that lay on Russia’s route to the

empire: Afghanistan, Persia and, during this period, even Tibet. To make

Afghanistan a stronger barrier, Curzon proposed that the Amir be persuaded to

introduce railways and telegraphs in his country and define the status of the

British representative at Kabul. He warned that unless this was done, the subsidy

and passage of arms and armaments through British territories should be

denied to him.

For this purpose, the government of India wanted to send a

mission to Kabul. It required a good deal of effort on Curzon’s part to make the

Cabinet accept the proposal.

In December 1904, a mission was sent under

L.W. Dane, Secretary to the government of India in the Foreign Department.

The Amir tried to confine the negotiations to the question of repelling a Russian

attack. He argued that since he had observed all his father’s pledges, he was enti-

tled to all the privileges his father had enjoyed. He also hinted that he could get

arms and ammunition from elsewhere. By this time, the news of Russia’s defeat

in the war against Japan had reached Kabul and had generated confidence

there. The government of India was in favour of forcing the Amir to sign a

treaty on British terms, but it was ‘ordered’ by the Cabinet to accept the Amir’s

terms.

Finally, in spite of strong remonstrances from the Viceroy, Dane was

asked to sign a treaty renewing earlier arrangements. London was satisfied.

Brodrick held that it was not a bad stroke of policy to have got something which

could be taken away in the case of serious complaint.

After this mission, the

relations between the Amir and the British became, if anything, worse. The

Amir did not send all the letters he received from the Russians to the govern-

ment of India, as he had done earlier. In Persia, Russia continued to strengthen

its position despite defeat in the Far East and the revolution of 1905. There were

reports that it had acquired a shipping line in the Persian Gulf and had

appointed a consul at Bandar Abbas.

London merely watched. As Grey

explained to Spring-Rice, Britain was not really in a position to support Persia

militarily against Russian advances.

During this period, an effort was made to turn the land-locked state of Tibet

on the north of India into a buffer against any thrust by Russia from that direc-

tion. The military strength of the Tibetans themselves was, as the government of

India commented, ‘beneath contempt’.

Unlike in Afghanistan, the British here

were on a stronger geo-political terrain because Russia was separated from

Lhasa by some 1,800 kilometres of desert. Therefore, as Balfour wrote to the

King, Russia had ‘no chance of competing with us’.

During Curzon’s period,

‘rumours of a very persistent kind’ were reaching Calcutta that the Tsar had

been in contact with the Dalai Lama through a certain Dorjieff for some years.

Curzon thereupon suggested that a mission with a large military escort be sent to

Tibet with the aim of establishing direct British influence there to the exclusion

of that of Russia.

Ultimately, in the summer of 1903 a mission with a military

escort was sent under Colonel Younghusband. Historians tend to create the

152 Russia: a friend at last

impression that it was an imperious Curzon who dragged an unwilling Cabinet

into granting permission for the expedition,

but the matter was discussed at

length in a meeting of the Cabinet held on 19 February 1903. The ministers did

express their apprehensions forcefully to the effect that a ‘friendly’ mission ‘with

rifles and bayonets’ would end in the establishment of some form of protectorate

over Tibet. Yet they did not reject the proposal; after expressing their apprehen-

sions, the ministers gave approval. Ultimately, the Cabinet accepted that it would

be ‘highly inexpedient, indeed disastrous’ to permit the Russians to attain a

commanding or exclusive position at Lhasa.

Younghusband waited at

Khambajong from July to December 1903. The Tibetans did not come forward

to negotiate. He was asked to go ahead, and in August 1904 Lhasa was occupied

virtually without any opposition. The Dalai Lama fled with his entourage to

Mongolia. A treaty was signed between the governments of India and Tibet,

which provided for the occupation of a part of Tibet – the Chumbi valley – for

seventy-five years. But the government at London commanded the government

of India to revise the treaty. Even the revised treaty, however, enabled the British

to establish a British Trade Agent at Gyantse, to impose an indemnity, to occupy

the Chumbi valley for three years (or until the indemnity was paid) and to make

the Tibet government promise that it would not give concessions to any other

power.

The aggressive display of British power in Afghanistan and Tibet thus

succeeded only in convincing the Cabinet that the problem posed by Russia

could not be solved locally on Calcutta’s initiative. It once again explored the

possibility of some settlement with Russia. In the meeting held on 19 February

1903, in which sanction was given for the expedition to Tibet, the ministers also

asked Lansdowne to see whether some modus vivendi could not be arrived at

which would diminish ‘this perpetual friction in Central Asia’.

When Russia

did not give any positive response, the British government tried to put pressure

on Russia by adopting a minatory posture. It gave permission to the British

expedition, which was waiting at Khambajong to proceed to Gyantse, halfway to

Lhasa. It also decided to buy two battleships that the government of Chile

wanted to sell so as to deny them to the Russians. Lansdowne told Cromer: ‘I do

not, however, at all regret that we should have succeeded in irritating them and I

feel sure that we shall not thereby have at all diminished the prospects of an

agreement’.

These tactics did have some effect. In November 1903, Count Benckendorff,

the Russian ambassador at London, told Lansdowne that Lamsdorff wanted to

remove all sources of misunderstanding between Britain and Russia in Persia,

China and Afghanistan.

‘What had proved unattainable in 1898 and 1901

became a possibility in 1903’, comments Zara Steiner.

Lansdowne continued

the negotiations with Russia with the full backing of the Cabinet. On 1

January 1904, he circulated a draft of an agreement with Russia on various

matters duly signed by the Prime Minister. But matters could not proceed any

further, because relations between Russia and Japan had reached a breaking

point.

Russia: a friend at last 153

The Anglo-French entente

By the summer of 1903, many ministers in London began to favour an under-

standing with France. The origins of this feeling have to be traced not to the

disillusionment resulting from efforts to befriend Germany or Russia but to the

factors that led to the hunt for allies in the first place. The strategic dilemma

centring on the inadequacy of resources to defend the Indian Empire against

Russia’s expansionist moves had remained unresolved. The efforts to create a

strong anti-Russian front by befriending Germany had remained futile, while

Russia had not responded to calls to settle the points of dispute. Most ministers,

particularly the Foreign Minister and the India Minister, looked upon the settle-

ment with France as a stepping stone to a better understanding with Russia.

On Lansdowne’s attitude, Paul Kennedy aptly comments: ‘If Lansdowne was

eager to improve relations with any power in this period, then it was with Russia

– for imperial defence considerations – and not with France, which (however

useful a colonial partner) threatened to drag Britain willy-nilly into continental

power-politics’.

Hamilton, the India Secretary, was as keen for a settlement

with Russia. He wrote to Curzon in January 1903: ‘Time is on Russia’s side; the

longer we delay coming to an arrangement, the worse the settlement for us will

be’.

The desire to come to a settlement with Russia was an important reason

that made London turn to Paris.

Two Frenchmen who played the most important role in bringing France and

Britain together were M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, and Paul

Cambon, the French Ambassador at London. Both became known as

Anglophiles and both occupied their positions in 1898, the year of the Fashoda

Crisis. But the process of improvement did not begin immediately after

Fashoda. The issues of conflict between Britain and France in West Africa and

the Sudan had been settled in 1898 and 1899 respectively, but the resentments

had not dissipated even four years later. To many Frenchmen, these settlements

represented diplomatic defeats. During the Boer War, the French press had been

more vitriolic than the German. Politically, in France this period was marked by

frequent change of governments and, in the political alignments that emerged,

the colonial group occupied a decisive position. It stood to gain politically by

taking an anti-British position. At the same time French colonialists began to

dream of controlling Morocco, which was seen as the only missing link in the

French Empire stretching from equatorial Africa to Tunisia. In 1880 a treaty

had been signed under which European powers had acquired many rights in

Morocco. Delcassé decided to make efforts to obtain recognition of France’s

special interests in this region by the countries involved. In 1900 he was able to

secure Italy’s consent. In the summer of 1901 he approached Germany.

Relations between the two countries had become worse since the Fashoda Crisis,

when Germany had watched France’s discomfiture with apparent glee. At the

time of the Boer War, Kaiser William II had suggested the formation of a

Continental League against Britain, and the French government was taken

aback when the German government clarified that this would imply acceptance

by France of the permanent loss of Alsace and Lorraine. When Delcassé

154 Russia: a friend at last

opened negotiations with Germany over Morocco in June 1901, the Germans

made it clear that the price of their co-operation would be exactly the same as

before.

This was the time when the Conservative government in Britain was

under attack for co-operating with Germany in Venezuela and on the Baghdad

railway issue, and the question of defending the Indian Empire was being fever-

ishly discussed. Hence Lansdowne decided to co-operate with France. In the

spring of 1903 he admitted the possibility of accepting French preponderance

in Morocco. At that time it was not perceived as a step preliminary to an

entente, but a feeling began emerging that an improvement in relations with

France could facilitate improvement in relations with Russia. Even Cromer at

Cairo used the Russian card. Advocating an understanding with France, he

wrote to Lansdowne in early October that it ‘may prepare the ground for some

reduction in our enormous military and naval expenditure’.

The efforts to

improve relations with France were likely to get support from the other side of

the House also. The Liberals and the Radicals had always been in favour of

befriending France.

Around this time, the business community also showed keenness for

improving relations with France. In 1900 the famous banker, Sir Thomas

Barclay, arranged a visit of the British Chamber of Commerce to Paris. The

French Chamber paid a return visit. The two countries also agreed to refer the

disputes between them to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal.

In May 1903, King

Edward VII paid an official visit to Paris and President Loubet visited London in

early July. These visits did generate goodwill. Delcassé had accompanied the

President, and some preliminary discussions about an agreement did take place,

but relations between the two countries remained uncertain.

By this time it was apparent that in the Far East, Russia and Japan were

heading towards a confrontation. Russia was refusing to evacuate Manchuria

in violation of the schedule agreed upon between the two countries in April

1902.

This had made the Japanese truculent. On 27 April 1903, the

Japanese minister of marine asked Britain to reinforce its squadron in the

Pacific. On 3 July 1903, Hayashi announced that Japan would approach

Russia for a direct settlement of differences between the two countries in

Korea and Manchuria. He also invited Britain, under the terms of the Anglo-

Japanese alliance, to discuss matters of common interest placed in jeopardy by

Russia.

It was the prospect of getting involved in a war in the Far East which

provided the vital spur to negotiations between Britain and France. None of

the countries could act as a neutral. The specific terms of both the Franco-

Russian and the Anglo-Japanese alliances provided that each signatory would

remain benevolently neutral if only one country was involved, but would fight

if its partner was opposed by two or more powers. In 1902, Britain had taken

the risk with full consciousness of its consequences. At the same time, Britain

wanted to ward off the ‘appalling calamity’ of having to join the war.

soon as the prospect of war between Russia and Japan appeared on the

horizon, negotiations started. Conversations between Lansdowne and Cambon

began on 29 July and were carried on tenaciously. There was hard bargaining

Russia: a friend at last 155

on certain colonial issues. But whenever the pace of negotiations flagged, the

prospect of having to join in the war encouraged them to carry on. On 8

February 1904, Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and the Russo-

Japanese war started. Thereafter, negotiations acquired a greater momentum

and in two months’ time, on 8 April 1904, the Anglo-French entente was

concluded.

The Anglo-French entente was not an Anglo-Japanese style alliance involving

mutual assistance in time of war or any commitment for support in Europe. It

merely settled various irritating disputes in different parts of the world, in Egypt,

Morocco, West Africa, Siam, the New Hebrides and the fisheries off

Newfoundland.

The most important provisions related to Egypt and Morocco.

In Egypt, the French government agreed that it would not obstruct the action of

Britain by insisting ‘that a date should be fixed for the British evacuation or in

any other manner’. Britain also obtained a waiver of the financial restrictions.

With this, Egypt ceased to be a vulnerable point in British diplomacy. Britain

recognised French predominance in Morocco. The ‘Secret Articles’ contem-

plated the partition of Morocco between France and Spain, Spain getting the

northern coastal strip and France the vast hinterland.

Britain and the Russo-Japanese War

In the war between Japan and Russia, a defeat for Japan was universally

expected. What attitude should Britain take? This was the crucial question

before the British statesmen. Should Britain restrain Japan? Should Britain let

the two countries fight? Both these views emerged at London. What is interesting

is that both sides weighed the issue in the context of the effects of their policies

on the security of the Indian Empire.

Lansdowne abhorred the prospect of

war. He was in favour of telling the Japanese distinctly that they should accept

the best bargain they could get. He told Austen Chamberlain: ‘If we throw in

our lot with Japan that will mean war with Russia all over the world and we have

no longer to consider the local conditions in the Far East’.

It was the apprehen-

sion that an exultant Russia could strike at the British Empire whenever it

pleased through Afghanistan, and that Britain could not hit back at any point,

that lay behind the fear of getting involved.

Balfour, on the other hand, believed that Russia’s involvement in the war

would drain it of its resources and, therefore, Britain would gain by such a

combat, irrespective of whether Russia won or lost. He discussed the question at

length with Francis Knollys, the private secretary to King Edward VII, who

reported to the King:

Russia, even if successful, would be greatly weakened, she would have

created in the Far East an impregnable and un-sleeping enemy. She would

be under permanent obligation of keeping in these distant regions an army

and a fleet, which would be most burdensome to her finances. And Mr.

156 Russia: a friend at last

Balfour concludes from all this that she would be much easier to deal with,

both in Asia and in Europe, than she is at present.

Balfour also believed that even if successful, Russia could at best occupy

Korea. For various reasons other ministers and members of the CID – Selborne,

Chamberlain, Arnold-Foster, Altham and Nicholson – agreed with Balfour.

The King was inclined to support Lansdowne, but Balfour was able to convert

the King to his views.

Ultimately, despite apprehensions of getting involved in

the war, the British government did nothing to restrain Japan. Lansdowne was

advised to continue efforts in progress to conclude an agreement of a general

nature with France.

While the war was ongoing, there was no question of signing any alliance

with Japan’s enemy, Russia, but the British government did not lose sight of the

ultimate objective. It tried to do what it could, to soften relations with Russia.

The reasons have been stated succinctly by Spring-Rice:

Germany will no doubt try to persuade Russia that France has been bought

off by England and that its ally was deserting it. Germany would, of course,

offer to take the vacant place. But what we can do is to avoid justifying any

aggressive action on the part of Japan, and doing her such acts of courtesy

as prove our goodwill – so far as it does not imply a breach of faith to Japan

… The next step should be no doubt to use the French arrangement as a

stepping stone to some sort of improvement in our relations with Russia.

Britain did not respond favourably to Japan’s efforts to obtain some tangible sign

of British sympathy. It took the view that the Alliance did not apply to a war

between Japan and Russia alone.

The British government followed a policy of

restraint in its dealings with Russia even in the face of provocation.

It removed

the China Station fleet from Wei-hai-wei so as to avoid possible incidents. It

restrained the government of India from adopting a confrontationist posture at

Kabul and Lhasa. Meanwhile, on the war front, to the surprise of many, the

opening battles showed that Japan was more than a match for its Occidental

opponent.

On 22 October 1904, a close encounter of a bellicose kind took place at

Dogger Bank in the North Sea, when the Russian Baltic fleet heading for the

Far East sank some British fishing boats believing them to be disguised Japanese

torpedo boats. There was uproar in the British press and a demand for

revenge.

For the first time since Penjdeh in 1885, the British government

considered the possibility of war. It accepted the government of India’s

demand for 150,000 men, knowing that soldiers in such a number were simply

not available. The War Office hastened to inform the government of India that

it would send the reinforcements needed and made inquiries about the details

of their composition, the interval between their arrival and so on. Selborne

enjoined the First Sea Lord to prepare an Admiralty study of the naval means

of coercing Russia.

This was also the time when in India the dispute between

Russia: a friend at last 157

Kitchener and Curzon on the question of authority over expenditure on the

army had reached a most delicate stage. Balfour requested Curzon not to press

his objections to Kitchener’s scheme. The reasons he gave show his intensity of

concern:

But if no commission be appointed to consider the military organisation in

relation to the changed circumstances of India, if Kitchener thereupon

resigns and if, to crown all, we become involved in serious hostilities with

Russia, I believe that both at home and in India an impossible situation

would be created.

The world’s ‘top nation’ could not concede that it did not have the resources to

defend its empire. On his part, Delcassé strove feverishly to mediate between

London and St Petersburg. Ultimately, Britain agreed to demand only an inquiry

into the affair and punishment for those responsible for the shooting.

Japan was able to defeat Russia on sea and land. On 2 January 1905, Japan

occupied Port Arthur at a heavy cost. Defeat abroad compounded internal

unrest in Russia, which burst forth into an open revolt on 22 January 1905. In

May 1905, the Russian Baltic fleet of fourteen battleships and five armoured

cruisers was annihilated at Tsushima. Thereafter Russia sued for peace. The

Treaty of Portsmouth was signed between the two countries on 5 September

1905. During the war, Britain had not made any effort to bring the hostilities to

an early end. The editors of The British Documents on the Origins of the War devote a

section to ‘the British Contribution to the Mediation of President Roosevelt’.

This tends to give the impression that because of its special position under the

alliance, Britain played an important role in mediating between the two belliger-

ents, but this impression is erroneous. The question of ensuring the security of

India had reached such an impasse that members of the Cabinet came to agree

that their interests would be served better by continuance of the war until Russia

became too exhausted to embark upon expansionist ventures on the north-west

frontier of India.

When it became obvious that Japan was doing very well,

Brodrick wrote to Ampthill, the acting Governor-General of India, that ‘another

six or nine months may exhaust Russia to a degree which will render her

innocuous for many years to come’.

After Port Arthur fell in January, Balfour

wrote: ‘From a narrowly national point of view, the balance of advantages, I

suspect, is on the side of continued hostilities’.

On the effect of Russia’s defeat

on the security of the Indian Empire, there were two views. Clarke believed that

after the mauling Russia had taken in the Far East, Russia would not think of

following an expansionist policy. But the general feeling was that Russia would

try to retrieve its lost prestige, both internally and internationally, by some

aggressive move towards India. The government of India, Charles Hardinge at

St Petersburg and Claud MacDonald at Tokyo shared this view.

At this stage, the Conservative government decided to renew the Anglo-

Japanese alliance. This alliance was to last for five years. But Balfour took up this

question in 1905 itself, mainly for two reasons. First, a change of government was

158 Russia: a friend at last

likely and he did not want the next government to give up a policy the success of

which had been a matter of pride for his party. Second, he saw in this alliance an

opportunity to make Japan share the burden of defending the Indian Empire. A

meeting of the CID was held on 12 April 1905 at which questions relating to the

defence of India and the proposal to renew the alliance with Japan were taken up.

At the time of the Dogger Bank ‘incident’, the promise to send a reinforcement of

150,000 soldiers to India had been reiterated and the feeling had remained that

so many men could not just be spared. An appropriate amendment of the Anglo-

Japanese alliance offered a way out of this dilemma.

It had other advantages as

well. C.L. Ottley, the Director of Naval Intelligence, pointed out that provision

for troops from Japan would reinforce the Indian army ‘in as many weeks as a

numerically equal army from home would take months’.

In a note on the

‘Future Relations of Great Britain and Japan’, G.S. Clarke argued that a simple

revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was of no use to Britain. He added:

In return for the great weight of naval protection accorded to Japan, she

should undertake to supply (say) 150,000 troops for the defence of our

Indian frontier…The fact that a large Japanese contingent would be

supplied in the event of our Indian frontier being threatened would amply

suffice to put an end to Russian projects in that direction – if they exist.

The revised draft worked out by the British Cabinet provided for two major

changes. One was that the treaty was to operate in case of attack by a single

power. In other words, it was to come into operation in the case of attack by

Russia alone. Secondly, it provided for military help from Japan on the northwest

frontier of India if the security of India was imperilled in that quarter. The first

change amounted to a concession to Japan. But this concession was given as bait

to Japan to extend the scope of the alliance to India.

Not only did the Balfour government undertake strenuous efforts to make

Japan commit itself to sending a large force to India, it delayed the renewal of

the treaty until the Japanese agreed to extend its scope to cover the adjacent

regions. Balfour defined these as ‘Afghanistan, the strip of Persian territory

adjoining Afghanistan and Baluchistan, or if the last is too large, then Seistan

alone, or possibly Tibet’.

The Japanese resisted. The Japanese ambassador

pointed out that if the terms Britain wished to employ were adopted, Japan

would henceforth be obliged to organise its military forces in times of peace so as

to provide, in times of war, a suitable force for service in India.

Ultimately, the

decision was postponed. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was renewed on 12 March

1905, providing that a conference would be convened to discuss the issue of

assistance from Japan for the defence of India.

The Moroccan crisis and Anglo-French ‘conversations’

While negotiations for the Anglo-French entente were ongoing, the German

Foreign Office maintained a low profile. But it could not remain indifferent.

Russia: a friend at last 159

From the German point of view mere settlement of overseas quarrels between

the two countries was of significance for it deprived Germany of the chance of

adopting the Bismarckian device of extracting a pound of flesh for itself.

Further, mere joining together of the two Mediterranean powers was likely to

make Italy reconsider its membership of the Triple Alliance and thus it threat-

ened to break up the Alliance. But, above all, it was the fact that Lansdowne and

Delcassé had taken care to buy off other powers, but not Germany, that hurt.

This was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to snub Germany. Germany first

turned to Britain for ‘compensation’ for changes in the status of Egypt.

Bargaining continued until June 1904. Later, Germany decided to mount a

direct challenge to the Anglo-French entente on the question of Morocco.

Germany’s case was strong. It had been a party to the agreement of 1880 guar-

anteeing full commercial freedom in Morocco. In 1904–5 Germany could claim

to be defending the Open Door.

In January, France sent a deputation to Morocco to negotiate with the Sultan.

In March, Wilhemstrasse arranged a tour by Kaiser William II to Tangier, a

Moroccan port on the Atlantic. The Kaiser landed there on 31 March and

publicly proclaimed his belief in the total independence of the Sultan. The ques-

tion arose: what did Germany want? Germany did not seem to want concrete

territorial gains. German commercial interests did not ask their government to

act on their behalf.

No one within the German government pushed for a war

over Morocco. Tirpitz did not talk of war. Even Holstein, ‘the driving force

behind the whole affair’, did not want war. He perhaps wanted concessions from

France by means of a successful conference. Gradually, demands appeared in the

German press for the ‘resignation’ of Delcassé and for submitting the Moroccan

question to a conference. Delcassé was the man held chiefly responsible for

bringing about the Anglo-French accord and for frustrating German efforts to

come closer to Russia during the Russo-Japanese war. In June, Delcassé resigned.

The following month, the French government accepted the demand for a confer-

ence. The Germans had perhaps calculated that the British would be glad to get

out of the deal over Morocco and thus the Anglo-French accord would become

bereft of any significance.

Britain, at this time, was engaged in negotiating the renewal of the alliance

with Japan. Japan had already exposed the weakness of Russia’s position, and,

therefore, the entente with France seemed less necessary. During the summer of

1905, Britain tended to be concerned more about French feebleness than

German bullying. France seemed to be dragging Britain into continental power

politics. During autumn, there was very little contact between Britain and

France, but Britain watched Germany’s efforts to move closer to Russia with

anxiety. German leaders had thought that the Anglo-French accord would break

the Franco-Russian alliance. Since the summer of 1904, the Kaiser had been

making efforts to effect a Russo-German rapprochement. On 24 July 1905, the

famous meeting took place between Kaiser William II and Tsar Nicholas II at

Bjorko in the Gulf of Bothnia near Finland. There some secret assurances for an

accord were exchanged. At London, this raised the sceptre of the revival of the

160 Russia: a friend at last

Dreikaisersbund. There was a strong feeling at London that, blunted in the Far

East, Russia would try to retrieve its prestige by aggressive moves towards India.

An accord with Germany could provide Russia with just the right conditions for

this purpose. At the same time, it was likely to impede all chances of a settlement

between Britain and Russia, the Power with whom Lansdowne was most keen to

improve relations.

The international conference on Morocco was held at Algeciras in Spain in

January 1906. But before this, there was a change of government at London. In

December 1905 Balfour resigned and the Liberals formed the government under

Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Edward Grey became the Foreign Secretary. In

the elections held in January, the Liberals won a landslide victory, and this led to

significant changes in the realm of domestic and commercial policies. But, in

foreign affairs, Grey proved to be, to borrow Zara Steiner’s phrase, ‘an embodi-

ment of continuity’.

He had long experience of foreign affairs. He had been

the Parliamentary Under-Secretary during Rosebery’s government and was

acknowledged as the Liberal spokesman on foreign affairs when the Liberals

were out of office. During the election campaign itself he had made it clear that

he had no intention of changing the direction of foreign policy.

In January 1906, Cambon asked Grey about the stance Britain would take if

Germany attacked France in the course of the dispute. At London, the feeling

was that Germany was deliberately trying to break the entente and that a second

overthrow of France by Germany would be prejudicial to Britain’s interests,

especially because Germany had emerged as a powerful industrial and military

power. By this time the defeat of Russia in the Far East had generated confi-

dence in Britain, but it had also strengthened Germany’s position. In this

situation, a sub-committee of strategists was appointed to consider this question.

It reported that it would be necessary for Britain, in its own interest ‘to lend

France her active support’ should a war break out.

Grey told Delcassé that

Britain would observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality and, at the same time,

added that in such an eventuality public opinion would be strongly moved in

favour of France. He also warned the German ambassador that Britain was

likely to support France. During the Algeciras Conference, Britain gave sustained

support to France. In the settlement signed after this conference, Morocco was

formally recognised as an international problem. The Moroccan bank and

policing of ports were placed somewhat under international control. This

amounted to considerable gains for Germany, but Spain, Italy, Russia and, of

course, Britain, stood by France. The proceedings of the conference were seen as

a diplomatic disaster for Germany.

This crisis focused attention also on the nature of British strategy in the event

of a European war. In a weighty speech delivered by Balfour on 11 May 1905 in

the name of the CID, in which he dealt exhaustively with the roles of the army

and navy in any attempted invasion of England, he accepted the Blue Water

theories in an unequivocal manner. He assured the nation that, provided the

navy was efficient, ‘serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which

we need seriously to consider’.

He added that the major military problem was

Russia: a friend at last 161

that of the defence of India, and the major task of the government was the

despatch of regular army reinforcements from Britain to India. By implication,

he underlined that the army was not needed for the defence of Britain’s shores

but was intended to take the field on the northwest of the Indian Empire. The

newly constituted General Staff was not ready to confine its remodelled army to

the task of defending India which was strewn with staggering difficulties of

terrain, distance and supply of manpower. It wanted to retrieve its own and the

army’s position as an independent service arm and to break the monopoly of

India in military thinking.

100

In the summer of 1905, in view of the crisis in Morocco, a sub-committee of

the CID was asked to investigate the possibilities of offensive operations on the

continent.

101

The Admiralty thought in terms of capturing German colonies and

assigning the usual secondary role to the army for diversionary attack on the

German coast to relieve pressure on the French army. But, in the wargame

played in this connection, the General Staff envisaged violation of Belgian

neutrality by Germany and British action to defend it. General Grierson argued

that if Germany invaded Belgium, Britain and France would have to jointly

attack its flank. Even otherwise, Britain would have to support and reinforce

France for reasons of morale.

102

The prospect of standing by France and

Belgium in opposition to Germany could give the army the role it lacked. The

army staff found allies in two very influential members of the CID who had

direct access to the Cabinet, Clarke and Esher. Clarke considered efforts to plan

strategy for Indian defence futile and endorsed the War Office stance.

103

Thus,

before the Schlieffen Plan was finalised, the British General Staff was discussing

the eventuality of Britain going to war with Germany on the issue of violation of

Belgian neutrality.

104

For the moment, however, it was the reluctance of soldiers

to reinforce the army in India that was making them consider alternate strategies.

An important offshoot of the Moroccan crisis was that secret military ‘conver-

sations’ started between the General Staffs of Britain and France. The Admiralty

contemplated an amphibious strike against the German coast and the War

Office explored the possibility of despatching an expeditionary force to fight

alongside the French. A parallel series of discussions took place with Belgium.

There has been much controversy about the contents of the ‘conversations’, how

far these amounted to Machiavellian cleverness on Grey’s part and how

committed Britain became to help France in a Franco-German war. In his

defence, Grey always pointed out that these discussions had begun under

Lansdowne and he merely authorised their continuation.

105

The Anglo-Russian entente

As soon as the Treaty of Portsmouth had been signed in September, Balfour,

Lansdowne and Clarke began to feel that the time was ripe for approaching

Russia for the settlement of Central Asian quarrels. In October, ‘to put the

crown on all the French and Japanese agreements which have been so exceed-

ingly well-received’, Clarke prepared a note on the basis of agreement with

162 Russia: a friend at last

Russia.

106

Grey had made his position clear during the election campaign itself

when he had expressed himself in favour of supporting France on the Moroccan

issue, on the ground that otherwise Russia would not think it worthwhile to make

a settlement with Britain.

107

After assuming office, he let the King know that an

entente with Russia would ‘complete and strengthen the entente with France and

add very much to the comfort and strength of our position’.

108

So far, Russia had not shown any inclination to make up with Britain. It was

taken for granted at St Petersburg that any settlement with Britain would mean

accepting finite limits to expansion towards the south-east and was, therefore,

not acceptable. But after ignominious defeat and internal upheaval, Russia’s

policy makers had to take a fresh look at foreign policy. There were many who

wanted to restore the alliance of the three eastern monarchies. Tsar Nicholas

was amongst them; in fact, this was the purpose of the Bjorko meeting. It has

been argued that if the German government had agreed to support Russia in

Central Asia at Bjorko, the Anglo-Russian entente would not have been

signed.

109

Other Russian statesmen, especially Lansdorff and Witte, wanted

Russia to withdraw from the Dreikaisersbund and negotiate with Britain. They

were stung by the fact that the German press had rejoiced at their discomfiture

during the Russo-Japanese War. They were also conscious of their financial

dependence on other countries. When Russia stood by France at Algeciras, the

German government had advised its banks not to advance any loans to Russia.

With improvement in relations with Britain there could be the hope of floating a

loan on the London money market. This was the time when obstacles to the

expansion of grain export had been growing. Russia’s grain producers hoped to

find a market in Britain. The Liberals in Russia, who had become influential

after the Revolution of 1905, viewed efforts towards the establishment of Russo-

German monarchical solidarity with suspicion. They were in favour of

improving relations with Britain. Izvolsky, who succeeded Lamsdorff in 1906,

also favoured this course. He wanted Russia to take renewed interest in the

Balkans and in European affairs in general. Therefore, he wanted to come to

some settlement with Britain on the Central Asian issue.

The negotiations opened officially on 7 June 1906, but they got off the

ground only after Izvolsky paid a visit to Germany and gauged that Berlin was

not hostile to Russia’s efforts at rapprochement with Britain.

110

The process did

not turn out to be smooth. The negotiations seemed to break down more than

once. There were long periods of quiescence as well. Meanwhile, the question of

Britain’s capacity to defend the Indian Empire was studied at various levels and

the conclusions uniformly confirmed the need to settle with Russia.

When the question of obtaining reinforcements for the Indian army from

Japan was discussed further, the Japanese government showed extreme disincli-

nation to send its soldiers. It stated that the presence of Japanese troops in India

or of British troops in Manchuria, owing to differences of armament, food, race

and customs, would cause difficulty in the line of communications and in the

matter of supply.

111

The government of India expressed its own reservations

about employing additional men on the north-west because of difficulties of

Russia: a friend at last 163

transporting them to the theatre of war and of ensuring supplies. It also pointed

to the adverse effects of seeking Japan’s co-operation on the prestige of the

Raj.

112

Ultimately, at a conference held during May–June 1907, it was decided

that Britain and Japan would act in their own spheres and each would try to

create a diversion on behalf of its ally.

113

Clarke comments wryly: ‘The Japanese

have got all they wished, and we have got practically nothing’.

114

The

Dominions also refused to share Britain’s burdens. Colonial conferences were

held in 1902 and 1907. In 1907, the desirability of establishing an Imperial

General Staff was discussed, but the Dominions refused to make any definite

military commitments.

115

Towards the end of 1906, the Liberal government

appointed a committee to report on the military requirements of the empire. It

was headed by John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, and included

amongst its members Asquith, Grey and Haldane as well as the representatives

from the army and the navy. It held six meetings during January–February 1907

and came to the unwelcome conclusion that a military establishment that would

enable 100,000 men to be sent to India in the first year of war appeared to be a

military necessity.

116

This amounted to the total acceptance of Kitchener’s

proposals. But resources were simply not available. Morley put the problem in a

nutshell: ‘We have not got the men and that’s the plain truth of it’. To Minto,

Morley wrote that the deliberations of the Committee ‘showed what a tremen-

dous load of military charge and responsibility you have to carry if you won’t

come to terms diplomatically with Russia’.

117

The War Office made its own very

detailed survey of the resources of the Russian Empire. It reiterated the view

that the number of men that Russia could pour into Central Asia was practically

unlimited. The cost of fighting a successful war against Russia seemed so exorbi-

tant that the War Office came to the ominous conclusion that, ‘it will remain a

question of practical politics whether it is worth our while to retain India or

not’.

118

In short, the British government had not found any remedy for their

worst case scenario. This strengthened the resolve not to let the negotiations

lapse.

Morley had additional reasons as well for advocating a non-military solution

to the problem of defence of the empire. In June 1906 he had committed

himself to introducing ‘Liberal’ reforms in India giving some say to the Indians

in the determination of policies. The success of any such policy depended on

winning the goodwill of politically conscious Indians. Morley was conscious that

any increase in military expenditure would exacerbate nationalist feelings in

India and would hamper the success of his ‘reforms’ proposals. Only a settle-

ment with Russia at the diplomatic level could prevent the government of India,

especially Kitchener, from pressing for an increase in allocation in government of

India’s budget on armed forces.

119

The government of India under Curzon and

Minto consistently had expressed itself against negotiating with Russia. It had no

faith in the promises of the Russian government. The opposition of the govern-

ment of India made Morley’s support very valuable for Grey.

The British government wanted to create a cordon sanitaire against Russia’s

advance towards Britain’s India. Grey wrote:

164 Russia: a friend at last

The policy of the agreement is to begin an understanding with Russia,

which may gradually lead to good relations in European Questions also and

remove from her policy designs upon the Indian frontier either as an end in

themselves or as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon us to overcome

our opposition to her elsewhere. If this policy succeeds India will be relieved

from apprehension and strain.

120

So keen was the British government to call a truce in what was contemporane-

ously described as ‘the great game in Asia’ that it showed a readiness to take a

sympathetic view of the fears and susceptibilities of the Russian statesmen. The

Tsar conveyed that in view of ‘the great disasters of the war’, a treaty might be

regarded as a sign of weakness, unless that treaty contained stipulations which

were evidently advantageous to Russia.

121

Russian statesmen feared that the

whole strategic status quo in Central Asia would be altered to Russia’s great

disadvantage if Britain made Anglo-Afghan relations more intimate, undertook

to train its troops or constructed railways and roads in Afghanistan.

122

The visit

of Amir Habibullah Khan to India in January–March 1907 seemed to confirm

these suspicions. The Russian General Staff feared that the British might move

into Afghanistan and stir up the Muslims in Central Asia.

123

Izvolsky, therefore,

wanted an assurance that Afghanistan would not be transformed from a ‘buffer

state’ into an avant-garde of the Indian Empire.

124

The British government

viewed all these fears sympathetically. It also showed a readiness to recognise

Russia’s preponderance in northern Persia. Grey held that there was no way of

preventing Russia from strengthening its hold there and, therefore, it was best to

prevent Russia from establishing its hold over those parts ‘which are dangerous

to us’.

125

The negotiations were opened with Tibet, because this issue was not expected

to cause much difficulty. Even before the negotiations started, Grey and Morley

had made it clear that their aim was not to consolidate, in any way, the position

achieved for the British by colonel Younghusband. They merely wished to estab-

lish a friendly government in Tibet who would not interfere with the frontier and

with Britain’s ‘comparatively insignificant trade interests’.

126

Before the negotia-

tions started between London and St Petersburg, an Anglo-Chinese Convention

had been signed in April 1906 under which the Chinese were allowed to pay off

the Tibetan indemnity agreed under the Lhasa Convention of 1904. This

implied recognition of China’s suzerainty over Tibet. Under the Convention of

1907, Britain and Russia promised not to interfere in Tibet’s internal administra-

tion and recognised nominal sovereignty of the Chinese government over

Tibet.

127

The British government attached special importance to the settlement

on Afghanistan because, as far as the general public was concerned, this was

likely to be ‘the most noticed section’.

128

Russia accepted that Afghanistan was

outside its sphere of influence, that it would conduct political relations with

Afghanistan via Whitehall and that no Russian agents would enter the country.

On its part, the British government renounced any intention of occupying or

annexing Afghanistan or interfering in its internal affairs.

129

The Foreign Office

Russia: a friend at last 165

was satisfied, for Britain had obtained in writing from Russia what had hitherto

been only verbal assurances. As regards Persia, the Convention recognised the

independence and integrity of Persia and went on to divide the country into

three parts: Russian, British and a neutral zone between them. The two high

contracting parties engaged not to seek for themselves or encourage their

subjects or those of third powers to seek concessions of a political or commercial

nature in the sphere of the other. The British sphere covered Seistan, Charbar

and Bandar Abbas.

130

This was considered sufficient to ensure the security of

the north-west frontier of the Indian Empire because Russia had agreed to

exclude itself from Afghanistan.

To ward off any possible threat to the route to India, the government of India

wanted a Russian ‘hands off ’ declaration as regards the Persian Gulf region. But

Nicolson warned that Izvolsky would never accept this as it involved German

interests over the Baghdad railway.

131

Finally, a separate declaration was

published which formally took note that Russia did not deny British interests in

the status quo in the Gulf.

132

In May 1907, Benckendorff raised the issue of

opening the straits. After Russia had started building its Black Sea Fleet in the

1880s, it had wanted to alter the status quo so as to permit use to the navies of

only riparian powers, i.e., Turkey and itself. This issue acquired urgency after

1904 when Russia saw that it could not use its Black Sea fleet during the Russo-

Japanese War. Russia was also using the straits route increasingly for the export

of agricultural produce to Europe, which had become the major plank of the

government’s economic strategy. In times of peace, commercial use of the straits

was freely permitted, but the Russian government and the agricultural and

industrial lobbies wanted them to be opened to warships for the protection of

trade, especially as a result of increasing political instability in this region since

the 1890s. All this made it increasingly necessary for Russia’s leaders to work for

opening the straits to Russia’s fleet.

133

Britain’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean had become much stronger

after the decision to stay in Egypt. In 1903, the CID had noted that in view of

the consolidation of Britain’s position in Egypt, free Russian egress through the

straits or even Russian occupation of the Dardanelles ‘would not fundamentally

alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean’.

134

But Britain

remained reluctant to relinquish its old objections to the opening of the straits.

During the Russo-Japanese War, Britain had demonstrated its ‘benevolent

neutrality’ towards Japan by insisting on the strict enforcement of the provisions

relating to the Straits and had prevented Russia from using its Black Sea fleet. In

1907, Britain finally refused to reconsider the question of the opening of the

Straits on the ground that it would involve the consent of the Powers who were

signatories to the 1871 Convention signed at London.

Historiographically speaking, the accepted view on British foreign policy has

been that antagonism between Britain and Germany was the main theme of the

period from 1902 to 1907 and that the ententes with France and Russia

emanated from the fear of Germany. Commenting on Lansdowne’s period,

166 Russia: a friend at last

George Monger says that the most important event of his period of office was

the estrangement from Germany.

135

On negotiations with Russia during 1906–7

this period, he comments: ‘It is plain that the negotiations were dominated from

beginning to end by fear of Germany’.

136

Zara Steiner also notes: ‘The general

fear of German ambitions as well as the specific concern with a Russo-German

understanding was a constant Foreign Office pre-occupation throughout the

negotiations’.

137

On Grey, Monger says that he ‘put his fear of Germany at the

centre of this policy, related everything to it, and thought of nothing else’.

138

It is

remarkable that having argued that the most important feature of Balfour’s and

Lansdowne’s policies was estrangement from Germany, Monger comments on

discrepancy between this assessment and the tenor of his source material. On

Lansdowne, he says: ‘Lansdowne never really understood the most important

event in his office, the event for which it is now remembered – “the estrangement

with Germany”.’

139

Similarly, he says that in Balfour’s papers on the Triple

Alliance, the Russian entente and Imperial Defence there is ‘nothing to show

that he understood the growing rivalry with Germany’.

140

Such divergence

between the views of these statesmen and Monger’s conclusions about the poli-

cies pursued by them point to the need to revise those conclusions. If the papers

of Balfour and Lansdowne show that they did not understand rivalry with

Germany, then the logical conclusion has to be that rivalry with Germany was

not the main feature of this period. Their correspondence and memoranda show

constant concern with the defence of India. To substantiate the view that antag-

onism with Germany was the main motive of Grey, some of his statements are

very often quoted. One of these is that ‘an entente between Russia, France and

ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany, it

could then be done’.

141

But, in Grey’s correspondence, as Keith Wilson also

confirms, references to Germany are incidental while the desire to improve and

maintain friendly relations with Russia is the running theme.

142

In 1912 he

confirmed that ‘the fons et origo’ of the Anglo-Russian agreement was that

Russia ‘should not acquire influence or use what influence she had to disturb our

Indian frontier’.

143

In his memoirs he wrote that ‘the primary and cardinal’

object of the entente was the security of the Indian Empire.

144

The purpose of British foreign policy was to ensure the security of the British

Isles as well as to maintain Britain’s global position. Until the onset of the

‘Dreadnought Era’ in 1907, though Germany’s growing economic, military and

imperial power was watched with anxious concern, the British government did

not see any military threat to Britain’s security or its world status from Germany.

Russia was the enemy. The entente with Russia was likely to make the Indian

Empire secure. After 1907, too, the British government wanted to maintain the

ententes not only to ward off the threat to balance of power in Europe from

Germany’s policies but also to preclude the emergence of a situation in which

Britain might be called upon to cross swords with Russia. This forms the theme

of the next chapter.

Russia: a friend at last 167

Most contemporary observers tended to argue, and historians have tended to

accept, that the chief features of international relations during 1907–14 were

effervescence of Anglo-German antagonism

and the end of Anglo-Russian

rivalry.

To the factors that had exacerbated Anglo-German relations so far – the

colonial quarrels, the shift in economic power in Germany’s favour and assertion

centring on weltpolitik – was added the German decision to build dreadnoughts.

To Britons, Germany seemed to be aiming at the creation of a navy that would

be, to borrow Paul Kennedy’s graphic description, like ‘a sharp knife held

gleaming and ready only a few inches away from the jugular vein of Germany’s

most likely enemy, Britain’.

The anxiety on this score was enhanced by the fact

that Germany possessed the most efficient army as well. The rancorous feeling

against Germany was very much in evidence in the calculations of the Foreign

Office, the Admiralty, debates in Parliament, public speeches and comments in

the press. As a result, most historians have also tended to see this as the motive

force behind all diplomatic initiatives and manoeuvres during this period. In

Anglo-Russian relations, the conclusion in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian entente by

Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s government has been seen as the culmination of

efforts made by successive British governments at least since the 1880s to sign

some agreement with Russia. By implication, it is presumed that after 1907, the

British government was relieved of all anxieties centring on Russia’s aims and

policies.

An examination of Britain’s foreign policy concerns during 1907–14,

however, shows that both these impressions need to be re-examined. The British

government and the people showed a single-minded commitment to main-

taining their superiority over Germany in the naval field, and they were

successful. Britain was able to outperform Germany in the construction of

dreadnoughts. With a stronger navy and the English Channel dividing them

from Germany, the British Isles seemed immune from attack. Besides, down to

1914, the two countries carried on negotiations to settle different points of

dispute between them. In fact, during the two years preceding the outbreak of

the war, there were clear signs of optimism in Anglo-German relations.

Similarly, the signing of the Anglo-Russian entente did not automatically result

in the establishment of friendly relations with Russia. Faith in the promises of

8 Nurturing the entente,

1907–14

Russia remained minimal and the majority of ministers in the Cabinet, and

Radical politicians generally, continued to dislike association with militarist and

authoritarian Russia. But to the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office, it

seemed vital to maintain friendly relations with Russia. Hence the entente had to

be nurtured carefully.

In discussing foreign policy under Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, it is

also important to remember that many members of the Liberal Party as well as

the Cabinet were of radical persuasion. In fact, it has been said that in the

Liberal Cabinet of about twenty members, there were never more than five

ministers with the same outlook as Grey.

The rest wanted to occupy a genuinely

isolationist position and were opposed to alliances, both in principle and prac-

tice. They had welcomed the Anglo-French entente as a sign of good relations

between two Liberal countries, but they remained opposed to the entente with

Russia on grounds on which they opposed all decisions that smacked of mili-

tarism and jingoism. They were in favour of giving to Germany guarantee of the

British neutrality in the event of a continental war. They objected to conscrip-

tion because possession of a large army was expensive and was likely to

encourage the government to embark upon expansive ventures. They supported

their government’s efforts to arrive at some general diplomatic agreement with

Germany, or at least to arrive at some settlement on the naval issue. Grey contin-

ually had to look over his shoulder to appease their suspicions. They disliked the

use of the phrase ‘the Triple Entente’ for the new relationship between Britain,

France and Russia.

In order to placate them, the Foreign Office was instructed

to avoid the use of phrases like ‘cornerstone of foreign policy’ and ‘bedrock of

foreign policy’ to describe the Russian connection.

In 1908, considerable omis-

sions were made from the Blue Book on Persia so as not to publish anything

which could cause embarrassment to the Russian government.

Grey and the Foreign Office showed a readiness ‘to stake everything’ on

maintaining the entente with Russia. In 1912, Grey wrote to Hardinge, who had

become the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in 1910, ‘If it were to go

everything would be worse.’

In the correspondence of Grey, Hardinge, Nicolson

and others, one comes across such statements frequently.

Why were they so keen

to maintain the entente? It has been argued that the aim was to provide a coun-

terpoise to the power of Germany. Zara Steiner comments: ‘Grey and his

officials well appreciated the value of a “Triple Entente” to contain German

ambitions.’

It is true that any success of Germany on the continent could make

Germany a power of Napoleonic proportions. Britain had no means to meet

German power on land. It maintained only a small army of six divisions, which

Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, described as ‘fifty too few’.

Only France and Russia possessed the armed strength to meet the German chal-

lenge on land. But Britain did not have to maintain friendly relations with

France for that reason. As long as Germany occupied Alsace and Lorraine,

France was likely to join any war against Germany in any case. An important

consideration in forming the entente with France was the opportunity it provided

to develop friendly relations with Russia so that the latter would not place itself

Nurturing the entente 169

in opposition to Britain in the Near East or Central Asia. This very reason

seemed to make it imperative to maintain the ‘Triple Entente’. Throughout this

period, Britain carried on protracted negotiations with Germany. It is significant

that throughout these negotiations the British government hankered to find a

political formula that would improve relations with Germany, without being

open to misconstruction in France or Russia.

The entente had not dissipated

apprehensions regarding Russia’s capacity to reach the Indian frontier. Nicolson

put the problem succinctly: ‘She could hit us where we were powerless.’

British government could afford to overlook the fact that Britain simply did not

possess human or material resources to fight Russia in that region. After 1910, as

reports about the recovery of Russia began to circulate, fear of Russia gave place

to virtual myopia about Russia’s capacity. ‘The Great Game in Asia’ thus did not

end in 1907. Constant efforts had to be made to maintain the goodwill of

Russia. As in previous decades, the worst scenario for the British government

remained the revival of the Dreikaisersbund which, it was feared, would remove

the energies of Russia from the Balkans and would enable Russia to concentrate

on the Indian frontier. The problem was stated by Grey in a communication to

C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian in 1912: ‘if France retired, Russia would at

once do the same and we should again be faced with the old troubles about the

frontiers of India. It would also mean complete ascendancy of Germany in

Europe’.

This provides the key to Britain’s foreign policy during 1907–14.

The dreadnought issue

On 10 February 1906, Britain launched the battleship Dreadnought at Plymouth.

It was a much larger and more powerful ship than anything afloat. The

launching of this ship meant that all navies would have to start anew from point

zero.

Germany acted quickly. In November 1907, the German government

announced its intention to build dreadnoughts. In 1908, the Reich adopted a

naval programme providing for the construction of four dreadnoughts annually

from 1908 to 1911, and two annually from 1912 to 1917. With this began what

became the most celebrated arms race in history up to that time.

The German decision touched the British nation at its most sensitive point. It

created an uproar in the British press. The number of dreadnoughts became a

benchmark for naval strength. The Admiralty immediately demanded an

increase in British estimates to compensate for the new German programme. On

becoming Foreign Minister in December 1905, Grey had not viewed the

German decision to build a navy as a ‘hostile act’ against Britain.

But after the

German decision to build dreadnoughts, it became ‘the one subject of interest to

the exclusion of all other questions’.

The Liberal government resorted to a

quantitative arms race with Germany despite emphatic pledges during the elec-

tion campaign to reduce defence expenditure and devote itself to social reform,

and despite being troubled by internal problems centring on industrial unrest,

Ireland, and a little later, the constitutional crisis.

The country showed a single-minded determination to pre-empt a situation

170 Nurturing the entente

where an inferior naval power could threaten its naval mastery. Each decision by

Germany to add to its fleet was followed by a rancorous debate in Britain after

which, each time, the British government took the decision that the German

fleet should be outbuilt. In November 1907, Grey claimed that Germany was a

long way behind Britain: ‘We shall have seven Dreadnoughts afloat before they

have one, without our laying down any more. In 1910 they will have four to our

seven, but between now and then there is plenty of time to lay down new ones if

they do so.’

In early 1909, Britain had a grand total of eighteen big ships

building and projected as against thirteen by Germany. Until the coming of the

dreadnoughts, the Admiralty had based its plans on French warship plans and

had adopted the two-power standard. By 1901, naval mastery meant supremacy

over Germany. In this year it was decided that Britain must maintain a ratio of

16 : 10 with the German navy.

Neither opposition from the Radicals in the Cabinet and the Liberal Party

nor chronic complaints of shortage of funds could make Britain abandon the

policy of naval supremacy.

In 1909, R. McKenna, the First Lord of

Admiralty, wanted sanction to build six dreadnoughts. The ‘reductionists’ in the

Cabinet thought that construction of four dreadnoughts would enable Britain

to maintain a safe margin. But, when this decision was announced, there was

an uproar in the press and the country at large in favour of eight dread-

noughts, and this number were ultimately laid down. Winston Churchill

commented in his characteristic style, ‘The Admiralty had demanded six ships,

the economists offered four and we finally compromised on eight.’

In 1909,

when the government needed to raise £38 million for naval estimates alone,

Asquith feared that the proposal would lead to ‘an open rebellion’.

But

nothing of this sort happened. The country even accepted large increases in

income tax. Belief in naval superiority cut across party and class lines. In

1889–90, the year when the ‘two-power standard’ was adopted, Britain’s naval

spending represented 17.46 per cent of government revenue. In 1913–14, on

the eve of the war, it represented 26.03 per cent of government revenue. As

Keith Neilson comments, these figures demonstrate that there was no financial

barrier to maintaining the British navy as the world’s pre-eminent naval force

and that there was political willingness to see it done.

Britain was able to

maintain overwhelming superiority. The relative naval position of Britain,

Germany and France on the eve of the First World War can be gauged from

Table 8.1. As we shall see, in the autumn of 1912 and again in the summer of

Nurturing the entente 171

Table 8.1

Relative naval strength of Britain, France and Germany, 1913–14

Dreadnoughts Battlecruisers Pre-Dreadnought Battleships

Britain 24 9 40

Germany 16 6 30

France 10 0 15

Source: The table has been compiled from figures given in Neilson (1991: 705).

1914, Tirpitz drew back from the eventuality of war

and Britain’s superiority

was a powerful reason behind this decision.

The crisis in the Near East, 1908–9

The first diplomatic issue that confronted London after the signing of the Anglo-

Russian entente centred on Izvolsky’s attempt to revise the straits rules. His

hopes of opening the straits to Russian warships had been encouraged by

Britain’s attitude during the negotiations for the entente. In June 1908, King

Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II met at Reval (now Tallin). This meeting was

seen as a demonstration of friendly relations. It acquired additional significance

because Admiral Fisher, Sir John French, Sir Charles Hardinge, Stolypin, the

Russian prime minister, and Izvolsky were also present. Later, Izvolsky held that

at Reval the British gave the Russians an understanding that Britain would

support a revision of the straits rule in Russia’s favour. Historians have not found

any evidence of this in the accounts of Hardinge or of Izvolsky himself,

but

the conversations there must have encouraged Izvolsky to look for requisite

opportunity.

The very next month, in July, there was a revolt in Macedonia. This spread

rapidly and, by the end of the month it had grown into what became known as

the Young Turk movement, headed by the Committee of Union and Progress.

Sultan Abdul Hamid was forced to grant a constitution. The Liberals saw in

these events the prospect of the end of autocratic rule and the establishment of

a constitutional and progressive regime at Constantinople. In the diplomatic

world, these developments ignited old anxieties and ambitions. In London, when

the Sultan had given a railway concession in Macedonia to Russia, Hardinge

had mused: ‘the struggle between Austria and Russia in the Balkans is evidently

now beginning, and we shall not be bothered by Russia in Asia…The action of

Austria will make Russia lean on us more and more in the future. In my opinion

this will not be a bad thing.’

It was from this angle that events in the Near East

were watched by Whitehall. At St Petersburg, Izvolsky saw in these events the

opportunity to settle the straits issue by coming to some arrangement with

Austria-Hungary. He met Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, at Buchlov

in Moravia on 15 September 1908 to discuss the situation. There he showed

willingness to accept annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

provinces which Austria-Hungary had ‘occupied’ in 1878, in return for Austria’s

support in the opening of the straits to Russian warships. This arrangement

involved changes in the Treaty of Berlin and had, therefore, to be submitted to a

conference of European powers. Therefore, Izvolsky left for a tour of European

capitals to secure their assent.

Izvolsky and Aehrenthal had not signed any written agreement, and bitter

differences emerged later between the two.

However, before Izvolsky

completed the round of European capitals, on 5 October, Vienna announced

that it had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time Bulgaria

declared itself independent and Crete announced its unification with Greece.

172 Nurturing the entente

Izvolsky, then in Paris, found these developments very humiliating. There was

great indignation at Constantinople also. The ‘Young Turk’ government looked

to London for rectifying these violations of the Berlin Settlement of 1878. On 9

October, Izvolsky reached London. The British government did not know the

details of the agreement made between Izvolsky and Aehrenthal at Buchlov.

Izvolsky at this time made a new proposal. He suggested that in time of peace,

the ingress and egress of the straits should be open to the warships of the

riparian powers of the Black Sea under certain conditions.

He wanted thus to

secure an advantageous position for Russia as well as to retrieve his own position

at St Petersburg.

Soon after the Anglo-French entente, when a crisis had emerged in Anglo-

French relations on Morocco, Britain had stoutly stood by France. But this time

Britain decided not to support Russia, despite the fact that there had been

rethinking at Whitehall on the issue of passage through the straits. The Black

Sea strategy was no longer considered viable. A feeling had grown that from the

point of view of Britain’s strategic interests, closing of the straits to Russian

warships was not really crucial. Relations with Turkey were not cordial.

Hardinge testified that it was ‘already a settled principle of naval warfare with us

that in no case would our fleet enter the Straits unless Turkey was an ally’.

There was also sympathy for Russia’s aspirations. In a letter to Riffat Pasha,

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey wrote that the British government had

‘felt for some years that the international denial to Russia of all egress through

the Straits was a thing which could not be maintained forever’.

However,

despite these views, Whitehall decided not to support Russia on this issue. The

reason was, as it had always been, that such a provision would have given Russia

the advantage of an inviolable harbour and a base for quick raids in a crucial

area on the route to India without reciprocal advantage. Britain did not want the

goodwill of Russia at the cost of seeing it entrenched on the route to India.

Ultimately, Britain offered to support a modification of the straits rule on the

basis of giving reciprocal rights to all belligerents in time of war. This did not

suit St Petersburg. Thereafter, the question of the straits was not raised until

October 1911.

The crisis in the Balkans, however, dragged on for months. The government

at Constantinople was shaken by the loss of its sovereignty over Bosnia,

Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and wanted some compensation. In Serbia, the issue

created popular clamour for war. In 1903, a new dynasty had been established

there by a group of intensely nationalist officers who were determined to incor-

porate all those areas where Serbs lived into their own state. By 1908, Serbia had

emerged as the strongest state in the Balkans. Along with Montenegro, Serbia

demanded territorial compensation from Austria-Hungary and even partially

mobilized its army. The British government refused to let Russia change the

Straits Convention, but in the Balkans it extended support to Russia. At first, to

settle the Turkish dispute, the idea of an international conference was mooted.

But ultimately, bilateral talks were held and negotiations and threats of war

followed during which Grey warned the government at Constantinople that if it

Nurturing the entente 173

became involved in any war with Bulgaria, Britain would not help. Ultimately,

Turkey agreed to accept monetary compensation from Bulgaria and Austria-

Hungary. Russia decided to support Serbia’s demand for territorial

compensation. Britain also decided to stand by Serbia, though few in London

cared about the lot of ‘wretched Serbians’. Throughout this period, the prospect

of a European war loomed large on the horizon.

Austria-Hungary had decided on annexation without any consultation with

the German government. This did arouse some resentment at Berlin. But at

Wilhelmstrasse, the coming together of Britain and Russia had been watched

with anxious concern and the Reval meeting had ignited fears that Germany

was being encircled by a ring of hostile powers. In this background, Berlin

decided to stand by its only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary. This made the latter

take a stiff stand in negotiations with Serbia and Turkey. In January 1909, Berlin

gave assurances that it would stand by Austria in a preventive war if Austria so

decided, as also in the contingency of a direct military attack on Austria. This

was followed by sabre-rattling with a vengeance. On 22 March Germany issued

an ultimatum to St Petersburg demanding recognition of annexation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and threatened that war would break out

if Russia refused. Thereafter, Russia decided to abandon the Serb cause.

During this crisis, Whitehall went as far as it could to stand by St Petersburg

so as to preserve the entente. It did not support the government at

Constantinople despite the fact that the Liberals had welcomed the prospect of

the establishment of a constitutional government there. Grey warned Turkey not

to expect support from Britain in a war with Bulgaria. He admitted to Gerald

Lowther, the British ambassador at Constantinople, that it was not from blind-

ness or any light reason that Britain risked its popularity at Constantinople.

When Izvolsky asked Grey directly whether if Russia was involved in a war with

Austria and Germany, Britain would extend support, the latter refused to answer

such a hypothetical question.

But Grey knew that if there was a war as a

consequence of Germany’s support for Austria-Hungary, ‘it would be very diffi-

cult for Britain to keep out of it’.

In May 1901, he let Hardinge, at that time

ambassador at St Petersburg, say that the Russians ‘must realise that in the event

of a general conflagration in which they are associated as allies of France, it is

not likely that we shall not actively participate’.

Britain chose to be on the side

of Russia on issues that did not affect the security of the Indian Empire or the

routes thereto.

Britain and France: the Moroccan crisis

On the Moroccan issue also, Britain sought to ensure that the ententes with

France and Russia were not adversely affected. In November 1909, there had

been a quarrel between France and Germany on what became known as the

Casablanca incident. This issue was settled by arbitration. After prolonged nego-

tiations the two countries signed an agreement under which, while still professing

to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco, Germany recognised

174 Nurturing the entente

France’s special political interests in preserving peace and order while France

recognised that Germany enjoyed equality of economic opportunity. At this

time, France did not consult Britain.

Many influential circles in France

expressed themselves in favour of a general settlement with Germany, which

aroused vague apprehensions at London about the loyalty of France to the

entente. But Asquith and Grey were clear about one thing: if relations between

France and Germany deteriorated, it was not possible to ‘fold our hands and

look on’.

This was also the time when pourparlers were going on between Britain and

Germany on the question of naval programmes. As a precondition for naval

limitation, Germany insisted on a pledge of neutrality on Britain’s part in case

there was war between the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance.

Britain merely offered not to join in any unprovoked attack on Germany. On its

own part, Britain did not ever really state what it did want from Germany in

return for a reduction in the pace of Germany’s shipbuilding programme and

acknowledging Britain’s naval superiority.

However, Whitehall made it clear

that it could not enter into any political understanding with Germany which

meant separation from France and Russia. In July 1910, dilating on the difficulty

of making any political arrangement with Germany, Grey told the Cabinet:

‘France and Russia would regard any such agreement with suspicion and all the

blessings of the entente with France and Russia would go, and we might again

be on the verge of war with one or other of these Powers.’

Even before these negotiations concluded, another crisis developed in

Morocco. In May 1911, there were ‘disturbances’ in Fez, the capital of Morocco.

From the beginning, the whole question was seen as an issue between European

countries. The French government sent an expedition to establish ‘order’. Britain

was not consulted. A fortnight later, Spain also sent troops. France denounced

this action as a violation of the Algeciras Act. France waited anxiously for

Germany’s reaction. Germany looked upon the French action as a breach of the

Algeciras Act, and chose to use theatrical tactics to display its displeasure. The

German warship Panther was ordered to drop anchor at Agadir on the Atlantic

coast of Morocco, which it did on 1 July. Negotiations were opened to settle the

issue. Germany wanted to obtain ‘suitable compensation’ from France’s colonial

possessions. Gradually, Germany made it clear that it wanted France to cede

practically the whole of the Congo. This surprised the French government.

France turned to its friends. Russia did make representations at Berlin, but

only in a perfunctory way. This was the time, the summer of 1911, when Russia

was carrying on conversations with Germany at Potsdam on the Baghdad

Railway, Persia and the issues relating to Europe. It did not want this process to

end prematurely. Besides, France had also not taken much interest in Russia’s

concerns in the Balkans. At London, the Cabinet, the Foreign Office and the

strategists showed a determination to stand by France. Not only Grey and

Asquith, but also the former pro-Germans – Lloyd George, Winston Churchill

and Haldane – expressed themselves very strongly in favour of supporting

France. The strategists also displayed as much determination. This period did

Nurturing the entente 175

see a War Office–Admiralty quarrel but, as Paul Kennedy says, this was about

how to support France, not whether to support France.

The negotiations between France and Germany proceeded very slowly. The

British Cabinet resolved that Germany must not be allowed to secure a port on

the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, that sufficient support should be given to

France so as to prevent it from falling under Germany and that the Moroccan

issue should not be treated as a casus belli.

Grey, therefore, did not yield to

French pressure to define British policy. In this situation, on 21 July, Lloyd

George delivered a speech at Mansion House in which he said that Britain

demanded that it be consulted on all vital international issues. This speech was

in line with the deliberations in the Cabinet, though it was perhaps not discussed

there.

It exacerbated tension between Britain and Germany. The British

government stood by France not because of the terms of the Anglo-French

entente but because of a desire to maintain the entente. In September 1911,

Grey wrote to Goschen: ‘I daren’t press the French more about the Congo. If I

do so we may eventually get the odium in France for an unpopular concession

and the whole entente may go.’

France remained grateful for this speech at

Mansion House, which enabled France to become more assertive in negotiations

with Germany. In November, France and Germany were able to reach a settle-

ment. Germany recognised the French protectorate over Morocco and ceded to

France a small tract of Cameroon territory, while France ceded to Germany a

substantial part of Congo. With this, the second Moroccan crisis ended. But, by

this time, a political crisis was brewing in London.

As a corollary to this diplomatic support, the issue of extending military

support to France had to be taken up. On 23 August 1911, the Committee of

Imperial Defence discussed the question. Some ministers were also invited. Rival

strategies of the navy and army were taken up. The Admiralty favoured

amphibious operations while the army forwarded the plan to fight along the

French and Belgian borders. On this occasion, Henry Wilson very lucidly

presented his view on how the six or seven divisions of the British Expeditionary

Force would balance out the German army’s expected numerical preponderance

on the north-west of France.

After this, the strategy of sending the British

Expeditionary Force to the aid of France was never reversed. Wilson settled with

his French counterparts the plans for British intervention down to the last

detail.

There was such readiness to help France militarily that, in October,

when it was discovered that McKenna had not implemented instructions given

by Asquith in 1909 regarding plans for the despatch of the British Expeditionary

Force to France, he was shifted from the Admiralty and was given the Home

Office portfolio.

In the summer of 1911, Balfour, at that time the leader of the Conservative

Party, pledged support of his party to the policy of giving military aid to France

in case of attack by Germany. But within the Cabinet, this question of aid to

France created an explosion of resentment which continued for months. During

the first Morocco crisis, military ‘conversations’ had begun between the staffs of

Britain and France. These had been carried on secretly, without reference to the

176 Nurturing the entente

full Cabinet. Subsequently, these had lapsed. When these ‘conversations’ were

revived in 1911, the whole Cabinet came to know about these. This caused a

furore.

This came at a time when disenchantment with France and Russia had

been growing. Ministers expressed resentment over the fact that France had sent

an army to Fez without consulting London. Russia’s conduct in Persia was

becoming a matter of concern. At Berlin, taking advantage of the indignation in

his country, Tirpitz was planning a big increase in naval strength. In this situa-

tion, the Radical ministers insisted on the policy of opening negotiations with

Germany. In February 1912, Haldane, with whom Grey was on most intimate

terms, was sent to Berlin to gauge the feeling there. But the effort got off to a

bad start. The day before Haldane reached Berlin, the Nouvelle of 1912 was

published. It provided that three additional capital ships would be laid down,

and the number of battleships and battlecruisers in the active fleet would be

substantially increased. Haldane failed to persuade Bethmann-Hollweg, the

German Chancellor, to agree to a reduction in the naval programme. The most

Germany offered, was a reduction in the rate of increase. In return it asked

Britain to pledge benevolent neutrality if either signatory became entangled in a

war with third parties.

For Britain, the commitment to the French remained

the first priority. Grey wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, the ambassador at Berlin:

‘though we are quite prepared to satisfy them, we have no intention of attacking

them or supporting an aggressive policy against them, we must keep our hands

free to continue the relations we already have with France’.

Whitehall was at

best ready to give the assurance that Britain would not join any unprovoked

attack on Germany. This did not suit Berlin particularly because the German

General Staff had taken the decision to act on the Schlieffen Plan, and its imple-

mentation was likely to be regarded in Britain as an aggressive act. The talks

thus broke down in March. The German government not only decided to go

ahead with the new supplementary naval law but also to increase land forces in

order to ensure the numbers necessary to implement the Schlieffen Plan.

This vast increase in the German naval programme, together with the fact

that Italy and Austria decided to build new dreadnought-type ships, made the

Admiralty consider ways to protect its interests in the Mediterranean and the

North Sea without incurring additional expenditure. In this situation Winston

Churchill, who had moved to the Admiralty in October 1911, proposed that

Britain’s battleships should be moved from the Mediterranean to ‘home’ waters.

The CID discussed many alternatives.

At this stage the French offered to

protect Britain’s Mediterranean interests if London would do the same for

French interests in the Channel and southern North Sea, from where France

would withdraw its ships. The British government decided to adopt this option.

The general opinion was that an understanding with France, even at the price of

some reciprocal commitment, offered ‘the cheapest, simplest and safest

solution’.

However, some senior imperialists, navalists and Radicals expressed

misgivings.

As a result of their pressure, the government decided to adopt a

‘one power standard’ against the Austrian fleet as the basis of Britain’s strength

in the Mediterranean.

Nurturing the entente 177

In return for defending Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean, the French

wanted that there should be some agreement about joint consultation in the

event of a threat to either country. Asquith and Grey were already confronted

with virtual revolt in their party. In December 1911, about eighty Liberal MPs

had formed the Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee to check the government’s

tendency to move too close to Russia and France at the expense of a better

understanding with Germany. In view of this, there were elaborate drafting exer-

cises and, ultimately in November 1912, the exchange of Grey–Cambon notes

was effected. These provided that, in times of crises, the two countries would

automatically consult each other. Staff talks were acknowledged, though there

were inevitable references to their non-binding character and a provision that

before implementation the talks would require prior sanction of the Cabinet. It

is significant that the whole Cabinet accepted this exchange of notes, not just the

Liberal-Imperialist clique. It is also notable that the Radical MPs did not force

through a denunciation of the ententes even though the Moroccan Crisis had

produced a revanchist government in France under Poincaré. With this redistri-

bution of fleets and exchange of letters, the expectation that Britain would stand

by France increased. Outside official circles, references to the ‘inevitable’ struggle

between Britain and Germany became very frequent. Exaggerated stories about

German ‘spies’ in Britain were already circulating. The establishment used the

situation to expand the secret service, censorship and intelligence work within

Britain against a supposed foreign menace.

As far as Anglo-French relations

were concerned, Britain was committed to defending the French coastline in the

event of German attack in return for the French promise to defend the

Mediterranean.

Towards the end of 1912, Whitehall still insisted that ‘although we cannot

bind ourselves under all circumstances to go to war with France against

Germany, we shall also certainly not bind ourselves to Germany not to assist

France’.

But this was merely a theoretical statement of their position. Grey and

Nicolson had consistently opted for maintaining the ententes with France and

Russia. Churchill’s ‘holiday proposals’ confirmed this further. Twice in 1912 and

once in 1913, Churchill put forward the suggestion to the naval powers that they

join Britain in taking a holiday from building battleships. The proposals arose

largely out of political problems within Britain, where there were bitter dissen-

sions within the ruling party on the question of rising expenditure on

armaments. It also had the advantage of freezing the balance of naval power in

Britain’s favour. The proposal did generate general discussion on the subject, but

no country, except the United States, reacted favourably. In exchange for

accepting the proposal, Berlin demanded the earlier price, a pledge of British

neutrality in case Germany became involved in a general war. But in each such

suggestion, Britain had seen a desire on Germany’s part to gain hegemony in

Europe by creating estrangement between Britain and its entente partners.

France was also disinclined to accept the proposal on the ground that if

Germany curtailed its expenditure on the navy, it would divert the savings to

building its army.

This made the Foreign Office less enthusiastic. It had no

178 Nurturing the entente

wish to prise apart the whole diplomatic structure centring on the ententes.

However, the rejection of this proposal by Germany helped to create a domestic

political consensus for increased spending on armaments.

Britain and Russia: the Balkan wars

Britain had not offered any assistance to the Young Turks when Austria and

Bulgaria had violated the integrity of their state during 1908–9. After the

Bosnian crisis, too, Britain remained almost passive with regard to the disputes

and revolts in this region. The Russian government, smarting from its discomfi-

ture, decided to strengthen its position in the Near East. It tried to negotiate with

the Turks on the straits issue. Thereafter, pourparlers were carried on during

1910–11 between Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser William II at Potsdam. Sergei

Sazanov, the new Foreign Minister, was also present there. These did not yield

any specific agreement beyond tacit understanding on issues relating to Persia

and the Baghdad railway. But Britain watched these meetings nervously because

of fears centring on the resurrection of that ‘chronic condition’, the

Dreikaisersbund. This was the reason why Britain merely looked on when in

September 1911, Italy, galvanised into action by French successes in Morocco,

invaded Tripoli. In order to enlist Italy’s support against Austria, Russia wished

to stand by Italy and Britain decided to stand by Russia. Italy had its way and

annexed Tripoli the following month. This was also the reason why Grey

strongly resisted all suggestions to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance by taking

advantage of the tenuous connection of Italy with this alliance. Italy was likely

to respond favourably. Because of its long coastline, Italy’s security was depen-

dent on the goodwill of Britain and France.

Besides, under the Franco-Italian

Agreement of 1902, Italy had agreed not to join in any German attack on

France. But Grey did not make any attempt to woo Italy. He felt that Britain’s

interests would not be served by the dissolution of the Triple Alliance because

this would encourage Germany to think of reviving the Dreikaisersbund.

In 1912, the Balkan states – Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro –

signed a series of alliances and created a defensive and offensive league to extend

their territories, obviously at the expense of Ottoman possessions in the Balkans.

On 8 October, Montenegro invaded Turkey. Soon the other allies joined.

Throughout the war, the Balkan states were deluged with appeals from the Great

Powers to end hostilities, while the Ottoman government was deluged with

appeals to conciliate the people of Macedonia by making concessions. The

Balkan states quickly won a series of major victories. Within a month, every

Turkish army in Europe was defeated. Problems arose on the two extremities of

the Ottoman Empire in Europe. In the west, Serbia conquered Ottoman territo-

ries along the Adriatic coast. On the eastern side, by early November, the

Bulgarian army reached the very gates of Constantinople. All the Great Powers

watched the events in the Balkans with great interest and anxiety. Austria and

Italy were perturbed by the successes of Serbia. Berchtold, the new Austrian

Foreign Minister, became a staunch advocate of the policy of establishing an

Nurturing the entente 179

autonomous state of Albania, which the Albanians had been demanding so as to

prevent Serbia from reaching the Adriatic Sea. In Britain, the Radicals within

the Cabinet and outside watched the success of the Balkan states with apparent

delight because it seemed to symbolise the triumph of nationalism. Russia too

was elated because the Balkan League had been formed under Russia’s

patronage.

Whitehall was, however, perturbed by this development. The reason often

forwarded in this context has been that the Muslims, who looked upon the

Ottoman ruler as the Khalifa, would resent the end of the Ottoman Empire.

But important strategic considerations also entered the calculations of Britain’s

policy makers. Disappearance of the Ottomans from Constantinople was likely

to lead to the disintegration of their Asiatic Empire as well. The British govern-

ment wanted continuance of Ottoman control over its Asiatic Empire because it

acted as a dyke to check the advance of Russia towards the Red Sea and the

Persian Gulf.

Besides, the success of the Balkan states created the spectre of

war between Austria and Russia in the Near East, with the corresponding fear

that Germany might then unleash a war towards its west.

Haldane on 3

December 1912 and Grey the next day warned Lichnowsky, the German ambas-

sador in London, that under ‘no circumstances would England tolerate the

overthrow of the French’ and if Austria, Russia and France were involved in war,

‘no one could tell what further developments might follow’.

In other words, if

Germany joined in, it would have to reckon with Britain. The Director of

Military Operations began a study of the question of transportation of the

Expeditionary Force.

The implications of these warnings were not lost on the

German government. The Kaiser took Haldane’s words as ‘a moral declaration

of war’.

He immediately summoned major civil and military advisers to work

out a scheme for the invasion of Britain. At this conference, Tirpitz expressed

himself against an immediate resort to arms and demanded a postponement of

the struggle for eighteen months.

In this context, it has also been argued that

the British Cabinet was not really thinking of Germany’s attack on France. The

real fear that gripped London was that in order to avoid a war in the Near East,

Berlin might negotiate with St Petersburg on some very liberal terms and thus

resurrect the Dreikaisersbund.

This had been Britain’s nightmare because of

its connection with the security of the north-west frontier of the Indian Empire.

While giving thought to the eventuality of a great power conflict, Britain and

Germany had also talked of ways of avoiding the escalation of the Balkan wars

into a general war. On 3 December, the belligerents – the Balkan states and

Turkey – agreed to an armistice and to holding a peace conference at London.

This opened at St James’s Palace on 16 December. Grey presided over its

sessions. At its meetings, compensations were arranged for the victors while the

Great Powers worked to safeguard their interests.

Despite the mediating role

expected of him, Grey tended to give in to the wishes of Russia, as the

prolonged dispute on the issue of assigning the town of Scutari made clear. The

Great Powers had resolved that it should go to Albania but, in April 1913, it was

seized by Montenegro. The Powers decided to hold a naval demonstration.

180 Nurturing the entente

Russia implored Britain and France to take part in this, though failing to partici-

pate itself. This threat worked, and Montenegro gave way. Grey’s conduct on this

issue clearly demonstrates that whenever the concert and entente diplomacies

clashed, Grey would work to preserve the entente.

Ultimately, the Treaty of

London was signed by all the Balkan allies on 30 May 1913. It confirmed the

loss to Turkey of all its European territory except the area around

Constantinople. Greece and Serbia were the principal beneficiaries, but Bulgaria

and Montenegro also acquired some territories. A new state of Albania, which

had a Muslim majority, was created.

Within a month, war started once again amongst the victors over the division

of spoils. When Bulgaria was engaged in fighting outside Constantinople, Serbia

and Greece occupied most of Macedonia. This caused resentment at Sophia.

On 29 June 1913, without warning, Bulgaria attacked Serbian and Greek posi-

tions in Macedonia. Rumania, which had remained neutral so far, joined the war

against Bulgaria. Bulgaria was badly defeated, and even Turkey recaptured

Adrianople. On 10 August a chastened Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Bucharest

which formally confirmed the loss to Serbia of much of Macedonian territory.

At this stage Russia cast a covetous eye on Adrianople. This had never been

acceptable to Britain. Grey was unequivocal in insisting on a hands-off policy

even though it created bitterness between the two. Turkey remained in posses-

sion of Adrianople and made an offer of an alliance to Britain. The war ended

officially in August with the Treaty of Bucharest, but instability continued in this

region on issues relating to the implementation of this treaty and on account of

the conflicting ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Serbia over control of Bosnia

and Herzegovina.

The entente in Asia

In Asia, too, the British government carefully nurtured the Anglo-Russian

entente. The aim was frankly to keep Russia away from the territorial rim of

India. This made Britain willing to accommodate Russia in Europe as well. In

April 1909 Hardinge wrote, and Asquith and Grey concurred, that even a pro-

German orientation on the part of Russia in Europe need not and should not

lead to the collapse of the Anglo-Russian understanding in Asia.

But, after

1912, when Russia was seen as casting covetous eyes on Herat and extending its

influence at Lhasa and in the neutral zone in Persia, anxiety levels rose. In this

context, Ira Klein has argued that the Anglo-Russian convention failed to fulfil

the aim of halting Russia’s expansion in areas strategically crucial to the defence

of India and that in Central Asia, after 1912, it hindered rather than furthered

Britain’s quest for security.

But it would be well to remember that, while

desirous of halting the expansion of Russia, the British government remained

conscious that it did not have the human and material resources to challenge

Russia in any of these regions. Besides, while Britain watched any increase in the

power of Russia nervously, it was not willing to bring the states in India’s vicinity

into its own orbit. It was not the Anglo-Russian Convention that hindered the

Nurturing the entente 181

quest for security, it was the need to ensure the security of India without teeth

and muscle which made Britain opt for friendly relations with Russia. The

British government was forced to maintain ‘cool heads and [a] civil tongue’ also

because the Amir of Afghanistan had not given his consent to the Convention.

The government of India did not want to antagonise him. As Minto wrote: ‘The

Amir is a more dangerous neighbour to us than Russia and, therefore, in respect

to India a more necessary friend.’

The Amir could not be coerced because

experiences in this direction had been bloodily bitter. The Convention had not

thus technically come into force, and Whitehall feared that Russia could repu-

diate it on this ground alone.

Initially, Britain and Russia were able to co-operate in Afghanistan and Persia.

Izvolsky was trying to secure the revision of the Straits Convention, for which he

needed Britain’s support. In July 1908, when there was a problem on the Russo-

Afghan frontier near Herat, Russia conducted negotiations with the Afghans

through the British.

Similarly, in Persia, where Tehran saw a struggle for power

following the granting of a constitution by Shah Muzaffar-al-Din, the ambas-

sadors of the two countries were able to maintain most cordial relations. London

instructed Sir George Barclay, the British ambassador at Tehran, to co-operate

with Russia despite the embarrassment that the comments from the Radicals

caused to the government.

Both countries worked to take advantage of their

positions in their own spheres. The British and Indian governments built up

strong economic stakes by obtaining road and rail concessions and by subsidising

shipping services. In 1908, a British syndicate struck oil in the British sphere in

southern Persia. This was quickly recognised as a substantial source of fuel. The

Admiralty watched this development with relish. The British government

decided to back the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was purely British,

rather than the National Bank of Turkey, which was collaborating with British as

well as German and Dutch interests.

Russia, on its part, was strengthening its

influence in northeast Prussia along the Afghan border. This made Britain

uneasy. Britain also suspected Russia of extending its influence into the neutral

zone. The problem before the British government was complicated by the fact

that it was not willing to acquire more territory. As Grey stated: ‘The weakness of

our position in Persia is that the Russians are prepared to occupy Persia, and we

are not. We wish Persia to be a neutral buffer state, they are willing to partition

it.’

There were several reasons for this. A policy of absorption, if successful,

would have resulted in a co-terminous frontier between Britain and Russia, a

contingency never welcomed at London. The questions relating to Persia were

discussed between Grey and Sazanov at Balmoral in September 1912. There,

Grey did mention that if Russia interfered in the north, Britain would have to

introduce a British-officered force in the south.

But, given knowledge of the

constraints before Britain, Grey knew that this was an empty threat. Sazanov

suggested the construction of a trans-Persian railway network. This suggestion

caused discomfort in London as well as Delhi because this would have linked the

Russian railway network directly to the Indian railway networks, a prospect that

had never been welcomed. Thereafter, the talks were discontinued. In any case,

182 Nurturing the entente

there was the problem of finding financial resources. The government of India

had always been reluctant to contribute. Morley had sought to enlarge the basis

of support for the Raj by associating some sections of the Indian population with

the administration of the country, but Indian leaders were unhappy with this

dose of ‘liberalisation’. This made Morley reluctant to work for sustaining the

constitutional government in Persia. His argument was that it would be very easy,

and not unreasonable, for Indian politicians to ask why they should pay for the

establishment in Persia of a constitutional system strictly denied to themselves.

In Tibet also, London wanted to nurture the entente by not sanctioning any

policy that smacked of the Curzon–Brodrick line of interference.

In 1907, the

Tashi Lama had visited India.

The government of India wanted to give ‘three

or four hundred rifles’ to him as an ‘indication of friendship’. London vetoed

this proposal.

In February 1908, when the Tibetans paid the last instalment of

the indemnity, London forced Calcutta to evacuate the Chumbi valley in spite of

remonstrances from the government of India and in spite of the fact that the

trade agreement as envisaged under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 had

not been concluded.

During ‘the reformist vigour’ displayed by the Manchu

dynasty, the Chinese sent an armed expedition to Tibet and occupied Lhasa in

1909. Thereupon, the Dalai Lama had moved southwards to India and was

given shelter,

but the British government refused to interfere in Tibet. Grey

merely urged Peking to respect Tibet’s trade commitments to the British under

earlier Anglo-Chinese Conventions.

Morley told the government of India in

unambiguous terms that ‘all the business of the Dalai Lama is to be in effect

decided by the Foreign Office and the India Office here’.

The year 1911 saw the Revolution in China and the fall of the Manchu

dynasty. In the conditions of political instability this created, Russia saw an

opportunity to strengthen its position in the outlying provinces of this vast

empire. The British government was keen to maintain the entente and asked the

government of India to preserve the status quo as defined.

Tibet and Mongolia

strove to take advantage of the situation. The Dalai Lama approached both

London and St Petersburg to get recognition for the independent status of

Tibet.

The government of India wanted to take a positive stand so as to

prevent him from turning to Russia,

but London remained disinclined to inter-

vene. Soon, reports began reaching London and Delhi about Russia’s initiatives.

In October 1912, Russia signed a treaty with Mongolia in which the former

agreed to support Mongol autonomy in return for extensive privileges there.

Four months later, there were reports that Tibet and Mongolia had signed a

treaty, Article VI of which provided for ‘mutual assistance against external and

internal dangers’.

It was not clear whether the Dalai Lama had accepted this

treaty,

but it seemed clear that Russia was trying to establish its influence to the

north of India by working through Mongolia, thus overcoming the constraints

imposed by the Anglo-Russian Convention. These reports seemed more ominous

because the Amir of Afghanistan had not formally accepted the Convention of

1907. This could have prevented the British government from objecting to the

establishment of contacts between Russia and Tibet through Afghanistan.

Nurturing the entente 183

In this situation, many began to advocate a policy of establishing some influ-

ence in Tibet. These included Crewe at the India Office, J.N. Jordan at Peking

and Hardinge, the Viceroy of India.

While the government of India wanted to

acquire influence at Lhasa, it refused altogether to resort to military means.

Hardinge wrote: ‘Not only shall we have our hands full in all probability with

operations in Persia but we shall more or less be committed to the indefinitely

prolonged occupation of Tibet at immense cost without corresponding advan-

tage.’

Ultimately, it was decided that the problem should be tackled through

diplomacy. A conference was arranged at Simla to which representatives from

the concerned countries – India, Russia, China and Tibet – were invited. The

first meeting was held on 6 October 1913, and continued for more than a

month. It was chaired by A.H. McMahon who had been associated with

drawing the Indo-Tibetan boundary line. The purpose of the conference was to

decide on the status of Tibet and to exclude Russia from Tibet. The British

government proposed the creation of an autonomous outer Tibet, and an inner

Tibet in which the Chinese would have larger control. In foreign policy, Tibet

was to be restricted to relations with Britain and China only. A British commer-

cial agent was to be stationed near Lhasa.

McMahon was not able to secure the consent of either Tibet or China to

these proposals.

But the stiffest opposition came from St Petersburg. Sazanov

argued that the British were in effect proposing to establish a protectorate over

Tibet.

He ‘scoffed’ at the British explanation that the function of their agent in

Tibet would be purely commercial.

At this stage, the Russian government put

its hand on a very sensitive chord. It suggested that it would accept the proposal

to station a British agent in Tibet in return for the placement of a Russian agent

at Herat to handle recurring local problems. This suggestion created acute

resentment in London as well as Delhi. Herat had always been regarded as a

very vital point for the defence of India. There were acrimonious exchanges

between London and St Petersburg. The British government was so sensitive on

matters relating to the security of India that Sazanov was told that excessive

Russian demands would cause the Anglo-Russian accord to break down alto-

gether.

Any agreement with Russia which could not ensure the security of

India was of little use. In March 1914, Crewe asked the Governor-General of

India for his opinion and suggestions regarding policy on the suppositions that

the Anglo-Russian agreement was maintained or alternatively should be

revised.

This came in the background of a growing feeling in all European countries

that the recovery of Russia was complete in European terms. In 1913, Russia

had launched a ‘big programme’ of rearmament, which it was universally

believed, would be completed by 1917.

100

This heightened nervousness in

London. Russia was a friend, and any increase in Russia’s power should have

caused glad tidings in London. But this was not to be. The increase in the power

of Russia together with Russia’s diplomatic initiatives in Asia seemed to make

the task of defending the Indian Empire even more formidable. Many ministers,

the Foreign Office as well as diplomats in various European capitals, expressed

184 Nurturing the entente

themselves in favour of courting Russia not just as a counterpoise to Germany

but to prevent it from casting covetous eyes on the countries along the territorial

arc of the Indian Empire.

101

Nicolson went to the heart of the matter:

Russia especially could cause us extreme embarrassment, and, indeed,

danger, in the Mid-East and on our Indian frontier, and it would be most

unfortunate were we to revert to the state of things, which existed before

1904, and 1907.

102

In April 1914, Russia suggested that there should be ‘naval conversations’

between London and St Petersburg along the lines of the Anglo-French ‘conver-

sations’ of 1912. Grey was hesitant because the Radical wing of the party was

likely to raise questions. But the Cabinet sanctioned the ‘conversations’ neverthe-

less. Some preliminary discussions took place at London. Sazanov communicated

that he wanted questions relating to Persia, Tibet and naval collaborations to all

be settled by early August 1914.

103

With increasing consciousness that ‘the

corner-stone of their foreign relations’ should be Anglo-Russian friendship, that

Russia was trying to strengthen its position in Persia and Afghanistan, that

Britain did not have the means to thwart Russia’s expansion, and that Russia had

fully recovered, July 1914 was no time to adopt a policy antagonistic to Russia.

In fact, London tended to co-operate with St Petersburg even when it was

not convinced of the righteousness of Russia’s position. The Liman von Sanders

affair is a case in point. In November 1913, a German military mission headed

by General Liman von Sanders was put in command of a Turkish army corps

at Constantinople. St Petersburg, fearing further increase in German influence,

protested. The British Foreign Office did not think that Russia had a strong

case. Besides, any protest from London was likely to prove embarrassing

because an Englishman, Admiral Limpus, was already engaged in the task of

restructuring the Turkish navy. But Russia had made it a point to test the

entente, and the British did pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Russia. To

mollify the British and the Russians, it was the German government which ulti-

mately accepted a compromise under which von Sanders was ‘promoted’ to the

rank of Inspector-General of the Turkish army and became too senior to

command an army corps.

104

Commenting on the state of Anglo-German relations during the pre-First

World War period, historians have tended to argue that in European interna-

tional relations there was perpetual talk of an impending war between Britain

and Germany and that efforts made to negotiate on various issues had remained

barren.

105

But, in fact, the period just before the war was one of détente in Anglo-

German relations. Since Britain had been able to maintain its lead, the naval race

seemed to be winding down. Discussions of the issue in the press became

subdued.

106

Internally, the British government and the press were wrapped up in

the Irish crisis. In Germany, in the elections of 1912, the Social Democrats had

emerged as the largest single party and this had given a new dimension to the

issue of risking a war.

107

In the economic sphere, the two countries were excellent

Nurturing the entente 185

trading partners. Germany provided Britain’s second best economic market.

Further, the diplomacy of the two countries was influenced by fear of Russia.

They collaborated during the Balkan Wars so as to prevent Austro-Russian

confrontation. In January 1913, Grey wrote: ‘Our relations with Germany have

improved because Kiderlen worked for peace in the Balkan crisis and Jagow had

done the same.’

108

In the colonial field, the two countries had carried on negotia-

tions for the division of Portuguese colonies and had reached an agreement in

August 1913 though, for various reasons, this was not formally accepted.

109

It is

interesting that on 27 July 1914, Bethmann-Hollweg expressed readiness to sign

this Convention. The two countries were able to reach an agreement even on the

most sensitive issue of the Baghdad Railway. After 1903, some stretches of the

railway had been built.

110

Thereafter, planning stagnated for some years, but

Whitehall was convinced that the railway would be built and continued the efforts

to ensure that the railway between Basra and the Persian Gulf was not built

without Britain’s consent. After prolonged negotiations, a treaty was signed with

the Turkish government under which the latter accepted Britain’s demand and in

return Britain agreed to a 3 per cent increase in Turkish customs duties and

recognition of Turkish sovereignty over Kuwait.

111

In 1914, a treaty was signed

between Britain and Germany on this issue. It was the refusal of the Turks to

settle the matter with Germany without an improvement in the financial condi-

tions offered which prevented the implementation of the Anglo-German

agreement on the Baghdad Railway.

The assassination and its aftermath

On 28 June 1914, Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria, was assassi-

nated at Sarajevo by a Bosnian high school student, Gavrilo Princip.

112

Within

six weeks, this assassination led to an armageddon in which, over four years time,

over twenty million persons – combatants and civilians – died. Events during

these six weeks have been studied very extensively. Yet, many gaps remain.

113

Historians have not ceased to ask why this isolated act of terrorism led to the

outbreak of a world war. Why did the machinery, which had worked in the past,

fail in this instance? In the case of Britain, one has to confront even more trou-

bling questions. On 4 August the British government declared war by sending an

ultimatum to the German government. Britain was not attacked. Why did

Britain’s policy makers opt for war despite acute divisions within the ranks of the

Liberal Party? Britain turned out to be the only country where holiday crowds

expressed themselves in favour of war even before their government took the

decision to join the war.

114

Why did Britons welcome the war with such enthu-

siasm?

A brief summary of events during these six weeks is attempted here.

115

Even

contemporaries commented on the absence of mourning at Vienna, but the

Austrian government did see, in this regicide, a direct threat to its survival. It

immediately assumed that the conspiracy to murder the Archduke had been

hatched in Serbia with the connivance of its government and officials. Serbia

186 Nurturing the entente

had doubled in size during the Balkan Wars and was boldly supporting Bosnian

irrendentists. The Austrian government decided to take energetic action in order

to demonstrate its power, to weaken Pan-Slav nationalism and to eliminate the

Serbian problem once and for all. It is noteworthy that the crowned heads of

Britain and Russia and the President of France were not invited to Archduke

Ferdinand’s funeral. This could be the result of fear that they might exert a

moderating influence on Hapsburg designs with regard to Serbia.

116

At the same

time, the Austrian government was aware that Russia was likely to intervene on

behalf of Serbia and that only Germany could hold Russia back. So immedi-

ately after the Archduke’s funeral, Berchtold asked Berlin for support.

The German government decided to stand by its lone ally. It was very acutely

aware of the decline in the power of the Hapsburgs as well as of the need to

ensure the continuance of Austria-Hungary as a great power. It was never confi-

dent about Italy’s support, despite the fact that Italy almost annually issued firm

pledges of allegiance to the Triple Alliance, the last one as late as February

1914.

117

Moreover, the issue of Trieste was widening the gap between Austria

and Italy. While the Triple Alliance was never cohesive, the Triple Entente

seemed to be becoming more formidable. The efforts made by Germany to

make up with Britain had not succeeded. Reports about the Anglo-Russian

‘naval conversations’ of April 1914 had heightened anxiety levels in Berlin. The

German Chancellor saw this development as ‘the last link in the chain of

German encirclement’.

118

France was also engaged in enhancing its military

strength. In 1913, a new law had been passed extending compulsory military

service to three years. All this encouraged the feeling in Berlin that if war was to

come it was better for it to come sooner than later. The result was that the

German government responded positively to Berchtold’s plea for help. Kaiser

William II assured the Austrian government that it could count on ‘Germany’s

full support’ in the Balkans even if ‘serious European complications’ (read ‘war’)

resulted.

119

He also added that Germany fully expected war with Russia and had

made all preparations over the past few years with this in mind. While giving this

‘blank cheque’, the role of Italy was not mentioned. Nor was any attempt made,

even subsequently, to ask the Russians to stand aside in this matter.

Vienna took its own time in delivering the ultimatum because the army units

earmarked for mobilisation had already proceeded on ‘harvest leave’. It was

considered inadvisable to recall them.

120

It was on 23 July that Austria delivered

the ultimatum to the Serbian government containing a very stiff list of demands.

Amongst other things, Austria demanded that representatives of the Austro-

Hungarian government should participate in the inquiry into the origins of the

assassination plot as well as the suppression of subversive activities directed

against Austria-Hungary. The Serbs were to send their reply within forty-eight

hours. The text reached the European capitals the next day. The crucial impor-

tance of these demands was immediately recognised. Grey described the

ultimatum as ‘the most formidable document I have ever seen addressed by one

state to another that was independent’.

121

Russia was a country that had a great deal to gain in terms of military power

Nurturing the entente 187

by postponement of conflict.

122

But, for Russia, the option of peace meant

abandoning Serbia and all the gains made in the Balkans during the preceding

half of the decade, watching the consolidation of the power of Austria and

Germany in the region and facing the wrath of the Pan-Slavs in the Duma. It

decided to stand by Serbia. When the ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the

mood at St Petersburg was upbeat. The French president and the premier,

Poincaré and Viviani, were on a state visit there. It is not clear what transpired

between the political leaders, but French statesmen were very conscious of their

immediate weakness vis-à-vis the Germans, as the introduction of the controver-

sial three-year law made clear. The population of France was only 60 per cent

that of Germany and the rate of its growth was discouraging. Even after the

introduction of a three-year conscription law, in 1914 the French military

strength remained 700,000 men in peace time and 3.5 million in war, while the

corresponding figures for Germany were 800,000 and 3.8 million men.

123

The

French government was also determined to preserve the Franco-Russian alliance

of 1894 as it alone offered France security against Germany and hopes of recov-

ering Alsace and Lorraine. So, it saw no reason to urge caution to St Petersburg;

in fact, at a diplomatic reception on 21 July, before the ultimatum was delivered,

Poincaré told the Austrian ambassador to Russia not to forget that Serbia had

‘some very warm friends in the Russian people’ and that ‘Russia had an ally,

France’.

124

Serbia’s reply was delivered on 25 July, just before the expiry of the time limit.

It was conciliatory in tone, but some of the demands had been accepted with

reservations. The demand relating to the association of Austria in the inquiry

into the assassination plot was seen as unworthy of acceptance by a sovereign

state. The Serbian government had foreseen that its reply would not be

accepted, as is obvious from the fact that it ordered mobilisation three hours

before the delivery of the reply to Vienna. On 28 July Austria declared war on

Serbia and began by shelling Belgrade. Thereafter, events moved too fast for

diplomats and the initiative passed increasingly into the hands of military men

who had been trained to put a premium on rapid mobilisation.

The British government could not have remained indifferent to these develop-

ments on the continent. The Radicals in the Liberal Party had opposed the idea

of war and had kept the nation aware of the possible costs of war. But the

nation was also aware of the possible costs of staying away. On 6 July itself,

Lichnowsky, who had returned to London after a short visit to Germany, had

warned Grey that the Austrians intended to take strong measures and that

Germany would support them. Subsequently, reports began to reach London of

plans for a strong indictment of Serbia.

125

But the feeling at London generally

was that another crisis was likely in the Near East. Perhaps, flattered by the

success of efforts at mediation during the Balkan Wars, Grey began to give

thought to the possibility of collaboration between the Great Powers. It was only

after the text of the Austrian ultimatum reached London that the British govern-

ment began to show signs of anxiety.

Throughout this crisis, those who charted Britain’s foreign policy were

188 Nurturing the entente

convinced of one thing – Britain would have to stand by France and Russia. As

Zara Steiner also notes, Grey’s strategy was to work with the German govern-

ment ‘as far as might be possible’ without moving away from France and

Russia.

126

As soon as Grey sensed that Germany might not restrain Austria, as it

had done during the First Balkan War, he advised the Russian and Austrian

governments to discuss the issue between themselves. Poincaré, who was in St

Petersburg, and Sazanov suggested that the entente powers make a demonstra-

tion of entente solidarity by giving a warning to Vienna. Grey did not accept this

suggestion for fear that it would alarm the Germans. After the ultimatum was

delivered, Grey put forward the suggestion of holding a conference of the four

powers which did not have direct interest in Serbia – Britain, France, Germany

and Italy – to discuss the Serbian question.

This was the time when Britain seemed to be on the verge of a civil war on

the question of Home Rule for Ireland. The Cabinet’s attention was focused on

this issue. The Cabinet had not discussed foreign policy for a month. Grey had

discussed the matter only with Asquith, Haldane and Churchill because he did

not want to involve ‘the pacifist brigade’ of the Cabinet. It was in the Cabinet

meeting of 24 July, at the close of discussions on Ulster, that he brought up the

Serbian crisis. The Cabinet approved of the proposal for a four-power media-

tion. Thereafter the ministers, including the Foreign Minister, scattered for the

weekend. Meanwhile, the Admiralty took precautionary steps. On 17–18 July, a

grand review of the whole fleet had been held at Spithead. On 26 July, Churchill

took the decision not to demobilise the fleet which had assembled there. Grey,

who was informed in the evening, approved of the decision. They decided also

to publicise the decision. The aim was to assure the French and the Russians and

to warn the Germans.

127

Over the weekend, though the prospect of civil war in

Ireland drew closer, the attention of ministers remained riveted on Europe. It

was on 27 July that the full Cabinet devoted itself to the question of Britain

participating in the war in case France was attacked by Germany. In this

meeting, five ministers made it clear that they would resign if the government

took the decision in favour of war.

128

It seemed that divisions within the Cabinet

on this issue could lead to the fall of the Liberal government and to political

instability at a decisive moment, when Europe stood on the brink of war. The

Cabinet, however, took the decision that a ‘precautionary’ period be initiated by

despatching warning telegrams to all naval, military and colonial stations.

129

this very day, the Germans rejected Britain’s proposal for a four-power confer-

ence. On 28 July 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. With this, all prospects of

peaceful negotiations between Vienna and St Petersburg ended.

The decision to enter the war

On 29 July 1914, a meeting of the Cabinet was held to discuss the situation from

all points of view in the event of a war between the Great Powers. A prolonged

discussion was held. Ultimately, no decision was taken. John Burnes summed up

thus: ‘It was decided not to decide.’

130

The majority of the members took the

Nurturing the entente 189

view that both the French and the Germans be told that the British government

was unable to pledge itself in advance, ‘either under all conditions to stand aside

or in any condition to go in’.

131

By this time, the question of Belgian neutrality

had also come up. It was known for a long time that German war plans were

based on the movement of a German army through Belgium. The Treaty of

1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium had implied that if any guarantor

state infringed that neutrality, each of the others could claim a right, and in some

circumstances a duty, to resist that infringement.

132

During the prewar decade,

the Belgian government had kept outside the European alliance system and had

repeatedly stressed its adherence to the strictest neutrality, so much so that in July

1914 it refused to the last to ask any country for support. In the meeting of 27

July the Cabinet had postponed the question of taking a decision on this issue.

On 29 July the Cabinet decided that if the matter arose, the decision would be

one of policy rather than legal obligation. But Grey warned Lichnowsky

privately that if Germany and France became involved in war, for Britain, ‘it

would not be practicable to stand aside and wait for any length of time’.

133

On 29 July, shortly before midnight, Bethmann-Hollweg suggested to

Goschen at Berlin a neutrality agreement in which, in return for Britain’s

neutrality, he offered a guarantee of independence of the Netherlands and a

promise not to undertake ‘territorial gains at the expense of France’. Grey

refused to accept, what he described as a ‘shameful proposal’.

134

On 31 July, long

before Germany demanded the right of German troops to cross Belgian terri-

tory, Grey asked both the French and German governments whether they would

be prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as no other power

violated it. The French replied in the affirmative while the Germans remained

non-committal.

135

By this time, Russia had decided to support Serbia unequivo-

cally. On the afternoon of 30 July the Tsar had signed the ukazes announcing

general mobilisation. On 1 August Germany formally declared war on Russia.

Under the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, this meant that France was

obliged to enter the war and all European powers knew that this would result in

an immediate attack by Germany on France. Every well-informed observer knew

also that the German attack on France would involve the questions of the viola-

tion of the neutrality of Belgium and, hence, of Britain’s entry into the war.

In this situation, the decision about Britain’s attitude to the war could no

longer be postponed. This question had no relation to the size or effectiveness of

the expeditionary force. It had always been accepted that, by continental stan-

dards, the British army was ‘contemptibly small’. In fact, on 2 August, Grey

himself had said to the French ambassador that sending two or even four divi-

sions at the beginning of a war would ‘entail the maximum of risk and produce

the minimum of effect’.

136

There were no war plans for using even this force

effectively. Britain’s naval and military plans had remained ambiguous because,

until August 1914, the Cabinet had not formally decided whether, in the event of

a European war, Britain would stand by France, and if it did so, whether it

would fight purely a maritime war or commit its expeditionary force to the conti-

nent. Even in his speech of 3 August, Grey had told the Commons that there

190 Nurturing the entente

was no commitment to send an Expeditionary Force to France.

137

This had

forced the strategists to work in a vacuum. The military chiefs were anxious to

play a major role on the continent, but they did not have enough troops to do so

or even plans to raise them. The Admiralty had the plan to blockade Germany,

but had omitted to assess Germany’s vulnerability to a blockade. It was only in

March 1914 that an inter-departmental committee had been established to work

out plans to ship the expeditionary force. This Committee had presented its

report only on 30 July, and did not decide on sending troops inevitably to France

because many Cabinet ministers were opposed to it.

138

Even after Britain joined

the war, the General Staff remained unable to fix ‘the decisive place’ where the

British force would land. Debate continued as to whether it should land at

Antwerp, Amiens or Maubeuge, and over how many divisions should go.

Ultimately, the expeditionary force was sent not because it existed, but because

the entente existed and because Britain wanted it to remain.

During the last week of July, in his parleys with the French and German

ambassadors, Grey had referred repeatedly to his fears that public opinion would

not support intervention.

139

But Britain turned out to be the only country where

holiday crowds expressed themselves vociferously in favour of war even before

the government took the decision for war. Ramsay MacDonald, at that time

chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who travelled to Downing Street

on 2 August, told Morley that ‘it would be the most popular war the country had

ever fought’.

140

People not only went willingly to war, they maintained their

enthusiasm even after the terrible battles up until 1915. This was a result of what

James Joll described as ‘the mood of 1914’.

141

A recent study of depiction of

military force and ‘imagery’ employed to convey the idea of war in Edwardian

newspapers has shown that, like their counterparts on the continent, Britons

were also fed on ideas centring on ‘glorification of war’, ‘blessing of war’,

‘survival of the fittest race’ and war as a necessary antidote to ‘a world grown

old, cold and weary’. Even advertisers utilised the imagery of the redemptive

quality of war for a nation suffering from ‘fatty degeneration’.

142

War was seen

as an acceptable method of settling differences between nations and of main-

taining the country’s standing in the world. The belief in the need for empire

was widespread and the empire was seen as beneficial to decadent and lethargic

Britain. The study emphasises that it was not a minority view held by old men

and military experts. It was there in newspapers written for readers from myriad

social backgrounds.

143

However, Britain joined the war not because of public sentiments but because

Britain’s interests required the government to do so. At every stage, Britain’s

policy makers chose their options carefully. On 2 August, early in the morning,

German troops crossed into Luxemburg. In the Cabinet meeting held on this

day, questions surrounding the defence of France’s northern coast and of

Britain’s attitude in the case of violation of neutrality of Belgium were taken up.

By this time, it seemed that the Cabinet had come near to parting of ways. Grey

insisted on the government taking a decisive stand, but he did not place before

his colleagues the considerations that had convinced him of the necessity of

Nurturing the entente 191

taking the step on which he was insisting.

144

According to J.A. Pease, Grey

simply presented the Cabinet with the alternative of his resignation.

145

Asquith

informed the waverers that he would stand by Grey in any event.

146

The minis-

ters showed greater concern about the effects of their resignation on

continuation of power in the hands of the Liberal Party. Ultimately, the Cabinet

decided that ‘a substantial violation’ of Belgium’s neutrality would compel the

government to take action. By this time, the number of ‘ministerial irreconcil-

ables’ had reduced to two: John Burns, who resigned that day, and Morley, who

did so the next day.

The decision to join the war in case the neutrality of Belgium was violated

was thus reached before the intentions of the Belgian government were clear.

Without an invitation from the Belgian government, any intervention could be

interpreted not as an attempt to uphold Belgium’s status under the treaties, but

as a further infringement of its neutrality. Even at the time of the Agadir crisis,

the Committee of Imperial Defence had expressed concern about this state of

affairs.

147

Relations between Britain and Belgium had been far from cordial. The

British had been far too prominent in protesting about the Belgian Congo to be

at all popular in Belgium. In 1912, when the British government had made an

attempt to resume Anglo-Belgian staff talks, it had been rebuffed.

148

By 1914,

Belgium did not think of Britain as a reliable and disinterested protector. In

these circumstances, even if the right to intervene without an invitation could be

established, there was the danger of appearing more Belgian than the Belgians.

However, on 3 August, much to the relief of the British government, King

Albert of Belgium finally appealed to King George V for diplomatic support.

Thereafter, the whole tempo of decision making changed.

149

Having decided to take action in case Germany violated the neutrality of

Belgium, what remained to be determined were the grounds on which the deci-

sion should be advertised. It was necessary to find a way of presenting the

government’s position in an acceptable manner because people would not iden-

tify themselves with an aggressive and provocative policy. They would support

only a defensive war in national interests. On 3 August, Grey was to meet the

French ambassador. He was advised merely to ‘allude’ to unspecified British

interests. The Cabinet meeting on this day was devoted to working out the

details of Grey’s speech in the House of Commons. His speech in the afternoon

was extraordinarily effective. He appealed to the individual conscience of each

member. Carefully choosing aspects that would appeal to different listeners, he

reviewed relations with France highlighting informal, moral obligations and

referred to the question of Belgium, all in a fumbling tone.

150

He did not refer to

the interests at stake or to the entente with Russia.

On 4 August, the German army crossed into Belgium. The information

reached London at mid-day. At 2 pm, Grey, probably after consultation with

Asquith, sent an ultimatum asking the Germans to withdraw their demands on

Belgium and to respect Belgian neutrality. He also added that unless reply was

received by midnight, Britain would be obliged to take ‘all steps in their power

necessary to uphold the neutrality of Belgium’.

151

There was no German reply

192 Nurturing the entente

to the ultimatum. At 11 pm (midnight in Berlin), Churchill despatched action

telegrams to the fleet at Scapa Flow, Cromarty and Rosyth and thus declared

war against Germany. The Belgian issue enabled the government to cloak its

final decision in moral terms. It provided the waverers in the government and

Parliament with a perfect justification for their volte face. It helped to convince

their countrymen that they must join the struggle against aggressive and bullying

powers.

152

One has still to explain why Britain joined the war. Despite continuing efforts

to establish friendly relations with Germany and some success in eliminating

points of conflict in some sectors, it was clear that Britain would not join the war

on the side of Germany. At least for a decade, the government, the bureaucracy

and the press had attributed hegemonic designs to Germany and identified it as

the eventual, even inevitable, antagonist in any future war. This left Britain with

the choice of either staying out or of joining the war on the side of France and

Russia. The issue is generally seen in terms of a German victory, and not in

terms of victory for the Franco-Russian combine. It is argued that if Britain had

remained neutral and Germany had been victorious, the balance of power on

the continent would have been destroyed and Germany would have become all-

powerful in Europe. Britain could not afford to stand by and let a strong naval

and military power like Germany overrun France and establish control over the

southern coast of the Channel. Historians have tended to argue that it was for

this very reason that Britain had to stand by France and Russia. Steiner

comments: ‘War was not acceptable but it was thinkable. And it was preferable

to living beside a German-dominated continent subject to its military rule.’

153

But the issue of the consequences of Britain’s standing aloof has to be viewed in

the context of Britain’s relations with its entente partners also. Britain had to side

with them for reasons for which the ententes had been made. If Britain stayed

out, either defeat or victory for France and Russia would have spelled disaster for

Britain’s standing in the world. In the case of defeat, it was believed that Russia

would have tried to secure redress by expanding towards its southeast, towards

Britain’s Indian Empire. Even in 1905, when Russia was defeated by Japan,

British strategists had expressed such fears. In the scenario where Britain stayed

neutral and Russia was victorious, the latter was likely to do the same to take

revenge on Britain. All Europe had recognised that the empire formed the basis

of Britain’s great power status and that the Indian Empire formed Britain’s

Achilles’ heel. The entente was seen as necessary because Britain did not want to

cross swords with Russia in that region, and it was honoured in 1914 for the

same reason. Bertic had written from Paris in 1912: ‘Should Russia be dragged

into a war with Austria and Germany and should we stand aloof, the Entente

will die a natural death and no power on earth will bring it to life again.’

154

Less

than two days before Britain joined the war, Buchanan wrote from St Petersburg:

if we do not respond to the Tsar’s appeal for our support we shall, at the end

of the war, whatever be its issue, find ourselves without a friend in Europe,

while our Indian Empire will no longer be secure from attack by Russia. If

Nurturing the entente 193

we defer intervention till France is in danger of being crushed, the sacrifices

we shall then be called upon to make will be much greater.

155

If the British government did not have the option to join Germany, it did not

even have the option of staying aloof. It could not consider any alternative, the

consequence of which would be a relinquishment of control over India. This

would have been tantamount to demonstrating that Britain was no longer a great

power.

In discussing the July crisis, Grey has been depicted as a ‘fumbling’, ‘hesitant’

and ‘indecisive’ foreign minister afflicted with a sense of helplessness who ‘seems

not to have understood the full significance of Russian mobilisation’, who

encouraged Bethmann-Hollweg to gamble on his ‘ultimate neutrality’.

156

These

are extremely harsh allegations against a statesman who was extremely consis-

tent in his handling of foreign policy. On coming to office, he staked everything

on maintaining the entente with France and forming one with Russia.

Thereafter, he devoted himself to pulling the ententes through. During the nego-

tiations carried on with Germany, Grey did not entertain any suggestion that

could have adverse repercussions on Britain’s relations with its entente partners.

During 1907–14, the possibility of conflict in the Near East was envisaged often,

and each time British statesmen and diplomats came across impediments in the

way of co-operating with Russia. Yet they opted for a policy of co-operation

with Russia because they did not want to alienate Russia and France. Goschen

called this ‘a perfect beast of a problem’ for Britain and elaborated:

If Russia moves against Austria, Germany will join the latter. Then of

course France must also chip in…But, where should we be if we were to

stand aloof ? I shudder to think of it. What friends should we have left?

and…all our old anxiety, which we set at rest by our Ententes, brought to

life again. It is really rather awful to think of it.

157

In January 1914, when Sazanov warned that if England failed to support Russia

over another Balkan issue ‘there would be an end to our understanding’, Grey

wrote to Goschen that he did not think that it was worth all the fuss Sazanov was

making on this issue, ‘but as long as he does make a fuss it will be important and

very embarrassing to us: for we can’t turn our back upon Russia’.

158

In his

annual report on Russia for the year 1913, which was received in London in

March 1914, Buchanan wrote: ‘It is useless for us to blind our eyes to the fact

that, if we are to remain friends with Russia, we must be prepared to give her

our material as well as moral support in any conflict in which she becomes

involved in Europe.’

159

The summer of 1914 was no time to alienate Russia. On

issues relating to Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia, Britain had seen that, though

Russia’s reaction was curt, Britain was in no position to take a confrontationist

stance. While Britain’s resources to defend the Indian Empire had remained

inadequate, Russia seemed to be gradually becoming stronger.

In the July crisis the British government merely continued the policy it had

194 Nurturing the entente

followed all along. Throughout July, Grey did not make any effort to mediate

between Russia and Austria because comradeship between them in Europe did

not suit Britain. The day after Serbia rejected the ultimatum, Buchanan tele-

graphed from St Petersburg:

We shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support or

renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we cannot hope to maintain

that friendly co-operation with her in Asia that is of such vital importance

to us.

160

At the end of July 1914 it was accepted at the Foreign Office that an under-

standing with Russia was ‘essential to our interests as an Empire’, that Russia was

‘the one Power with whom it is our paramount duty to cultivate cordial relations’

and that Russia was ‘rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her

friendship at almost any cost’.

161

This was the reason why Asquith also told the

King on 28 July that if Britain did not support Russia, Russia would find

Britain’s friendship valueless.

162

This was the reason why Nicolson could speak

to Balfour, ‘as if it were a matter of course that we should join in at once with

France and Russia’.

163

Steiner also takes notice that Grey never intended to

abandon his friends.

164

The decision to stand by Russia and France stemmed not

only from commitments undertaken under the ententes, obligation to defend the

neutrality of Belgium, from a desire to be in less beaux yeux de Serbie and from a

desire to prevent German domination of Europe, but also from the compulsion

to be on the side of Russia for maintaining the Raj.

During the last days of peace, Grey opted not to spell out Britain’s position.

Far from being an example of ‘innocence or stupidity’,

165

Grey’s attitude was an

outcome of well-considered judgement. This stemmed from two factors. One

was that he shuddered to think of the impact of war on the economy. The

Committee of Imperial Defence had appointed a sub-committee which had

interviewed financial leaders of the City and had concluded that an Anglo-

German war would be calamitous and ruinous.

166

The second and more

immediate reason was that there was certain to be strident opposition to the

decision to join the war and more so to that of joining on the side of Russia from

the majority in the Cabinet and three-fourths of the Liberal MPs.

167

The

Conservative leadership had expressed itself in favour of co-operating in the war

effort but, for Asquith and Grey, it was the backing of their own party that was

of crucial importance. Ponsonby became particularly active in mobilising anti-

war forces, and arranged a meeting of his Foreign Affairs Group daily during the

last three days of July. Grey requested him to keep his group quiet for a week on

the assurance that he was working for peace.

168

Outside the Parliament, Radical leaders of the Liberal Party – Graham

Wallas and Norman Angell – had formed their Neutrality Committee and

Neutrality League respectively on 28 July. On 31 July the Cabinet had rejected

Churchill’s proposal that reserves be called out. Morley and Simon claimed that

their anti-war views were shared by industrial centres in the north and the

Nurturing the entente 195

banking and commercial authorities in London. Kier Hardie, chairman of the

International, issued a manifesto against war. On 1 August, Asquith reported that

the Cabinet had come ‘near to the parting of ways’.

169

With the advantage of

hindsight, it is easy to see that men were not really divided into pro-war and anti-

war camps, but at that time it seemed clear that the idea of fighting alongside

Russia would be bitterly opposed. This could be the reason why Grey, who was

convinced of the need to support Russia, avoided making any attempt to

convince his colleagues about the appropriatness of the policy that the govern-

ment wanted to adopt. In the long and very crucial Cabinet meeting of 2

August, too, to secure the consent of his colleagues, he threatened to resign, thus

making the decision to join the war a question of politics rather than of policy.

This has been described as the most striking feature of the British Cabinet’s deci-

sion for war.

170

He raised the question of commitment to defend the northern

coast of France, but not that of compulsion to co-operate with Russia. Keith

Wilson rightly comments that Grey’s silence about Russia during the last days of

peace ‘becomes silence most eloquent’.

171

In his speech in Parliament on 3 August, amongst other things, Grey said that

the country would suffer a little more if it went into war than if it stayed out.

This was not said because of anxiety about the defence of the British Isles,

which were separated from the continent by the Channel and where Britain had

been able to maintain its naval supremacy. It was Britain’s vulnerability on the

Indian frontier that must have been at the back of his mind. He also urged

Britain to stand by its entente partners. This made him a symbol of Britain’s

determination to fight the war second only to Kitchener.

172

And, in all this,

concern for empire was an important ingredient. Zara Steiner describes Britain

as ‘the weary titan’ which was ‘beginning to feel her age’. About Britain’s deci-

sion to enter the war, Steiner says:

Just as the Germans, in their eagerness to capitalise on their burgeoning

strength, followed an erratic, over-ambitious and unnecessarily aggressive

course, so the British, fearful of losing what they had, sought to tighten their

defences.

173

Empire had always been a very powerful constituent of Britons’ self-perception

as a great power. What Britain feared to lose, above all, was its empire, and the

place of India in this empire is implicit in the imagery most often used, that of

‘the jewel in the crown’. Thus the reasons why Britain entered the war in August

1914 have much to do with this determination to retain their Koh-i-noor.

196 Nurturing the entente

In this age of empire, Britain did not perceive any threat to its own security or

integrity from any country. There were only a few fleeting and groundless inva-

sion scares from France. Russia was certainly perceived as a rival throughout, but

it lacked a strong navy and was therefore not in a position to pose any threat to

Britain. Germany’s decision to build a navy did create apprehensions centring on

the security of the British Isles. But the British government and people showed

determination to maintain their superior position and were able to do so.

At the beginning of the period covered in this work Britain possessed territo-

ries and interests in every part of the globe. In Britain’s empire, the Indian

Empire was unique due to its vast scale and human and material resources. Ever

since parts of India passed under the British during the second half of the eigh-

teenth century, the issue of control over the empire in India was regarded as

non-negotiable. The British people at all levels looked upon the possession of

India as a very important constituent of the identity of their nation as a great

power. Policy makers remained conscious that India was not just a piece, or even

the king or queen, on the diplomatic chessboard and that, whatever the costs and

risks, the Raj had to be maintained. During ‘the age of high imperialism’, in

which the dominant perception was that empire was desirable, that it conferred

great benefits, in fact greatness itself, on a nation, it was taken for granted in

Britain as well as in all European countries, that loss of India would be a great

blow to Britain. On this issue, the empirical evidence is compelling. In fact, when

centrality of the Indian factor in determining Britain’s diplomatic and strategic

priorities is taken note of, it becomes easier not only to place Britain’s relations

with other European states in their proper perspective but also to understand

how Britain’s imperial designs came to be tacked on to the Near East, the

Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia.

The continuance, on the continent, of peace, status quo and balance of

power served Britain’s interests perfectly. Such a situation provided not only

security to Britain but also ensured that the British were left in unmolested enjoy-

ment of their vast and splendid possessions. They did not gain anything by being

quarrelsome. Salisbury’s oft-quoted comment, ‘whatever happens will be for the

worse and therefore it is in our interests that as little should happen as possible’

expressed this basic truism.

But, in this respect, two points have to be borne in

9 Conclusion

mind. First, Britain did not have the resources to ensure peace or status quo on

the continent. British statesmen remained conscious that ships sailing on the sea

could not stop armies on land, that they could not operate against continental

powers except under the wings of a military ally and also that they did not have

the resources to meet Russia in superior force to defend the Raj. Second, things

would not, and did not, stand still. This created problems. Russia continued to

expand towards its south-east, so much so that by 1895 the Russian Empire and

the British Empire were separated by a very narrow strip of territory which the

British very insistently and calculatingly placed under Afghan sovereignty. Other

European countries too began to acquire colonies, and since Britain owned the

biggest empire, it felt threatened everywhere. Moreover, resentment against alien

rule began to spread. This became a matter of concern for Britain in India, West

Asia, the Balkans and Africa.

It was accepted contemporaneously that the two hegemons and rivals of the

nineteenth century were Britain and Russia. To explain this rivalry contempo-

raries as well as historians have laid emphasis on ideological incompatibilities

between autocratic Russia and liberal Britain. But these were not the causes of

enmity. Britain looked upon Russia as an enemy because Russia seemed to have

the resources as well as the will to threaten the Raj and the routes thereto. In the

quest for a warm water coast, Russia’s mission had been to reach the

Mediterranean. This created, for the British, the sceptre of entrenchment of a

powerful rival on the most efficient route to the Orient, which was of particular

importance to Britain because of the desire to maintain control over India.

Simultaneously, Russia’s expansion in Central Asia was seen as a threat to the

frontiers of India. Britain keenly watched all developments in the Balkan region,

and despite professions of ‘isolationism’, became active whenever Russia tended

to acquire stronger position. Here Britain could have the support and sympathy

of many of the European powers because they had interests in questions

centring on Constantinople, the Danube region and the Mediterranean coast. In

concert with the powers, who possessed strong armies, Britain could take care of

its interests, as happened during the Near Eastern crisis of 1875–8 and the

Bulgarian crisis of 1885–7.

In Central Asia, Britain found itself helpless. The continental powers were

not generally interested in checking Russia’s expansion in this region. Britain

worked to ensure the security of its Indian Empire by keeping other European

powers, especially Russia, off not only the frontiers of India but off all states

along the territorial rim of the Indian Empire. The problem could be solved if

Britain could ensure the goodwill and co-operation of these states. But Britain’s

efforts to do so in Afghanistan and Persia did not bear fruit. Britain took seri-

ously reports of Russia’s manipulations even in Tibet, which was known as ‘the

Forbidden Land’. An expedition was duly sent there in 1903. French expansion

in the direction of India from South-East Asia also did not go unchallenged, but

France was vulnerable to Britain’s navy and hence Britain was in a position to

handle any threat from France. In Central Asia, Russia was not vulnerable to

Britain’s naval pressure. British statesmen and strategists broadly considered two

198 Conclusion

strategies to stall Russia’s advance in the direction of India. One consisted of

meeting Russia in superior force on the northwest of the Indian Empire, and the

other of cutting Russia’s underbelly by an attack through the Black Sea. But, as

seen in this book, for giving practical shape to the former strategy, Britain did

not seem to possess the human and material resources, and for adopting the

latter, Britain could not get diplomatic support from the central powers.

For these reasons, despite talk of ‘isolation’ and all admitted suspicions and

antagonisms between Britain and Russia, settlement with Russia seemed prefer-

able to the arduous policy of seeking to isolate Russia diplomatically or facing it

militarily. Britain made persistent efforts to reach accommodation with Russia.

Contemporaries worked for it and historians take note of it though, generally,

the latter stop short of explaining why an accommodation with Russia was

considered so important. Eyre Crowe, who emerged as one of the most influen-

tial officials of the Foreign Office and who claimed that he watched ‘every

single negotiation or interchange of views with Russia’, found Britain’s attitude

‘abjectly servile’. In October 1902 he wrote: ‘The number of times we have in

recent years made direct overtures ... for the purpose of having a friendly

understanding is greater than you can think possible. The answers are always

studied insults.’

In 1905 when the feeling of helplessness on the issue of

defending the Raj against Russia was at its peak, George Clarke also wrote:

‘History of our relations with Russia is an amazing one. It will have to be

written some day.’

The desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia made

the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 extremely important for Britain. Despite

active opposition from a majority of the ministers, the Liberal governments of

Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith made every effort to be accommodating to

Russia. But on issues that touched the Raj, Britain was not ready for any

compromise. Britain remained adamant on the issue of keeping the Straits

‘closed’ and remonstrated strongly when Russia made suggestions about having

an agent at Herat.

Britain’s desire to ensure its hold over the Indian Empire decisively influenced

Britain’s relations with the other European powers as well. The League of Three

Emperors of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary remained Britain’s night-

mare throughout this period. Why did Whitehall become perturbed by the

revival of the Dreikaisersbund, the Bjorko Meeting of July 1905 or the Potsdam

Conversations during 1910? Ideological suspicion of conservative monarchical

governments does not sufficiently explain the intensity of concern. One reason

for dreading bonhomie amongst these three powers was that because of geograph-

ical location, this combination had direct bearing on the security of India.

Friendship between these three powers could free Russian forces from the Polish

border. On the contrary, if relations between Russia and the central powers

remained strained, Russia would have to divide its resources and efforts between

its Western and Central Asian frontier, thus relieving Britain of much anxiety.

Similarly, Britain courted the Triple Alliance from the time it was formed in

1882. Broadly speaking, two reasons for this have been advanced. First, for

managing the affairs of Egypt, Britain needed the majority of votes on the

Conclusion 199

International Debt Commission. Since France had bitterly resented the unilat-

eral occupation of Egypt by Britain, Britain depended on the Triple Alliance for

securing a majority on this Commission. Second, Britain wanted the Alliance’s

support against Russia’s expansion in the Balkans. While these considerations

were important, the compulsion to defend the Indian Empire also entered the

calculations. For resorting to the Black Sea strategy of putting pressure on

Russia, Britain needed to send its fleet through the straits, and permission from

the Ottoman ruler was needed for this purpose. Only the friendly attitude of

Germany could make the Ottomans take a stand against Russia. In 1885, at the

time of the Penjdeh crisis, Bismarck was able to prevail upon the Ottomans not

to grant such permission. Moreover, if a fleet was sent in that direction, France

could attack it from the rear. Again, Only Germany could prevent France from

doing so. The Franco-Russian alliance was seen as the worst combination against

Britain. While French money could enable Russia to build railways in Central

Asia, thus obliterating the distance between the two empires, the French navy

could prevent Britain from sending reinforcements to India from Britain. Thus,

at no stage was it possible for Britain to isolate itself from European affairs. The

need to ensure continued control over the Indian Empire decisively influenced

Britain’s relations with all European countries.

From this study of the Indian factor in Britain’s foreign policy, some reflec-

tions might tentatively be offered on some related issues. It has already been said

that Britain stood to gain by continuation of the status quo, not only in Europe

but also globally. Britain opposed even the construction of the Suez Canal.

Whenever this status quo was threatened, Britain became active. It showed that

it had the resources, the technology, the industrial capacity and, above all, the

will to maintain its pre-eminent position. When the scramble for Africa started,

Britain not only participated but also ended up a dominant power in Africa. In

1882, Gladstone’s government occupied Egypt and defended it on the grounds

that it was necessary to ensure control over the route to the East. Subsequently,

in order to maintain control over Egypt, Britain swallowed the entire region up

to the source of the Nile, southwards from Egypt and westwards from the

eastern coast of Africa. Britain remained concerned about control over the Cape

route. In the rest of Africa too, Britain brought the most valuable parts under its

wings. To provide security to the eastern frontier of India against French

intrigues, Britain annexed Upper Burma in 1886 and worked to create a buffer

state further east in Siam. To strengthen its position on the northwest frontier of

India, Britain absorbed Baluchistan and Chitral. When Germany’s decisions to

create an empire, to build a navy, to expand in the Near East together with

Kaiser William II’s provocative references to weltpolitik, seemed to demonstrate

Germany’s desire to alter the status quo, Britain showed a determination to stay

ahead. By maintaining its naval supremacy even after the construction of the

Dreadnought, Britain demonstrated that it was not ready to accept any alteration

in the ranking of powers. In the diplomatic field, Britain, on the whole, followed

a policy of accommodation and deterrence. Britain remained fearful of the cost

and wider implications of a large-scale conflict. Yet, Britain showed a determina-

200 Conclusion

tion to defend the nation’s perceived interests. In 1914, Britain did not seriously

consider the option of staying neutral. Britain joined the war not only because it

could have resulted in German victory, and hence German predominance on the

continent, but also because Britain could not afford to antagonise Russia by

standing aloof. Either of the results – success or defeat for Russia – could have

spelled disaster for Britain’s position as a global power because, in each case,

Russia was likely to turn towards the north-west of the Indian Empire where

Britain did not have the means to defend it.

One question raised in this context is, did India distort British Foreign Policy?

M.E. Chamberlain, who raises this question in this form, concludes that Britain

was a European power and, on the whole, responded to the balance of power

considerations on the continent.

P.J. Marshall also comments: ‘The conclusion

that Britain’s political leadership has rarely been willing to allow the supposed

needs of the Empire to impose significant changes on Britain, seems

inescapable.’

In fact, many accounts of British foreign policy do not breathe a

word about the Indian Empire, and in these the question of influencing or

‘distorting’ British foreign policy does not come up. Whether India ‘distorted’ or

‘determined’ British foreign policy depends on one’s perception of the nature of

the Indian connection. But, as has been argued in this book, the total commit-

ment to retain control over India formed the unceasing assumption behind all

foreign policy decisions, at times spoken but often unspoken. Foreign policy

revolved around a strategic focus. In an age when no danger was envisaged to

the security of Great Britain and its Great Power status had to be retained,

British policy focused a great deal on guarding the Raj, the omphalos of the

empire.

It has been a matter of debate amongst historians as to whether there was

consensus across different political parties and individuals as to what Britain’s

foreign policy should be. But support for the policy of ensuring continued polit-

ical control over the Indian Empire cut across ideological, political and class

spectrums. Concern for the defence of Britain’s possessions transcended partic-

ular political interests and groups and entered the sphere reserved for matters of

national interest. It has often been argued that Parliament was concerned with

the costs of the empire rather than with any glories it might bring to the

Crown.

Parliament did want to execute its strategy of retaining Britain’s impe-

rial position on the cheap. A constant stream of cost-cutters were always a part

of Britain’s political scene. But whenever any threat was perceived to the Indian

Empire, irrespective of remoteness, triviality or irrationality, the reaction in

favour of retaining the Indian Empire was instantaneous and vociferous.

Whether it was the French effort to open a consulate in Rangoon, or defeat of

an Afghan army near the remote Afghan frontier at Penjdeh, or German plans

for a railway up to Baghdad or the visit of a Russian monk to Lhasa, any threat

to India galvanised the British government, Parliament and the nation.

Parliament and the people did not hesitate even when the price for defending

India had to be paid in monetary terms. In fact, the House of Commons tended

to give sanction for demands placed by the government so readily that often the

Conclusion 201

ministers were nonplused. To recall just a few instances, this happened in 1875

when funds were needed for the visit of the Prince of Wales to India, in 1878

during the Russo-Turkish War, in 1882 at the time of the expedition to Egypt, in

1884 for the expedition to Sudan, in 1885 in connection with the Penjdeh inci-

dent, in 1896 when a loan had to be arranged for Egypt, and in 1898 at the time

of the Fashoda crisis. So unique was India’s position within the British Empire

that even ‘the devoutest Little Englander’ – Gladstone – was ready to applaud

the government’s policies there. One reason, of course, was that India under-

wrote all administrative costs – from ensuring a splendid lifestyle for those at the

top level to paying the wages of the charwoman at the India Office.

Historians have talked of the bifurcate nature of British foreign policy, of an

inherent contradiction in demands placed upon foreign policy between those

who viewed Great Britain primarily as a European power and those driven by

the assumption of Britain as a global power. The entire argument in this book,

however, is that there was no such bifurcation. The aim of foreign policy was to

maintain the nation’s status as a great power. The relations with the European

powers and worldwide concerns were the co-joint expressions of maintaining

that status. It might almost be said that the raison d’être of Britain’s foreign policy

and strategy was to deny to the European powers the levers which might be used

to prise the imperial structure apart. Britain did not tolerate any infringement by

any European power either in the states bordering their Indian Empire or along

the lanes that linked London with Calcutta and Bombay. It is significant that as

Britain strengthened its hold over Egypt, ‘the Constantinople or Cairo’ contro-

versy started. The issue was not whether the British should try to have control

over the core or the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. The issue was, which of

the two alternatives would enable Britain to control the route to India better. In

the end, until 1914 Britain stuck to the policy of bolstering Turkey and retaining

control over Egypt. In fact, the determination to retain control over the Indian

Empire decisively influenced the choices made. When Disraeli purchased shares

of the Suez Canal, when he collaborated with Germany and Austria in 1878,

when he occupied Cyprus, when he tried to work for improvement in the condi-

tions of the Armenian Christians, when his government decided to invade

Afghanistan; when Gladstone conquered Egypt, when he sent the expedition to

Sudan, when, in 1885, he asked Parliament to grant money to fight Russia;

when Salisbury signed the Mediterranean agreements, when he exchanged

Heligoland with Zanzibar and other areas in East Africa; when Rosebery

decided ‘to be with the Triple Alliance but not of it’, when an expedition was

sent to Fashoda; when Balfour formed the Anglo-French entente, when the

Liberals formed the entente with Russia, in fact, even when Britain decided to

stand by France and Russia in 1914, an important ingredient was the uninfringe-

able will to hold on to India.

British statesmen presented their foreign policy in a warm moral and altruistic

jacket. Speeches and statements of all managers of British foreign policy are

replete with such sentiments. This is understandable. It did matter to them how

their policies were perceived by their electorates, and for this reason it was

202 Conclusion

important for them to present these in terms of moral principles. But public and

private statements made for this purpose cannot be taken as real motives. It is

interesting to note that even historians have tended to accept that Britain

managed to harmonise its policies with the general well-being and desires of

mankind. Paul Kennedy, concluding his classic work on Anglo-German antago-

nism, argues that Britain’s foreign policy did have a transcending international

ideology and that it was influenced by questions of right and wrong.

This

marching song is still played.

Shorn of national conceit, Britain’s foreign policy

was what any country’s foreign policy is supposed to be – a policy designed to

safeguard Britain’s national interests as perceived by the establishment and the

people. A study of Britain’s foreign policy shows that whatever the nuances of

public debates and political needs, British statesmen were as much guided by

considerations of realpolitik as those of other countries. It is understandable that

the establishment of their own rule over ‘non-white people’ did not trouble many

consciences at a time when most believed in the inferiority of non-whites. But

even for ‘white’ ‘oppressed’ people, Britons’ concern was very selective. They

showed considerable sympathy for the oppressed Poles and Bulgars in East

Europe and for Christians in Armenia. During the Near Eastern crisis of

1875–8, tremendous sympathy emerged for ‘persecuted’ minorities in the

Balkans and for Russia as their saviour, as unprecedented sale of Gladstone’s

pamphlet testified. But, towards the end of 1877, when a victorious Russian

army began its march towards Constantinople, old fears centring on threats to

Britain’s interests in the Near East and Middle East revived and the whole

British establishment and the public turned sharply and strongly against Russia.

At the mass level, a new xenophobic mood emerged adding a new word to

English vocabulary: ‘jingoism’. Similarly, Britain took interest in improving the

condition of Christians in Armenia and the reason was not any concern for their

plight but the calculation that a contented population would be better able to

resist Russia’s expansion in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

Was the Indian Empire valuable or expensive? Scholarly literature has yet to

resolve this central question on determinants of Britain’s presence in India. But

there is no doubt whatever that Britain’s policy makers deemed it absolutely

essential to maintain their hold over the Indian Empire, whatever the risks. Even

the nation at large showed irresistible fascination for India and endorsed govern-

ment policies. British and American historians continue to reinforce the Liberal

view that the possession of empire was irrational, that empire was ‘an expensive

and deleterious affair’, that it was ‘a waste of money’.

But the British not only

shouldered the bill in monetary terms, but also readily bore all non-economic

burdens. This study highlights that the foreign policy choices made by the policy

makers were decisively influenced by the fact that they were determined to main-

tain the Raj. If far-flung and far-fetched precautions were taken by successive

British governments for continued control over ‘the jewel in the crown’, then the

valuation of the jewel must have been very high. It would be illusory to think

that humanitarianism, personal ambition, missionary zeal or desire for prestige

made successive British governments take such far-reaching precautions to

Conclusion 203

ensure control over India. However much in the background and ill-explored,

power politics had an economic dimension.

It is said that there was music in

the phrase ‘the Indian Empire’. Some of the notes must have been economic

ones.

In diplomatic history, the battle between Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik has raged

for decades. British historians have tended to insist that British diplomacy was

relatively free of domestic constraints and, that, while Innenpolitik might have

accounted for much of Germany’s policies, it accounted for far less of Britain’s.

Zara Steiner, in one of the most influential studies of the period, states emphati-

cally and unequivocally: ‘This whole argument presupposes the primat der

Aussenpolitik in any understanding of British diplomacy.’

Here it has been

argued that the commitment to retain their Koh-i-noor was an important determi-

nant of British foreign policy. If the need to maintain this empire was felt for

economic benefits, for prestige, for maintaining the imperial system or for any

such reason, the relevance of domestic considerations cannot be summarily

negated. In fact, commenting on Britain’s decision to enter the war, Steiner says:

‘the British, fearful of losing what they had, sought to tighten their defences’.

The most concrete manifestation of what Britain had was its empire and in

trying to maintain the empire, Britain was responding at least partially to

domestic compulsions.

Britain’s foreign policy, thus, cannot be situated on a map of Europe. Britain’s

status as a pre-eminent global power and the determination of policy makers

and the nation to maintain that position decisively influenced Britain’s relations

with other European countries. Visible or not, the security of India was a

powerful constituent of their worldview and power. The pattern of relations with

other countries and the diplomatic and military strategies adopted during the

period highlight the importance of the Indian Empire. So, any account of

British foreign policy which does not focus on concerns centring on the Indian

Empire cannot claim to be comprehensive.

204 Conclusion

British Prime Ministers

Gladstone December 1868–February 1874

Disraeli February 1874–April 1880

Gladstone April 1880–June 1885

Salisbury June 1885–January 1886

Gladstone February 1886–July 1886

Salisbury July 1886–August 1892

Gladstone August 1892–March 1894

Rosebery March 1894–June 1895

Salisbury June 1895–July 1902

Balfour July 1902–December 1905

Campbell-Bannerman December 1905–April 1908

Asquith April 1908–December 1916

Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs

Granville December 1870–February 1874

Derby February 1874–April 1878

Salisbury April 1878–April 1880

Granville April 1880–June 1885

Salisbury June 1885–January 1886

Rosebery February 1886–July 1886

Iddesleigh August 1886–January 1887

Salisbury January 1887–August 1892

Rosebery August 1892–March 1894

Kimberley March 1894–June 1895

Salisbury June 1895–October 1900

Lansdowne October 1900–December 1905

Grey December 1905–December 1916

Appendix

Secretaries of State for India

Argyll December 1868–February 1874

Salisbury February 1874–April 1878

Cranbrook April 1878–April 1880

Hartington April 1880–December 1882

Kimberley December 1882–June 1885

Randolph Churchill June 1885–January 1886

Kimberley February 1886–August 1886

Cross August 1886–August 1892

Kimberley August 1892–March 1894

Fowler March 1894–June 1895

Hamilton June 1895–September 1903

Brodrick September 1903–December 1905

Morley December 1905–November 1910

Crewe November 1910–December 1916

Governors-General and Viceroys of India

Northbrook May 1872–April 1876

Lytton April 1876–June 1880

Ripon June 1880–December 1884

Dufferin December 1884–December 1888

Lansdowne December 1888–January 1894

Elgin January 1894–January 1899

Curzon January 1899–November 1905

Minto November 1905–November 1910

Hardinge November 1910–April 1916

206 Appendix

Preface

1 I have mostly used ‘the Indian Empire’ and ‘India’ for what was the British Empire in

South Asia and was known as ‘India’ until August 1947. I have generally used

‘Britain’ and ‘Great Britain’, though it was usual to use ‘England’ and ‘English’ at

least until 1914.

2 Note on the ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia’ by E.

Peach, DAAG, Military Intelligence Division, 31 May 1901. Public Records Office,

London, Cab. 38/1/4.

3 See note by E. L. Altham, 10 August 1901, PRO, War Office, 106/48, E 3/2 and a

comprehensive survey published by the War Office in 1907 on ‘Military Resources of

the Russian Empire’, PRO, W.O. 33\409.

4 Balfour to Lansdowne, 12 December 1901, Balfour Papers, British Library, London,

Add. Mss 49727.

5 Marshall (1995): 379.

6 P. M. Kennedy (1981): 72.

7 Bourne (1970); Steiner (1977); Chamberlain (1988). C.J. Lowe (1967) has devoted one

chapter to the defence of India in the 1880s.

8 Millman (1979).

9 In fact, in Millman (1979) covering over 600 pages there are hardly any index entries

on India. This is as much true of Heller (1983).

10 Martel (1986: 295).

11 Amongst these, mention may be made of Greaves (1959) and Gillard (1977). Two

journals also devoted an issue each to this question: International History Review vol. 2

(1980), and South Asian Studies vol. 21 (1987).

12 K.M. Wilson (1985) and (1987a).

13 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 13).

14 See Mackenzie (1986: 1–2). See also Viscount Grey of Fallodon, vol. 2 (1925: 5,

1988: 15–16).

15 Mill (1981).

16 See M. Taylor (1991: 1–23).

17 Seeley (1883/1899).

1 Constructing Britain’s foreign policy

1 On this issue, see C. Howard (1967: 64–8).

2 See memorandum on ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and

Russia’, August 1901, Public Records Office, London, War Office, 106/48, E3/2,

para 10A. Also see Neilson (1991: 708).

Notes

3 P.M. Kennedy (1981: 20) and Hobsbawm (1987: 350).

4 On this issue see Beeler (1992: 547–75).

5 Friedberg (1988: 200).

6 On this issue see Offer (1989).

7 French (1982: 19).

8 Quoted in Marder (1940/1964: 65).

9 Ibid., 15.

10 Matthew, vol. 13 (1994: lxvii–lxix).

11 Hobsbawm (1987: 59).

12 For this article see Edward Dicey (1881/1986: 31–2).

13 Mackenzie (1982: 1–2), also Taylor (1991: 1–23).

14 Quoted in Marshall (1993: 390).

15 The white settler colonies of Canada, Newfoundland, the Cape Colony and Natal,

Australia and Newfoundland were self-governing and ran their own domestic affairs.

However, Britain had responsibility for their defence.

18 For the area of these colonies see Table 1.1

19 Nish (1987: 667).

20 A.N. Porter (1991: 195), also McLean (1976: 304).

21 See note by Fredrick Roberts, 13 June 1887, National Archives of India, New Delhi,

Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, October 1887, nos 286–91.

22 See Gillard (1977: 14–17); Yapp (1987a: 50–7).

23 Steiner (1969: 265).

24 Joll (1973: 19), see also 15, 82–3.

25 Monypenny and Buckle, vol. 4 (1916: 467).

26 ibid.

27 Quoted in Darby (1987: 24).

28 Martel (1991: 679–80); McDermott (1979: 100), K.M. Wilson (1981: 21–41).

29 P M. Kennedy (1976: 201).

30 See minutes of the 111th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 26 May

1911, PRO, Cab. 38/18/40.

31 Bourne (1970: 7).

32 Bernard Porter recounts ‘moments of non-isolation’ (1987: 37–8).

208 Notes

Area of colonies governed from Britain in 1880

Total area Percentage

Dependent global empire 2,246,000 -

Empire excluding India 341,700 15.2

Indian Empire 1,904,000 84.8

For details see Table 1.1

The British Empire

Population in thousands Percentage

Year UK RG India All other

dependant

colonies

India All other

dependant

colonies

1872

31,874

7,018

160,788

5,399 15.5

3.4

78.4 2.6

1912

45,436

24,186

322,441

51,582 10.2

5.4

72.6 11.7

Source:

Compiled from figures given in Davis and Huttenback (1986: 28)

RG: Dominions with responsible government

33 Salisbury to Morier, 1 February 1988. Salisbury Papers, quoted in C.J. Lowe (1965:

46–7).

34 Derby to Russel, 31 October 1876, quoted in P.M. Kennedy (1980: 37).

35 Ibid., 37.

36 Russel to Derby, 8 January 1876, PRO, F.O. 64/850, no. 15, quoted in Millman

(1979: 65).

37 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 182).

38 See Bridge (1972: 384–86).

39 Minute by Grey, 21 November 1913, Nicolson Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/371.

40 For example see P.M. Kennedy (1980: 78, 185–6).

41 On this see Bosworth (1979: 1–38).

42 Beeler (1992: 556).

43 See D. N. I. Memorandum on Naval Policy, 13 October 1896, in Marder (1940/64:

576).

44 Salisbury to Dufferin, the Governor-General of India, 16 January 1891, Dufferin

Papers, Correspondence with Persons in England.

45 See PRO, Cab. 37/21/15, 15 and Cab. 37/22/32, 37. Also PRO, W.O. 106/48.

46 For example Kimberley, the India Secretary for some ten years, wrote to Dufferin as

early as 1886 that ‘As far as it dares, it plays into the hands of Russia’. Kimberley to

Dufferin, 25 August 1886, Dufferin Papers, Correspondence with the Secretary of

State for India.

47 See S.R. Williamson (1969: 23).

48 See Joint Report of E.F. Chapman, the Director of Military Intelligence, and

C.A.G. Bridge, the Director of Naval Intelligence, 18 March 1892, Cab. 37/31/10.

49 ‘…for many seasons past, as a matter of fact, no differences have arisen between

Russia and us in that quarter, and the predominance of Germany in Northern

Europe renders such differences much less likely than formerly’. Memorandum by

A.W.A. Hood, July 1888, Cab. 37/22/44.

50 See Fromkin (1980: 936). Also P.M. Kennedy (1980: 411).

51 Millman (1981: 1).

52 Cain and Hopkins (1993: 398–9).

53 As in Millman (1981) and Seton-Watson (1935/1962).

54 Nish (1987: 667).

55 Salisbury to A.H. Layard, 9 May 1878, BL, Layard Papers, Add. Mss 39137, pp.

82–4.

56 See Khalfin (1987: 645).

57 For the text of this circular see Fraser-Tytler (1915: 305–9). For a discussion of

Russia’s motives see Waldron (1997: 103–38). See also Palat (1988: 157–297) and

Kazemzadeh (1962: 489–529).

58 Khalfin (1987: 639–46); Fromkin (1980: 949–50).

59 Greaves (1959: 27).

60 On this see Fromkin (1980: 950).

61 See, for example, the file ‘Military Needs of the Empire’, PRO, W.O. 106/48, E

3/2.

62 New Delhi became the capital of India in 1912.

63 Gillard (1977: 29); Chakravarty (1976: 33–41).

64 On this issue see Petrov (1987: 625–38).

65 See Duthie (1981: 36–72).

66 Yapp (1987b: 647–65), also note by F. Roberts, 28 August 1891, para 4, PRO, Cab.

38/1/2.

67 Quoted in Grenville (1960: 25).

68 Quoted in Sumner (1942/1968: 7–8).

69 Quoted in Fischer (1967: 121).

70 Mahajan (1982: 173).

Notes 209

71 Sir H. Drummond-Wolff to Salisbury, 6 July 1888 reporting his conversation with

Prince Dolgorouki, NAI, Foreign Department (Secret), External Proceedings,

September 1888, nos 117–18.

72 Note by Bertie, Under Secretary in the Foreign Office at that time, 18 January 1898,

Bertie Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/176.

73 See Memorandum by Brackenbury, 25 January 1887, PRO, Cab. 37/19/8 and

India Office Memorandum, November 1891, PRO, Cab. 37/20/29. Extracts from

both are printed in C.J. Lowe, vol. 2 (1967: 45–7).

74 On this see Chapter 6 below.

75 K. Neilson (1991: 707).

76 Memorandum by Major J. S. Rothwell, 7 July 1884, PRO, Cab. 37/13/36.

77 See Alder (1981: 318–29).

78 The other four capitals were Paris, Vienna, St Petersburg and Brussels. On this see

Steiner (1982: 552).

79 Memorandum by Salisbury, 4 June 1892, PRO, Cab. 37/31/10. Also in Bourne

(1970: 429–32).

80 Cain and Hopkins (1993: 398–9) and Millman (1981: 454).

81 See Inalcik with Quataert (1994: 759–65).

82 See memorandum by J.L.A. Simmons, Inspector General of Fortifications, 30

October 1876, Simmons Papers, PRO, F.O. 358/2; Lytton to Carnarvon, 21

January 1877; Lytton to Salisbury, 9 July 1877, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. 518/2.

83 Nickjoo (1979: 1).

84 Despatch to the Russian ambassador in London, 6 May 1877, Parliamentary

Papers, C. 1770 (1877), pp. 135–6. Also in Bourne (1970: 407–9).

85 Heller (1983: 1).

86 Shukla (1973: 121–2).

87 Ibid.

88 Salisbury’s memorandum, 4 June 1892, PRO, Cab. 37/31/10.

89 Graham (1967: 1).

90 Lansdowne to Sir Arthur Hardinge (Minister at Tehran), 6 January 1902, BDOW,

vol. 4. No. 321a; emphasis added.

91 Reports of all activities of Russia in Central Asia were duly collected, compiled and

analysed at London and Calcutta. See for example NAI, Foreign Department

(Secret) Frontier Proceedings, August 1887, nos 461–6.

92 Duthie (1979: 187).

93 It was only in the twentieth century that the question of obtaining oil became a

matter of concern when its use as fuel for the navy began. The Anglo-German

naval rivalry heightened this preoccupation. By 1914 Britain had secured a

monopoly over oil in Persia and became concerned about deposits of oil in

Mesopotamia; see Kent (1976).

94 The boundary between Persia and Baluchistan was demarcated in the late 1870s.

Some modifications were made in 1905.

95 See George Hamilton to the government of India, 6 July 1900, FO, Persia, 623/14.

BDOW, vol. 4, no. 320.

96 Minute by Salisbury, 25 July 1885, F.O. 65/1247.

97 Giving instructions to Drummond-Wolff before his departure as ambassador to

Persia in February 1888, Salisbury wrote: ‘It is to the interest of this country that the

integrity of Persia should be maintained, that its resources should be developed, and

that its government should be strong, independent and friendly’. Salisbury to Wolff,

very confd., 29 February 1888, F.O. 60/491.

98 On this issue see Cain and Hopkins (1993: 411–18).

99 Seistan lay to the west of Baluchistan. It was believed that Russia could send an

army from Khorasan in the north of Persia to Baluchistan in India via Seistan.

100 Greaves (1959: 26–7, 42).

210 Notes

101 India Office to Foreign Office, 22 May 1889, PRO, F.O. 60/506.

102 Hamilton to Curzon, private, 7 November 1901, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111.

103 After prolonged haggling, it was decided in 1879 that the government of India

would pay twelve-seventeenths of the expense. This did not satisfy the Foreign

Office. See Greaves (1959: 25–6).

104 A. Nicolson in the Foreign Office did comment ‘Recently we have left the

Government of India entirely out of account’. BDOW, vol. 4, no. 294.

105 On the First Afghan War see Norris (1967).

106 He had been Chief Commissioner of Punjab from 1852 to 1859. Therefore, this

School was also referred to as ‘the Punjab School’.

107 See IOL, Letters/Political and Secret/3/87, pp. 468–70 and 758–9. This feeling

forms a constant undercurrent in all letters and memoranda on the subject.

108 On this aspect see Duthie (1981: 36–72).

109 Ibid., 36.

110 See IOL, Letters/Political and Secret/3/73, pp. 517–32.

111 On this issue see Singhal (1963/1982).

112 Ibid., 7–8.

113 ‘Resident’ was the term used for the representative of the Governor-General of

India at the court of a princely state in India or its neighbourhood.

114 See Moulton (1968: 227–30).

115 This word was coined by Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, for the panic

caused by Russia’s annexation of Merv.

116 Northbrook to Argyll, 5 February 1874, quoted in Duthie (1981: 62).

117 See Parliamentary Papers, 1878–9, vol. 56, 112–18.

118 Quoted in Thornton (1966: 44).

119 Ellenborough, who became the Governor-General of India in 1842, was the first

Governor-General to take this route. He took 115 days to reach Bombay. Farnie

(1969: 7, 19).

120 Quoted in Graham (1967: 24).

121 For a list of such books see Hoskins (1928/1966: 32–3).

122 Ibid.

123 See Cain and Hopkins (1993: 359–60). The situation changed only in the 1880s

when gold and diamond deposits were discovered in adjacent areas.

124 Quoted in P.M. Kennedy (1980: 220).

125 Graham (1965: 66–8).

126 Note by Director of Naval Intelligence, 12 November 1895, quoted in Marder

(1940: 247–8).

127 Kent (1984: 77).

128 The three battleships commissioned in 1883 were to be ready only by 1888, 1889

and 1890. See Memorandum by A.W.A. Hood, July 1886, Cab. 37/22/44, also

Martel (1986: 28).

129 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 23).

130 Ibid.

131 BDOW, vol. 4, no. 210. See also Fay, vol. 1 (1928/1965: 72–3).

132 Hoskins (1928/1966: 268). For details see Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 76–7).

133 Cited in Hoskins (1928/1966: 268).

134 Ibid.

135 At that time merchant ships were much smaller.

136 Farnie (1969: 29).

137 Chamberlain (1988: 137).

138 Farnie (1969: 30).

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid., 43.

141 Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 21 May 1870, PRO, Cab. 41/2/23.

Notes 211

142 Troops were sent to India in 1857 on this route. They were able to cover major part

of overland journey from Alexandria to Cairo on this railway and the last lap of

forty kilometres in vans which required about a ten hours’ journey. See Hoskins

(1928/1966: 44–5).

143 For details see Rodgers (1984: 131).

144 See Parliamentary Papers, 1871, no. 386, 36–7.

145 Hoskins (1928/1966: 430–2).

146 In Britain a minister, the parliamentary head of an administrative department, is

known as the Secretary of State.

147 During British rule, the Englishmen in India referred to themselves as Anglo-

Indians. This phrase was also used to refer to people of mixed British and Indian

parentage.

148 On this see Duthie (1979: 181–207, 1981: 36–72).

149 Darby (1987: 26). Charles Webster described the First Afghan War as a question of

Indian strategy and politics not of British foreign policy; Webster (1963: 752).

150 This is a recurring theme. For example see McIntyre (1967); Pearce and Stewart

(1992: 155).

151 Singhal (1963/1982: xi); also Darby (1987: 26).

152 On relations between the government of India and the British government see

Kaminsky (1986).

153 C.C. Eldridge comments, ‘In fact, every conceivable expense in governing India was

charged against the Indian revenue, from the costs of the army in India to the wages

of charladies in the India Office in London. The costs of the mutiny in 1857, the

cost of transferring the East India Company’s rights to the Crown, gifts to the

Zanzibar mission, the expenses of the diplomatic establishments in China and

Persia, part of the expenses of the Mediterranean fleet, the cost of the telegraph

from England to India and even the maintenance of a lunatic asylum at Ealing were

laid at India’s door’. Eldridge (1978: 63–4).

2 Flaunting the Indian Empire, 1874–80

1 In 1872, Gladstone’s government had resolved the long-standing dispute with the

United States over the ship Alabama, which had been running since the American

Civil War. Britain agreed to pay over £3 million in compensation to the United

States, a vast sum by the standards of the day but far less than many influential

Americans demanded.

2 Speech in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, 3 April 1878. Monypenny and Buckle,

vol. 5 (1920: 191–2). Also Bourne (1970: 403).

3 Kebbel (1882: 521).

4 See Baumgart (1982: 2); Hobsbawm (1987: 60).

5 On this issue see Bodelsen (1924/1960: 120–3).

6 Koebner and Schmidt (1964: 110–11).

7 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., vol. 62, col. 1020.

8 The notion that cartridges given for rifles to Indian soldiers were smeared with cow

or pig fat had become an important source of discontent against the Raj.

9 Quoted in Fenner (1987: 54).

10 Harcourt (1980: 87–109), also Rodgers (1984: 129–49).

11 Rodgers (1984: 145). All charges for this expedition were borne by the British

government. See Parliamentary Papers, C. 128 (1878), p. 298.

12 For Britain’s reaction see Queen Victoria to the German Emperor, 20 June 1875 in

Dugdale, vol. 1 (1928: 14–15). For details of ‘war-in-sight’ crisis see Langer

(1931/1950: 40–55).

13 See Monypenny and Buckle, vol. 5 (1920: 422).

14 See above, pp. 28–9.

212 Notes

15 Farnie (1969: 234).

16 Quoted in Hoskins (1928: 466–7).

17 Quoted in Bradford (1982: 323).

18 An amendment to limit the expenditure to £60,000 was defeated by 360 votes to

16.

19 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 9 March 1876, vol. 27, cols 1727–28.

20 The government had failed to inform the leaders of the opposition in advance.

There was also some debate on the appropriateness of title.

21 Fenner (1987: 49).

22 Mackenzie (1984: 4).

23 On this crisis, a very well-researched work is (Millman 1979).

24 On this issue see Millman (1979: 63–7).

25 Ibid., 63–4.

26 Seton-Watson (1935/1962: 33, also n. 2).

27 Odo Russel, the British ambassador, had offered to resign on this issue; ibid., 34.

28 Disraeli to the Queen, 29 May 1876, PRO, Cab. 47/7/12.

29 Millman (1979: 101).

30 Disraeli to the Queen, 29 May 1876, PRO, Cab. 47/7/12.

31 The efforts made by the powers to mediate present an exceedingly intricate and

convoluted picture. The Reichstadt Agreement of 8 July 1876 between Russia and

Austria was one such effort. See Millman (1979: chaps 8 and 9).

32 Lytton to Salisbury, 25 October 1876, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/518/1.

Salisbury to Disraeli, 29 October 1876, cited in Millman (1979: 193).

33 Millman (1979: 214–18).

34 D. Gillard (1977: 132).

35 See Millman (1979: 454).

36 Salisbury to Lytton, Lytton Papers, 8 March 1877, E. 218/516/2.

37 This report is available in the Public Records Office in Simmons Papers, PRO, F.O.

358/1–3. J.L.A. Simmons was the Inspector General of Fortifications. This report

was used in 1878 when Cyprus was occupied to countervail the increase in Russia’s

influence in Asia Minor.

38 See Salisbury to Lytton, 9 February 1877, Lytton Papers, E. 218/516/2.

39 All that ultimately emerged was an innocuous London Protocol of 31 March 1877

which merely called upon the Porte to introduce reforms. Even this was rejected by

the Porte.

40 The Austro-Russian military convention was signed on 15 January and the political

convention on 18 March 1877. See Millman (1979: ch. 16).

41 Salisbury to Lytton, 22 June 1877, private, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/516/2.

42 Lytton to Salisbury, 9 July 1877, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/518/3. In their

Friday congregations and other public platforms, Indian Muslims had expressed

themselves in favour of Turkey even during the Turco-Serb War. The movement

was clearly anti-Russian. Therefore, the government of India had adopted a permis-

sive attitude. On this issue see NAI, Home Department Public B. Proceedings,

February 1878, nos 215–244. See also Shukla (1973: ch. 5); Millman (1979: 193–4).

43 Layard to Salisbury, 17 April and 1 May 1878, Layard Papers, BL, Add. Mss 39131.

44 Bourne (1970: 130).

45 Bradford (1982: 345).

46 Disraeli to the Queen, Secret, 17 April 1877, PRO, Cab. 41/9/16.

47 Ibid.

48 Millman (1979: 305).

49 Derby’s despatch to Count Shuvalov (Russian ambassador at London), 6 May 1877,

Parliamentary Papers, C. 1770 (1877), 135–6. Also in Bourne (1970: 407–9).

50 Bourne (1970: 30).

51 This section is based on Millman (1979: ch. 16).

Notes 213

52 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 8 February 1878, vol. 237, cols 1315–51.

53 Millman (1979: 379).

54 Ibid., 392; also 374–8.

55 Ibid., 392. See also Matthew, vol. 9 (1986: liii–iv).

56 Many versions of this song exist. One of these runs:

We don’t want to fight

But by Jingo if we do

We’ll stay at home and mind the store

And leave it to the mild Hindoo

57 It is worth noting that here the advantages in human and material terms flowing to

Britons from the possession of India are aptly set forth. This version is given in

Davis and Huttenback (1986: 156). A similar version is given in Doyle (1986: 287).

58 Contemporary observers, both British and foreign, commented on this. The Spanish

Minister at London talked of the ‘irresolution and timidity’ of the British govern-

ment. See Millman (1979: 580, n. 9). Even Ponsonby, a British diplomat, compared

the British squadron at the entrance of the Dardanelles to a terrier sniffing at a hole

hoping to find a rabbit but fearing a badger might be at the bottom of it. See

Bradford (1982: 345).

59 Millman (1979: 397).

60 Turkey had fourteen first-class armoured battleships at that time, most of them built

in British shipyards. This navy was larger and more modern than that of the

German Empire at that time. See Hubatsch (1985: 110).

61 Seton-Watson (1935/1962: 333).

62 On this issue Derby resigned, and Salisbury moved from the India Office to the

Foreign Office.

63 Circular to European Powers, 1 April 1878, Parliamentary Papers, C. 1989 (1878),

765–72. An extract from this circular is given in Bourne (1970: 412–13).

64 See Despatches from Layard, 28 January 1878, no. 130; 5 February 1878, no. 175; 5

February 1878, no. 263; F.O. 78/2777, 2778, 2780.

65 Memorandum by Brackenbury, 25 January 1887, Intelligence Branch, War Office,

PRO, Cab. 37/10/8.

66 See Layard Papers, BL, Add. Mss, 39130, letters to Disraeli, Derby and Lytton.

67 See Temple Papers, IOL Mss Eur. F. 86, Correspondence 1878. All these arguments

were used in the debate on the vote of credit for strengthening the army of Britain

in anticipation of trouble with Russia. Parliamentary Debates, H.C., vol. 237, cols

560–5 and vol. 238, cols 52–5.

68 Anderson (1966/1970: 200).

69 Durrans (1982: 262–84). Durrans uses the phrase ‘Asiatic soldiers’ perhaps out of

habit.

70 Disraeli to the Queen, 12 April 1878, PRO, Cab. 41/11/10.

71 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 27 May 1878. See Millman (1979: 443–4).

72 It was a strip of Turkish territory that separated Serbia and Montenegro.

73 Actually the Russians delayed the evacuation of Balkan mountain range. In the

autumn of 1879, when they did withdraw because of British pressure, the Turks

were too frightened to re-occupy the Balkan passes because of the intense anti-Turk

feeling amongst the Bulgars. See Bourne (1970: 134).

74 Printed in Anderson (1970: 105).

75 See Simmons Papers, F.O. 358/1. Salisbury to Layard, 2, 9, 10 May 1878. Layard

Papers, BL, Add. Mss 39137. Also Despatch from Salisbury to Layard, 30 May

1878, NAI, Government of India, Foreign Department (Secret) Proceedings, 1878,

nos 34–42, KW no. 2.

76 On this see note by W.S. Churchill, 21 June 1910, Cab. 37/89/83.

214 Notes

77 See Layard Papers, Add. Mss 39013, pp. 248–9, NAI, Foreign Department, Political

A Proceedings, July 1876, no. 113 and Political and Secret Home Correspondence,

vol. XXVI, July-September 1878, also Shukla (1973: ch. 4). Mohammarah (now

Abadan) was a port on Shatt-al-Arab. In 1891 a British vice-consulate was estab-

lished there.

78 See Hoskins (1928/1966: 440), also Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 18 July 1878, col.

1773.

79 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 21 February 1879, Cab. 41/12/7.

80 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 18 July 1878, col. 1773. See Thornton (1962: 573).

81 European powers were aware of Britain’s motives. For example, see Pourtales,

chargé d’affairs in St Petersburg, to Caprivi, 15 September 1890, Dugdale, vol. 2

(1929: 112, also 109).

82 See Layard’s despatches to Foreign Office sent to India Office and printed for the

use of the Cabinet, Political and Home Correspondence, vols XVIII, XXII, Layard

Papers, BL, Add. Mss 39130.

83 C. Howard (1967: 8, 45, 89).

84 W.S. Churchill, Paper on the Condition of Cyprus, 26 June 1910, PRO, Cab.

37/89/83.

85 See Salisbury’s Memorandum for the Cabinet, 26 June 1878, PRO, F.O. 78/2911.

Also in Bourne (1970: 415–16).

86 Ibid.

87 See Parliamentary Papers, C. 1770 (1877), 135–6.

88 Medlicott (1938: 103–4, 121–2).

89 See Bradford (1982: 349–50).

90 Millman (1979: 448–51). All the quotations that follow are from these pages.

91 See Dugdale, vol. 1 (1928: ch. 10). See also P.M. Kennedy (1980: 33–5).

92 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 157–8).

93 Disraeli to the Queen, 3 December 1879, Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd series, vol. 3,

56–7.

94 Salisbury to Lytton, Private, 13 July 1877, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/516/2.

95 See India Office Library, London, C/137. Influence of the members of the Council

of India on Salisbury has been studied by Duthie (1979: 181–208).

96 Salisbury to Lytton, 22 June 1877, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/516/2.

97 Salisbury to Lytton, Private, 4 August 1878, Lytton Papers, Mss Eur. E. 218/516/1.

98 Ibid.

99 Salisbury to Northbrook, 19 November 1875, cited in Duthie (1979: 195).

100 For example see Despatch to India, 22 January 1875, Secret, no. 2, Appointment of

British Agent at Herat, IOL, Letters/Political and Secret/7/320: 3–25. Salisbury to

Cranbrook, 17 September 1878, cited in Duthie (1979: 194–5).

101 See above, p. 23.

102 Singhal (1963/1982: 14).

103 For this despatch of Salisbury see Parliamentary Papers, C. 56, 1878–9, 156–9.

104 See Singhal (1963/1982: 17–19).

105 Parliamentary Papers, C. 56 (1878–9), 157.

106 See above, p. 40.

107 See speech by Grant Duff, a former Under Secretary of State for India, Parliamentary

Debates, H.C., vol. 234, cols 1833–41.

108 For details see Parliamentary Papers, C. 56 (1877–8).

109 The Indian agent who stayed at Kabul on behalf of the government of India.

110 Parliamentary Papers, C. 56 (1877–8), 224.

111 Disraeli to the Queen, 22 July 1877, Monypenny and Buckle, vol. 6 (1920: 155).

112 See Despatch from the government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 2

July 1877, paras 44–6, IOL, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures from India,

vol. 15.

Notes 215

113 For this effort see Layard Papers, BL, Add. Mss 39164. See also Singhal

(1963/1982: 24–30).

114 See Singhal (1963/1982: 10–11).

115 Ibid., 34–8.

116 For a report on this meeting see Disraeli to the Queen, Secret, 26 October 1878,

PRO, Cab. 41/11/18. Also in Bourne (1970: 417–20).

117 Secretary of State to the Governor-General, 24 October 1878, OIL, Political and

Secret Letters and Enclosures from India, vol. 19, 1484.

118 Abdur Rahman had been a pensioner of the Russian government since 1867.

Selection of such a man was unexpected. See Singhal (1963/1982: 62–5). However,

this decision proved to be a wise one.

119 Parliamentary Papers, Central Asia (1881), vol. 2, no. 1 of 1881.

120 See Klein (1974: 97–121); Durrans (1982: 265); Singhal (1963/1982: 26). Also

Chakravarty (1976: 238–9); Yapp (1987: 83).

121 Disraeli to Salisbury, 1 April 1877, Disraeli to the Queen, 22 July 1877 and 26

October 1878 in Monypenny and Buckle, vol. 2 (1912: 251); vol. 6 (1920: 155 and

386–8), respectively.

122 Salisbury to Disraeli, Private, 31 October 1875; Bourne (1970: 403–4).

123 Disraeli to the Queen, 26 October 1878, Cab. 41/11/18.

124 See Pearce and Stewart (1992: 155); Eldridge (1978: 109–10); Durrans (1982: 267).

125 See Porter (1983/1986: 38); Millman (1979: 453).

126 B. Porter (1983/1986: 38).

127 The Times, 15 August 1876, cited in Durrans (1982: 264).

128 Cited in A.J.P. Taylor (1957: 64).

129 Florence Nightingale to P.K. Sen, 20 June 1879, cited in Gopal (1953: 1).

3 In the garb of moral imperatives, 1880–5

1 For some recent examples see Chamberlain (1988: 142); Matthew, vol. 10 (1990:

lxii); Cain and Hopkins (1993: 204–5); Beeler (1997: 15, 16).

2 Gladstone’s Third Midlothian Campaign Speech, 27 November 1879. See Bourne

(1970: 420–2).

3 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxii).

4 Ibid., lxii–lxiii.

5 Ibid., lxiii.

6 Ibid.

7 Eldridge (1979: 154).

8 Cited in Chamberlain (1988: 132).

9 Gladstone to Ripon, 6 September and 4 November 1881, Gladstone Papers, The

British Library, Add. Mss 43515. This argument is still ongoing; see Davis and

Huttenback (1986); see also Mahajan (1992: 931–8).

10 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxiv).

11 See Chamberlain (1976: 231–45).

12 Quoted in Chamberlain (1988: 142).

13 See Ripon to Hartington, 1 August 1880, Ripon Papers, BL, Add. Mss 43610.

14 General Haines, the commander-in-chief in India and W. Stokes, the military

member of the Viceroy’s Council, recorded their minutes against evacuation from

Kandhar. See IOL, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures from India, vol. 26,

1219–20.

15 Ripon Papers, BL, Add. Mss 43610, Despatch no. 23, 39.

16 ‘Note on Kandahar’ by Napier of Magdala, Gibraltar, 12 October 1880, PRO, Cab.

37/3/58.

17 See Hartington to Ripon, Ripon Papers, BL, Add. Mss 43615.

18 Singhal (1963/1982: 80).

216 Notes

19 See Ripon to Hartington, 9 May 1880 and Minute by Ripon, 11 September 1880.

Ripon Papers, BL, Add. Mss 4360; also Singhal (1963/1982: 198, Appendix F).

20 See Lepel Griffin to Abdur Rahman Khan, July 1880, PRO, Cab. 37/2/36.

21 There were some like Northbrook in the Liberal Cabinet who criticised this. See

memorandum by Northbrook, 15 October 1880, Cab. 37/3/59.

22 Singhal (1963/1982: 83).

23 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 164–6).

24 Balfour to Lansdowne, 12 December 1901, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49727.

25 See Barclay (1914: 41–2).

26 See Bourne (1970: 139).

27 For controversy amongst historians on this issue see Knaplund (1935/1970:

131–40). For the view accepted now see Matthew, vol. 9 (1986: xxxiv) and vol. 10

(1990: lxvii), and Bourne (1970: 137).

28 The central powers showed reluctance to participate, but the Turks gave in to the

threat of blockade. See Knaplund (1935/1970: 140).

29 Telegram from Göschen to Granville, 25 March 1881, quoted in ibid., 148.

30 It is significant that Gladstone did not consider relinquishing control over Cyprus

even after the occupation of Alexandria in 1882, when the position at Cyprus

became largely redundant from a strategic point of view. On this see Military

Intelligence Memorandum on Naval Policy, 13 October 1896, in Marder

(1940/1964: 573, Appendix III). For reasons for retaining Cyprus thereafter, see the

paper by W.S. Churchill, 21 June 1910, PRO, Cab. 37/89/83.

31 Knaplund (1935/1970: 157).

32 Gladstone to Granville, 1 September 1883, Letterbooks, vol. XX, p. 313, BL,

Gladstone Papers.

33 For this treaty see Langer (1931/1950: 204–12).

34 Oliver and Sanderson, vol. 6 (1985: 596–7). Ismail was Khedive from 1863 to 1879.

35 For a good summary of this issue see Thornton (1962: 584–6).

36 See Disraeli to the Queen, 21 February 1879, Cab. 41/12/7.

37 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 86).

38 Ibid.

39 Schölch (1981).

40 Ibid., 77–8.

41 It was a body representing the provincial notables set up by Khedive Ismail in 1866. It

was called majlis al-nuwwab and was chosen by direct open ‘elections’. It was designed

as an additional instrument of administration. Until the crisis of 1879 its members

did not take any overt political initiative. See Oliver and Sanderson (1985: 594–5).

42 On this see Schölch (1976: 773–85).

43 See Cain and Hopkins (1993: 366).

44 See Blunt (1907).

45 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxii). This figure is based on a reckoning of his assets which

he had drawn up in December 1882.

46 See Cain and Hopkins (1993: 367).

47 Schölch (1981: 312); Oliver and Sanderson, vol. 6 (1985: 596–7).

48 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxx).

49 Schölch (1981: ch. 3).

50 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: ch. 4).

51 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxiii).

52 See Farnie (1969: 288–9). The telegraph line between Britain and its Indian Empire

ran from London to Lisbon, thence to Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria before going

overland to Suez. From there it ran to Aden and across to Bombay. The only weak

point in this chain was in Egypt, which was partially eliminated when the British

occupied it in 1882. On this see P.M. Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications

and Strategy, 1870–1914; in P.M. Kennedy (1979: 77).

Notes 217

53 Cartwright to Granville, 16 July 1882, Granville papers, PRO, 30/29/285; also

Galbraith (1979: 274).

54 See Farnie (1969: 290).

55 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 119).

56 Ibid.

57 Ensor (1936: 79).

58 See Gladstone to Madame O. Novikov, 15 September 1882; Matthew, vol. 10 (1990:

334).

59 Gladstone to Chiders, 15 September 1882; ibid., 333.

60 Such a treaty was signed in April 1888. For the text see Gorst and Johnson (1997:

3–5).

61 Farnie (1969: 293).

62 Blunt played a most important role in this respect. For this view see Blunt (1907).

63 Of contemporary works by participants in the process, the following works became

very popular: Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (London, 1892) (this book went through

four editions and eleven impressions during 1892–4); Sir Auckland Colvin, The

Making of Modern Egypt (London, 1906), by the Controller-General of Egypt; and

Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt (London, 1908). On this see Farnie (1969: 484).

64 Robinson and Gallagher (1961). For comments on their approach see Hopkins

(1986: 370–3).

65 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 120).

66 Malet (1909: 59).

67 So powerful has been the hold of the received view that various aspects are still

repeated in surveys of British history. See Chamberlain (1988: 144–5) and Pearce

and Stewart (1992: 158).

68 Eldridge (1978: 365–6).

69 See Galbraith (1979: 274–92); Hopkins (1986: 384–5). Later Urabi admitted to a

charge of rebellion and slipped quietly into exile.

70 See Hopkins (1986: 388).

71 Milner called it a ‘veiled’ protectorate. This phrase has been repeated since. In fact,

Britain’s control was not even ‘veiled’.

72 Cain and Hopkins (1993: 365).

73 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxii).

74 For Blunt’s views see his Secret History of British Occupation of Egypt published twenty-

five years later (Blunt 1907). See also Chamberlain (1981: 21).

75 See Farnie (1969: 292) and Schölch (1976: 773, n. 4).

76 Cain and Hopkins (1993: 369–70), also Hopkins (1986: 380–5).

77 Swartz (1993: 369–70), also Hopkins (1986: 380–5).

78 Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 123).

79 Gladstone to Derby, 24 December 1884; Matthew, vol. 11 (263–4).

80 Gladstone to Ripon, 6 September 1882, BL, Add. Mss 43515; also in Matthew, vol.

10 (1990: 326–7).

81 India was a colony of Britain. Therefore the requirements of Britain could be met

even when India did not have wheat to spare. The export of wheat was not prohib-

ited or restricted even during the Bengal famine of 1874. See Farnie (1969: 360–3).

82 Farnie (1969: 292–3); Hopkins (1986: 374, 390–1); Cain and Hopkins (1993: 368);

Schölch (1976: 774).

83 Schölch (1976: 774, 784).

84 Hopkins (1986: 374, 390–1).

85 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxiv). See also vol. 9 (1986: xlii).

86 Quoted in Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxiv).

87 They conclude that ‘each fateful step seemed to be dictated by circumstances, rather

than will’. Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 120).

88 See Martel (1986a: 20).

218 Notes

89 Ibid.

90 Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxix).

91 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 133).

92 Pearce and Stewart (1992: 160).

93 Note by Gladstone, 12 March 1885, Matthew, vol. 11 (1990: 83).

94 In June 1885 the Mahdi died, probably of typhus. A few weeks later, the last

Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan were withdrawn (except those at Suakin and

Equatoria). The half-hearted attempt to advance from Suakin to the Nile was aban-

doned. See Oliver and Sanderson, vol. 6 (1985: 619).

95 Graham (1967: ch. 2).

96 Gladstone to Dilke, 14 December 1884; Matthew, vol. 11 (1990: 259).

97 For correspondence on Kirk’s mission see PRO, F.O. 84/1679.

98 Despatch from Sir John Kirk, 9 December 1884, confdl, see Knaplund (1935/1970:

180).

99 Farnie (1969: 293–4, 334); J.S. Galbraith and A. Lutfi al Sayyid-Marsot (1978:

471–3).

100 See Matthew, vol. 10 (1990: lxxxviii).

101 Dugdale, vol. 1 (1928: 195), introduction to chapter 13.

102 See Greaves (1959: 57). For maps see Darby and Fullard (1978: 186).

103 For reactions to the occupation of Merv see NAI, Foreign Department (Secret)

Frontier Proceedings, December 1884, nos 384–98.

104 For correspondence on this question between London and St. Petersburg see NAI,

Foreign Department (Secret) External Proceedings, June 1884, nos 396–416. The

cost of the commission was shared by London and Calcutta after Ripon remon-

strated against bearing the entire cost. See Singhal (1963/1982: 115).

105 P.M. Kennedy (1983: 178).

106 See memorandum by Major J.S. Rothwell, 7 July 1884, PRO, Cab. 37/13. Also

printed in Jelavich (1973: 189–98).

107 Dufferin to Salisbury, 21 March 1885, Dufferin Papers, Correspondence with

Persons in England.

108 Ibid.

109 See Gladstone’s note on the Cabinet Meeting of 24 March 1885. Matthew, vol. 10

(1990: 312).

110 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Foreign Proceedings, January 1886, nos

55–302.

111 Gladstone to the Queen, 12 March 1885, PRO, Cab. 41/19/20.

112 Early in May 1885, Randolph Churchill from the opposition benches presented to

the House of Commons a vivid description of previous breaches of engagements

and scornfully derided the government for having faith in the Russian word. See

Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 4 May 1885, cols 1524–41.

113 For Gladstone’s speech see Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 27 April 1885, cols 855–60.

114 For these telegrams see PRO, F.O. 65/1239.

115 Kimberley to Dufferin, private telegram, 20 April 1885, Dufferin Papers,

Correspondence with the Secretary of State.

116 Greaves (1959: 72–3).

117 Ibid., 72.

118 See Dufferin to Kimberley, private, 23 March 1885, Dufferin Papers,

Correspondence with the Secretary of State.

119 Beeler (1997: 22).

120 See Kimberley to Dufferin, 10, 17 and 24 April 1885, Dufferin Papers,

Correspondence with the Secretary of State; Granville Papers, PRO, 30/29/186.

Also see Robert Morier, British ambassador at St Petersburg, to Salisbury, Confdl.

No. 146, 18 April 1888, PRO, F.O. 65/1348.

121 Cited in Greaves (1959: 66–7).

Notes 219

122 Memorandum by Rosebery, 26 April 1885, cited in Martel (1986: 21).

123 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 185).

124 For example, see Bismarck to Prince Henry VII of Reuss in Vienna, 9 April 1885

and other letters in Dugdale, vol. 1 (1928: 197–201).

125 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 185).

126 Of the books published in the 1990s see Pearce and Stewart (1992: 157); Beeler

(1997: 15, 16).

127 See Gladstone to Hartington, 28 August 1882, Gladstone to Ripon, 6 September,

24 October, 27 November and 1 December 1882, BL, Add. Mss 43515.

128 Cited in Cecil, vol. 3 (1930: 136).

4 Courting the Triple Alliance, 1885–92

1 The forces that led to this urge to acquire colonies and to the partition of Africa

remain unexplained until now. For a concise account of this controversy see Andrew

Porter (1994).

2 Campbell (1974: 149–54).

3 Brackenbury to QMG, 14 April 1886, PRO, W.O. 33/47. See also note by

Brackenbury, ‘General Sketch of the Situation Abroad and at Home from a Military

Standpoint’; 3 August 1886, W. A. White Papers, PRO, F.O. 364/3. William Arthur

White was ambassador to Turkey from 1886–91.

4 Memorandum by Roberts, ‘Is an Invasion of India by Russia Possible’, Enclosure in

Ripon to Kimberley, 5 April 1884, Ripon Papers, Correspondence with Secretary of

State.

5 Friedberg (1988: 146); P.M. Kennedy (1983: 178).

6 After the fall of Gladstone’s government in June 1885, the Conservatives formed the

government which continued until January 1886. A new government was formed

under Gladstone on 1 February. This government fell on the question of Home

Rule to Ireland, so elections were held again in July 1886. The Conservatives

together with the Liberal Unionists got an effective majority of about 120. This

government lasted until August 1892.

7 However, for the first six months of his second administration, Lord Iddesleigh was

the Foreign Secretary.

8 He faced opposition only from Randolph Churchill, ‘the talented and unorthodox

demagogue’ who was India Secretary in his first administration and the Chancellor

of Exchequer for the first six months in his second administration.

9 Except that sometimes there were some awkward questions from some Radicals.

Rosebery, who took over from Salisbury in February 1886 and again in 1892,

believed that the foreign policy of the country should not be dragged into the arena

of party warfare. On this see Pearce and Stewart (1992: 162).

10 On this see Steiner (1969: ch. 1).

11 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 192).

12 Salisbury was the last ‘noble’ prime minister. Andrew Porter has argued that as a

representative of the traditional landholding class, Salisbury attempted to prevent

further financial decline of this class by resisting increased taxation. Hence, in

foreign and imperial affairs he adopted a policy of restraint so as to avoid crises and

hence expenses. See ‘Lord Salisbury, Foreign Policy and Domestic Finance’, in Blake

and Cecil (1987). This argument has been demolished in this same collection in arti-

cles by John France and F.M.L. Thompson.

13 Swartz (1985: 147).

14 On this see Pugh (1982: ch. 3). The League was named after Disraeli’s favourite

flower.

15 See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 212); Lowe (1965: 112); Grenville (1964: 1).

16 Quoted in Greaves (1964: 12).

220 Notes

17 See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 184–5).

18 Memorandum by Brackenbury, 25 January 1887, PRO, Cab. 37/19/8.

19 Salisbury to Grosvenor, 11 September 1885, confdl, PRO, F.O. 65/1250, no. 336.

See telegram from India Secretary to Viceroy, 25 August 1885 and Viceroy to India

Secretary, 26 August 1885, NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings,

September 1885, nos 1098 and 1099.

20 As examples of this see NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings,

September 1885, nos 1053–1106 and October 1886, nos 29–88. See also

Parliamentary Papers, C. 5114 (1887), 581, and Morgan (1981: 199).

21 Paper shown to Count Herbert Bismarck at Koenigstein by Currie, 22 August 1886;

Bourne (1970: 423–5).

22 See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 165–6, 184–7).

23 Quoted in ibid., 185.

24 C.J. Lowe (1965: 90–1).

25 For a detailed account of relations with Burma during this period see Mukherjee

(1988).

26 On this see Tuck (1978: 249–50).

27 Kimberley to Ripon, 4 September 1884, Ripon Papers, BL, Mss Eur. 43525.

28 Ripon to Kimberley, 26 September 1884, ibid.

29 NAI, Foreign Department (Political) External Proceedings, May 1883, 145–7; June

1883, nos 79–84.

30 Ibid., May 1884, no. 380.

31 Ibid., July 1884, no. 246. See also Parliamentary Papers C. 4614 (1886), 116–22.

32 Tuck (1978: 249).

33 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) External Proceedings, September 1885, nos

98–106 and January 1886, nos 432–7.

34 See Mukherjee (1988: 498–514).

35 IOL Records, Memo B., Book 3, Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in Burma,

1880–1885, 66.

36 See R. Churchill to Dufferin, 18 November 1885, Dufferin Papers, Correspondence

with Persons in England.

37 Martin (1970: 256).

38 See Mukherjee (1988: 561).

39 Churchill to Dufferin, 18 November 1885, Dufferin Papers, Correspondence with

Persons in England.

40 See Singhal (1959/1981: 104); Mukherjee (1988: 561).

41 See Salisbury to Sir W.A. White, Private, 24 September 1885, PRO, F.O. 364/8,

part 2. Also in Bourne (1970: 425–6).

42 Martel (1986a: 425–6).

43 Salisbury to White, 24 September 1885, in Bourne (1970: 425–6).

44 Quoted in Langer (1931/1950: 16).

45 Quoted in Bourne (1970: 146).

46 Salisbury to R. Churchill, cited in W.S. Churchill, vol. 2 (1906: 161).

47 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 192–3).

48 Morier, the ambassador at St Petersburg, to Salisbury, 18 August 1887, cited in

Greaves (1964: 110).

49 See ‘Correspondence respecting the movements of Russia in Central Asia and her

relations with Afghanistan from 1864 to 1881’, IOL, Political and Secret

Department, 8 February 1882; see also Greaves (1964: 103).

50 The Times, London, 6 May 1885, quoted in Greaves (1964: 105).

51 Brackenbury to Morier, 25 August 1891, Morier Papers, quoted in Martel (1986a:

70).

52 Salisbury’s ‘Message to Lord Rosebery on leaving the F.O.’, 18 August 1892, in

Bourne (1970: 432–3).

Notes 221

53 For the text see BDOW, vol. 8, no. 2.

54 As examples see Langer (1931/1950: 428); Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 264–5).

55 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 267).

56 See Parliamentary Papers, Egypt no. 8 (1887), nos 45, 50, 54.

57 See Farnie (1969: 335–6).

58 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 267).

59 See Langer (1931/1950: 434).

60 For the text see BDOW, vol. 8, no. 13.

61 For details see Langer (1931/1950: 434).

62 This was Salisbury’s favourite argument. He maintained that Britain’s popular and

parliamentary institutions made it impossible for the British government to give any

assurance, engagement, pledge or promise to go to war in the future. See C.

Howard (1967: 76–7).

63 Salisbury to the Queen, 10 February 1887, PRO, Cab. 41/20/31.

64 C.J. Lowe (1965: 39).

65 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 195).

66 C.J. Lowe, vol. 2 (1967: 114).

67 Salisbury to the Queen, 10 February 1887, Cab. 41/20/31.

68 Farnie (1969: 335).

69 As reported by the German ambassador in London to Bismarck, 20 September

1886, cited in Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 261).

70 Cited in Gooch (1974: 10).

71 Hamilton to Salisbury, 5 February 1888, cited in Lowe, vol. 1 (1967: 159).

72 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 15 March 1888, cols 1350–1.

73 See Marder (1940/1964: 141, 172–3).

74 See Hood Memorandum of July 1888, in C.J. Lowe, vol. 2 (1967: 81).

75 See Memorandum by H. Brackenbury (Intelligence Branch, War Office), 8 June

1888, PRO, Cab. 37/21/15 and memorandum by Hamilton, The Third Lord of

Admiralty, 16 June 1888, Cab. 37/21/17.

76 Memorandum by Salisbury, 29 June 1888, Cab. 37/21/18.

77 Quoted in Friedberg (1988: 147).

78 Marder (1940/1964: 105–6).

79 C.J. Lowe (1965: 197).

80 See Carroll (1931/1934: 140–2).

81 Friedberg (1988: 146).

82 On this see P.M. Kennedy (1980: 190–1, 196); Bourne (1970: 149).

83 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 192).

84 The Chancellor perhaps hoped to get British support in his clash with the United

States over Samoa, but London was even less keen on fighting the Americans than

the French. See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 196–7).

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., 196.

87 See Gorst and Johnson (1977: 3–5).

88 DMI Memorandum on Naval Policy, 13 October 1896, in Marder (1940/1964:

572, Appendix I).

89 British ambassador in London to Bismarck, 13 August 1886, cited in Robinson and

Gallagher (1961: 261).

90 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 254).

91 See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 184, 200).

92 Marder (1940/1964: 146).

93 Cited in Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 258).

94 For details see table, ibid., 276.

95 Cited in Cecil, vol. 4 (1932: 137–8).

222 Notes

96 For correspondence between Baring and Salisbury see F.O. 78/4243. Martel argues

that control of the Sudan was not a vital British interest while supremacy in Egypt

was. Martel (1986a: 20). Such distinction was not made by statesmen in 1890. For

them, control over Sudan was essential if they wanted to hold onto Egypt.

97 See above, pp. 73–4.

98 The complex struggle for power has been graphically described by Sanderson

(1965).

99 Ibid., pp. 94–5.

100 Its area is just 100 square kilometres.

101 Sanderson (1965: 292–5).

102 In terms of territory the British got 356,400 square miles (1000 ⫹ 110,300 ⫹

245,100). See Davis and Huttenback (1986: 27–8).

103 Fergusson to Salisbury, 4 July 1890, 28, cited in Robinson and Gallagher (1961:

299).

104 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., vol. 347, cols 769–961.

105 See P.M. Kennedy (1979: 171).

106 C.J. Lowe (1965: 11); Pearce and Stewart (1992: 142, 163).

107 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 191).

108 See Salisbury’s Memorandum for the Cabinet, 4 June 1892, PRO, Cab. 37/3/10.

Also in Bourne (1970: 429–32).

109 Salisbury to the Queen, 22 August 1891, Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd series, vol. II,

65.

5 Facing the Franco-Russian combine, 1892–8

1 Boisdeffre to Frecynet, 10 August 1892. Quoted in A.J.P. Taylor (1954/1971: 338).

2 Generally this is called the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, but sometimes the date

given is 1893. On 27 December 1893 Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, informed

the French government that the Tsar had given approval to the Military Convention

between them. The French sent their approval on 4 January 1894.

3 On this see C. Howard (1967: 43).

4 The Prince of Wales wrote to Rosebery on 11 August 1892: ‘There are many grave

questions…affecting our interests in India, Egypt and Morocco and it requires a

very watchful eye – to prevent Russia and France from harming us – and a thorough

knowledge of the subject which nobody possesses more than you do.’ Robinson and

Gallagher (1961: 321).

5 By this time Rosebery had emerged as the leader of the group that believed that

Britain should maintain the traditional free trade system and thus preserve the inde-

pendence of the money market on which Britain’s predominance depended. He

defined a ‘Liberal Imperialist’ as a person who was passionately attached to the

empire and intensely interested in the best means of sustaining and promoting it.

See Baumgart (1982: 166) and Martel (1986a: 15).

6 He formed a government composed of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. Of the

total of 670 seats, the Conservatives got 340 seats while the Liberal Unionists got 71

seats.

7 Steiner (1969: 23).

8 Hartington was made Duke of Devonshire in 1891.

9 Quoted in Martel (1986a: 221).

10 Quoted in P.M. Kennedy (1981: 105).

11 Quoted in B. Porter (1975: 127).

12 See PRO, Cab. 37/21/14, 15 and W.O. 106/48.

13 See Salisbury’s Memorandum, 4 June 1892, PRO, Cab. 37/31/10; also in Bourne

(1970: 429–32).

14 See Gillard (1967: 245).

Notes 223

15 See Martel (1986a: 257).

16 Preston (1977: 273).

17 J. Gooch (1974: 10–12).

18 Martel (1986a: 137).

19 This was stated by Salisbury in his Memorandum for the Cabinet, 4 June 1892,

PRO, Cab. 37/31/10.

20 Ibid.

21 See P.M. Kennedy (1979: 219) and Martel (1986a: 257).

22 Marder (1940/1964: 180–5).

23 Friedberg (1985: 155).

24 See Sumida (1989: 10–12).

25 On this see Martel (1984: 387–404), also C.J. Lowe (1965).

26 Martel emphasises repeatedly that this was Rosebery’s policy; see Martel (1986a: 82,

97, 157, 223–4, 259). But Rosebery was, in fact, continuing Salisbury’s policy. See

above, pp. 82, 98–9.

27 Martel (1991: 685).

28 P.M. Kennedy (1979: 171).

29 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 214–16).

30 See Cromer to Salisbury, 27 March 1896, Cromer Papers, PRO, F.O. 633/6. See

also P.M. Kennedy (1980: 222).

31 On this see Klein (1968: 119–39).

32 Satow Diary, 25 July 1893, quoted in Martel (1986a: 31). Satow was the leading

expert on Siamese affairs in the Foreign Office. See also Klein (1969: 125–6).

33 Colonial Office memorandum to Foreign Office, confdl, 22 June 1893, F.O.

17/1180.

34 On this issue see PRO, FO; Confdl Series, 422, Siam, vol. 36.

35 See, for example, Klein (1969: 127–8), Fieldhouse (1965: 229), Hall (1955/1994:

603).

36 Martel (1986a: 130–2).

37 This part of the conversation was not recorded officially. It is found in a letter

written by Rosebery to Dufferin. On this see Martel (1980: 296–7).

38 Ibid.

39 Martel (1986a: 134). Martel, however, adds that references to Egypt in this despatch

were removed.

40 On this issue see Klein (1969: 121–5).

41 Martel (1986a: 133).

42 Dufferin to Rosebery, 31 July and 9 August 1893, PRO, Cab. 37/34/42, 46. Frontier

skirmishes and negotiations, however, continued. On this see Klein (1969: 119–36).

43 See Tuck (1995). This forms one of the central contentions of this book.

44 On this, see the minute on ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and

Russia’, 10 August 1901, PRO, Cab. 48/1/6.

45 For example, see C.J. Lowe, vol. 1 (1967: 174).

46 Martel (1986a: 134).

47 Ibid.

48 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, September 1891, nos

280–319 and KW.

49 See Lansdowne to Kimberley, 5 October 1892, no. 48, Lansdowne Papers, Mss Eur.

D. 558/5. See also Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, November

1891, no. 207; August 1892, nos 65–149; October 1892, nos 144–72.

50 See note by Lansdowne, 6 May 1893, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier

Proceedings, August 1893, nos 6–34. Also Lansdowne to Kimberley, 6 June 1893,

Lansdowne Papers, Mss Eur. D. 558/5.

51 NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) External Proceedings, December 1891, nos

206–91.

224 Notes

52 Resistance of the Amir to British proposals is writ large in the correspondence that

can be seen in the proceedings of the Foreign Department of the government of

India relating to Afghanistan. For example Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier

Proceedings, December 1891, nos 206–91; October 1891, nos 1–35.

53 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Foreign Proceedings, July to December, vol.

VI, no. 15.

54 IOL, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures from India, vol. 62, 855–7.

55 Martel (1986a: 134).

56 Ibid., 69.

57 See Kimberley to Lansdowne, 26 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers, Mss Eur. D.

558/5. Hamilton Diary, 19 August 1892, cited in Martel (1986a: 72–3). Ripon was

Secretary of State for Colonies at that time.

58 Martel (1986a: 72).

59 NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier proceedings, October 1892, nos 144–72,

nos 144, 147, 150. See also Proceedings of April 1893, nos 69–71.

60 Rosebery to Howard, 24 August 1892, F.O. 65/1440, nos 154–6. Morier to

Rosebery, Private, 2 September 1892, quoted in Martel (1986: 74).

61 Ibid., 74–5.

62 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 5 October 1892, Lansdowne Papers, Mss Eur. D. 558/5.

63 Martel (1986a: 75).

64 See PRO, War Office, Diary for July 1892, F.O. 65/1441. See also NAI, Foreign

Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, September 1891, no. 109.

65 See memorandum on ‘The Present Position in Central Asia’ by H.M. Durand, 21

May 1887 and comments by Roberts on this, 13 June 1887, in NAI, Foreign

Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, October 1887, nos 286–91. Lansdowne

to Kimberley, 13 September 1892, Lansdowne Papers, Mss Eur. D. 558/5.

66 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, January 1894, nos

193–217.

67 Rosebery’s speech at Lord Mayor’s banquet on 9 November 1894, quoted in A.J.P.

Taylor (1954/1971: 354).

68 See George White to Elgin, 3 May 1895, White Papers, Mss Eur. F. 108/20.

69 For details see Kanomori (1968: 386–404) and Huttenback (1971: 126–44).

Salisbury’s government decided to retain control over Chitral. It was absorbed

directly into the Indian Empire when the North West Frontier Province was created

in 1901.

70 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, July 1895, nos 891–933

and May 1896, nos 1–24.

71 C. Howard (1967: 42–3).

72 See above, p. 5.

73 Kimberley to Rosebery, 6 April 1895, quoted in Martel (1986a: 242).

74 Rosebery’s memorandum, 30 July 1894; ibid., 217.

75 Kimberley to Rosebery, 18 May 1895; ibid., 250.

76 Rosebery’s memorandum, 30 July 1894; ibid., 247.

77 Salisbury to Lascelles, British ambassador at St Petersburg, 2 July 1895, cited in

Grenville (1964: 30).

78 Cited in K.M. Wilson (1987a: 15).

79 Grenville (1964: 29).

80 This could not be carried out because of one unexpected difficulty after another.

See telegram from Salisbury to Sir Philip Currie, 5 August 1895, F.O. 78/4627.

81 See K.M. Wilson, ‘Constantinople or Cairo: Lord Salisbury and the Partition of the

Ottoman Empire, 1886–97’, in K.M. Wilson (1987a: 9).

82 Ibid., 7.

83 Grenville (1964: 511–13).

84 On this see K.M. Wilson (1987a: 1).

Notes 225

85 Ibid., 3.

86 Grenville (1964: 24–5).

87 K.M. Wilson (1987a: 3–6).

88 Ibid.

89 Salisbury to the Queen, 19 February 1896, PRO, Cab. 41/23/20, 41.

90 Salisbury to Currie, 14 December 1895, cited in K.M. Wilson (1987a: 18).

91 Salisbury to Monson, 4 February 1896, BDOW, vol. 8, no. 1(f).

92 Salisbury to Currie, 18 February 1896, PRO, F.O. 407/136, quoted in K.M. Wilson

(1987a: 8).

93 For the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 see Grenville (1964: 89–95).

94 Martel (1986a: 89).

95 See telegram from Arthur Hardinge, the First Secretary at Cairo, to Rosebery,

confdl, 12 October 1892 and related correspondence in F.O. 78/4455.

96 Cited in C.J. Lowe, vol. 1 (1967: 171).

97 Martel says that he later regretted making this statement; Martel (1986a: 260). This

phrase was quoted often for it seemed to sum up the scramble for territory that typi-

fied the ‘new’ imperialism.

98 See Sir Philip Currie to Morier, 2 December 1892, Morier Papers, quoted in Martel

(1986a: 88).

99 Comment by Matthew, vol. 13 (1994: lxv).

100 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 326–30).

101 See G.M. Trevelyan (1937: 61).

102 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 326–30).

103 It is difficult to accept G.N. Sanderson’s argument that the British decision of 11–12

March was a move in Salisbury’s European diplomacy, a gesture to maintain

friendly relations with the Triple Alliance; Sanderson (1965: 242–52).

104 Telegram from Salisbury to Monson, 2 December 1895, F.O. 78/4884.

105 See Wilson (1987: 23–4).

106 Salisbury to Cromer, 13 March 1896, quoted in Robinson and Gallagher (1961:

348–9).

107 The French Foreign Minister had accepted the plan to send Major Marchand on a

‘peaceful’ mission to Fashoda in November 1895. He was able to leave only in June

1896. The decision at London was taken independently. See Grenville (1964:

107–8).

108 See F.O. 78/4761.

109 Salisbury to the Queen, 29 September 1896, PRO, Cab. 41/23/41.

110 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 358).

111 Memorandum on Naval Policy by the Director of Naval Intelligence, 28 October

1896, Marder (1940/1964: 578–80, Appendix 4).

112 See Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 355).

113 K.M. Wilson (1987a: 24).

114 He wrote to Queen Victoria’s Private Secretary, ‘Our only chance is to keep the

things quiet until our railway to Uganda is sufficiently far advanced to enable us to

send troops by it’, 5 December 1895, PRO, Cab. 41/22.

115 Sanderson (1965: 256).

116 See Beachey (1967: 237–54). Camels and bullocks for the expedition were acquired

from Bombay.

117 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1975: 92).

118 Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 367).

119 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 27 June 1898, vol. LX, cols 241–50.

120 Quoted in Grenville (1964: 122). On the Fashoda crisis see Bates (1984).

121 On this see Sanderson (1965: 350).

122 On this see Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1965: 93).

226 Notes

123 The settlement could be reached only by March 1899. It was only a matter of

recognising facts.

124 Amongst the politicians only Morley, and among the newspapers only the Manchester

Guardian, stood out against this general line of approval. Robinson and Gallagher

(1961: 377).

125 Cited in Sanderson (1965: 396).

126 See above, p. 74–5.

127 Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher (1961: 419).

128 See Cains and Hopkins (1993: 370–80).

129 Martel (1986a).

6 Seeking partnerships, 1898–1902

1 P.M. Kennedy (1988: 259).

2 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 231).

3 The decline of Britain has been one of the most debated issues in economic history.

Almost all agree that, though Britain’s power declined in relative terms, even in

1914 Britain was the pre-eminent Great Power. On this controversy see articles in

The International History Review, vol. 13, 1991.

4 The classic study of this period is Monger (1963); on this issue, see chapter 1. For a

comparatively recent study see Friedberg (1988).

5 They were Secretaries of State for Colonies, War and India respectively.

6 On this see Mahajan (1982: 168–92).

7 See Preston (1978: 254–80). Wolseley was Adjutant-General from 1885 to 1890 and

held the Irish Command from 1890 to 1895.

8 BDOW, vol. 5, no. 272; also see above, pp. 104–5.

9 Neilson (1991: 714).

10 See Memorandum by Brackenbury, 25 January 1887, PRO, Cab. 37/19/8.

11 See Military Report on the Trans-Caspian Railway, June 1887, PRO, F.O., 65/1321.

12 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, April 1901, nos 25–44.

13 Quoted in Hinsley (1977: 135) and P.M. Kennedy (1983: 50).

14 Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 6 July 1885, Russo-Indian

Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Selection of Documents 1999, no. 165.

15 Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 14 July 1888, ibid., no.

168.

16 See The Times of India, Bombay, 27 December 1890, ibid., no. 134. Also see nos

131–3.

17 Ibid., nos 169–74.

18 Ibid.

19 See Hamilton to Curzon, 2 November 1899, Curzon Papers, F. 111/158, no. 60.

Also Note by Altham, DAAG, Intelligence Division, 10 August 1901, para 42, PRO,

W.O. 106/48/E3/2.

20 See Memorandum by Balfour, 30 April 1903, PRO, Cab. 6/1/12D.

21 Salisbury to Northcote (Governor of Bombay), Private, 8 June 1900, cited in

Greaves (1959: 15–16).

22 Ibid.

23 Greaves (1959: 45).

24 See note on ‘Advantage to Russia of a Railway to Seistan’, 2 May 1904, PRO, Cab.

6/1/149D. See also note by Balfour, 24 November 1903, PRO, Cab. 38/3/73.

25 See Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 26 March

1903, PRO, Cab. 38/2/17.

26 Note on the ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia’ by

E.A. Altham, 10 August 1901, para 35, PRO, W.O. 106/48.

Notes 227

27 Papers laying down requirements for an army, 1 June 1891, Parliamentary Papers,

C. 607.

28 Barnett (1970: 334).

29 For deployment of the infantry battalions of the British regular army in 1899 see

Friedberg (1988: 277, Table 5.1).

30 P.M. Kennedy (1979: 102).

31 See Curzon Papers, IOL, Mss Eur. F. 111/285.

32 Preston (1978: 268).

33 Friedberg (1988: 234).

34 Despatch from the government of India, 26 April 1900, no. 58, PRO, CID Papers,

Cab. 38/1/7; BDOW, vol. 6, no. 465.

35 Despatch from the government of India, 20 September 1900, no. 137, PRO, CID

Papers, Cab. 38/1/7.

36 Memorandum by Altham, 10 August 1901, PRO, W.O. 106/48.

37 Report of the committee appointed to consider the military defence of India, 24

December 1901, PRO, Cab. 6/1/6D.

38 Memorandum by Balfour, 3 July 1903, PRO, Cab. 6/1/28D.

39 Monger (1963: 8–9).

40 See memorandum by Selborne, 17 January 1901, quoted in ibid., 11.

41 Friedberg (1988: 137).

42 Selborne to Curzon, 4 January 1903, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/229.

43 J. Gooch (1974: 22).

44 Friedberg (1988: 256).

45 Letter from the Treasury to the War Office, 3 November 1904, Arnold-Forster

Papers, BL, Add. Mss 50311, 185.

46 Despatch from the government of India, no. 18, 2 August 1902, CID Papers, Cab.

38/1/10.

47 Curzon to Hamilton, 24 September 1902, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/161, no.

82.

48 On this see Chandra (1966: 586–601).

49 Ibid.

50 Curzon to Hamilton, 7 May 1903, Mss Eur. F. 111/161, no. 30.

51 Wilkinson (1998: 99).

52 See note on ‘Successive Demands for Reinforcements by the Government of India’,

PRO, Cab. 6/3/91D.

53 Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Military Defence of India, 24

December 1901, PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/1/7.

54 Minute by E. Peach, 31 May 1901, W.O. 106/48/E3/2.

55 See W.O. 106/48/E3/2.

56 Letter from Balfour, 25 August 1904, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49728.

57 See Balfour to Lansdowne, 21 December 1903, ibid.

58 J. Gooch (1974: 181).

59 Memorandum by E.A. Altham, ‘Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France

and Russia’, 10 August 1901, para 10, W.O. 106/48/E3/2.

60 Minute by Curzon, 18 May 1898, PRO, F.O. 60/601.

61 See Monger (1963: 216).

62 See despatch from the government of India, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier

Proceedings, no. 86, 11 May 1899, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/287.

63 Curzon to Hamilton, 2 February 1899 and Abdur Rahman to Curzon, 4 April

1899, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/158, no. 34 and F. 111/287.

64 Memorandum to Salisbury, 6 February 1900, Appendix II to note on ‘Direct

Relations between Russia and Afghanistan’, IOL, Letters/Political &

Secret/10/125, no. 3082. Also see BDOW, vol. 4, no. 465.

228 Notes

65 Curzon to Hamilton, 25 February 1900, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/159, no.

10.

66 See despatch from the government of India, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier

Proceedings, no. 166, 1 September 1904, NAI, Foreign Department (Secret)

Frontier Proceedings, nos 233–71, nos 234 and 236. Also see Mahajan (1980:

175–92).

67 Before becoming governor-general, Curzon had published Persia and the Persian

Question and Russia in Central Asia. See also Steiner (1969: 237).

68 Foreign Policy Memorandum on British Policy in Persia, 31 October 1905, BDOW,

vol. 4, no. 321.

69 Quoted in Cain and Hopkins (1993: 415).

70 The King did not want to give Garter to a non-Christian. He agreed only when

Lansdowne threatened to resign. See Steiner (1969: 204, footnote on 236).

71 Hamilton to Curzon, 6 January 1903, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/162.

72 See Cain and Hopkins (1993: 411–15).

73 Balfour to Lansdowne, 6 September 1902, PRO, F.O. 60/657.

74 Hardinge to Grey, 23 December 1905, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 322.

75 For this see NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, March 1901,

no. 57.

76 This was the conclusion of the exhaustive War Office survey entitled ‘The Military

Resources of the Russian Empire’ prepared in 1907, PRO, W.O. 33/419.

77 McDermott (1979: 102).

78 Ibid.

79 Williamson (1969).

80 Quoted in Monger (1963: 16).

81 Ibid., 17.

82 Grenville (1964: 137).

83 Otte (1995: 1160); see also Grenville (1964: 143).

84 Grenville (1964: 131).

85 Salisbury to O’Connor, telegram, 17 January 1898, BDOW, vol. 1, no. 5.

86 Salisbury to O’Connor, 25 January 1898, ibid., no. 8.

87 See Grenville (1964: 142).

88 Balfour to the Queen, telegram, 26 March 1898, PRO, Cab. 41/42/34.

89 Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 5 April 1878, cited in Grenville (1964: 145).

90 Grenville (1964: 138–42).

91 Sanderson to Salisbury, 19 November 1897, Sanderson Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/2.

The China Association was the pressure group of British merchants engaged in

China trade.

92 Ibid.

93 See Grenville (1964: ch. 7).

94 Ibid., 170.

95 See Herwig (1991: 221–440). See also P.M. Kennedy (1980: 224–30, 424–5).

96 Chamberlain’s confidential memorandum ‘The South African Situation’, 6

September 1899, PRO, Confidential Papers Cab. 37/50/70, printed in Bourne

(1970: 460–1).

97 See note entitled ‘Russia: Increase in Military Force in Central Asia during the Boer

War’, 5 February 1900, PRO, 30/40/14/2.

98 Godley to Curzon, 28 February 1902, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/161, no. 22.

99 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 242).

100 Hamilton to Curzon, 9 February 1900, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/145.

101 Godley to Curzon, 8 February 1900, ibid.

102 See Grenville (1964: 354).

103 Lansdowne’s ‘very secret’ memorandum, 11 November 1901, Bourne (1970:

469–71).

Notes 229

104 Steiner (1969: 51).

105 The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 can be looked upon as a recognition that

Britain could no longer afford to count the United States among its potential

enemies and that it must concede naval as well as military supremacy on the

American continent to the United States.

106 Hamilton to Curzon, 25 May 1901, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/161, no. 33.

107 Same to same, 9 February 1900, ibid., F. 111/145.

108 Memorandum by Chamberlain, 10 February 1900, PRO, Cab. 37/53/65.

109 Ibid.

110 See P.M. Kennedy (1980: 243). The Germans were later able to insist that

Manchuria was not covered by this agreement. In fact, in the German diplomatic

documents, it is referred to as ‘the Yangtse Treaty’. See Grenville (1964: 318).

111 Cited in Monger (1963: 21).

112 See Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald reporting his conversation with

Hayashi, 19 March 1901 and MacDonald to Lansdowne, 22 March 1901 reporting

his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, BDOW, vol. 2, nos 60 and 61

respectively.

113 See BDOW, vol. 2, no. 99.

114 Balfour to Lansdowne, 12 December 1901, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49727.

Also Memorandum by F. Bertie, 11 March 1901, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 54.

115 See Monger (1963: 31–4).

116 Memorandum by Lansdowne, 25 October 1901, PRO, F.O. 17/1510 and

C.Hardinge to Lansdowne, 4 November 1901, F.O. 65/1623.

117 As reported by Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 March 1901, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 77.

118 Ibid.

119 Grenville (1964: 345).

120 Ibid., 351.

121 Hamilton to Curzon, 25 April 1901, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/146.

122 Memorandum by Salisbury on Anglo-German understanding, 29 May 1901,

BDOW, vol. 2, no. 86.

123 Salisbury to Curzon, 17 October 1900, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 111/70.

124 See Lansdowne to Whitehead (British Charge D’Affairs at Tokyo), 31 July 1901,

BDOW, vol. 2, no. 102.

125 See, for example, Lansdowne’s letter to Lascelles reporting his conversation with

Eckardstein, 18 March 1901, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 77. Copies of this letter were sent

to Salisbury, Balfour, Devonshire and Chamberlain.

126 Steiner (1969: 64).

127 ‘Balance of Naval Power in the Far East’, Memorandum by Selborne, 4 September

1901, PRO, Cab. 37/58/87.

128 See Grenville (1964: 412–14).

129 Monger (1963: 59).

130 Balfour to Lansdowne, 12 December 1901, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49727. See

also Mahajan (1982: 169).

131 Hamilton to Curzon, 13 February 1902, Curzon Papers, Ms Eur. F. 111/162.

132 See Nish (1966: 204–10).

133 Ibid., 181–2.

134 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 249).

135 Nish (1966: 163–74).

136 For drafts and the text of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement see BDOW, vol. 2, no.

125.

137 M. Howard (1967: 94).

138 Memorandum by Lansdowne, 11 November 1901, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 92. Also see

Lansdowne to Balfour, 12 December 1901, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mass 49727.

139 See Monger (1963: 47), also Martel (1991: 684).

230 Notes

140 Chamberlain (1988: 10, 162).

141 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 231).

142 BDOW, vol. 2, no. 92.

143 Ibid., no. 94.

144 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 186, 226).

145 Grenville (1964: 344).

146 Lansdowne to Lascelles, 18 March 1901, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 77; also Monger (1963:

48).

147 Quoted in Monger (1963: 23). See also Minute by William II, 7 April 1898, quoted

in A.J.P. Taylor (1954: 377).

7 Russia: a friend at last, 1902–7

1 For instance, Monger says that the most important event of Lansdowne’s period was

the estrangement from Germany; Monger (1963: 234). P.M. Kennedy describes the

period from 1902 to 1906 as ‘The Flowering of the Antagonism’; Kennedy (1980,

the title of chapter 14). See also Steiner (1977: 245).

2 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 267).

3 BDOW, vol. 2, nos 171, 180. For a summary of this affair see Monger (1963:

104–7).

4 Hamilton to Curzon, 31 December 1902, Hamilton Papers, C. 126/4.

5 Monger (1963: 107).

6 See memorandum by Lansdowne, 17 April 1903, PRO, F.O. 800/145.

7 See Francis (1973: 168–78).

8 Monger (1963: 121).

9 Friedberg (1988: 83).

10 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 251).

11 Quoted in Monger (1963: 69).

12 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 251).

13 Sir Eyre Crowe, who was to become a very influential Foreign Office official and

was later regarded as an extreme Germanophobe, was one of these. On this see

P.M. Kennedy (1980: 254).

14 McDermott (1979: 100).

15 In 1910 its composition was changed considerably. For details see d’Ombrian (1973:

Appendix I).

16 Johnson (1960). Also see d’Ombrian (1973: 169).

17 McDermott (1972: 169).

18 d’Ombrian (1973: 1).

19 On this see McDermott (1979: 115, n. 38).

20 Kitchen (1996: 3).

21 Minutes of the first meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 18 December

1902, PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/1/13.

22 See J. Gooch (1974: 203–4).

23 See PRO, Cab. 6/1/45D.

24 Minutes of 32nd meeting, 2 March 1904, PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/4/10.

25 Minutes of 33rd meeting, 4 March 1904, ibid., Cab. 38/4/12.

26 Minutes of 57th meeting, 16 November 1904, ibid., Cab. 38/6/117.

27 See telegram from Curzon, 4 January 1905, PRO, Cab. 6/3/91D.

28 War Office comments on ‘Memorandum’ by Curzon and Kitchener, 11 November

1903, PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/3/70.

29 Ibid. See also Cab. 38/1/12 and 38/2/22.

30 See Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India, PRO, Cab. 38/1/126.

31 Note on the Military Policy of India, 19 July 1905, Kitchener Papers, PRO, 30/57.

32 Ibid.

Notes 231

33 On this see Friedberg (1988: 256, 276).

34 Notes on Military Strategy in a War with France and Russia combined, 1905, PRO,

W.O. 106/48/E3/3, 87.

35 Memorandum on the Despatch of Reinforcements from U. K. to India, PRO, Cab.

6/1/15D.

36 See J. Gooch (1974: 182).

37 Explanatory notes on the Memorandum on the Defence of India, 10 March 1903,

PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/2/18.

38 Supplies in Afghanistan, ibid., Cab. 38/6/91.

39 Memorandum on the Provisional Report of the Committee on Indian Defence by

Curzon, 7 August 1903, ibid., Cab. 48/3/66.

40 Balfour to Curzon, 3 November 1904, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49733, 175–6.

41 Quoted in Neilson (1991: 714).

42 On this see Lambert (1995: 597).

43 See ‘Failed Schemes’ and ‘Approved Schemes’, Arnold-Forster Papers, BL, Add.

Mss 50301 and 50302.

44 See ‘Army Re-organization: Correspondence between the Prime Minister and the

Secretary of State for War’, PRO, Cab. 37/74/10.

45 For details see NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, May 1899,

nos 334–9 and May 1905, nos 448–557. See also Curzon to Hamilton, 18 February

1899, Hamilton Papers, Mss Eur. D. 510/2.

46 Curzon to Dane, 9 December 1904, NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier

Proceedings, January 1904, nos 34–136, 57. See also Balfour to Brodrick, 17

December 1903, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49720.

47 See NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) Frontier Proceedings, October 1904, nos

233–71 and May 1905, nos 1–141.

48 Note by Brodrick, 12 August 1905, Morley Papers, Mss Eur. D. 573/37.

49 See Hinsley (1977: 142–3).

50 Grey to Spring-Rice, 12 June 1907, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 421.

51 Despatch from the government of India to the Secretary of State for India, 8

January 1903, Parliamentary Papers, C. 1920 (1903), 155–6.

52 Balfour to the King, 19 February 1903, PRO, Cab. 41/28/2.

53 See Parliamentary Papers, C. 1920 (1903).

54 See Addy (1984: 95–99); Lamb (1960/1986: 225–32).

55 See report on this meeting by Balfour to the King, 19 February 1903, PRO, Cab.

41/48/2. See also Cab. 41/32/65.

56 Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, 10 May 1904, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 291.

57 Balfour to the King, 19 February 1903, PRO, Cab. 41/48/2.

58 Quoted in Mahajan (1982: 185).

59 Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, 7 November 1903, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 258.

60 Steiner (1969: 237).

61 Spring-Rice to Louis Mallet, 13 April 1904, Lansdowne Papers, PRO, F.O.

800/141.

62 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 278). For ‘for imperial defence considerations’ read ‘for the

defence of the Indian Empire’ – author.

63 Hamilton to Curzon, 6 January 1903, Hamilton Papers, Mss Eur. C. 126/5.

64 Sanderson (1965: 380).

65 Cromer Papers, PRO, F.O. 663/6. It contains many letters from Cromer on this

theme. Also see BDOW, vol. 2, ch. XV.

66 A treaty on these issues was signed on 14 October 1903. BDOW, vol. 2, nos 289 and

318.

67 Sir C. MacDonald to Lansdowne, 27 April 1903, BDOW, vol. 2, no. 226.

68 See Monger (1963: 127–9).

232 Notes

69 Selborne to Balfour, 21 December 1903, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49728. See

also Lansdowne to Monson, ambassador at Paris, 11 December 1903, BDOW, vol.

2, no. 259.

70 For text of the Anglo-French entente see BDOW, vol. 2, no. 417.

71 For opinions of Selborne, Lansdowne and Chamberlain see Selborne to

Lansdowne, 21 December 1903; Lansdowne to Balfour, 22 December 1903; and

Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 21 December 1903. All in Balfour Papers, BL, Add.

Mss 49728.

72 Quoted in Monger (1963: 149). Also see Nish (1985: 223–4).

73 Knollys to the King, 28 December 1903, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49683.

74 On this see Monger (1963: 148–52).

75 Knollys to Balfour, undated, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49683.

76 Balfour to Lansdowne, 31 December 1903, ibid., 49728.

77 Spring-Rice to Louis Mallet, 13 April 1904, Lansdowne Papers, F.O. 800/115.

78 See Monger (1963: 152–3).

79 Britain observed restraint on issues relating to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the question

of contraband and the volunteer fleet. See Neilson (1989: 63–87).

80 See Monger (1963: 172–5).

81 See Neilson (1989: 67).

82 Balfour to Curzon, 3 November 1904, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49738.

83 See BDOW, vol. 4, Editors’ Note, p. 11 and ch. 5.

84 Ian Nish states that there were abundant reasons why Britain did not support

Roosevelt, but he does not go into the question; Nish (1966: 297).

85 Brodrick to Ampthill, 17 March 1905, Ampthill Papers, Mss Eur. E. 233.

86 Balfour to Lansdowne, 24 January 1905, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49729.

87 For the views of the government of India see Report of the Sub-Committee on the

Military Requirements of the Empire, 1 May 1907, PRO, CID, Cab. 38/13/20. For

the opinions of Hardinge and MacDonald see BDOW, vol. 4, nos 26 and 117

respectively.

88 Minutes of the 70th meeting, 12 April 1905, PRO, Cab. 38/9/32.

89 Memorandum by C.L. Ottley, 8 April 1904, PRO, Cab. 17/67.

90 ‘Note on Future Relations of Great Britain and Japan’, 4 May 1905, Sydenham

Papers, BL, Add. Mss 50836.

91 Both Monger and Nish agree on this. Monger (1963: 193); Nish (1966: 312).

92 Balfour to Lansdowne, 30 June 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49729.

93 See K.M. Wilson (1992: 336).

94 See D.E. Kaiser (1983: 442).

95 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 275–8).

96 Steiner (1977: 39).

97 See Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49711.

98 For details see Monger (1963: 266–80).

99 See Marder (1979: 81–2).

100 On this see McDermott (1979: 109–11).

101 See Minutes of the 77th meeting of the CID, 26 July 1905, PRO, Cab. 38/9/65.

102 See Clarke to Balfour, 17 August and 17 September 1905, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss

49702.

103 McDermott (1979: 109).

104 See the paper entitled ‘Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium during a Franco-

German War’, 29 September 1905, PRO, CID Papers, Cab. 38/10/73.

105 For a full discussion of this issue see Monger (1963: 236–56).

106 Clarke to Balfour, 14 October 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Mss 49702.

107 See K.M. Wilson (1981: 34).

108 Grey to Knollys, 28 March 106, Grey Papers, F.O. 800/103.

109 Klein (1971: 127).

Notes 233

110 See Nicolson to Grey, 29 May 1906, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 221.

111 Memorandum by Baron Nish for the Anglo-Japanese Conference, 29 May 1907,

W.O. 106/48, 268–70.

112 Nish (1966: 300–09).

113 See Conclusions of the Anglo-Japanese Conference, 6 June 1907, W.O. 106/48.

114 Quoted in K.M. Wilson (1992: 353).

115 Kitchen (1996: 15).

116 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire, 1 May

1907, PRO, CID Cab. 38/13/20.

117 Morley to Minto, 19 September 1907, Morley Papers, Mss Eur. D. 573/2. See also

Morley to Campbell-Bannerman, 6 January 1907, Cab. 38/13/20.

118 War Office, ‘The Military Resources of the Russian Empire’, 1907, PRO, W.O.

33/419, p. 295.

119 Morley to Minto, 9 March 1906 and 31 May 1907, Morley Papers, D. 573/1, 2.

120 Quoted in K.M. Wilson (1981: 36).

121 Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 26 January 1906, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 208.

122 Nicolson to Grey, 19 February 1907, IOL, Letters/Political and Secret/10/125.

123 J. Gooch (1974: 237).

124 Nicolson to Grey, 20 March 1937, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 256.

125 Quoted in K.M. Wilson (1981: 36).

126 NAI, Foreign Department (Secret) External Proceedings, May 1913, nos 261–502.

127 For the text of the Treaty see BDOW, vol. 4, Appendix I, 618–20.

128 See Foreign Office memorandum respecting the Anglo-Russian Convention, 29

January 1908, BDOW, vol. 4, no. 549.

129 BDOW, vol. 4, Appendix I, 618–19.

130 Ibid.

131 Hinsley (1977: 146).

132 A declaration to this effect was published in the Convention. BDOW, vol. 4, no. 455.

133 See Kent (1984: 82); also see Neilson (1989).

134 See Kent (1977: 156).

135 Monger (1963: 234).

136 Ibid., 293.

137 Steiner (1977: 82).

138 Monger (1963: 330).

139 Ibid., 234.

140 Ibid., 233.

141 Memorandum by Grey, 20 February 1906, BDOW, vol. 3, no. 299.

142 K.M. Wilson (1981: 37).

143 Quoted in K.M. Wilson (1987a: 150).

144 Grey, vol. 1 (1925: 165–6).

8 Nurturing the entente, 1907–14

1 This forms the main theme in the treatises of Steiner (1977) and P.M. Kennedy

(1980).

2 J. Gooch (1974: 165); Gillard (1977: 176); also P.M. Kennedy (1980: 441–2); Steiner

(1977: 82).

3 Cited in Herwig (1991: 275).

4 K.M. Wilson (1987b: 188). See also p. 185.

5 See Harcourt to Grey, 8, 9, 14 January 1914, Grey Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/91.

6 Nicolson to O’Beirne, 9 and 22 November 1910, Nicolson Papers, PRO, F.O.

800/344. See also K.M. Wilson (1987b: 192).

7 Grey to Hardinge, 28 January 1912, Hardinge Papers, vol. 92; Grey to Buchanan,

20 February 1912, Grey Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/74.

234 Notes

8 Grey to Hardinge, 28 January 1912, Hardinge Papers, vol. 92. Also BDOW, vol. 6,

no. 425.

9 For example, see Spring-Rice to Grey, 16 July 1907 and notes by Grey and

Hardinge on this, PRO, F.O. 371/26042; Grey to Nicolson, 5 October 1908,

BDOW, vol. 5, no. 301; Note by Grey on Kerr to Grey, 30 March 1911, Grey

Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/108; Nicolson to Buchanan, 22 October 1912, Carnock

Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/359.

10 Steiner (1977: 82).

11 K.M. Wilson (1981: 26).

12 See Grey to Goschen, 16 December 1910, BDOW, vol. 6, no. 425.

13 Nicolson to Townley, 7 April 1914, Nicolson Papers, PRO, F.O. 800/365.

14 Cited in French (1986: 3).

15 For reaction to the dreadnought revolution in Germany, see Herwig (1991: 221–40).

16 Monger (1963: 267).

17 Grey to Bertie, 26 August 1908, vol. 6, no. 120.

18 Minute by Grey on Bertie to Grey, 22 November 1907, BDOW, vol. 6, no. 73.

19 Marder, vol. 1 (1961: 182–5, 283). However, this was made public only in 1912.

20 For opposition from the political left see Semmel (1986), also P.M. Kennedy (1980:

454–55).

21 Quoted in Marder , vol. 1 (1961: 151).

22 See K.M. Wilson (1985: 7).

23 Neilson (1991: 696–725).

24 Steiner (1977: 98–9).

25 See Neilson (1991: 704–5).

26 On this see Sweet and Langhorne (1977: 245).

27 Hardinge to Goschen, 7 April 1908, Hardinge Papers, vol. 13.

28 On this issue see Anderson (1966: 279–83).

29 Hardinge to Nicolson, 13 October 1908, BDOW, vol. 5, no. 372.

30 Ibid. See also nos 338, 349.

31 See Grey to Riffat Pasha, 10 February 1909, BDOW, vol. 6, no. 269; vol. 5,

Appendix III. See also PRO, F.O. 371/733.

32 Quoted in Heller (1983: 21). See also minute by Grey, 7 August 1908, PRO, F.O.

371/545.

33 See Steiner (1977: 89).

34 Grey to Nicolson, 10 November 1908, BDOW, vol. 5, no. 441. Also Hardinge to

Nicolson, 1 November 1908, Hardinge Papers, vol. 13.

35 Grey to F. Cartwright, Ambassador at Vienna, 1 May 1909, BDOW, vol. 9(2), no.

926. See also no. 626.

36 Grey to Nicolson, 10 November 1908, BDOW, vol. 5, no. 441.

37 Ibid.

38 Steiner (1977: 52); P.M. Kennedy (1980: 446).

39 Quoted in K.M. Wilson (1985: 79). See also BDOW, vol. 10(1), no. 914.

40 P.M. Kennedy (1980: 448).

41 Asquith to the King, 19 July 1911, PRO, Cab. 41/33/22. See also Bertie to Grey, 18

July 1911, BDOW, vol. 7, no. 392.

42 Hinsley (1977: 278).

43 See Grey to Goschen, 27 September 1911, appended by editors to Goschen to

Nicolson, 22 September 1911, BDOW, vol. 7, no. 564. See also Memorandum by

Grey, 20 February 1906, BDOW, vol. 3, no. 299.

44 See Minutes of 114th Meeting: Action to be taken in the event of intervention in a

European War, 23 August 1911, PRO, CID, Cab. 38/19/49.

45 On this see S.R. Williamson (1969: ch. 6).

46 K.M. Wilson (1987b: 181).

Notes 235

47 On this issue see K.M. Wilson, ‘The Opposition and Crisis in the Liberal Cabinet

over Foreign Policy of November 1911’, in Wilson (1987b: 110–25).

48 Diary of Lord Haldane’s visit to Berlin, 9 February 1912, BDOW, vol. 6, no. 506.